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Tffls History of the Operations in Somaliknd, 1001 -04, has 
been compiled in the Department of the Chief of the General 
StafE from information obtained from all ava,ilabl6 official 
despatches and reports, and from unofficial diaries and de- 
scriptions of various incidents furnished by officers who took 
part in the several expeditions. 

The first and second expeditions during 1901-02, were 
under the command of Lieut. -Colonel E. J. E. Swayne, Indian 
Army, and were controlled by the Foreign Office ; the third 
and fourth expeditions during 1902-04, were under the com- 
mand of Brig.-General Sit W. H. Manning, Inspector-General, 
King's African Rifles, and Lieut, -General Sir C. C. Egerton, 
K.C.B., Indian Army, respectively, and were controlled by the 
War Office. The forces under Lieut. -Colonel Swayne consisted 
almost entirely of locally raised levies, while those engaged 
in the third and fourth expeditions were principally drawn 
from the native army in India, and from East, Central and 
South Africa. 

With respect to the two latter expeditions, the compilation 
of the work has been rendered easy by the many excellent and 
clear reports and diaries which were kept and furnished by 
officers ; but, aa regards the former expeditions, considerable 
difficulty has been met with owing to the general lack of 
official records. 

While endeavouring to confine the contents of the work to 
reasonable dimensions, the aim has been to produce a military 
history which may not only be a reliable record of events, but 
abo an interesting and instructive study tor all ranks of all 
the important work undertaken by units, services and de- 
partments, in connection with the conduct, organization, and 
administration of one of the so-called " small " but difficult 
and harassing wars in an uncivilised and comparatively 
unknown coimtry, which the Army (sometimes, as in this case, 
in co-operation with the Navy), is so often caUed upon to 

SOMAITLAM), 1901-1904. 


General DESCBiPnos of the Coontiiy. — Peinoipal 
Harbours and Ports.— Native Settlements. —Over- 
sea AND Inland Communications. — Land and Water 
Transport. — Climate.^Trade in Arms. — ^Food Sup- 
plies, — Fuel. — ^Water. — British Trihes. — ^Disposition 
OF THE Tribes during the Operations. — Internal 
Administration of the Country. 

SoMALiLAND occupies that portion of North-East Africa, Area and 
known as the " Horn of Africa," wliicili liea betvreen the 
Equator and the 1 1th degree of north latitude, and is bounded 
on the north by the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, on the east 
by the Indian Ocean, and on the west and south-west by 
I Abyssinia and the British East Africa Protectorate, 

The whole of the above area covers some 320,000 square 
miles, and is partitioned into spheres of influence amongst 
France, Great Britain, Italy and Abyssinia. 

The British Protectorate occupies the north -central Britirii 
portion of the " Horn of Africa," and its area, with aji average ^'^^^•■'^' 
length of some 300 miles, and a depth inland of 70 miles in 
the west, 150 to 200 in the centre, and 150 in the east, is esti- 
mated to contain 58,000 square miles, and to have a popula- 
tion of 246,000 (1899), comprising the following Somali 
tribes ;— Isa, Gadabursi, Habr Awal, Habr Qerhajis, Habr 
Toljaala, Dolbabanta and Warsangh. 

• See Map I. 

As regards its physical geograpliy Somaliland may be 
divided into three distinct tracts of country ; — 

1. The fringe of maritime plain between the mountains and 
the sea. 

2. The maritime mountains running paiallel almost to the 
coast, and often intersected by ioland plains. 

3. The raised plateaux to the south, with 8ubsi<Mary hills 
linuig the water drainage. 

The maritime plain, a strip of arid coast, extends from 
Obok in French Somaliland through British SomaUland, 
where it attains its maximum width of 60 nules, to Gape 
Gardafui, near which it narrows to some 200 yards. Thence 
it widens as it goes south, until it merges in the Mogdishu 
Plain. Close to the sea it forms sand-dunes, which bed up 
the drainage. 

The mountainous region consists of a mass of mountains 
fo rmin g parallel ridgea and isolated peaks, connected by 
raised plateaux and low-lying interior valleys, all intersected 
by ti'igs or dry watercourses. 

The raised plateaux are separated by a lofty seaward 
scarp, some 6,000 feet high, from the lower mountains of the 
maritime range, and form inland a series of gently sloping 
terraj^es which fall abruptly to the main line of drauiage, 
[ the Webi Shebeli, and then rise and fall to the Juba, 

b'ttiimgu. There are, in Somahland, three main lines of drainage 


(!) That of the maritime ranges and seaward slope of the 
main plateau. 

(2) That of the inner slope of the latter. 

(3) That of the Harrar Highlands. 

1. From Zeila to Cape Gardafui a succession of tugs or 
watercourses drains the raised plains of the western, and the 
mountainous regions of the central and easteru jjortiona. 

Their general direction is from south to north, and conse- 
qaently their courses are so limited that all are of a torrential 

nature. Rising generally in the main plateau, tUey fluw 
after rain, in bioad sandy beds with alluvial banks through 
the inland plains, and in narrow boulder-atrewn channels 
through the maritime ranges into the maritime plain, where 
their waters are absorbed in the sand-dunes that line the 

Of these tiigs the most important is the Issi'itugan in the 
west, which rises in the neighbourhood of Hargeisa. Running 
northwards down to Jalelo, it forces a way through the sub- 
hills with a detour eastward beyond Aleyalale to Hedi- 
gale, and gradually widening beyond So Midgan, where it 
drops sheer down 40 feet, enters the maritime plain near 
Grerigoan Hill, losing itself eventually in various beds east of 
Bulhar. When rain falls it is a roaring torrent ; at other 
times there is in places a tiny rivulet in the centre^ sinking 
out of sight and reappearing at intervals. The sand of the 
bed is saturated with water forming awkward quicksands. 

The maritime range of the east coast is drained in the same 
way by a number of tugs or watercourses, which occur at 
increasing intervals from north to south, as the hills ^minlsh 
in height. 

2. The drunage from the inner slope of the main plateau 
either finds its way into the plains — where it is dispersed and 
is then evaporated or sinks underground — or else is canied off 
in a south-easterly direction by the tug Darror and the 
tiig Der. The latter in its upper course receives a 
few insignificant af&uents, and afterwards little water 
from the northern slopes and still less from the Hand on 
the south, while the Darror has apparently no tributaries 
beyond those which, coming from the Warsangli and El 
Maekad Mountains, join it near its source. 

3. It is, however, only from the Harrar Highlands that 
rivers of any importance rise. The most northern of these 
is the Fafan, which, Uke its tributary the Jerer, forms stagnant 
poob in the dry season, but in the rains it causes extensive 
floods, especially about Faf. 


Both it and the Webi Shebeli, which always has running 
water, lose themselvea in extensive marshes before reaching the 
sea, the former south-east of Faf, the latter not far from the 
mouth of the Juba. 

The latter river ia the only navigable one in Somaliland, but 
I navigation ceases at Bardera ; its source is in the Abyssinian 

British Somaliland consists of the following areas, each of 
which has distinctive physical features : — 

(a) A semi-desert country — valuable only for its ports 
and the grazing which it afEords to sheep and goats — comprises, 
under the collective name of Guban, in the west, the maritime 
plain and ridges, and extends inland for an average of 35 miles 
in the west and under 2 miles in the east ; 

(6) Qolis, the wooded northern crest, some 6 miles broad, of 
the western and central portion of the interior plateau, 
amalgamates east of Berbera with the maritime mountains, 
but in the WarsangH country again separates from them ; 

(e) Ogo-Gvban, the country from Hargeisa westwards 
which intervenes between Guban and the crest, and partakes 
in its nature of both Ogo and Guban ; 

(d) Ogo, the southern slope of the northern crest behind 
Guban, consists of a strip from 10 to 30 miles in width 
of grassy downs or thorn-covered wilderness ; its counterpart 
in the east is the Waraangh Plateau ; 

(e) The Darror Valley, somewhat similar to the central 
I portion of the Nogal ; 

(/) The Nogal, with good pasturages in its upper and 
, and sandy or stony plains, as a rule, in its central portion ; 
. and 

{g) The Haud, a belt of thorn wildernesses and pasturages 
(waterless in Jilal), runs, with a breadth of 150 to 250 miles, 
from the neighbourhood of Jig-Jiga in a direction somewhat 
south of east to the maritime ridges of Italian Somaliland, 
and separates Ogaden and the Harrar Highlands from Ogo, 
Guban and the Noga! Plateau on the north. 


The following aection on the line Berbera-Bihendula-GoUs 
shows most of the above sub-divisions, as well as the general 
geological structure of British Somaliland. 

JVAritimePlAin /fAritime Ranges Jnland Plain. Sont&ti PtAtcau 
■"■■: JllluyUim :::^limestone(^DubKT VV BathanctJi limssZona 
lllll C/Ufrfs <^nd limestones orthsQoLia ^ 

%?,o /fecit f^r/Ue 3&nci:-lcnES 'iW Arcfteecx-n. Hot-Ks. 

( rAjBdeited line from Mirsolxithe HAudia th£ Level oftheS/teiKh Pass 

»e, Decoda IV., 

(a) Gabon. — (i) The Marithne Plain. The maritime plain 
stretches inhind from Zeila for a distance of 60 miles, but soon 
narrows to 30 miles south of Harag Jid, and to but 3 miles at a 
distance of 8 miles east of Bulhai. Behind that town it again 
opens out into a semi-circle of some 14 miles radius, hut again 
narrows to some 7 miles behind Berbera, whence it gradually 
diminishes to 1 nule at a point 20 miles east of Berbera. 
Thence to the Italian frontier It varies in breadth from 200 
yards to 2 miles. 

The Zeila Plain consists of a desert of smooth saud, stretch- 
ing inland for 1 or 2 miles, where a strip of evergreen bushes 
separates it from a great open grass plain which stretches 
to the foot of the Bur Ad Range, 

At Bulhar the plain is covered with a dense bush, and 
between that town and Zeila is studded with holeSj of brackish 
but drinkable water, which renders travelling on horseback 
somewhat dangerous. 

At Beibeia the plain is a bushless strip of white pebbles 
for 1 or 2 miles inland, when it becomes sandy, and is clad with 

I tb 

^^^ CO 


kkansa 3 £eet high, and witli scattered thora bushes 9 feet 
higher, It slopes gradually to a height of 300 to 400 feet at 
7 to 10 miles from the coast, where the maritime range rises 
suddenly from it. 

East of Berbera it is generally level and sandy, and is 
occasionally intersected by ravines, in whose sandy beds water 
can be found throughout the year, either in pools or by digging. 
In the Warsangli country, however, it is diversified by low 
Band Tiillw and rocky pointe, and more rarely by rocky plateaux. 
The vegetation is scanty, and consists of salsolacious plants, 
stunted arman, acacia and other thorn bushes. 

(ii) The Maritime Ranges. The north-western frontier of 
British SomaHland is marked by a ridge of hills, running in a 
S,8.W. direction. The maritime mountains proper rise in the 
south-eastern corner of the Zeila Plain, and at first form a 
confused mass of table-topped plateaux of black trap rock with 
precipices 30 feet deep, continued by steep slopes of dihris for 
some 300 feet down to the river beds, which intersect them. 
Strewn with boulders or jagged and rounded rocks, with tufts of 
feathery grass in the crevices, and covered with an open jungle 
of khanaa bush, these plateaux are very trying to camels, and 
still more so to horses. They stretch from Ogo almost down 
to the sea at Bulbar, increase in height east of that town, 
and break up into a number of parallel limestone ranges, 
which vary in height from 1,500 feet in the outer to 4,500 feet 
in the inner mountains. The aspect of these maritime ranges 
is very forbidding ; bare precipices, flanking deep and narrow 
river gorges, alternate with rounded shoulders, on whose gravel 
surface only a low scrub can thrive. Within the ranges, and 
between them and the Golis, are undulating interior plains, 
intersected by broad sand-rivers, winding through alluvial 
banks and thick jungle of guda-thorntreeB,or by torrent beds, 
choked with boulders and dense undergrowth of reeds and 
thorns. Between the rivers are occasional stretches of 
coarse grass, but, as a rule, the intervening watersheds are 
stony and gravelly, and are studded with low mimosa. 


Eastward of Berhora the maritime ranges mergt into one 
another, and then combine with the northern crest of the 
interior plateau to form an irreguhir range of Umestone liilla, 
145 milea long, which limits the plain to a breadth varying 
from 200 yards to 2 milea. 

Near the sea these hills are but 400 to 1,000 feet high, but 
at 10 to 15 miles inland culminate in a broken crest 3,000 to 
4,000 feet high, which forma the northern edge of the Northern 
Hand. Prom the western frontier of the Warsangli country 
the formation again changes, and the three distinct levels of the 
plain, maritime ranges and Golis again appear. The maritime 
hills, brown and sterile, sometimes of basalt or volcanic 
formation, form low broken ranges from 700 to 1,500 feet in 
height, cut by mmieroua rocky ravines. 

(6) and (c) Golis and Ogo-Qviban. — The northern crest of the 
interior plateau runs first in a south-south-easterly and then 
I an easterly direction to HargcLsa, whence it strikes in a 
torth -easterly direction, under the names of the Assa and 
lolis ranges. It is then broken by the Huguf Plain and 
afterwards runs slightly north of east to the Italian frontier. 

From the N.W. comer of the interior plat-eau, 2,000 feet, 
the crest rises rapidly to 4,S00 feet, and to fl,500 feet some 
~B0 miles further south. It runs generally within 500 feet of 

i level to the Dubburo Mountain, west of Hargeisa. To 
^e north it descends in terraces to the plateaux that form the 
western portion of the maritime mountains, and it falls 
similarly from Dubburo to Hargeisa, and to the country north 
mI that town. These terraces form the tracts known as Ogo- 
t, where precipices of 200 to 300 feet separate cedar-clad 
lateaux from narrow valleys of jungle, caves and mosa-grown 
Here luxuriant pasturages have sprung up in the 
rich soil, a black vegetable mould. 

From the Ogo-Guban of Hargeisa the crest rises gradually 
through the Aasa, 3,000 to 4,500 feet, to the Gohs range, 5,900 
to 6,900 feet. To the north these ranges descend abruptly, 
forming, as it were, a gigantic step, up which lead the Jirato 

and Sheikh passes, steep and toilsome, though improved 
in recent years. 

A remarkable feature in the northern slope of Gohs ia a 
ledge of broken ground, a mile or two wide, known as Mirso 
or the " Haven." This ledge runs some 1,000 feet below the 
crest of Qolis for 20 to 30 miles east of the Jirato Pass ; 
although covered with jungle, and having a shallow and stony 
soil, it is a favourite pasture of the Habr Awal and Habr 

At about 45° 40' E. the Golis range descends in broken 
terraces to the narrow Huguf Plain, beyond which the northern 
crest of the interior plateau merges into the maritime range 
already described. But eastwards of the latter Golia reappears 
in the lofty Warsangh Mountains, which, rising in precipitous 
steps of 800 to 1,000 feet from the west, north and east, run 
for some 170 miles, parallel to, and at a distance of 10 to 20 miles 
from, the coaat, tlirough the whole of the Warsangli country. 
At Pyramid Peak, in the extreme west, this range ia 5,170 feet 
high, then in the next 11 miles rises to 7,150 feet at Jebel 
Sarut, and thence for over half its length forms a uniform 
ridge 6,000 to 7,000 feet above the sea, and finally descends 
into the Dagan Valley. 

Dense jungle, vegetation, and a little grass distinguish the 
slopes of these ranges from the sterile maritime hiUs below, 
while higher up gum, myrrh and frankincense trees, and a 
variety of the aloe, abound. They are said to have an in- 
vigorating climate, and water is plentiful in rocky pools. 

{d) Ogo. — Ogo b the resort of the Gadabursi, Habr Awal, 
and Habr Gerhajis during Jilal, or the dry season, when water 
and grass fail in the Haud and Guban below. The com- 
parative equability of the climate and the presence of water at 
all times have, also, led to the establishment of some permanent 
settlements around which jowari cultivation has sprung up. 
The vegetation is more varied than elsewhere, for with the 
thorn jungles and grasses of the Haud are nungled the cedars of 
Golis, and the giant euphorbia or hassadan. The most impor- 

tant of the plains of Ogo are : the Daba-Debba Valley in the 

west ; the Seyla Baa south-east of Hargeisa, where grass and 
thorn jungle intermingle ; the Shilmale and Daldawan plains 
and Khansa Bush, south of Silt, with water in pools at moat 
seasons, and excellent pasturage of short dihe grass ; the 
Gralgudan, Sanak and Arori Plains, south of Sheikh, all with 
excellent pasture, and the first two watered by the tiig Der ; 
the Harakatis and Negegr plateaux, the latter somewhat 
deficient in water, and both combining thorn jungle with 
pasturage ; and the green forest which surrounds all but the 
northern sides of Habrji Peak to a depth of 7 to 8 miles. Hero 
^ife may be noted water could probably be accumulated by 
jamming the river which loses itself in the plains. 

Behind the Warsangli Mountains is a somewhat similar 
mtry, the Warsangli Plateau, which descends from the main 
rest, a height of fi.OOO to 7,000 feet, by successive terraces 
"with gentle slopes, for some 3,000 feet, to the Nogal Plateau 
on the west and the Darror Valley on the east. Luxuriant 
pasturages, the resorts of the nomad Warsangli, and dense 
jungle are found mingled with thorn wildernesses on the 
plateaux just as in Ogo. 

(e) The Darror Valley. (Including portion in Italian Somali- 
Bid). — The Darror Valley extends, for a distance of some 
) miles from the foot of Mount Hadaftimo, almost due east 
I the south Bay of Hafun. It is broad and well defined, 
ing bounded by the Kurkar Range on the south, which rises 
me 500 feet and separates it from the Northern Hand, and by 
e Warsangh Range on the north. The width of the valley 
ries from 50 miles at 49° E. to 10 miles about 50° E. 
1 marked dry torrent, the ti'ig Darror, into which a 
mber of dry, rocky ravines run, traverses the valley. Al- 
1 after rains a volume of turbid water rushes down the 
i and floocU the surrounding country, yet at ordinary times 
is no water except in the last 50 miles. In this portion 
e tiig long shallow pools or reaches are to be found in 
laces throughout the year; some 10 miles from the mouth 


(here is raiuiing water, whioli then disappears in a mangrove*; 
covered mud flat. The valley and surrounding range 
generally very arid, but amongst and around the clay and 
gypsum hills, some 3,000 feet above aea ievel, which vary tha 
upper portion, extensive pasturages are found. The bed of. 
the stream from 50 to 10 miles from it« mouth, which is 
never less than 700 yards wide, and is shut in by precipitouft 
banks, 50 to 200 feet high, is covered with a vivid greea 
vegetation of tall trees, date and doum palms, and presents 
striking contrast to the brown, sterile, undulating plains and 
hills above. But no effort is made to cultivate anything but' 
the date palm ; even the alluvial hanks at the mouth of the' 
stream bear only palms, acacias and salvodora. 

(/) The Nogal Piam.— The Nogal Plain is formed by th* 
junction of two main affluents, the northernmost rising' 
from the Gohs Range, and the southernmost from tJ 
southern slopes of the Bur Dab and similar short limestoi 
ranges, which separate the two streams. These ranges a 
comparatively well watered, but produce httle except gaxi 
bushes and pasturage ; cut up by rocky passes and nullahfl 
they render marching difficult even for camels ; otherwiBO 
being easily turned, they present no tactical difficulties. 

The pasturage is good in the rains, but in the dry seasoi^ 
the grass dries up, and camel grazing can he obtained only on; 
the airman bush of the neighbouring Haud. 

The first affluent, the tug Der, has water running in it on^ 
after rain and as far as Burao, and flows through a levdl 
plain, grassy on the left bank, and with open desert and 
jungle on the right bank. Below Burao the Der spread) 
over an open level plain of excellent pasturage, and is lost» 
Below Ber the plain is open, intersected by numerous nullahe, 
and generally covered with good grazing. The latter continues 
to 47° E., where the plain becomes arid and so continues 
beyond Jidbah. North and south of both affluents and of 
the main stream an abrupt range of hills rises at distances of 
8 to 10 miles to the level of the Haud, some 500 to 1,00Q| 


These hilla ara aocesBible to camels only by the rocky 
passes, whicli occur to the south at intervals oE 4 to 5 miles. 
Numerous nullahs intersect the Nogiil Plain, and are full, 
during the rains, of excellent water, which can be found in 
many shady pools for some months of the dry season, as well 
as in the permanent wella of Wadamago, Odergoeh, Las 
Elberdali, Beretabli, Kallis and of other places. The trees 
and bushes found in the Nogal Plain are never very thick ; 
east of the Shilemadu Hills are groves of figs and dates. 

At 30 miles east of Jidbali, the plain, under the name of 
Dudi, affords excellent pasturage and is more populous, but 
at 48° E. it is again arid, stony and sandy. At 49° E. it is 
narrowed to a width of about a mile by the northern range 
closing on the southern ; here green jungles extend from the 
sandy river bed up the sides of the hiUs. At Garserio (49° 
E.), where the name is changed to the Dun, the river appears 
to bold running water at all seasons. Curving then in a 
southerly direction, the Dun below Daga Dalola receives its 
first tributary. After this it turns west and south-west and 
flows in a narrow gorge towards the Indian Ocean, until at 
some 1.5 miles from the sea, it breaks up into two or throe 
channels, which, too, nin through narrow gorges. The 
northernmost, the Uabbe, is sand-barred, as too is the main 
central channel, the Ail or Eildun, during the dry season, but 
the latter occasionally flows through or over the bar after 
heavy rains. Six and a half miles further south, and 4^ 
miles north of lUig, is the Gallule, which, according to native 
report, is the southernmost channel of the Dun. Fresh, 
but brackish, water of doubtful quality can be found even in 
the dry season within the bars of the Gabbe and Eildun. 

The Northern Hand, which forms the northern hmit of tlie 
Nogal Plain retains a uniform level of about 3,000 feet. 

(3) The. Haud. (British, Abyssinian and Itahan.) — The 
Hand — a Somah word to describe a country of thick, some- 
times impenetrable thorn jungle with an unden^rowth of hig 
or (for aloes, and broken up by shallow watercourses — is the 
(8927) B 


name applied to a great elevated undulating plateau, water- 
less in the dry seaaon, which includes large strips of open, 
rolling, grass plains or bans, or, to the south-east, semi-desert 
country called aror. It is probably the most valuable part 
ot Somaliland, for on its pasturages the surrounding tribes 
ato dependent for the summer grasdug of their flocks, the 
source of their food and their wealth. Its importance is recog- 
nised in the Anglo -Abyssinian Treaty, which maintains, 
without distinction of tribes, freedom of access to all the 
portions in which the two nations are concerned. 

The Haud runs at first in a direction south of east, between 
British Somaliland and Ogaden, aa far as 46° E. ; it then 
appears to widen out and to embrace all the country, except 
the Nogal Plain, as far as the eastern maritime ranges and 
between the Kurkar HiUs on the north, and a line running 
from Galkayu to the sand hills behind Obbia on the south. 

The Eastern Haud is divided by the Nogal Plain into a 
northern and southern portion. The following are the 
limits of the red clay or red sandy soil which is characteriatie 
of the Western and Southern Haud : — 

1. Northern : The mountain range west of Hargeisa ; 
thence a line south of the Khansa Plain via Berato to Kirrit ; 
and from that point the western and southern edge of the 
GraUai and Shiloleh Ranges as far aa the blufEs, which, running 
eastwards, border the southern edge of the Northern Haud. 

2. Western and south-western : The blufEa which run 
parallel to and above the left bank of the Jerer and Fafan to 

3. Southern : An east and west line from Hahi via 
Gerlogubi, Wardair and Gfaladi Wells, and the Dudub district 
to Galkayu. 

4. Eastern : A line curving from the last-named wells east 
and north to the bluffs on the southern edge of the Northern 

AooesB to the Haud up the bluffs from the Nogal, Fafan and 
Jerer is, in the case of camels, limited to fairly numerous, but 

steep and atony passes ; eJsewhere the outer edge of the Haud 
has a gentle slope. The Haud itself falU gradually from N.W. 
to S.E., the north-western portion being in pWes over 6,000 
feet, while in the south-east the elevation falls to 2,000 feet. 
Water is plentiful all over it in the rains, which are heavy 
as compared with Guban. But after the first month of 
the dry season all the pans and the numerous nullahs dry 
up owing to the porous nature of the soil, through which 
much of the rainfall is lost. Then water is to be found only in a 
few permanent wells at intervals of three to four days' march ; 
of these wells in the Southern Haud, the moat important are at 
Bohotle on the northern edge and at Mudug {Galkayu) on the 
southern, at both of which the supply is more orlesa permanent,* 
Possibly the deficiency elsewhere may be remedied by sinking 
new wells to the level at which water is found north and south 
of this portion of the Haud, viz,, at 50 to 60 feet from the sur- 
face, as at Burao, where the wells have been dug through sand, 
or at Gerlogubi, where they have been hewn through rock- 
Or, again, tanks might be formed where the clay is hard enough 
to retain the water, and much of the rainfall be thereby saved. 

In the wooded portions of the Haud dense thorn jungles 
and scattered trees alternate with small glades of durr grass ; 
while ant-hills, often rising to 25 feet, appear at every 100 yards 
in the more open portions. The Southern Haud is, as a rule, 
covered with thorn bush, more or less thick, and, apparently, the 
whole of the Haud was at one time so covered. But, especially 
in the "Western Haud, floods and fires destroyed the bush, 
which was then overwhelmed by white ants. These erected 
their mounds around the withered trees and after a time 
abandoned them, when wind and rain distributed the vegetable 
mould thus formed, and laid the foundation of the bans or 
grassy plains. 

Green grass is plentiful in the raina, but in the dry season 
practically none is obtainable ; camel grazing can, however, 
be always obtained throughout the year. 


Mvdtig oasis. — The Mudnig oams — in tte shape of a horse- 
shoe with the Doho district, where there is good grazing for 
ponies, in the centre — lies in the Bouth-eastern corner of the 
Haud. It extends from Badwein to the Dagarir tank, and 
ifl from 60 to 80 miles from east to west. It affords 
excellent pasturage to large herds of camels and cattle 
and flocks of sheep and goats, and has numerous permanent 
wells, important amongst which is Galkayu, where a fort 
erected hy Tuauf Ali of Obhia, was once taken by the 
Mullah. The country of the latter'a tribe, the Bagari, and 
of the Rer Ibrahim and Ker Ali appears to lie partly in and 
partly to the west of the oasis, and to be in places covered 
with dense bush. Sub-tribea of the Marehan, Ogaden, 
Dolbahanta, Mijjarten and Hawiya frequent the oasis, 

Abyssinian Somaliland embraces -. — 

The Harrar Highlands. 

The Ogaden country, comprising — 

(i) The southern portion of the Western and Central 
Haud {vide Britit^h Somaliland). 

(ii) The mountainous and billy country watered by the 
Webi ShebeU, the Fafan and their tributaries, and 
continued across the former river to the Juba. 

(iii) The high stony plateau eastward of the last sub- 
division and north of the alluvial plain of the 
Webi Shebeli. 

The Earrar Highlands. — The Harrar Highlands consist 
of lofty peaks, 8,000 to 10,000 feet above sea level, and elevated 
plateaux, which are highly cultivated by the Gallas, and more 
to the east afford excellent pasturage for the cattle of the 
Somalia. An eastern spur connects this mountainous tract 
with the Sau Range in British SomaUland, and thus forms 
the north-western boundary of the Ha\id. Between this spur 
and the range to the north-west lies an extensive plain or 
high ban known as the Harawa Valley and the Banki Ellis, 
where rich pasturage similar to that of the Haud is found. 

'Ogadmi. — The moutUai?tous eastern portion is formed by 
foot hills of the AbysainiEin Moimtalns and of the 
Harrai Highlands, and is roughly bounded as followa ■ — 

1 a. On the north by the eastern range of the Uarrar High- 

^^^H lands. 

^^^^K b. On the west by the Errer and Webi Shebeli as far as Imj, 
^^^^B and by a line thence to the Juba at Dolo. 

^^^H c. On the south-east by a line from Dolo to Bari ; and 
^^^^K d. On the east by a tine from Bari to the Fafan and Jerer, 
^^^^ The northern portion of this area is a series of ranges and 
I broad plateaux of limestone, or, in places, of granite, covered 

with open jungle of thorn trees and with high grass. The sides 
I of the hi Ik and plateaux are generally bare, but in the valleys 

thorn bush and jungle grass are diversified by stretches of 
! cultivation, open sandy plains, and abandoned tracts of jowari 

} cultivation. Water is found after rains in the tiigs, but in the 

dry season is obtainable only in wells often 40 to 50 miles 
apart. South of the latitude of Milmil the ranges break up 
into isolated hills some 3,000 feet high, while the tugs in 
the west, which generally have water at all seasons, and often 
are flowing streams, niii through gorges, sometimes 1,000 feet 
deep, between alluvial banks covered with excellent grass, 
creepers, undergrowth aud tall trees. The plateaux and valleys 
become broader and are often bare and sandy or stony, but 
are still interspersed with tracts of graring for camels. Water 
on the plateaux east of the Webi Shebeli appears to be com- 
paratively abundant, but many wells have been destroyed, for 
the country is thinly inhabited owing to the attacks by the 
Ogaden on the Gallas, and the counter raids by the Antharas. 
The mountainous country south of the Webi ShebeH is unex- 
plored, but it appears to be somewhat similar to the country 
to the north, with more jungle and extensive pasturages for 
cattle and camels. 

The Marehan Plateau courdry of the eaat lies south of 
Haud and north of the Webi ShcbeU, and is bounded 

on the west by the Fa£an and on the east by a line 
which nms from, approximately, the junction of the Bldairi 
with the Shebeli to the Galkayu Wells, 

Except along its outer edges it is a barren elevated plateau 
o£ rocky and disintegrated limestone, generally open, but 
occasionally interspersed with thorn jungle. 

The eastern edge is a mixture of stony plain, khansa bush, 
jungle and pasturage ; it is the meeting line of the Marehan 
and of the Hawiya from the south. Water is found only at 
wide intervals, some three to five days march, both within the 
plateau and along its northern edge. But along its other sides 
a fair quantity of water is found either in welk on the west, 
in the Shebeli and its affluents on the south, or in wells or 
pans on the east. 

Italian Somaliland may be divided into : 

(a) A maritime plain, which runs eastwards to Cape 

Gardafui, and thence southwards to the Juba River. 

(b) An elevated interior plateau, the seaward crest of 

which forms a broken series of maritime ranges and 
which descends gradually southwards to, 

(c) An alluvial plain that stretches inland from the 

maritime plain along the lower Webi Shebeh. 
{d) The plateau country between the latter and the Juba 

(o) The marititne plain extends from the Anglo-Itahan 
frontier eastwards to Cape Gardafui in a low sandy belt, 
varying from 200 yards to 5 miles in width, and scantily covered 
with a stunted vegetation of marine plants, acacias and other 
thorn bushes. In places it is interrupted by scarped rocks 
and rocky points and hills, especially east of Bandar Alula, and 
between Las Khorai and Bandar Maraya is but a narrow beach 
backed by a steep limestone range. In the broader portions 
it forma low sandy bilk or plateaux, and south of Bandar 
Alula becomes swampy and broken by lagoons. A few water- 
courses intersect it, but these are generally dry ; water is, 


wever, plentiful, as too are sheep and firewood, at all but 
I few of the coast villages. 

From Cape Gardafui southwards the maritime plain cou- 
tinues a narrow strip of sand, scantily covered with bush, 
and rising gradually to the foot of the maritime range. Aa 
Ear as Ras Ali Bash Kit it ia often broken by rocky bluffs and 
ranges; south of that place, as far as the Darror, it is con- 
tinuous and increases gradually in width from 1 to 5 miles. 
Prom the Darrot to the Nogal it ia a narrow, broken, 
rocky coralline stretch, 200 to 400 feet in height, with 
occasional patches of drift sand, and fairly well aupphed with 

From Illig southwards to 7° N. the plain continues the rocky 
coralline formation, but around Cai>e Garad are extensive 
pasturages which, mingled with occasional patches of vegeta- 
tion, then extend as far aa Obbia between the rocky foot hills 
of the maritime range and the low sandy strip, interspersed 
by sand dunes, that borders the coast. 

Numerous herds of camels and flocks of sheep and goats are 
seen on these pasturages, of which the most extenaive are 
near Obbia. 

A few miles south of Obbia the maritime plain, a succession 
of sandy hills and plains, with occasional pasturage and 
cultivation of durra and beans, rises to an interior sandy 
undulating plain of similar vegetation, but with also wide 
belts of dense jungle. This interior plain stretches apparently 
from the Marehan Desert on the north to the alluvial plain 
of the Webi Shebeli on the south-west, and behind Mogdishu 
is continued southwards by the maritime plain which, gradually 
changing from white to reddish sand, is at first bare, but from 
Brava to the Juba becomes covered with a stunted bush. The 
whole of the maritime plain south of Obbia is well populated, 
i cameb, sheep and goats abound. 
I {b) The wUerioT ■plateau. — The northern crest of the interior 
sau, consisting of a series of flat-topped Umestone moun- 
i, covered with frankincense trees, runs from the Dagau 

Valley parallel to, and as a rule not more than 5 miles fioni, 
the coast. 

Along the IncUan Ocean from G. Gaidatui to Bargal the 
seaward crest, 3,000 feet high, is rarely more than i miles 
inland, and descends in a series of deep precipices to the 
maritime plain, or sometimes to the sea itself. From Bargal 
the Gor Ali Range mna westwards to Las Khorai, and forms the 
southern edge of the plateau of Osman Mahmud'a tribe. 
Close to Bargal this range turns southwards to the Gengado 
Peaks, a spur which sheds the water on one side to the 
Gulf of Aden and on the other to the Indian Ocean, and 
which also connects with the plateau of the Isa Mahmud 
to the south. From Bargal southwards the main crest 
diverges south-westwards under the name of the Suleiman 
Mouutaiua, 2,700 feet, which, uniting with the Waraangh 
forms the northern boimdary of the Darror Valley. 

South of the Darror Valley the continuous line of 
the Kurlcar Hills rises rapidly to a second limestone 
plateau, which, bounded on the west and south by the 
Nogal Plain, falla eastwards, at a few miles from the sea, 
to the coralline maritime plain by broken chains of steep, 
rocky, flat-topped bills, 1,500 to 2,000 feet, from which 
numerous deeply ravined and, as a rule, dry watercouraes 
find, their way to the sea. This stretch of maritime hills, 
beginning in detached or continuous conical hillocks of friable 
sandstone, rises to arid, stony plains of limestone and un- 
dulating plateaux with thickets of acacias, aloes and the like 
then follow in succession large tracks of pasture in a chalky 
clay, rich vegetation and stouy hills as far as the Wadi Darimo. 
Prom tiiis place stony, cheerless, boldly undulating plateaux 
with wide zones of forest extend to the Agdaldansho Moun- 
tains, south of which an arid and rugged country of basalt 
outcrop and scanty water supply — except for the luxuiiant 
valley of the Wadi Dugaloho — stretches to the Nogal. 
South of the latter the billR gradually lose the boldness of 
outline which characterises them further north. The rock 



still outcrops, but is frequently interspersed with sand ot 
sand and clay. The interior plateau becomes more diversified 
and undulating ; good paatorage alteraatea with sandy tracts 
now open and again covered with sinnan bush or jungle, 
while locky patches are less frequent ; water becomes more 
plentiful, but still is often only to be found at intervals of 25 to 
30 miles. Approaching Obbia from the north a succession 
of sandy hills extends inland for some 20 to 30 miles, while 
inland beyond them lies an elevated diversified plain of white 
sand, which at 50 miles is varied by a red clay. Some few 
mdes south of Obbia the sand hills fall away gradually to the 
interior plain, already described, in which the maritime plain 

(c) The Alluvial Ivienor Plain. — The alluvial plain extends 
for some 3 to 10 miles along each bank of the Webi Shebeli from 
the place where the river leaves the plateau country, to the 
swamp, north ot the mouth of the Juba, in which the river la 
lost. The plain is densely populated, more particularly about 
Shidli, Geledi, Galwin, and behind Brava, and is exceptionally 

GJeledi, 10 hours by camel from Mogdishu, is especially 
worthy of mention, for not only does the latter port draw all 
its supplies from the Geledi district, but also the town of Geledi 
stands at the main crossing over the ShebeU of the caravan 
routes between Lugh, Bardera and Mogdishu. 

{d) The Jvba-Shebeli Plateau. — This plateau, a rough 
square of sides 160 miles long, extends from the Abyssinian 
foothills in the north-west to the alluvial plain of Italian 
Somaliland on the south-east, and descends somewhat abruptly 
in an easterly and westerly direction to the Shebeli and Juba 

The principal harbours, porta and anchorages in Somaliland prinoipal 
which had an important bearing on the operations are :— potta'ftnd 

JibiUi (French), a small but growing town with several auolioroges. 
well-built houses, stores and shops, clean streets and a healthy 
reputation, is situated IJ miles south of the low, rooky point 

of Ras Jibuti. It has a considerable aud growing trade with 
Abysainia and Harrar ; eheep and cattle are cheap and 
plentiftd, and gootl water is obtained in abundance about 
IJ miles from the town, and is to be conveyed to it by pipes. 
4,000 to 5,000 tons of coal are kept in stock, and are partly 
stored in lighters which supply vessels. 

The anchorage space for ships, 1 mile long and J a mile 
broad, is enclosed by reefs and well sheltered, and afiorda good 
holding ground of mud in 4 to 7 fathoms. The harbour has 
two piers and two fixed lights, one white, 105 feet above high- 
water and visible at 15 miles, one red, 84 feet high and visible 
at 9 miles, while in the town are two other white lighte, atill 
more powerful. A third substantial pier is also under conatruc- 

Jibuti ia the headquarters of French Somaliland, and has a 
population of 15,000, including 2,000 Europeans, 

Zeiia, the onlyport (and that a poor one) exceptJibuti in 
the laa Somali country, is a town of about 50 stone houses, 
600 huta and narrow and tortuous streets, built on a narrow 
spit which is nearly level with the sea, and becomes an island 
at high tide. 

In the south-west monsoon the heat is excessive, and more 
than half the natives migrate to the iuterior highlands, but in 
the trading aeaaon the population ia 15,000. 

The roadstead, 1 mile from north to south and 3 from east 
to west, affords anchorage in at least 3 J fathoms over mud and 
sand, about IJ miles off shore, but the best is in 4 fathoms, 
2 miles north of the town. In the north-east monsoon a 
moderate swell aeta in and increaaea towards afternoon. 

Bjilhar. — The town, standing on the beach and surrounded 
by a dilapidated stockade almost entirely washed away, 
consists of the Kesidency — a double-storied building of coral — 
the quarters of the native troops and pohce, a defensible jail, 
and aome atone houaes all along the beach and native cutcha 
houses in regular blocks and streets, separated from the stone 
portion by a clear space of 100 yards. The permanent 



T;/ulloH' I'laie i.) 


I an 


popolatioii, Ayal Yusuf clan of the Habr Awal, niunbera 
3,000, increased in tlie trading season to 10,000. There are a 
number of brackist wells along the beach, but no good water 
supply except when, after very heavy rwn, the Tesutugan 
cuts its way to the sea. 

Bulhar has an open roadstead where the surf is so heavy 
during the monsoons, especially the south-west, as to render 
landing very difficult and sometimes impossible, but at other 
times au anchorage can be found in 6 to 7 fathoms, J B mUe 
from shore. Native reports say that the wind blows for seven 
days on end during which landing is impossible, as it is often 
in March until evening. A surf-beaten spit, which small 
vesaels can cross at high tide, afiords an inner anchorage for 
them. There is a fixed white light 19 feet above the sea, 
visible 8 miles. 

Berbera. — The town of Berbera, occupied by the Egyptians 

1875 and by Great Britain in 1884, is built in two portions, 
of a mile apart. To the east, at the inner end of the harbour, 

the native town, rebuilt since a great fire in June, 1888, 
and consisting now of mat huts, an increasing number of stone 
buildings almost all along the sea, a few mosques, a pier, 
customs-house, and its own drinking tank, all laid out in broad 
streets. It is low -lying and was exposed, until the construction 
of a large circular embankment, to floods during the burst 
of the rains of the north-east monsoon. The official town, 
Shaab, conabts of a number of stone buildings, including 
court house, treasury, jail, Residency, and officials' quartera, 
and is situated on high gromid which drops steeply 20 to 
30 feet to the mud and coral beach, on which, just below the 
Shaab, is a large stone water tank. Between the native and 
official town are the pohee quarters, and west of the latter a 
detached fort, from which, now, to the Shaab pier, runs a 
trolley line. The surrounding tribe is the Isa Musa Habr 
Awal ; the population, 5,000 in the hot weather, is increased 
to 25,000 to 30,000 in the trading season. Water, some- 
what brackish, is brought by pipe from Dubar, 8 miles, 


laid Oil to the pier, where it gives 237 gallons pet hour, 
and to tanks in the town, having in 1893 a cubic capacity 
of 19,350 feet, of which the Shaab tank contained 10,500. 
The heat is iatensein the south-west monsoon, but the climate 
ia not unhealthy, except during the Khareef wind, and in the 
north-east monsoon it is comparatively cool. A little of the 
trade is with the Red Sea and Persian Gulf, but the bulk is 
with Aden, 150 miles, which obtains from Berbera almost all its 
supply of cattle and sheep, which, like fiah, aie plentiful. 

The harbour ia the only one along the SomaU coast where 
vessels can he in all weathers, and where cargo can be easily 
loaded or unloaded. It hes E.N.E. and W.S.W., and is formed 
by a low curving sandy coral spit, which extends 1 J miles west- 
ward, and terminates in the steep Tamar Point, It is 1 mile 
wide at the entrance, which is free of all dangers, and has a 
depth of 11 to 13 fathoms, which decreases gradually to 5 
fathoms at 400 yards from the shore. It afiorda good 
anchorage and complete shelter from all but westerly winds 
in a apace 1 J miles long, 3CM) to 1,000 yards broad and 4 fathoms 
deep. Steamers can enter andleave at all times, but buggalows* 
have been occasionally driven on shore, and in the south-west 
monsoon cannot leave till the evening, i.e., till the Khareef 
^^^ abates. 

^^H Off the official town is a screw pile pier of wood and iron 

^^H with 1?^ feet of water at high and 10 feet at low tide at the head 
^^* of the pier. The Aden mail boats and buggalows come aiong- 
r side, and ships of 2,000 to 3,000 tons can approach within 

L . 250 yards in 30 feet of water. An extension of the pier by 

^^^^ 100 yards would give a depth of 18 feet at low water. A 
^^H pier of coral stone, used by buggalows at high but unap- 
^^f proachable at low tide, runs from the customs-house in the 
I native town into the harbour at its head, which ia shallow 

I and apparently silting up. 

^^^^ Two and three-quarters miles west of the official town is 

^^^L a disused lighthouse, 70 feet high, but a tight ia hoisted on a 

^^^K • Nftt 


pole at its foot. There are three fixed hghtn, viz., one white 
49 feet high and visible 8 miles in clear weather, the other 
two red, visible 6 miles ; Tamar Point is marked by a beacon- 
Hots is fronted by a reef which afltords protection to 
dhows. North of it is Hais Island, between which and 
the mainland is a reef which aflorda fair shelter in the north- 
east monsoon in 5 fathoms. 

Bandar Gori, or Las Khorai, is the principal town of the 
Warsangli, and the chief residence of the Gerad. It is occupied 
by the Ogais Lebbay and Ayal Fateh sub-tribes. It consists of 
two villages, 600 yards apart, three large and six small pise 
forte, all very dilapidated. Each village consists of 20 to 30 
long, flat-roofed and very lai^e matted constructions, par- 
titioned off to contain half a dozen families, and unlike any- 
thing else on the coasts. 

Good and abundant water is obtainable at a depth of 12 feet 
from an old and well-built well. The sea abounds in fish ; 
cattle, sheep and firewood are procnrable. Sheep and gums 
are exported to Aden and Bombay, and guano also to Macalla. 
There is a considetable caravan trade to the interior to the 
Dolbahanta and Mijjarten tribes ; donkeys are the best means 
of transport across the high mountains. The roadstead is 
open and suitable for native craft only ; the anchorage is 
rocky, and the best is probably in 7 to 10 fathoms, J of a mile 
off shore. For three months of the monsoon, June especially, 
the anrt ia so bad that buggalows are taken to Berbera for 

Bosaso, or Bandar Kasim (Italian), the most important 
market of the Mijiarten, is a town of four forts, washed by the 
sea at high tide, and 100 huts, which form two quarters, viz., 
one for the Harti, i.e., Deshishi and Osman Mahmud, and one 
for the half-caste Arabs. The permanent population numbers 
500 to 600, increased to 1,000 during the trading season. 
Caravans resort to it from Kurkar, as well as from the War- 
sangli and Dolbahanta, and a considerable export trade ia 
conducted with Aden in gums, frankincense, ostrich feathers, 
iheep and gbi. It stands in an arid plain, backed by a distant 


mountain range, cut up by several torreot-Deds, and studded 
with a few bushoa. A track connecting Bandar Ziada with it, 
continues east for 1^ miles and then strikes inland past the 
hot springs of Bio Kolola. Anchorage in an unprotected 
roadstead is available at ^ a mile off shore, outside a coral 
bank, in 6 to 8 fathoms over sand. Good water is obtainable 
in wells in all the forts ; firewood can also bo had. 

lUig (ItaUan), one of the most important porta of the 
Isa Mahmud is a disorderly collection of 40 huts inhabited 
by some 200 of the Isa Darud clan of that sub-tribe, and 
governed by Farah Sementar, who is under Yusuf Ali. It 
owes its importance to its exports of sheep and goats (totalling 
15,000 to 20,000 annually), of gbi (50 tons annually), and of 
dried or salted meat to the Benadir coast, Zanzibar and 

Obbia (Italian), a town of 120 huts and 3 large square stone 
buildings, is situated, some 50 yards from the sea at high tide, 
on a large open and grassy imdulating plain of firm sandy soil. 
It was the chief residence of Pusuf Ali, who captured it in 1884 
from the Habr Ghidir, a pastoral sub-tribe of the Hawiya which 
extends inland for some 25 miles. There is plentiful grazing, 
which, however, begins to dry up after January. Fair and 
drinkable water is found in numerous small wella around the 
town, at 2 feet below the surface ; better water is obtainable 
at a depth of 4 feet in two wells 2 miles from the town where 
fresh wells could be dug in half an hour. Important trade 
routes lead inland to Mudug oasis, 76 miles, and Jeribau 
amongst other places. The climate is moderate, and, though the 
heat is great at times, it is free from malaria. 

It is the chief outlet of Hawiya trade, but in the 
height of the monsoons is cut off from communication sea- 
wards. Dhows anchor in 2 fathoms in a shallow bight formed 
by Diga Point, 10 feet high, projecting north-east for 400 yards 
and prolonged by two rocky islets for a further 1,600 yards, 
which ^ve shelter from south-west winds. 

Large ships can anchor in 7 fathoms in good holding 


ground at 1,400 yards trom the point, but this anchorage v! 
quite unsheltered ; there are, however, no outlying dangers. 
The point forms a natural breakwater (with a depth of 4J to 
5 feet of water), inaide which dhows can be beached, and 
landing can be effected by surf-boats at all states of the tide 
and weather, and by ahips' pulhng-boats in ordinary weather. 
There are six surf-boats ; these carry a crew of seven, and 
aeven to eight passengers, and are very crank ; their number 
could probably be considerably increased. 

Except Harrar and Qildessa and along the valleys of the Towna. 
Shebeli and Juba, there are no towns other than those on the 

In British Somaliland (excluding the Warsangli country) 
the coastal towns consist of a few stone buildings, the property 
of the Government or of Indian or Arab merchants, and of native 
huts similar to, but on a larger scale and more substantially 
constructed than the gurgis* of the nomads ; in some cases the 
mat coverings are replaced by mud. In the Warsangli and 
Mijjarten country, the coastal towns are a collection of mud 
or pis^ huts, with a mosque occasionally whitewashed, a few 
pise or stone forts, in the latter case of two to three storeys, 
and one to six large buildings of the same materials for the 
storage of gum. The towns and villages of the middle 
Shebeh consist of a cluster of palisaded huts of durra stalk, 
and the whole surrounded by a stockade of light timber. 

Permanent settlements {Tarigas] of priests are scattered Permanent 
throughout the country. These so-called Tarigas are of settlement*. 
importance, not only because of the influence exercised by their 
educated and, as a rule, travelled occupants, but also because 
they form the nuclei around which a portion of the nomads 
may be induced to settle, and from which cultivation and the 
establishment of a permanent water supply may radiate. 
Jowari cultivation always, and wells as a rule, are to be found 
in the neighbourhood. The most important are :— 

* Ctam(<I cloths used us tents. 

7« British Somaliland. — Hargeisa, under Sheikli Madar, 
a town of 1,000 inhabitants, mainly Habr Awal, with plentiful 
and permanent water supply, J square mile of jowari cultiva- 
tion, mat huta, one stone building and a breastwork, situated 
on the caravan routes to Milmil, Imi, Harrar, Gildesaa, Zeila, 
Bulhar and Berbeca. 

Upper Sheikh, at the summit of the pass of the same name ; 
Hahi, to the south of Sheikh, with a population of 250 under 
Haji Mui^a. 

In Abyssinian SomcdiUmd. — Seyid Mahomed's tariga of 
4O0 huts, about the size of Hargeisa, situated on the tiig 
Fafan, and surrounded with patches of jowari; the head of 
this tariga had, in 1895, much influence with the two Mahom- 
medan chiefs of Karanle ; Faf {6° 27' N. and 44° 17' E.), 
an important centie under Haji Mahomed Nur, with extensive 
cultivation, herds of camels, flocks of sheep and good grazing, 
and one of the reported sources of the Mullah's supplies ; En, 
west of Seyid Mahomed's tariga. 

On the Webi Shebeli. — Kulmis aud other small towns in the 
alluvial plain of Italian Somahland. 

The nomad Somalia wander annually in fixed orbits in 
search of water and pasturage. These orbits are generally 
marked by the zaribas of thorn bushes, called rer, in which 
the clan or sub-tribe establishes itself for a period not 
exceeding two months at a time. These zaribas are formed 
by a double ring of thorn-fence, of which the outer is often 
12 feet high, to keep out lions. Inside the zariba pens are 
made for cattle, camels, sheep and goats, and the gurgis or 
huts, which consist of a portable frame of galol-wood, covered 
with grass mats, hides and akins, ate erected on arrival. As a 
further protection against wild animals fires are lighted at 

The construction of the zaribas devolves on the male portion 
of the tribe, but that of the gurgis, as most of the manual 
labour, is the duty of the women. Caravans form single 
zaribas of a similar but more temporary nature, while neat 
the coast a low single fence as a rUle suffices. 


A regular weeUy mail service by Bteamers plies between Orer. 
Aden and the principal Protectorate ports. The usual ^<'"""™"*" 
course is Aden to Berbera, Berbera to Zeila, Zeila to BuUiar, 
Bulbar to Berbera, and thence back to Aden, the whole 
voyage occupying five days. Steamers also run two to three 
times a week between Aden and Berbera and other Somali coast 
ports during the trading season, October to April, and 
occasionally also between Berbera and Suez 1,400 sea miles. 

There is very considerable trade by buggalows between the 
coast ports and Aden, and there is occasional communication 
by small sailing vessels between the Warsangli ports, the 
Persian Gult and Bombay, All this trade is, however, con- 
fined as a rule to the trading season, i.e. the period of the north- 
east monsoon, November to April, when the sea is open, 
" Bat-Furan." During the south-west monsoon, " Bat- 
Hiddan," the connection between Aden and the ports to the 
north-east of Berbera ceases, but there is no interruption to 
the country craft interportal traffic, which indirectly main- 
tains the communication. 

'he nearest cable sta( 
miles, or Jibuti, the same distance. 

Telegraph lines now (190G) run between Berbera -Sheikh Wi^d 
Eurao and Berbera-Sheikh-Adadleh-Hargeisa. At the time and 
of the operations there were no telegraphs but those con- 
structed at the time (see Chap. XIV). Communication across 
the maritime plain is frequently interrupted during the 
period of the south-west monaoonby the violent sand storms, 
and during Jilal the want of water makes the crossing of 
the Hand a matter of great difficulty and risk. In the rainy 
season the Fafan and Shebeli flood the neighbouring valleys 
while south of the latter river the routes are so heavy and 
greasy that travelling is brought to a standstill. 

There are no roads in the European sense of the word, i.e., 
none fit for wheeled transport. Certain roads were con- 
structed during the operations (see Chap. XIV} and some of 
^lese, such as the Berbera-Sheikh road, could be rendered 

fit for wheeled transport. In the hard red clay of the 
WoBtern Haud, and in the open portions further east, roads 
could be easily made, but, owing to the greasinesa and 
heavineaa of the soil in wet weather, could probably be used 
only after the rains had run ofE. It may be noted that in 
the Haud there are no marked routes over the open spaces, 
which are everywhere fit for marching, but through the 
thorn-covered portions the traclts, often narrow and easily 
lost in the dark, must be followed. These tracks, though 
wider than those of Ogo and Guban, which average about 
2 feet, are not so well kept, and are often flanked by wait-a-bit 
or fish-hook thorn bushes, which catch in the camels' loads 
and lessen the rate of marching. 

Some of the passes, in order from east to west, which 
give access from the maritime plain to the interior plateau 
are given in ihe following table : — 

Name of Pubs or Defile. 




Midgid Pass 


Marilimn Killa . . 

Habr Toljaala 
hX"'^ Toljaalo 

Oaha Puss 


Maritime Hilk . . 



Dolbahauta country 

Blambidol Pons .. 



Bar bora 

Mfxiyo PoFis 


ItaKnr Pnas 


fiolia Range . . 

Habr" Uorliajis 

Shtikh Pa>4s 


Hahr Gorhajis 

Habr Gerhajia 

J into P»SB 



MiifBO Posa 


Habr Gerhajia 

Kil-Annd-MiM'uK via 


Mariliftie Hilb . . 


I>iiiiituK>tn Kivoi' DeHln 

Ihwri Piiisa 




Maritime Hills . . 


The Bils Ringe 

lap. nod Godabursi 


NOTB.— Tlie nniiM 

The Bubjoinrtd table shows the prindpal routes throngh 

Guban, in order, from east to west : — 



To {Distances in Miles)— 




Gaha Pass 

Magab and Meriye 

Pass (Sonag ntate) 
Raaor Pass 
Sheikh Pass .. 

lAfarug and Jirat« Pass 
Malgoi and Morgo Pass 
Halgoi and Argon 

Karara and Eastern Porta 

Habr Toljaala 

Habr Toljaalfl ; Bcr. 103 

Ber, 163; Garrero, 210 

Bnrao, 80; Btr, 93; Garrero, 141; 

Bohotle, 238 
AdadlPh. 53 ; Ber. Bl : Mayo, Wt 
Adadleh, 72 

Jalelo. 741 : Hargeisa, 105 ; Harrar. 39a 
Bulhar, 41 


Hatgeisa. 105 ; Harrar. 302 

Zeiift .. 


Two other rout^w to , . 

Cildcssa. 156 ; Hairitr. 185 

Caravans, as a rule, make each day's march in two portions Marclips 
in order to escape the midday heat and to give the camels 
time to graze, in addition to the half- hour which these animals 
have before sunset. An ordinary match lasts for some eight 
hours, during which 20 miles would be covered, and an easy one 
' is 15 to 17 miles. Marches of 25 miles, continued from day 
to day, are exceptional, unless loads do not exceed 250 lbs. 
and the weather is favourable ; on such marches a halt every 
five or six days is advisable. 

According to the lengtih of the march, dependent often on 
the intervals between the sources of water supply, the morning 
and afternoon hours of march would vary as follows : — From 
4 or 5 to 8 or 9 a.m. ; and from about 3 to 6 p.m. 

In Guban, caravans avoid the heat of the day by marching 
at night, when they can cover 30 miles without a rest, as the 
roads arc good. 

The eastern tribes generally make longer and quicker 
marches than the Isa and Gadabursi, whose country, being of 
trap rock, is difficult, and whose camels are generallv inferior 
to those of the former. 

(8927) o 2 


Camels are used throughout Somaliland for ' purposes 
of transport. In certain localities mules and donkeys 
are also employed, and most of the tribes north of the Shebeli 
Lave ponies, which are never used for transport pntposea, but 
for fighting and raiding. Ponies are also largely used for 
riding in the east and south-east of the Protoctorate, 

Along the coast the bullc of the trade is carried in the north 
by buggalows, and in the south by dhowa. An average sized 
buggalow, i.e., 60 by 15 feet, can carry 270 sheep and 15 

Surf boats are used along the coast from Illig to Obbia, and 
native canoes further south. The former are propelled by a 
crew of seven paddlers and can carry seven to eight armed 

Inland boats are few in number and are found only at the 
ferries, which consist of ricketty rafts, a dug-out canoe 
occasionally, or boata of planking fastened by vegetable cord. 

Seasons. — The year in Somaliland may be divided into 
four main seasons : JilaJ, the dry ; Gu, the fertile rainy season; 
Haga, the hot season, ending with the second interior rains; 
and Dair, the cold season, extending into January, the first 
month of Jilal. A fifth season, sultry and calm, viz., Kalil, 
is said to occur at the end of Jilal. The determining causes 
o! the seasons in SomalUand are the two monsoons, the north- 
east from November to March, and the south-west from May 
to September. Aoril and October, the two months intervening 
between the monsoons, are periods of variable aira and calms. 
The south-west monsoon is ushered in by rain, which is 
spread over one or two months, and its departure is marked 
by still heavier tains in the interior, while on the coast the 
second and more regular rains do not occur until November 
or December. 

As regards climate Northern Somaliland may be divided 
into four main zones, dependent mainly on elevation, viz. : — 

Maritime region. — Temperature hot, 79° to 105° in the 
shade ; rainfall slight, 2 or 3 inches annually ; wind, constant 


and cool in the north-east monsoon, November to March 
squally and hot in the aouth-weat monsoon, May to September. 

Ogo, Golis, Ogo-Guban. — Comparatively equable climate ; 
temperature, 40° to 91° in Western and as low as 25" 
in Eastern Somaliland, with great variation between day 
and night ; rainfall, ranging from 10 to 20 inches annually, 
accompanied by mists, and spread mainly over April to 
September ; wind uncertain ia the same period, otherwise 
as in maritime region. 

Higher interior plateau. — Greater variations than in Ogo 
of temperature between day and night ; extremes, 56° to 108°, 
dependent on nature of vegetation, i.e., wood or grass, or on 
its absence, e.g., bare open alluvial or sandy tracts ; lainfall 
similar to but less than in Ogo, varied in some years by 
droughts, which are more common in the arid country south of 
the Eastern Haud ; wind, strong to a gale in the northern 
plateaux from June to September. 

Valley of the Webi Shebeli. — Damp, trying and sultry 
from March to September ; rainfall apparently heavier than 
elsewhere ; wind slight throughout the year, except in the 
lower portion. 

During the last decade a very large impottatioa of arma '^^^ " 
has taken place through Obok and Jibuti to Harrar and ^_ 
Abyssinia. It is possible that some of these arms have found ^^| 
their way from Harrar into the Ogaden country to the south- ^^M 
west and the Galla country to the south. But the number 
which has reached Somahland by these directions is trifling 
in comparison with the active trade which sprmig up during 
the four years preceding the operations through the Mijjarten 
and partly through the WarsangU country. These arras, 
mostly of the Gras pattern, were brought from Jibuti, either 
direct or through Arabian ports to Las Khorai and other potts. 
They fomid their way thence through the NaUya Ahmed 
and Nur Ahmed, Dolbahanta, across the Nogal to the 
Mullah's headquarters. The close of the south-west monsoou I 
starts the period of activity in this trade, and at that time 1 




an average of one buggalow a day ia said to leave Jibuti 
with arms for the Arabian coast. Anns are also said to be 
landed oucaBionally at the mouth of the Nogal and on the 
Beuadir coast, and to be broi^ht thence to the Mullah. The 
latter'a anxiety to posseaa lumseif of rifles ia shown by the price 
which he is said to have offered in 1900, viz., five camels per 
rifle and one per 15 rounds of ammunition. Arms of patterns 
which are said to be British, French and Russian, are also 
brought overland through Persia and across Arabia, and are 
exported to Somaliland from Muscat and other Persian Gulf 

The staple foods of Northern Somaliiand are camels' milk 
and the flesh of sheep and goats ; ghi, obtained from the in- 
land tribes, is largely used by the rice-eating coast tribes ; 
camels' flesh ia somewhat of a luxury ; cattle owning tribes 
also Uve largely on cows' milk, but apparently are not great 
beef eaters. Along and south of the Shebeli, cattle and durra 
furnish the staple food, but poultry, eggs, sheep and goats 
are plentiful along the river. 

The denudation of the plain around Berbera by the tribes 
that resort to it during the trading season is steadily reducing 
the available supply of fuel in its neighbourhood, while in the 
inamediate neighbourhood of the sea on the Eastern Mijjarten 
coast it is not plentiful. In the interior, however, it is generally 
obtainable in ample quantities. The nomads obtain fire by the 
friction of two small pieces of wood — one soft and the other 
hard — called madag, which each one of them carries. 

With the exception of the Juba and Webi ShebeU rivers 
with their tributary streams, all of which Ue in the west and 
south within the Abyssinian and Italian spheres, there are no 
permanent rivers or streams in Somaliland. The whole of 
the northern, north-eastern and eastern portions of the 
country is dependent for water, in the dry season, on the 
permanent wells only, which, however, are, in the rainy 
-^easons, supplemented by rain pools. The permanent wells, 
or groups of wells (for they are often found in groups), lie at 


'^mtervals from each other, which intervals vary from 10 to 
100 miles, and occaaonaUy :eveii more, as for instance, 
between Bohotle and the Mudug wbUb, which ia about 
1 130 miles. 

■ In these wells, called " Eil " or " El," water, as a rule, 
MB some 50 to 80 feet from the surface of the ground ; the 
greatest depths occur in the Dolbahanta and Ogaden country. 
Narrow circular funnels are dug through alluvial soil or hewn 
through rock to the water level, and are provided with slots 
on which men stand and pass up the water from one t,<) 
another by hand in sldn buckets. About half the water is 
lost in handhng, and the remainder is turned into rough hide or 
wooden troughs, at which the animals drink. Separate wells, 
and, if necessary, separate watering hours, are allotted to the 
difierent tribes or sub-tribes. Some of the more important 
permanent wells indicate the head-quarters of certain sub- 
tribes during the dry season. 

The other, less important, wells contain, as a rule, only 
sufficient water for passing caravans. 

In addition to the wells, water is found during the rains not 
only in pools formed in nullahs and watercourses, but abo in 
ballisor depressions which contain pans, or shallowpits or broad 
tanks of clay, called las. These pools and pans are frequented 
by the tribes as soon as the rains begin, until they run dry and 
the surrounding grass is withered. In the case of the largest 
pools and pans, the supply of water will sometimes last as 
ftilong as two months. Even after this period water can 
metames be obtained by digging in the river beds or 
a the pans, but in the latter case care must be taken not to 
ftpenetrate beyond the clay layer, 2 to 4 feet thick. 

The quality of the water in pans and wells varies con- 
siderably. In the gypsum rock of the Nogal district it is, 
I rule, strongly impregnated with sulphuretted hydrogen, 
i ia considered better than untainted water for all animals 
Ut not for man ; in the pans of Ogaden the water is fouled by 
» flocks driven into the pools to water, whereas the tribes 



furthei north water by hand and trough ; at the beginning of 
the raina the surface scum, fouled by the flocks and herds 
some months before, is washed into the wella, and the water 
is, therefore, at first, bad for drinking. In the maritime 
plain water is always brackish. 
' The principal tribes in the British Protectorate are : — 

The Isa 

The Gadabursi 

The Habr Awal 

The Habr Gerhajis 

The Habr Toljaala 

The Dolbabanta t 

The Warsangli J 
All the above are distinct tribes and there is no cohesion 
amongst them, with perhaps the exception of the Habr tribes. 
The importance occupied by the family in a patriarchal 
system of government has led to the disintegration of the 
original tribes into sub-tribes, clans, and even families, which 
rarely act in unison, unless threatened by a common danger. 
Further, the scarcity of water makes the possession of wells 
a frequent cause of dispute, and the besetting sin of the 
Somahs, avarice, leads to raids and counter-raids for the 
capture of camels, which form the usual measure of wealth. 

The population of the British tribes was estimated in 1902 
at about 315,000, and the number of fighting men at about 
90,000 ; but it is very difficult to make even an approximate 
estimate of the population owing to the fact that the people 
are nomads. 

The fighting qualities and method of warfare of the Somalis 
are described in Chapter VITI. 
if In British Somaliland the Isa and Gadabursi, in whom 
the feeling of race ia stronger than the other tribes, had, 
apparently, no intercourse with the Mullah. The WarsangU, 
who were ill-disposed to the Dolbabanta, assisted him only 
by selling arms, probably with a view to commercial profit 
rather than from any sympathy with hia movement. In the 


spring of 1904, tlie Warsangli failed to co-operate with ua, in 
accordance with an undertaking previously given by their 
Sultan. The Habr Awal and Habr Gerhajis, except the Musa 
lamail, always rejected hia advances, while the Habt Toljaala, 
always a turbulent tribe, and the Dolbahanta were his only 
active supporters in British territory. Of the former the Adan 
Madoba were not only responsible for suppljdng him with 
arms, but alao assisted bim on all his raids. The Eer- 
Yusuf and Ahmed Farah, like the Musa lamail, were 
with the Mullah in 1900, but do not appear to have acted 
with him during the subsequent operations. The Dolba- 
hanta, all except the south-eastern portions, made sub- 
mission to the British force in 1901 ; but, exposed by their 
situation to the Mullah's influence and unable to offer any 
resistance but that of spears to his fanatical following, armed 
with rifles, they were forced to rejoin him, when, at the end of 
1901, he raided the Habr Toljaala from Laasadcr. The Ali 
Gheri and Jama Siad were probably willing followers of the 

Since the conclusion of the operations in 1904, a number 
of Ali Gheri and Kayat refugees from the Mullah have 
sought our protection, and have been provided with live-stock 
and arms and located in posts on the frontier, the Ah Gheri 
al Bohotle and the Kayat at Eil Dab. 

In Abyssinian Somahland the Mukabil Ogaden originally 
supported the Mullah, especially the Ibrahim anbtribe 
which made submission to the Britbh force at Bohotle 
and Kurmis in 1901. The Miyirwalal or Western Ogaden 
embittered against the Abyssiniana owing to frequent raids, 
accepted the Mullah in 1900, but apparently did not actively 
support him. On the other hand, the Abbasgul and Harrari 
tribes assisted the Muikh in 1900. The Adonis in the south 
are numerous, but are said to be unwarlike. They have, 
however, on more than one occasion fought in the Dervish 
ranks and are well disposed towards the Mullah. 

In Ilalian Somaliland, during Swayne's operations, the 

' [l-aliun 

Mijjarten, except Yuauf Ati's following, supported the Mullah 
and many Mijjarten fell in his ranks at Samala and 
Ferdiddiu, but in 1903-4 they were at least proEesaedly 
opposed to him. The Hawiya and Marehan, who are under 
YuBuf Ali, sufiered heavily from the Mullah's raids and were 
forced to join him. These last are not warlike, though com- 
paratively numerous, (generally it is difficult to say exactly 
what tribes supported the Mullah, since the ntunber of his 
followers increased or decreased in accordance with the rise 
or fall of his prestige. 

The British Protectorate of the Somaliland coast, since its 
transfer from the Government of India to the Foreign Office in 
1898, and fromtheForeignOffice to the Colonial Office in 1905, 
has been administered by a Commisaioner and Commander- 
in-Chief, who is assisted by a stafE of civil, political, and 
military officers, consisting in March, 1906, of about 30 
individuals. The coast towns of Berbera, Bulbar and 
Zeila are in charge of civil officers, while east of Berbera our 
authority is represented by two small police and customs 
posts at Karam and Hais, the headmen of Ankor, Raguda 
Shullah, Mait and Hashau being in receipt of a small monthly 
subsidy for flying the British flag. Berbera is the head- 
quarters of the Administration, but the Commissioner moves 
into the interior during the hot weather, April to September. 

By decree, dated 7th March, 1899, the French Protectorate 
of the Somali coast was placed under a Governor, with head- 
quarters at Jibuti, who is assisted by an executive council of 
three official and thiee non-official members. The branches of 
administration include a Secretariat and Departments for 
native affairs, police, judicial, prisons, treasury, health, public 
works, post and telegraphs, and customfl. 

Abyssinian Somaliland forma part of the Harrar Province. 
The Governor of this province lives at or near Harrar. 

The relations of the Italian Government with the Mijjarten 
Sultan, Osman Mahmud, and the Obbia Sultan, Ali Yusuf, 
are limited to the payment of an annual subsidy. The usual 


channel of communication is the Italian Consul at Aden, but 
at the present time (1906) Commendatore Pestalozza, C.M.G., 
who has his headquarters at the same place, has special 
charge of the conduct of affairs on the Mijjarten coast. 

Benadir coast and hinterland. — The government of the coast 
line from Elhur to the Juba and of its hinterland was vested 
in the Benadir Company, which held a charter from the 
Italian Government. But by a convention of January 24, 
1905, a new Benadir Company was formed, which has various 
commercial and agricultural concessions, but no adminis- 
trative functions of any sort. The Governor's headquarters 
are at Mogdishu and the Company has established trading 
stations at various places. 

Past History of British connection with Somalilahd, 

TECTORATE. — History op the Mullah, and Events 
which led up to the first expedition against the 
Mullah in 1901. 

Before describing the aeries of operations against the Mullah, 
which began in 1901 and were carried on partly within the 
limits of the British Prot43ctorate, and partly, in the later 
stages, in the Northern Hand, in the Nogal Plain and 
in the Italian sphere of influence from Obbia on the Eastern 
Somali coast to the Mudug oasis, it is desirable to give a brief 
account of the past history of our connection with Somaliland 
and of the land forces in the British Protectorate, also a short 
history of the Mullah, and the events which led up to the first 
expedition in 1901, and ended in the fourth expedition in 

The explorations of Buiton, Speke, Grant and Baker 
' turned the attention of the Egyptian Government to the 
interior of Northern Africa, the Red Sea littoral and the Horn 
of Africa. In pursuance of the Khedive's* ambitious policy 
for the extension of his dominions, Massowah was purchased 
in 1866 from the Porte for 16,000^. by Egypt, which then crept 
southwards. In 1870 it acquired the coast between Bulbar 
and Berbera, and established garrisons at those ports as well 
as at Zcila, purchasing the Sultan's suzerain rights over the 
latter town for an annual payment of 15,000^. In 1874 Eaoof 
Pacha, at the head of 4,000 men, took possession of Harrar. 
This force, one-quarter Sudanese and the remainder Egyptians, 
comprised, besides infantry, one to two squadrons of cavalry, 
and artillery with mountain guns, Gatlinga and rocket tubes, 

and was eventually distributed as follows : — 3,400 at Harrar 
and in the four adjacent highland provinces, 600 between Zeila 
and Berbsra, with detachments at Tajura, Gildesaa, Bulbar, 
Dabarand other places. 

In 1877 the British Government signed a convention at 
Alexandria, which cocognised the Khedival annexation of all 
the East African coast north of Ras Hafun, subject to the con- 
dition amongst others, that no portion of it should be ceded to 
BiDj foreign Power, and that Britisli Consular agents should be 
appointed at places on the coast. The Sultan of Turkey, 
however, refused his ratification. 

Meanwhile considerable improvement had been effected a* 
the porta, e,g., the construction of piers, lighthouses, quarters, 
blockhouses and zaribas, and the improvement of the water 
supply, and many benefits accrued to the country, with the 
exception of Harrar. Here Raoof Pacha had been guilty of 
oppression and illegal trading, and was consequently dia- 
missed by General Gordon, who replaced him by Ali Pacha. 

With the exception of a revolt of the tribes aroimd Harrat 
in 1880, nothing noteworthy happened until 1884, when events 
in the Soudan led to the evacuation of Somaliland by the 
Egyptians. An independent Government under the Emir 
Abdulahi Mahomed, of the old dynasty, was formed at Harrar, 
and the ports of Zeila and Berbera were occupied by detach- 
ments from the Aden garrison. 

In the latter half of 1884 and in January, 1885, the British 
Government, through the Resident at Aden, entered into 
treaties with all the tribes now under its protection except 
the Warsangli, who concluded a treaty in 1886, and the 
Dolbahanta, who have signed no agreement In February, 
1885, the establishment of a British protectorate over the 
Somali coast from Ghubbet Kharab to Ras Galwein was 
communicated to France, who in June of the previous year 
had occupied Obok. The evacuation of Massowah by the 
Egyptians was followed by the Italian occupation of that 
port, also in February, 1885, and by the extension of its 

Mr lai yn% m Dm^ho- rf Oat Tcu- 

Ik the msw «( nOO te was decided to amalgamate the 
Cones ia tfaa bet .Afatcas Protectorates into one body, to 
«U^ was gmm the aame of the Kiiig''s African Rifles, under 
aa inspeet«r-feBcsaL In 1901 the reoTganization had not 
b«o foUr realised in British Somaliland, when the operations 
against the Mollah caused the matter to he Buspended. It 
was int^ided that the ^omnliland Battalion, the 6tb Battalion 
King's African Rifles, shoiihl uonBiBt of — 

1 oamot cur]W, 

3 c(>mf«tuffl infaiilry, 



nombering 10 Uritiah *i\d S nstivw ofliccrs, and 1,037 other 
lanka. The tt'h* was to l>o armed with -303 Martini-Enficld 
rifles two "430 and one -303 Maxims, and five 9-pr. R.M.L. 

The roor((aiii>iiition oE the Military and Civil Police into 
rnic body, calli'd tlio Koot Police, was, however, taken in 
hand and duly n>iiiiiK>U't!. 

Mahommed-hiii-vVhdulUih Hassan belonged to the Habr 

Pubiman (or lliiK"*') sub-trilw of the Southern Ogaden, one 

o( whoBO wnteriiiK iilnoivs is ttaladi. He had, however, spent 

tuuoli nl hii timti Hiiioii^Nt till! Dulhahanta, with one of whose 

I «uh-tvibi>i, tlio AH llliori. Iio limi ititor-married. In 1900 he 

f» ill tilt' prim" "' I'to, hud IravdhHl much, and was described 

« ititrk-oitliilirinl, lull itiid thin, with a small goatee beard. 

OtirinK llii' yiWit \^W^ t*) \W\^ th(« Mullah made several 
wiWT\W»«lO»l«M'"""'''""'i"'""'' lli'"'wt '>t Muhammed Saleh, 
» nv«l 'i! tliw Kttdiirlyuh, I'll' moul, iuflnMitittl and popular 
Ho n-HUllii'-l iii'iiii' ti'il>'ii"lv by (ipditiimn prfHehiiifi in 

L , All 

P*'^* ten 

iera in 1895, after which he returned to his tariga, Kob 
Faradod, in the Dolbahanta, Here ho gradually acquired 
influence Ity stopping inter-tribal warfare, and eventually 
started a religious movement in which the Rer Ibrahim 
(Mukahil Ogaden), Ba Hawadle (Miyirwalal Ogaden) and the 
Ali Gheri {Dolbahanta) were the first to join. His emissaries 
sIho aoon succeeded in wi nnin g over the Adan Madoba, 
■table amongst whom was Haji Sudi,* his trusted lieu- 
tenant, and the Ahmed Farih and Rer Yusuf, all Habr 
Toljaala, and the Musa Ismail of the Eastern Habr Yunis, Habr 
Gerhajis, with Sultan Nur.* 

The Mullah made a special point of breaking up the 
tribal feeling. To efEect this he had offenders put to death 
by fellow-tribesmen, thus substituting his own authority for 
that of the headmen. 

At the beginning of 1S99, the Mullah committed Ms first 
overt act of hostiUty against the authorities of the Protec- 
torate. He suddenly appeared at Burao, raided other sub- 
tribes of the Habr Yunia, and forced the Mahraud Gerad 
Dolbahanta to join him. He then retired towards Bohotle. 

Shortly after this episode, in April, 1899, it was estimated 
by Consul General Hayes-Sadler that the Mullah's following 
amounted to about 3,000 men, hut he was beheved to possess 
only fiO modern rifles and a small quantity of ammunition. 

In the following August the Mullah again raided the Habr 
Yunis tribes, and re-occupied Burao with a force estimated at 
5,000 men, of whom 1,500 were horse and 200 had rifles. 
He gave himself out as the Mahdi, and nimours spread 
that he intended to advance on Berbera. 

The Consul-General accordingly proposed an expedition, 
with Burao as its immediate objective. Delay was, however, 
deemed expedient by Her Majesty's Government, having 
regard to the state of affairs in other parts of the world, 

* Haji Sudi was an ex -interpreter o£ the Royal N'avy. He had teon at 
Suakin sad wafi coDversaot with Decrieh vajs and hud impoHei mnay of 
their oustoma. 

t Sultaji Nur was the disgraced Sultno "t tho Habr-Y'tn's-lBhak iril e, 
•iiid was an outcast from his tribe. 

(8927) D 

At the end of October, 1899, the Chief of the. Dolbahanta 
tribe. All, was murdered by order of the MuUahj for refusing 
to assist in hia plans, and British influence was practically 
superseded in that portion of the Protectorate. The Mullah, 
however, apparently abandoned his project for an advance 
on Berbeia, and action against him, in consequence of the 
outrages above specified, was deferred owing to the wai' in 
South Africa. 

Early in the same mouth a boat from Jibuti, flying the 
French flag, conveyed a consignment of arms and ammunition 
to the Itahan Protectorate, where, without the consent of 
the Italian authorities, they were bought by the Sultan Oaman 
Mahmud, to be passed on, it is believed, later to the Mullah. 

In December, 1899, the Mullah's following dwindled, and 
he retired across the Prote.ctorate frontier to Walwal in the 
country of the Ibrahim Ogaden, 3 or 4 days' march south 
of Bohotle. Here he occupied himself in trying to combine, 
the Ogaden tribes against the tribes of the Piotectorat*, 
who had abandoned his cause. 

By the beginning of February, 1900, the Mullah had appar- 
ently collected more rifles, as well as large auppUea of grain 
and live stock ; but on the rumour of the advance of an 
Abyssinian force reaching him, he again retired, moving 
towards theWebi ShebeU. At this time his immediate following 
was reported to be about 1,200 men, while it was said that all 
the Ogadens had submitted to his authority. 

In March, 1900, an Abyssinian expedition of about 1,500 
well-armed men was despatched from Harrar against the 
Mullah, but, faihng to encounter him, fell back, and was 
followed up by 6,000 spearmen, chiefly of the Gallas and Harrari 
tribes. This force attacked the Abyssinians in a strong zariba 
with much boldness, but was eventually beaten back with 
a reported loss of 2,650 men. 

Early in June, 1900, the Consul-General reported that the 
Mullah was quiescent, bub that his movementa had con- 
siderably thrown back the civihzation of the country. 

On the 9th June, 1900, Colonel Harrington, the British 
"Agent in Abysainia, teiegi'aphed from Jibuti, that the Emperor 
Menelek proposed a combined movement o£ British and 
Abyssinian forces against the Mullah, and recommended 
acceptance of the proposal. 

In August, 1900, the Mullah renewed his activity by a 
sudden raid, which resulted in the capture of 2,000 Aithi- 
galla camels, and in causing all the British tribes to abandon 
the Hand in confusion. The Consul-General reported that the 
tribes were losing confidence in out ability to protect them, and 
that, unless confidence was restored, they might be driven to 
make the best terms they could with the Mullah. He accord- 
ii]gly urged the necessity of a forward movement. 

In September the Mullah made a second raid from Milmil 
on the Abyssinian Habr Awai at Harrhe, and on the 2(jth 
October, 1900, the Consul -General reported that the tribes 
who had suffered at the hands of the Mullah could no longer 
be restrained, and were preparing to attack him near Milmil ; 
and that consequently the half battalion 2nd Central 
African Regiment had been moved up towards Hargeisa. 

On 3rd November, the Consul-General telegraphed that he 
had heard from Harrington that the Emperor Menelek was 
willing to co-operate with a large force, and strongly recom- 
mended immediate concerted action, proposing to raise a levy 
of 1,000 men, including two mounted companies, witU a 
proportion of British officers under Captain (local Lieut. - 
Colonel) E. J. E. Swayue, Indian Army. Thb proposal being 
motioned, preparations were begun for organizing the first 
sedition against the Mullah. 

I Preparations bor the First Expedition. — The Opera- 
tions.— Advanced Post at S^uiala attacked by thb 
Mullah. — Skirmish at Waylahed. — Subjugation of 
Hostile Tribes. — Attack and Defeat of the Mcllah 
at Ferdiddin.— Return of the Force to Burao. — 
Dervish and British Casualties.^Observations op 
Colonel Swayne on the Expedition. ^)PERATioNa 
of the Abyssinian Force. 
Several conaiderations governed the decision as to timing the 
movement againat the Mullah. In January, 1901, a punitive 
expedition against the Southern Ogadens on the Juba was in 
progress, and it was expected that the operations would last 
to the end of March. It was therefore desirable, if possible, 
to defer the Somaliland expedition till our hands were free in 
Jubaland, unless it appeared that the Mullah's movement was 
connected with the rising on the Juba. Time also was requited 
to organize and train the levy. On the other hand, it was 
important to consider whether it would be an advantage or the 
reverse, if the operations againat the Mullah were timed to 
begin at a particular season. The headquarters of the Mullah 
in December, 1900, were at Milmil on the northern boundary 
of the Western Hand, and Bohotle, where it was thought 
that the Mullah might be attacked, aft^r he had been driven 
eastward by the Abyssiniana, is in the north of the Southern 
Hand. The Haud, therefore, became an important factor in 
the operations. During the dry season, January to April, this 
tract of countiy is moat inhospitable, and entirely devoid of 
water, thus rendering operations against Milmil or Bohotle 
during the first three months of the year a matter of consider- 

* s™ Map n. 

able difficulty. Yet, if the advance were delayed until the 
seaBoa when water is to be found in that region, the Mullah 
■would find it easy to evade our columns, and the difficulty 

of inflicting a decisive blow would be serious. 

On the othec hand, the rainy season was perhaps the best 
from the point o£ view of our transport and water supply, 
yet, if an efficient system of water transport were maintained, 
a considerable advantage over the enemy might be gained by 
moving in the dry season when his mobility would be impaired 
for lack of water. In the latter case, however, it would not 
be possible to count with equal certainty upon the Abyssiniana 
for effective co-operation. 

Conaul-General J. H. Sadler and Captain (local Lieut,- 
Colonel) E. J. E, Hwayne, after weighing all these considera- 
tions, decided that April would be the most favourable time to 
commence operations, and arrangements were made to that 
effect. The actual plan of operations, which was that the 
Abyssinians should drive the Mullah eastwards towards 
Bohotle where our expedition should attack him, depended 
on two main considerations, namely, the position of the 
Midlah at the time the operations began, and the extent to 
which the Abyssiniana would allow us a free hand in the Ogaden 
country. Information at the time indicated that the Mullah 
was returning to Bohotle about the 2Ist January, 1901, in 
which case the expedition would move straight on that place ; 
if he stood fast in the direction of Harrardiggit, Swayne 
woiild either have to wait till he was driven eastwards, or 
move to intercept the MuUah'a retreat tuwaids Bohotle, A 
direct move on Bohotle was ujidesirable, as this would uncover 
the whole of the Habr Yunis country. Accordingly, the 
preparations for the expedition were made on the assumption 
tiiat the advance would take place in the dry season in 
preference to waiting for the more favourable season of rains, 
and concerted action to this efiect was arranged between 
the British Commander and Ras Makounen, the Commander 
e Abyssinian force. 


Oil Mardi I7ti[\, 1901, the situation, howev-er, cliaiiged. 
'Jhe MiiUah was driven out by the AbyBsinians to the Dol- 
bahanta and was between Bohotle and Lansadcr. Swaync's 
operations could not, therefore, be dependent upon the co- 
operation of the Abyssinian force or upon the expedition 
nn the Juba. In these circumstances it was decided that 
with a view to prevent the Mullah from re-eHtabliahiag his 
]jower in the eastern portion of the Protectorate, the expedition 
should concentrate at Burao early in April, and operate 
against the Mullah down the Ain Valley, after making a. 
preliminary move against the Rer Ati to compel them to effect 
a settlement and return the loot taken from our tribes. 

The following instructions were issued to Lieutenant- 
(■olonel Swayne by Consul-General Hayes-Sadler previous 
to the departure of the expedition :— 

air. BetLera. Apil lltb, 1901. 

1 liave till' lioniiiic to iidilrcas joii in ponneption with the operations you 
ari' about to imderta]<e Hgainat tlie MulUTi Muhainmftd-bin- Abdullah. 

The object of the CTi>editLOTi is to capture or defeat the Mullah and to pot 
an end lo hiB movement in Ihe Dolbaiianta. Your operations will accordingly 
l>e directed against the Mullah nnd fliow who may noiv be found lo hp 
actively Boppocting hiin. 

Of the tribes who ore now roporti'd to have dealings with (he Midlah, 
with the expeption of the Ali Gheri, who may be ozpsc^^d to stand by him / 
to the last, it is not certain whieh will eontinne to nylmtain hia cause once i;^ 
he is confronted with our force. I enclose a note Fhave drawn up of our ' 
de^almga with the tribes after the disturbanpes of 1899, and I have noted 
fherdn, so far as information is available, tile prespnt attitude of the Dol- 
bahantA tribes from the reports which have from time to tinie been reeeived. 
Thia you will be able to check with information you will yom'selfapquive. But 
little reUanpe pan be (ilaeed on the reports reeoivpd as to the attitude of tlip 
Dolbahanta tribes, and it is probable that accm'ate information as to the 
nttitvide of the respective tribes will not be obtained till the expedition enters 
the coimtpy. It in, however, Ix^Uevod that, with tlie excoptioa of tbo 
A!i Gheri and possibly other aeptiona of the Girad Farih, the majority of 
the people who have joined the Mullah in the Dolbahanta have done so 
cither through fear of iiim or for peraoual gain, and that a large seceding 
from his following may be expected when our espedition takes the field, 

I have briefly recorded in the note our past dealings with the tribes in 
order that yon may know what SPttlenienta were arrived at^ and ii 
1 hose who are not now actively supporting the Mullah, take no attion which 
«ill conflict with those settlements. 


HOC, the post uiimleeds of the Habr Tijl)uala and cait^ni llabr 
Yimia tribes huve been dealt with, and unless any uf them now nutivelj 
support the Mullah, wliich I do not anticipate if all goea well, they should 
not in any way ba intOTfered with. 

Several of thein have to Bettto up [or loots, but this is a matl^T uot 
ill (mediately connected with the eiipedition and which can be attendml to 
» fterwards. 

The past and pcc-acnt conduct of the AH Gheri necesatateB that they 
should be punished, and I propose to infliot a Bne of 1,000 oajnois on them, 
whii^h you can jarataed tu enforce after the Miilkh has been dealt witli. 
As regards the Ararsamah, the Ba Aiarsamah and the Birkad, much will 
depend npou the attitude they a'^sume when our expedition is in the Held. 
If they do not actircly supitort the Mullali, I should be inclined to deal 
leniently with thera, our object being to suppress the Mullah and restore 

The chief danger of a largo oodition of the Dolbahauta agwnst na will 
lie in the possibility of our expedition bemg looked iipou as an Ishak 
invoflion of the Dolbahanta country. 

You will doubtless take al) possible measures to allay any sinpicion of the 
kiod ; steps in this direction have for some time past been taken here- 
with your knowledge of the country and people I need hardly warn you 
that any looting by our people of tribes who, though formerly with the 
Mullah, have cunce left him, and arc not now opposed to us, besidcB being 
impolitic, would create a dangerous scare and play into the hands of the 
Mullah by giving Mm the very means to efTect a powerful combination 
against ns which he if seeking, and which it might seriously tas our resources 
to meet. 

It ia for this reason that it is specially desirable to confine our operations 
to the Mnllah aod those tribes who are now found to be actively supporting 
him. Above all, those who seeede from the MuUoh and assist us against him 
must be protected, oven if the tribes who accompany our force have any 
'claims aguint^t them. Theeu will be matters for settlement after the con- 
clusion of the expedition. 

There are many claims by our tribes for damage done by the Hullah 
anil his followers ; it is reoaonablo that Oovenunent should be reimbursed, 
if possible, a portion of the heavy expenses incurred in connection with the 
expedition ; and the force will expect "lomething in the way of pri^e-raonoy. 
Tlieae should be met from any loot which is found with the Mnllah, or the 
ttibca now actively supporting him, and I am inclined to think that a fair 
proportion would be one-third to the force, ( 
damage done, andtheremainder for Gove 
a very subsidiary one, and you will doubtless ni 
judicB the main object of the expedition. 

So far as is known the Mjjjarten are hostile to the Mullali. But informa- 
tion was received yesterday that four emissariea of this tribe have been 
received in secret conference by the Mullah. The object ot their visit is 
^"tot known. Despatches have lately been sent by the Vice-Consul tor 

e-third to satiafy claims for 
:. This question is, however, 
it allow it in any way to pre- 

Italy at Aden to tbo Coimul-Geuoral for that coiuitry, who in now at Raa 
AIiiIb, to move the Miijarten under Sult«n Osman Mahniad and Sultan 
Yusuf AU to cut oH tho MuIIaIi'b retreat should lie attempt to eaoape to tho 
cOBSt throogh their eoantry. And I have lately addreHSed the Renidiait at 
Aden with a view to Biroilar warnings being givon to the ebiefa oa tho 
Bouthern Arabian littoral. 

I shall be glad to know if there is any further action wliioh it may occur 
to yovi can now be jisetiiUy tnkcn (rmn here to promote the object o£ the 

In tho unlikely event it the Mullah o&uring to surrender, in his case and 
ill that of the following— Ahmed Waraamah (known as Haji Sudi), Deria 
Anilf, anil Dcria Giiro— only an iinconditiona! surrender should be 
accepted, no ^larantce of any kind aa to future treatment being given. 
Kw, tho latt SultuJi of the Habr YuniB, may be guaranteed his life. 
I have. Ac. 
iSi^iiied) J. HAYRS-SADLER. 

' As the result of correaponJeuct, in November and 
December, 1900, between the Foreign Office and Consul- 
General Hayes-Sadler, sanction was given to raise the following 
local levies :— 

Camel Corps, 100; Mounted Infantry, 400; Infantry, 
1,000. The whole being under the command of 
Captain (Local Lieut. -Colonel) E. J. E. Bwayne, 
The employment with this levy of 17 British ofGcers— 
5 captains and 12 subaltfirna — was also approved, and recruit- 
ing proceeded. 

The nature of the work is best described in the following 
extracts from Lieut.-Colonel Swayne's report to the Consiil- 
General : — 

I n 

lived orikrB 

prelirainaiy measuri 
In less than a. week 250 men, com 
OoBst Police St^poye as N.C.Oh., n 
the use of their rifles. They i 

n the li-Jnd l^oveinbei', 1900, to tiUBe, as a 
number of men to replace the regulars.' 
rising eight sections andnr the command of 
reraised, armed and equipped, and taught 
>re marched inland by mo on the 28th 

* The residt of n decision to withdraw the 2nd Battalion King's African 
BiSes from the country, and to raise '2.'!i0 men torefleve the outlying garrisons 
hitherto furnished by them. The decision to withdraw the 2iid Battalion, 
King'a African RilleR was duo lo the repreEentation of lien t. -Colonel Brake, 
who received teporta that the cffioiency of tlie corpa was suffering from the 
want of vegetable diet in tho Protectorate and that their prolonged a baenci- 
from Central Africa would seriously affect recruiting then.' in Ihu fviture. 

November, aad the ifgular dutaciuncnts at Ad&dleh and Haj'^tsa, 3S inilea 
and 100 miles distant from Eerbcra, were relieved on the morning of the 
1st and 2nd Deuember respeutively, and aiippliea of rationa and ammimition 
were taken over at both places. A defensible masonry block-house for the 
storage of ammunition was built at Adadleh. 

No rifles bad yet arrived from England, so the new levies were aimed 
with the spare Martini-Henry and Snider rilleB of the Coast Police, and 
later on, when, on my return from Halgeisa on the 4th Deeeml»r, new 
seeliona were railed, such other Berviceable rifles of yarioua oalibres as were 
available in tlie ProteDtorute were utilised. On the departure of the regidara, 
l.'iO Martini-Enfleld single-loading '303 rifles were left on loan to the Pro- 
tectorate, and these also inimediately passed into the hands of the new levies. 

There was at this thne, owing to the feeling of exasperation causeil by 
Iht^ sufferings of the people, no difficulty in obtaining infantry recruits, even 
at the low rate of pay of 10, rupees a month, a rate 4 rupees less than that 
jiivea to the Coaat Pohee, On the first day some 1,200 men eame forward, 
lu selecting men, only tliose vouched for by responsible Chiefs and those 
belonging to trustworthy tribes were enlisted, no Dolbahanta being allowed 
to enter the ranks. Svery man, before marching out of Bcrbera, was paid 
an allowance 1^ piuohase his own Somali shoos and also a piece of American 
elolh. Extra hides and spare steel were sent up with the sections, and the 
men, amongst whom were many shoemakers and workers in iron, made and 
repaired their own shoes, and wade axes with which to cut thorn bushes. 
On the march thorn zaribas were made every night. 

In the beginning of December, when an expedition was sanctioned, you 
sutliorised me to increase the infantry of the levy up to 1,000, and later on 
to form a nioimted corps of 500 men. As I was at this tune alone, I had had 
to personally conduct the detaehnieiits up-country, and as this involved 
journeys of 200 miles to Hargeisa and back, I now found it unposaible to 
spore tlie four days occupied by the journey. Much work had to be done at 
the coast in brio^g over riding camels from Aden, in purchasing ti'ansport 
animals and supplies, and in sending caravans up-country. Estimates hciA 
to be prepared, and anna, equipment, clotlung, stores, water tanks, &e., 
ordered from England, Egyjit, or India. I found it neccHsary, therefore, 
to apply for the immediate services of two Subalterns in order to take charge 
_<tf the up-country posts, and on the 2nd BattaUon King's African Rifles 

ing from the ooast, the services of Lieutenants Byrne and Walshe were 
placed at my disposal. They were at once sent up to t^e charge of the 
' levies at Hargoiso and Adodleh (50 miles apart), whilst I continued to enlist 
men at Berbera. 

The raising of the mounted infantry gave much trouble. As aoou as he 

could be spared from Hargeisa, Lieutenant Byrne was sent westward to 

~}ebolek, where the Chiefs had agreed to bring up horsemen for enUstment. 

s succeeded in raising 100 men, bringing tbeu^ own ponies and saddles, 

t, owing to the threatening attitude of the Rer All Ogaden and to the 

Mquent disinolination of our tribes to leave their flocks unguarded, 
V enlistmeitt come to a standatill. 

^ I hmk the honour to luk 
«4* tka Km AIL Uem. 
tgmm, *Bal two stK^ticins of 
•« lb* burdo'. You were 
L t* suiction BO advance 

• •d f rm^^i ht iwtHlucii a contiDgent of 

: ** li'J'wr. Hia Majesty's Consul at 

-• tlMK tw nm* forward. Tho tribes 

•.^ vt fAn tl from the MnUah's raida, 

. •. n> h**lt. •»*»». wi=re not affected by tho 

•> «» tf <V m; mounted brauoh I found it 

w {muFB and mount my in/antty 

i up eo alowiy that it was 

F tat starting. I had (o enliat estra 

mI •ho to arrangu for getting in tribal 

• Ot operations. 

isleil for a tranBport torpa. These 
o called up for Bcrvioe or din- 
tile^ dntm were mainly connected irith the 
k «l ««^iik4 lirc-slovfc sent back front the front, 
•MWttnl llw tnuiBiiort riSemen, and were utiliaed us 
g amk xt a distance from the field columns. Thn 
«M« ••• *• pvot** part W'.'wtrd no |«y but were given a bonus out of the 
|ht>>'^u>.4, 1'A^Mird fiMiB ltK> onwiiy. 

Ki. tlv MivkU* of Jaaiuu)-, whiMtLhc first British officers began to arrive 
^ tlw i-,M>^ OM mi^ bad alrrody boen raised and the (tutachments at 
Hmi^M iM*^ .\iUtllch «t*e nmsiawably strengthened. These airaniy- 
mxHm ¥11* i»fy kr\* iiiatlFJV iiuk>t atWr the departure of the regulars, but, 
••4^ tu tW cuf!):i>ra)r<l rei«rta of our strength which reached the Mullah, 
W kvMiK' alipwliMisj™ of raid! by our levies and tribes on his own live- 
««*. and *a oiaitined biiuaclf to looking to his own prol-cction, and 
«l<M<4nn«rt Hie itlc* of making any fiirUier organised attacks upon our 

Allt^ithi-r i'l ofKcers iHiiiwI nic, viK., 1 major, 6 capfajna, 1 medical 
tilKccr, and l;l tnltaHnnis. MTien Ihr liivy was sauctioned no local nulitary 
•itahlixhuiellt" r^Ulf-d with the exception of the Coast Police, of whom 
*iwiii> lorly men ui>rt> NvaiUlile fur the charge of seotjons. Likely men of 
lltA l«vy wvrv liiailn aetiug tion-roromissioned officers, and taught by four 
liiillaii havlldani Ui>t inf timta Alien. The latter returned to India when 
Ihn Sinnull* *pi* »uttoi*iii(ly Hdvwitvd to lake oluirge of seotions, 
I llw InfMilry waa lUvidod into two corps of 5U0 men each, and the 
(muiclry aiitl mountwl Infantry formed one corps. The Mounted Corps 
WW wMHuiainkxt by Maj.w Vf. O, L, Beynon. D.B.O., I.S.C, and he was 
M>i>lnl by l^ptalii C. M- D. Bruce, B-K.A., who had charge of the Camel 
(Vr|«, aixd l^plnln J. W. M. -Mewwether, I.S.C-, oonunanding the mounted 
liilwiilit. Ihii luo iiiliuiliy i'or(iii were respectively commanded l^y Captain 


G. E. Phil]ii>a, R.Ji:., ikuI Caplalji M. M.^Xdll, Argyll and S.ilherlurd Kigh- 
landerF. (iBptnin B. A. fViedrichs, R.K., was appointed Adjutaot, Lieu- 
fo'nsDt Btous Trajiaport Officer, and Lieutenant Dickinson, Qiiart«miaHter. 
Biwldac AtuBa FArah raised and onmnidnded one of thn jiiountcd in/nntry 
I'oni panie«, and beAidex, acted aa Biaaldar-Major to the force. Chtin^ to 
hh inlimate knowledge of Somali ciiatoins aod his iiiHuence with the tribpN, 
I [ilaeed uuder his ohargo the arrangements for tribal sooating work. Spies 
nnd strong patrols were sent 100 miles aouth to report on the Mullah's 
lents, and to captoro prisonei'a and bo obtain information. A number 

I of the Mullah's spies n-ere caught and caraTana tatinB eu]iplies to hiin were 

' captured. 

The R*r Oulod of the Aidagalla were at lliis tuae trafflcking with the 
Mullah, and being an Ishak tribo in the midst of our own peopli 
necessary to coerce them into good bohaTiour. Risaldar Musa Farah by 
a rapid march with two aectiouH succ^wded in capturing and bringing in 
some d£ the rhief men, and these I found it convenient to attach to the 
exjxidition as a guarantee for the tribe's good behaviour. This measure 
allayed the ansiety of tljc levies as to the safety of their flocks duriuf; 
their absence. Tho Aid^alla bcharcd well, and I waa able, at the 
end of operations, to esiiross my satiafaction by making them a 
substantial present out of tho captured camels. In] February, owing; 
to the HarranligBit pool drying up, the Mullah waa compelled to shift 
quarters, and coneequenlly withdrew to the Bouthem edge of the Hand 
desert, to a pool of wat-er called Mcrai. The Abysainians, after the 
Mullahs attack on their post ut Jig-Jiga, recognised the gravity of the 
danger to their position amongst the Mahommedan tribes at Harrar, and 
decided to address tlio British Government with a view to a joint expedition. 
Ill January a force of Abyssinians, whith eventually reached 16,000 men, 
was sent down to the western edge of the Haud, from Jig-Jiga towards 
Uerlogubi, with orders to block that side of the country to the Mullah and 
prevent any chance of his combining with the Ogaden tribes, with whom 
Colonel Tetnan's expedition was at this time deahng. In February, owing 
to the operations of tho Abyssiuians, the Mullah found it necessary to leave 
Hersi. He had attempted to combine the Ogaden against them, but these 
tribes having l>een badly treated by liim, would not now help, and on the 
punishment of one of their outlying sections by tho Abysainiana, the Mullali 
iound himaelf compelled to retire eastward to Bohotle to our Dolbahantii 
tribes, his own Idiiamcn, wlio have always iiroved to be tho batkbone 
of his following. 

Shipments of ammunition began to arrive at Berbcra on the 10th 
January, and were followed by the rillta on the 7th February. The newly 
raised levies were put to the work of unloading, and eaJ'ned eoJimiendalion 
by their willingness to perform fatigue work, to which, until then, they had 
' been totally unused, and which is generally disliked by Somalia All 
K«fft«ers worked weil together, and recruiting, training, oqnipnipnl and 
mtlBkntry instruction were quirkly pushed forward. 

A credit was aHorded mo on the llubeca Ti'casuty, Mid nil 

The Kcr 
Ouled I '01 


pBiSh. Lateiona 
Rank oE India, in 

ofall and 
llitj of 

fcjfer of 

lid ailitlcs [jurcluiacd. Imally u"L'ro paid for on tlif 3|iot. in 
1 atiiount was opened witli the Aden branch of the If stioniil 
order to enable mo to pay by cheque for debts iaourced un 
account of tranait chargea and local purchaaea. Small advances of pay 
were made to the men in order to provide for the mtuntenanoe of their 
families during their iibi<euc<i in the interior. 

Meaats. Cowaaji Dinshaw Bcotliora tcanahipped all afoteg and brought 
them in their ateamers to thn coiLSt. They perfurmed thin work well. Some 
delay was caused by stores being, tlffongh error. oTcr-oarried to Ceylon. 

The men learned to shoot quickly, and in a competitioa held at Biirao 
in May actiially shot better than the Punjabi detachment. Their volleys 
nt 600 and SOO yards were well directed and tiro discipline becaiuo good, 
Buglora quickly learned the few calla I found it nvceaaary to touch tliem. 

The BO Punjabis, who liad been sent for from India tu act as harildara, 
di'ill instructors, and masira guo detaehmenta, nnfortnnately arrived on the 
coast only on the eve of the expedition leaving Biirao, when I had been 
compelled to do what I could with such ecsaity material as was avidhtblo in 
theahapeoE police on the coaat. I therefore decided to keep them aa a aeporate 
body and the Somalia were allowed to continue their work, (he tbre« maxJm 
guna, wliich had been fitted to riding camels, being managed entirely by 
them, under the direction of Lieul«QantB H. W. Thorp, East Torkahiro 
Regiment, and J. C. Lamprey, Boyal Dublin Fuailiers. 

Whilst enlifltmeut wa^ going on there was much sickness in the low 
coast region, and over 300 men had to be discharged and other men enlisted 
instead. Tlie wont of grazing alao caused much difficulty. The camels 
as quickly as they were purchased were aent up-nountry with supplies, and 
then had to be driven out to the grazing grounda some 40 miles distant 
from the interior levy-posts. The rains which should ordinarily have fallen 
in the Erst week in April were insufficient to bring out the graas, and a bad 
drought followed during April and May. All animals had thecefare ta bo 
oonatantly on the move, roaming about in search of food, and it became 
necessary to detach numerous parties of the levy to guard them. Even 
with the greatest care over 100 died and the remainder became so debilitated 
as to compel a postponement of the advance. 

On the Mullah's move eastward from Merai to the Dolbahanta country, 
a corresponding change of base oo our part became necessary. 

In April men and stores were sliifted, partly with our own transport and 
partly with hired animala from Adadleh to Burao. The latter place was qnito 
hare and the animals had therefore to be brought back some 40 lulles to 
graze. A defenaible post was made at Burao and strengthened wilh 
haibed wire, and £upply caiavans were sent up from Berbera by the 
direct route over tlio Sheikh Pats, Tlie reserve animunition at the Adadleh 
block house was, for safety, moved to Burao. 

The tribes at this time of the year require all their transport animals 
in order to shift their encampments when changing ground in search of 
grass ; moreover, their animals equally with ours were dying for the want of 
food. Much time was consequently taken up at Adadleh in intrrviews with 


tribal Eldera, wlio, howevpr, evenhially diii what tliey ware aaked t" d<i 
ill the way d£ supplying tranBport. 

Supplies vfen c&luutaUd ontheiusumptionthat tliQ force would requiie- Si 
twenty days' food carried tor it forward from Hurao, plus twelve days' ™ 
Hvo-atotk. Besides this a mootii's ratioaa was to be held in rcacrvp at 
Kurao, and aoother montli's food was to bn sent up to Bui'ao from Bei'bcra 
during the progi'ess of operations. All the supplies sent up byme iu Deceiii- 
br and January wern eoOBumed during the time ocoupied by the orgauizit- 
fion and training of the levies. Ijentcnant L. Murray, East Surrey Regi- 
ment, vaa directed to take charge of tlie supplies at Biirao. The mounted 
-infantry ponies were gra7.ed at the foot of the Golis range, where the only 
suitable gcaas for horses at this time was to bo found. 

Whilst the movement to Uuruo was in progress steps were taken to l, 
stop the Mullah's sources of itiformation. His spies in the lahak country 
were cither captured or driven away ; caravans taking stores to the Mullah 
were apprehended wttliin a radius of 00 miles, and a body of Iiis scouts 
was aurprised 30 miles south of Bnrao near Idoweina. Caravans coming in 
from the interior to Berbera were, as a rule, not interfered with, as it was 
not desirable or necessary to stop trade ; moreover, I derived much useful 
information from thum. Our own spies penetrated to the Rer Hagar 
Dolhahanta eocarapmenla at (\in Alio and Baliwcin, 75 miles south of 
Burao, and strong patrols acting on their information captured prisoners 
in the enemy's country, who supplied us with information. Some of these 
prisoners, after being misled as to our real line of advance were allowed 
to esca[ie at night, in order 1^3 return to the Mullah and deceive him. In 
order to assist in this object the Bolbahanta tribes at Bohotle were ordered 
to have sheep ready for the consmuption of the force at Eohotlc. 

A number of donkeys were purchased to asaiat in hospital transport 
and to be at the disposal, for riding purposes, of twenty selected Punjabis 
whom I had decided to take on from Buroo to my advanced field base. 
The rest of the Punjabis I left in the Burao post, as their slower rate of 
marching, and the amount of water and auppUea which they would have 
requited, would have considerably hampered our movements. 

Captain Phillips, who commanded at Burao, took the opportunity 
afforded by the delay caused by the postponement of the rains to perfect 
his men in musketry practice. 

Your orders were to capture or defeat tlic Mullali and to put an end to q 
his influence in the Dolhahanta country. It was borne in mind that once the ei 
expedition started no support could be given from the rear. In SomalUand, 
life revolves round tho camel. The people hve on the milk for the greater 
part of the year, and without the oamel the best grazing groonds distant from 
water would be unattainable, for sheep have to be kept near the wells. 
Without the camel the bulk of the people could n' 

In fonniug plans of attack, therefore, it ^ 
that if the flocks and herds of the enemy could b 
inevitably be compelled either to make terms o 

IS important to bear in mind 

le captured the men would 

a collect to atta/^k the 



TliB all- important point was to matoL Castci' tUan the eaemy mid be 
n,h]e to gurprUa him instead of his surpiising an. Slow taovement meant 
the poasibiJLty of attack by OTerwhelming maaaes o£ the enemy who noul'l 
havB had time to collect; and safety lay in rai>idity nf action nnd cmi- 
w([iient disorganiEation o£ the enemy's plans. 

ITie Mullah's fort-e waa reported to tonsist of aumo 5,000 nieu, the 
greater part of whom were horsemea, and he probably had Bome 600 rifles. 
Tho tribes on whom he might diaw for avipport probably miialered anotlicr 
^,000, but thcMm were uot able to gather together for more than a day or 
two owing to the want of grazing for their numcroua ponies. In addition, 
doubtful tribes, who would probably have joined the Mullah in uanc of our 
suffering a reverse, possibly had some 00,000 spearmen, and the Mijjarten 
tribes within the Italian sphere of influence, most of whom, however, were 
too distant to help the Mullah, had been estimut-ed by the Resident at .Aden 
at from 60,000 to 70.000 men. 

His Majesty's Consul- General had sent out proi-laniatiuna* informing 
tribes that only those who continued to a-ssiat the Mullah would be considered 
hostile to us, and warning them that tribes as a whole would be held respoii- 
»Lblo for fhe acts of individuals. I gave hostile tribes ftecjuent opportnnilies 
of making their submisaiDii ; and later on, afler every aL'liun, capturcil 
( hiefs were sent to them io explain (hat, provided they left the Mulhili, wii 
would eeaae to be hostile. 

It was intended to march direct on the Mullah wherever tho latest 
information should have located him, and, at the same time, by striking 
out at the liostilo tribes on the right and left of the line of march, to drive 
them back out of touch with him. I hoped early to capture sufficient live 
stodk to be able to drop the bulk of my transport at a point within striking 

^^ the I 

• PrudaiiHiiuiit. 

Be it knokrn to all concerned among the Dolbahanta tribes that the 
cxjiedition now about to bo dispatched by the (lovemment Is not agaiuitt 
the Durod tribes of the Dolbahanta ; it is to operalo against the Mullnli 
&lu(i a mmad-bin- Abdullah and those who ore affording Um assistance. 

All persons found supporting this Mullah will bo considered as hostile 
to tho Government and will be treated as such ; and tribes will be held 
answerable for their individual members. 

All tribes are therefore required to refrain from any dealing or conunonica- 
tiona with the Mullah, to leave that part of the country in which he now 
is and bia followers are, and to wain any of their members who may bo with 
the Mullah to leave him at once as they will be held responsible for any acts 
tted by such against the Adminiatration. 

(Signed) J. HAYE8-SADLEE, 

ail Brilajinie Majaty't Caneut-GiaiiTal, 
Homiiti Cooit Proteflcrate. 


diBtance of the Mullah and then advance as light as possible by fofcud 

inarches to the attack. In orilnr to nvoid delay, whioh might huva oMurrod Two coliirnT 

further on, the expedition was divided into two columas, each of whiuh furrned. 

was complete in itself, 200 camela being attached for water alone. The first Coluiunn 

column, oonaisting of the bulk of the levy, was under my personal command ; ^'"^ ""''''I'l 

it was made as hght as possible and a reserve of rationii ajid live stoek was 

brought up by tho second column, which consisted of aome 20 Punjabis and 

350 Somali Rifles, with a number of spearmen fur transport work, all under 

Captain McNeill. Both cohunna were to mari^h and camp together until a 

favourable opportunity of making a sudden attai'k on the enemy Hhoiilil 

]>rcsent itself, upon which the first column would leave all trauajioct aniiaulf, 

iiicept those neccaaary for the carriage of water, bnrhed wire and wounded 

nxen, with the second column, the men relying for their food upon the herdu 

of camels which could be quickly driven with them. 

In the middle of May, although Burao wor etill parched, rehi was Concoulrnl i 
reported to have fallen sufficiently in the Hand to make a move poasible. "' "Vinio. 
On the ^Oth May, therefore, the levies were concentrated with some StIO 
transport animals at Biu'ao, and the Mounted Infantiy and Camel Corpn 
were brought up simiJtaueoualy from the Golis r.inge, 45 milea distant. 
A new site commanding the wella was choBeo. luid sliMugly entrcuclicil. 

While these preparations were proceeding. Major the Hon. 
A. H. V. Hanbury-Tracy, Royal Horse Guards, who had been 
detailed to accompany the Abyssinian Force, had left for 
Harrar, and on April 5th it was reported that the British 
expedition had commenced its movement on Burao. 

On May 22nd, 1901, Swayne, leaving a garrison at Burao 'I'he ui»m- 
under three British officers with a month's reserve rations, gjart f™ni 
marched with the force 18 miles to Ber. The order of march Burao on 
„ , , . ■ ■ , . , tlie 22ml 

was generally an elastic square, witii tne transport in the Miiy. 

ceutrej and Mounted Corps half-a-tlay'a march ahead, pre- Order i^f 
ceded by scout* and spies. Mounted men and detached 
parties were also sent well out on both flanks and to the rear. 
At Ber, a check of three days occurred owing to the absence 
of a number of transport spearmen who were expected to join 
from the Habr-Toljaala tribe. 

Before leaving Burao, spies and scouts had been sent out inforniatii 
to keep two days' march ahead of the colnmna, and to send »tart. 
back from time to time such information as they were able 
to obtain, and to capture prisoners with this object. On leaving 
Ber on May the 25th, the information that the Mullah was at 



I Kuh.Fm 

Yahelli, having moved there through Boliotle and Lasaader. 
was confirmed. It was also reported that the Dolbahanta 
tribes had scattered for the want of grazing; that the Eer 
Ilagar and Ararsamah had gone southward towards Baliwein 
and Bohotle, and that the Jania Siad and Barkad had mo\Td 
westward towards the eastern end of the Bur-Dab range. 

Night marches were made bo aa to avoid the clouds of duat 
which would have indicated the march of the column, and a 
line of advance was chosen to avoid as much as possible dense 
bush, and to bring the force between the various sections of 
the hostile tribes. 

Eil Dab, 72 miles distant from Ber, was reached on the 
evening of the 28th, after three days' forced marching over the 
waterless desert ; the mounted corps being generally half-a- 
day ahead and keeping up connection with the scouts further 
1 ahead. On the way, the Mullah's stockaded village, and 
former headquarters, at Koh-Faradod* was burnt, the mosijues 
being spared so as not to offend Mahommedan feeling. 

The transport, after a little practice, was able to march even 
through thick bush at night, on a broad front of some six or 
seven strings o£ camels. SulBcient water was obtained in the 
rainpools at Ber to last the officers for 100 miles ; the water 
obtainable at Eil Dab and Ain Abo being only drinkable by 
Somalis. At Eil Dab our scouts captured a MuUah's caravan 
and located the various Dolbahanta tribes, 

Aa the biilk of the tribes was wavering, and it was 
probable that a sudden blow would decide them to leave the 
Mullah alone and return north, Swayne was anxious to punish 
the sections of the Mahmud Gerad Dolbahanta who had joined 
the Mullah, and raided our Habr Toljaala tribes. The tribe 
? generally on the left flank of the line of march, and as 
there was some danger of its raiding as far as Berbera after 
the force had passed, it was necessary to take steps to 
prevent this and so to reassure our men as to the safety of 
the women and children they had left behind them. More- 
over, the troops wanted live-stock badly in place of heavy 
"See ]HgB 49, 


bags of rice and- dattia which it was desirable to leave 

Hearing from prisoners that some encampmente of the 
Jama Siad section of the Mahmud Gerad tribe were some 50 
miles off, near Mayo, on the left of the line of advance to 
Yahelli, S'wa3Tie seized the opportunity and Bent off the 
mounted corps under Major Beynon to surprise them, the 
prisoners acting as guides. At the same time the infantry of 
both columns continued its march on the Mullah's position 
south of Yahelli, approaching it by an easterly detour which, 
besides avoiding the dense bush, enabled the force to take 
advantage of the grass plains and to make night marches. 
The columns reached a pool of rain-water at Samala on Arrival at 
May 30th, when news was brought in that the moimted corps 
had succeeded in surprising the Jama Siad sections of the 
Mahmud Gerad and capturing some stock. Swayne therefore 
decided to await the arrival of the captured herds and to 
form an advanced base before proceeding further. A strong AdyanoeU 
zariba, overlooking the wells, was conatrncted on a low hill ^1*81^1™* 
which was admirably adapted for defence, and barbed wire 
was plentifully used to strengthen the work. Foreseeing that 
the captured camels and transport would prove a strong 
temptation for attack from the enemy, Capt. McNeill, who 
was selected to hold the post, was directed to double the 
zariba, and to fill water tanks to use as cover against tiie 
enemy's rifle fire. McNeill carried out this work satisfactorily, 
and the excellent disposition of the maxim gun on a caim 
of stones commanding the zariba, afterwards contributed 
to a large extent to the repulse of the enemy when the post 
WHS attacked. 

Sections were also sent out to support the incoming mounted Mullah's 
corps, which presently arrived with some 300 captured camels, 
having covered some 90 miles and driven the hostile section 
of the Mahmud Gerad in flight northwards, thus separating 
them from the Midlab. In consequence of this action, the 
..Mahmud Gerad sent in deputations 10 make terms, and 


liouiid themselves to oppose the Mullah, who would now l>c 
compelled to meet the force, or lose all prestige with the 

Before proceeding with the aobsequent operations of the 
first column under Swayne, it is necessary to relate what 
happened to Captain M, McNeill, who was left in zariba 
at Samala to guard the live-stock captured from the Jama 
Siad and the prisoners. The British officers with McNeill 
were Lieutenants L. Murray, East Surrey Eegiment ; J, C. 
Lamprey, Royal Dublin Fusiliers, and H. Younghusband, 
Bedford Regiment ; whde the native officera were Jemadars 
Mahomed Yusuf, H. A. Abdurrahman, and Jama Siad, H. T. 
Abdi Mahomed. Captain McNeill reported : — 

II 1 was altai'keil on the -211^ dud .Ird June, lliOl, while in lariba at 
'" SamaU by a !ocne of the Miillah'^ tiK-n. cetlmati^d at 3,000 on the Sod June 
and 0,000 on the SIrd. Theae estimutes of numbers were formed ml the spot 
by niyuelf and the three British offii^ers under itie, and were subnequently 
I'onfimied by what priBoners, captiu'ed aftei' the fight, told iib. The foree 
under my command numbered just under 500, but of these only about 
370 were armed with ritleH, the reot lieing jnnda up nf spoarm.en and a few 
tribal horsemen. Added to this wo had to guard forty-8i.\ prisoners, about 
3,500 caniclB, about 50 eheep, goats, and cattle, and about fifty horses. 
I had aloo one '460 maxim served by Somalia and under command of lieu- 
tenant Yoimghusband, Bedford Regiment. The men were in a separate 
/.aribatrom the camcU, &c., both zaribas being on ageatle slope facing nearly 
west, the luen'n zariba being above, the cairtel zaiiba below and under 
eomuiand of view and fire from the men's zariba above. The maxim was 
placed on a cairn of stones at the top of the men's zariba, and commanded 
a good tield of fire aJl round. 'J'ke ground on all sides waa fairly open, bein;! 
praetiuolly clear of bushes for about 130 yards round both auiba.i. Tho 
lower or south-west end of the tamel zariba is on the edge of a shallow 
pool of water about 100 yards broad. On the fm'ther side of this water 
some fairly thick bush in |iatcbes comes pretty close to the water's edge, 
and it ifl to the better cover afforded in this place that I attribute the enemy 
getting close up to the camel zariba. The second eotunm got into their 
T.ariba on the Slst May in the evening. Tlie first rotumn deputed south- 
- east about 3 P.M. on the Ist June — the morning of tho lat Jime being spent 
by the second cohiiiin in strengthening and nialiuig generally secure both 
v.sJ'ibas. Ilie joumlng of the 2nd Juno was also spent in the same way. 
The attack began about 3.30 p.m., 2nd June. 

Aboat that time I saw some horsemen on a low range of hills about a 
mile to south-eaat. These men rapidly moreaaed in nmubere, and begaa 

tu (le^Lnd into tlie plain and coi]ii< rapidly towoids the zaribB. l at tmpe 
BCDt to eall in the camels, This waa well and expeditiimsly done, only two 
camels, wbicih broke away, being captured. 

The animals were driven into their zariba from both sides. On the north- 

t aide, where the greater nmnber of camels nere, they got somewhat 
towded in the entrance, and sbme got frigbtened and broke back, one 
Jot — a good ISO or eo — getting right out into the open plain about 600 yp.rdB 
or BO distant. By this time some of the horsemen had got right round to 
this aide, and I began to fear that I would lose at least a portion of the 
camels. I Bent out Jemadar Jama Siad (of the Police) with one section tu 
try and keep ofl the enemy till, at least, most o! the camels had been got 
in. I supported him by turning the masim on to the nearest horsemen. 
Jama Siod pdrfoimcni his work in a most excellent munaer, as he not only 
kept off the enemy till the camels near the zariba were brought in, hut hb 
also advanced well out into the plain and brought in all the camels which 
had gone out. Some of the horsemen had got right round by now — a good 
way out — but by keeping the masim on them, supported by long-range 
volleys from the Pimjabis, we did much to check them. Lieutenant Murray 
hod aisa gone outride the south side of the icariba with two sections and got 
all the camels in oa that side. Meantime, the enemy had kept pressing on 
from the south, the hoi'semen being supported by a large number of infantry, 
mostly armed with speora, but some hiul riUoa from which they kept up a 
somewhat irregular gro on the zariba, from which we lost two men and two 
horses killed and one man woimded. Tlie enemy advanced in the most 
plucky faabion, but not a man got up to the zariba, though some weie shot 
oliKie to it. By this time it «o.a getting pretty dark, and the attack slackened 
and ItnaUy ceased (or a time, though the enemy kept up an irregular fire, 
which, however, did no further damage The enemy did not go far back, 
however, but remaioed faiily clo«o They had so far failed in both their 
obJBUta, I.e., to cany off the camels and get into the zariba. Just previous 
to this 1 sent Lieutenant Lamprey to hold the lower edge of the uamol aoriba, 
as I muoh feaj'ed the results of the enemy getting in among the camels. 
It was very well I did this, as a determined attempt was made soon after 
dark to rush the north-west comer of the camel zariba. Some of the entany, 
asaistod by the darkness and the more favourable nature of the ground 
near here (on the further side of the water), got right up to the zariba, 
and were shot down practically touching it — on the outside, however, 
not a, man got inside. At the same time another attack was mode on the 
^, jigrth-ooBt ma.\im corner of the zarilja. This was held by the seven men 

o worked the maxim and by twenty-two Punjabis. Tlie outside of the 
a well protected by wire, whicli consitlerably delayed the enemy. 

bi and some good shooting by the Punjabis ehecked this rush also, about 
ten dead bodies being foimd round and near this part next morning. No 
further attai^k was made during tlie night, but a dropping lire was kept up 
by the enemy till about 10 I'.w, After this we were left in peace, but the 
y couid be heard all night moving about in the bush and calling to each 

ler. Tliey must have carried awav a lot of dead and wounded diuing thu 

1927) " \ii " 

night— H pretty goud proof of tbis bein^ Chat v/e siibiuquisotly fuLmd aboi 
ten or twelve of their borseS dead at TortouB places round t^e zaxiba. There 
were no s<Lddles or bridles uu any of them- Our total loss bo for wus two 
killed and one wounded. 

On the 3rd June, oa soon aa it woa Light enough tn Bee, I thoroughiy 
examined aJl the ground round about and the hills near with a powerful 
telHseope, but could only pee about ton horsemen and two foot men to the 
east. These men were about 3 miles off and going directly away from ufl, they 
soon disappeared trom sight. About 8.45 A.M. a large and rapidly iuoreasing 
niunber of foot men began to liaue from the hills to the south. They 
rapidly extended out till they Wfrc in one long line several ranks deep. They 
advanced straight on uu, gradually opening out and enveloping south and 
south'WPBt Bides of men and camel zaribas. At a distance of 1,200 to 1,500 
yards out, the line extended fmjn a point behind and to the east of the 
ina.iim gun cairn to a point well out and beyond the broken ground on 
furtlier side of water at lower (west) end of the camel zariba. They came 
on at a steady pace, opening out aa they came and keeping a good general 
line. At about 400 yards they ojipnod fire. I should say they must have 
had 70 or 80 msa. armed with rillca, and from this lire we snUercd several 
casualties, though lui'kily most oE the bullets went high. I ordered my men 
to reserve their fire till the enemy were within 600 yards of the zaiiba. 
This they did, nut a shot being fired till then. We then opened a heavy fire 
from both lifiee and maxim, tJle result of which was that not a man got 
within 150 yalds of the sooth or east aides of the zariba, though they 
advanced moat pluckily. 

Ijentenant Lamprey, with some transport and Bpearmen again ht'l<i 
the camel zariba, and here the brunt of the fighting most decidedly fell, ii«, 
in faot, it did the previoui day- 
Aided by the more favourable covet to the went and Bouth-wetit, the 
enemy got quite close up to the zariba, about 30 dead being found near this 
end alone, 15 of which were dragged out of the water close to the zariba. 
However, Lieutenant Lamprey and the men under him proved quite equal 
to holding their own, and, aa on the 2nd instant, not a man got into the 
zariba, though aovoral were killed dose up. Two of our spearmen were 
killed cmd one wounded by apears in thia zariba. This was the only port 
that was seriously threatened, and to lieutenant lamprey 1 wiali to givu 
every credit for the way he held thia zariba. Hod the enemy succeeded in 
getting into this zariba it would have been a very serious matter, as they 
could have coltected there under cover of the lar^ nuinlier of uam^-ls collected 
in it. They could then have advanced up to attack the lower edge of the 
man's zjiriba still under cover of the camola till quite close up, and even if 
they had not succeeded m getting into the upper zariba they would almost 
to a certainty have been able to let out all the camels from the lower end. 
After this rush was stopped the eofiuy relTeat«d, nor liid tbcy renew the 
attack. Our total loss fur the two days' fighting was nine killed and nine 
wounded (one wounded since dead). Wc actually found 180 enemy dead 
tound the zariba, and took five prisonci's. leBtJmate the eatuiy's total loss 


^^ Tiff 


1 500 tUlBd and wounded for these reasons: 180 dead antunUy counted 

jal accnp of fightiiiB, and I ara practically sure thnt a*, least 20 dead 

r been found, bavjng got away wouoded and died some dlataoce 

This mtvkeB "200 dead. Now, if it is taken into oonsi deration that 

•e all round us (as wp know they were} on the night uf the 2Qd 

gie, it is (dear they must have carried off a large numbcir of dead and 

landed, and i£ we further reckon two men killed out of five hit — in ray 

oa a liberal allowanee — the oumherg of the enemy killed and w 

d be 200 killed Hid 300 killed and wounded, includ'ng all carried away 

e night of the 2nd instant. 

n conelucion, I wish to state that I was particularly pleased with 
B work of all the British and native olficers of the column under me ; 
y all did their work in a manner (hat left nothing to be desired. 

To return to Colonel Swayne'a movements. On June 2nd, Fimt column 
r the ponies of the mounted infantry had had a day's oianh on 
after their hard work, the first column, leaving behind Mullah, 
surplus rations, and taking only wat«r and hospital 
lels, and driving eating camels for rations, moved on 
Waylahed, to which place the Mullah hail by this time 
transferred his headquarters. The direct rout* through the 
difficult Higloli Pass, where an attack under unfavourable 
conditions for the force might take place, was not used, a 
detour being made across the open plains eastward towarik 
Tifali and Las Anod, at which place Swayne succeeded 
interposing his force between the Mullah and the Mahraud 
^rad Dolbahanta. 
In retiring to liis headquarters after his successive skinniBh 
iveraes at Samala, the Mullah had passed his force through ""J'^''™- 
hills in detachments separated from one another by a 
considerable interval, and thus, the scouts having given 
timely warning, Swayne was able to push between the hostile 
detachments and complete their discomfiture. The Mullah 
himself, together with Haji Sudi, 8ult-an Nur and others, was 
found with some 500 horsemen, and appeared at first to 
intend to attack the rear-guard, but on the mounted troops 
Beynon being withdrawn from the front to 
his horsemen broke into groups, and, when 
t up into small parties, attempting t( 


a score of practicable passes over the stony hills. Thi 
occurred about 5 p.m., and Swayne, deciding to carry the 
pursuit through the night, divided the mounted troops into 
several detachments, and followed up the tracks of the 
largest party himself with the pick of the horsemen. Mean- 
while three companies of infantry (450 men) were moved up 
in support and the transport was zaribaed at the foot of 
a low hill, protected by two companies. 1 

The pursuit was carried on until it was too dark to serf 
tracks, wliich became lost in dense jungle and scattered in 
every direction. Having no guides, a halt was made until 
dawn, when the column again proceeded, and, eventually 
reached Waylahed, which, with Ana Harigli, formed 
Mullah's chief centres. 

At Waylahed some horses and prisoners were taken, an( 
the native encampment, large enough to contain 10,000 people, 
was burned. As themenatid horses had not been watered for 
twenty-six hours, Swayne decided to retrace fiis steps and, 
rejoin his infantry which he met on the way about 3 p-ig; 
on the day following the night pursuit. The horses were eO 
fatigued that it was found necessary to leave them behind^*^ 
some of them could not even walk. During, and previoiB 
to, the pursuit some fifty of the enemy were killed &iji 
some fifty taken prisoners. Forty-five horses were captoid^ 
and several rifles, ' 

On the pursuit being continued, a combined movement w- 
the force was made on Ana Harigli, where some more of 
the enemy's fugitives were killed and horses captured. From 
Ana Harigh the tracks led eastward, and following them up 
the force reached Courgerod and Ben Tagla (about latitude 8° 
and longitude 48°) on June 12th, On the way more prisoners 
were made and horses and camels captured ; an important 
horseman of the Ali G-herl being killed amonf^st others. 1 

It was found that the enemy had only watered at Ben Tagla, 
and had then moved south into the Haud, Reconnaissances 
were therefore sent out in all directions on the 12th and 


the I3th, one under Lieutenant O'Neill penetrating eastward 
to latitude 8° 5', longitude 48° 30', and one under Risaklar 
I Farah (Camel t'orps) going south to within a day and a 
half of Mudug. It was discovered that the Dolbahanta 
allies of the Mullah had retreated south-eastward towards lUig, 
and that the Mullah himself, with all hia herds and flocks, had 
fled due south across the Haud to Mudug, abandoning hia 
camels, bullocks, ponies, &c., and leaving his gurgis* standing. 
Having an insufficient number of water-tina to take the force 
across the Haud at this point, Swayne found it necessary to 
relax the pursuit until he could obtain a aupply from 
McNeill's zariba, towards which he now marched. He hoped 
to receive a sufficient number of tanks, &c., on the way (these 
being sent to meet him), and to be then in a position to proceed 
with the punishment of the Ali Gheri, whilst awaiting instruc- 
tions as to whether he should enter Italian territory at Mudug. 

During theae operations it was ascertained from the Avtion of 
prisoners captured that Sultan Osman Mahmud had aided m'^^j^u^' 
the Mullah in his escape. An aayluni had been granted him 
in Mijjarten territory, and the Sultan himself had sent 
caravans of arms, &c., to aid him, while some Mijjarten 
emissaries had actually escorted the Mullah's cattle to Mudug, 
Captain Friedrichs succeeded in capturing one of these cara- 
vans while on its way from Bosaso to the Mullah, and it con- 
tained amongst other things, three rifles and a c[uantity of 
ammunition Jn rice bags. In view of this information, 
letters were sent to the Mahmud Gerad, Berkat Gerad, 
Sultant Yusuf Ali, and Sultan Osman Mahmud, offering a 
reward for the capture of the fugitive prophet, and the Berkat 
__and Mahmud Gerad were asked to come into the British 


I the pursuit of l-he Mullah to Illig would probably 

ing the column into collision with Sultan Osman Mahmud, 

r * Oiimel cloths used as tsata, 

f t Yuauf Ali was the Sultid. of Obbio, who had hitherto been loyal fo 
e British cause. 

who waa an Italian protege, Swayne considered it incumteiit 
on him, before proceeding across the Haud, to obtain in- 
structions. He therefore wrote to the Consul -General from 
Heli Madu on the 13th June as follows : — 

Mj force Is, I consider, adequate in the present state of my information, 
biit should it tranipire that theMiJiarten forces are stronger than I at jireaont 
think thera to be, I shall, with your approval, concert meaaures with the 
Abyssinian force operating west of me between Gerlogubi and Bohotlc. 
The Mullah has probably lost all chanre of dominating the northern Dol- 
hahanta, but I am not »t all satisfied that he may not hereafter return anil 
re- establish hU authority with the aouthern Dolbahanta. 

It is a fortunate thing that the Kayat tribe, which most strongly sup- 
ported him, appears to have suffered the severest loHsefl. 

It ia not in any case probable that, provided the Protectorate main- 
tains a moderate police force available for immediate action, the Mullah 
can again disturb the peace of the Ishak country, although, possibly, he 
may compel the Dolbahanta tribes south of BiU' Dab to fly to us for pro- 
tection or to accept his domination. 

It IE a question, having regard to the possible forces which may be 
developed agiunst us, and also having in mind the extra expense entailed 
by prolonged operations, whether the force should leave matters as 
they are or go on. But, as the Italian territory and prot^g^s woidd become 
involved, I think it best to Itave this matter to you. 

Captflju Friedrichs goes in cojumand of some 300 rifles, escorting back 
over 2,000 captured camels, and will await j-our reply at Burao. 

I shall be glad to get yunr instructions as soon an possible, and will 
meanwhile deal with the Ali Gheri tribe. 

All the officers with me are well. I have not, howpver, heard from 
Captain McNeill, and cannot therefore say, but Captain Fiiedricha will 
inform yuu. No opportunities of communicating occurred before thin, 
owina to groups oEthe enemy'' s horsemen being on the road. 

Consul-General Hayes-Sadler received Swayne'a despatch 
on June 20th, while at Sheikh, and at once represented the 
situation to the Foreign Office. He pointed out that if Swayne 
now withdrew from pursuing the Mullah there would be no 
finality to the fanatic's movement, and that he might at any 
time return to the Dolbahanta and redominate that province. 
He was of opinion that as the Mullah could not be left at 
Mudug, so close to our Protectorate, arrangements should be 
made with the Abyssiniana for a concerted move with Mudug 
as the final objective. His Majesty's Government were. 

however, unatle to authorize the pursuit of the MuUah into 
the Italian sphere, and considered that the operations should 
terminate subject to any action which might be indispensable 
in the Ali Gheri country, and that Burao should be occupied 
by a mobile force for the protection of the Dolbahanta. These 
instructions did not, however, reach Swayne until the 
expedition was on its way back to Burao at the end of July. 

Having satisfied himself that the Mullah had actually Sway 
escaped to the Mijjart«n, with the collusion of the Mijjartfin ^ j^ijo^g 
people, and seeing that provision for more water than he had ^If^ '' 
at Beretabli was necessary, Swayne decided to eifect a juncture 
with McNeill at Lassader, south of Samala, and there receive 
from him the necessary water-tins to enable the column to 
proceed, if necessary, across the Haud to Mndug in pursuit of 
the Mullah. He consequently moved off and met McNeill's 
detachment 15 miles south of Samala without incident, the 
road back from Beretabli being marked by the bodies of men 
wounded at the zariba who had died on the road. There 
waa, therefore, no doubt that McNeill's estimate of casualties 
was fairly correct, and that, including the losses inflicted on 
the Mullah by the column, he could not have lost lesH than 600 
men killed and wounded. It was also clear that the Kayat, 
Adan Madoba, Rer Hagar, Ali Gheri, Jama Siad, Nur 
Ahmed, and Mijjart«n tribes were all implicated in the 
attack on the zariba, as was evidenced by the bodies of men 
actually shot, and by wounded men found on the road. 

In these circumstances, Swayne resolved to punish these 
refractory tribes. On the 19th June, by making forced 
marches, the Rer JIagar karias were surprised at Jillib, and 
more karias* of the Rer Hagar and Ararsamah were attacked 
at dawn on June 20th some 20 miles further on, with the 
result that over 3,000 camels, 20,000 sheep, and 620 cattle 

e captured. 

The effect of these sudden seizures and attacks on the Jama 


Siad and Rer Hagar had a salutary effect. Overtures ' 
made by both tribes, also by the Nur Ahmed, and the Beikat 
pxpressed their willingness to come in. 

It now only remained to compel the Ali Gheri to come to 
terms. By Jidy 8th this tribe was subdued after suffering a 
loss of some 50 men and 6,000 camels. The Eiders came in and 
some 25 of them were sent north to Berbera. 

While at Kurmis, Swayne tried to communicate with the 
Abyssinian force operating on the western aide of the Hand, 
but his scouts returned from GJerlogubi, reporting that the 
Abyssinians had gone south-westward in search of food, 
and had then marched back to Harrar, He received a letter 
from the Abyssinian Commander by a roundabout way, 
asldng for instructions, but found it too late to assist him, and 
many of the Abyssinians died for want of food. 

In the meantime the Mullah, who had succeeded in getting 
together his more fanatical followers* at Mudug, being 
threatened from the south by Sultan Yusuf Ali, of Obbia, and 
finding his retreat to the Ali Gheri comitry blocked by our 
levies, moved north again across the Haud to the neighbour- 
hood of Beretabli in British territory. 

As it was important to give the Mullah no time to re-es 
lish his authority with the tribes, Swayne determined to 
transport his force once more across the breadth of t^e 
Dolbahanta country and attack him, but on coming up with 
the enemy's rearguard near Courgerod orders of recall reached 
the force. Swayne was now over 340 miles from the coast, 
with no support nearer than Burao, 150 miles distant, and to 
retreat before an active enemy, through a country teeming 
with possible enemies, was courting serious danger. He 
therefore decided on the offensive, and proceeded to break up 
the Mullah's force before returning to Burao. 

Arriving at Courgerod after an 18-mile march at simset-' 

• These men were called Derawpsh (Dcrviahc), and were midfir oa 
fij;ht for theit leligion. 


the 16tli Jiilj, his scouts, who had been sent ahead, 
lorated the Mullah at Ferdiddin. some 14 miles eastward, 
Swayne decided to continue the march the same night and 
attack the enemy at dawn. 

There was no moon, so, in order to enable the column to 
get through the bosh, only the maxim, hospital, and water 
camels were taken forward, some sixteen animals all told, 
while the rest of the transport was left at Gourgerod in a 
strong zariba. 

The strength of the column had been reduced (owing to the 
necessity of detaching parties to escort captured animals and 
prisoners back to Burao) to about 700 rifles, 100 of whom 
were left to guard the transport at Courgerod. The mounted 
troops numbered about 75 men, exclusive of some 350 to 4(XI 
Dolbahauta tribal horsemen upon whom no reliance was to 
be placed. 

The force started at midnight preceded by scouts, and by 
dawn had descended into a shallow, bush-covered valley. 
Here some prisoners were captured, who reported the Mullah's 
villages to be just beyond a spur on the right of the valley, 
about 3 miles distant. The Mounted Corps was accordingly 
sent forward at a trot to reconnoitre and report, while the 
eolumn assumed the following formation of attack :— 

The Head-quarter escort (Came) Corps) in the centre, with 
Lieutenant P. A. Dickinson's company as a reserve ; the 1st 
Corps under Captain Phillips on the right flank to crown the 
hills, and the 2nd Corps under Captain McNeill to keep on 
the left over the plain ; allunits being warned to keep well in 
touch of the centre, and not to be led into a disorganized 

The smalt Mounted C?orps, some 75 men all told, under 
Major Beynon, under whom were Captain Friederichs and 
Lieutenant Walshe, soon rounded the spur some two miles 
ahead, followed by 350 tribal Dolbahanta horsemen, while the 
Head-quarter Camel Escort was moved up as a link to connect 

1 the column. 

17th JtinD 

saaco by 

Heavy firing coninienced aln\ost iDimediateiy behind the 
spur and along the hills above, and the Dolbahanta horsemen 
at once galloped back, Recognising that the mounted branch 
must be more heavily engaged than he had intended, Swayne 
directed the reserve company, under Lieutenant F. A. 
Dickinson, to move to the edge of the spur, whence a 
commanding fire could be brought to bear on the enemy in 
the plain, while the rest of the troops were ordered to 
extend and follow quickly in the order previously inti- 

Lieutenant Diddnson's men doubled over the intervening 
two miles and seized the spur, suffering somewhat from the fire 
of the enemy on the commanding hills beyond. Thanks 
to the fire of the Head-quarter Escort, however, that portion 
of the enemy which was in the bush in the plains, and was 
then attacking Major Beyuon's Mounted Corps, was checked, 
and the latter were able to fall back on the spur, but not 
before a number of our men were killed and wounded. 
Lieutenant Dinkinson was among the latter, and the maxim 
camels and some ponies were shot down. Our SomaUs, how- 
ever, clung steadily to the spur, and even managed, of their 
own accord, to disentangle the maxims from the dead camels 
and bring them into action on commanding ground. 
' The advance of Captain P hilli ps' corps over the hills on the 
right had now brought a considerable volume of fire to bear 
on the enemy in this direction, with the result that the 
dervishes were compelled to take cover and fire from behind 
boulders and bushes. This fire, however, did not last long, 
for Lieutenant C. H. Stigand's company, which was on the 
extreme right, presently outflanked the enemy and compelled 
hira to retire. 

Immediately the enemy's attention was occupied by the 
1st Corps, Lieutenant Dickinson's men went forward, under 
a native officer, and, descending at a run down the further 
sidey of the spur, drove the enemy from the hilla beyond. 
The dervishes' casualties became so heavy when they lost 

P"* plac 

cover tliat they gave way all almig the line and the retire- 
inent became a rout. 

In the meantime, the 2Ed Corps advancing steadily on the 
left, drove back the enemy which had been engaged with the 
Mounted Corps, and, moving fast through the bush-covered 
plain, outflanked the derviahes on the left. The enemy then 
mounted their ponies and galloped into the bush, continually 
losing men by our rifle fire. The pursuing force reached the 
Mullah's encamp-Tient and alter burning it, chased the enemy 
for five miles or so through the dense bush. The enemy tried 
Jiere and there to make a stand, but could not face our fb-e, 
Buffered considerable loss. 

The Dolbahanta horsemen, on whom no reliance had been 
placed, took no further part in the fight, but galloped away to 
loot the Mullah's flocks and herds. 

Captain Friednchs was killed at the commencement of the 
action. He had been sent forward by Beynon with 
some of the Mounted Corps to act as an advanced party, and, 
seeing the enemy on the hills some distance to his front, he 
concluded that the plain was clear of them, and advanced into 
some very dense bush where an ambush had been prepared. 
Immediately firing broke out, Beyiion moved up, dis- 
mounted, in support ; but nearly half his camels and ponies 
were almost immediately shot, and the enemy's riflemen, 
increasing in numbers at every moment, advanced, completely 
outflanking the Mounted Corps on both flanks. Beynon 
then directed a retirement. Owing to the loss of their mounts, 
the men could not get away without suffering loss, but the 
casualties would have been much heavier bad not Lieutenant 
Dickinson's company and the Ist Corps checked the enemy by 
firing from the spur. 

On the pursuit being continued, the enemy fled south, 
across the Italian border, into the dense bush of the Hand, 
leaving dead and wounded everywhere, and scattering in all 

After the pursuit had been continued some miles the cohe- 

Deatb oe 



fiioii ol our levies becanif. somewhat loosened, ao McNeill, 
who had got ahead of the lat Corps, decided to make a check, 
and reorganize his man. Here he waa joined by a company 
of the 1st Corps, luider Lieutenant C. H. Stigand, Royal 
West Kent Regiment, which had, by Captain Phillips' order, 
assisted in the pursuit, wheeling round from our right flank. 

By this time the force was nearly 50 miles distant from its 
last watering-place, and there was no water nearer than Bere- 
tabli. The water-tanks, with Lieutenant C, H. Taylor {York 
and Lancaster Regiment) at Courgerod, were nearly empty, 
the meu had expended the water they carried themselves, 
while only six camel-loada of water remained for the wounded 
men. The ponies and camels of the Mounted Corps had not 
been watered since the evening before, when only a limited 
quantity waa given, while many ponies and camels had been 
killed or wounded by the enemy's rifle fire. The Dolbahanta 
horsemen, moreover, were useless, and had disappeared. 

In these circumstances, and being also in some anxiety as 
to his wounded, Swayne found himself compelled to abandon 
the pursuit. After giving the men a few camels for their meal, 
collecting and burying the dead, and arranging for the carriage 
of the wounded, he returned the same evening to Coiu"gerod 
(H miles), arriving at the zariba at nightfall. 

It is worthy of notice that from midnight on the ITith to 
midnight on the 17th, during which time they had drunk 
nothing but such water as they carried, the men had marched 
40 miles, and had fought an action in dense bush and over 
stony hills. 

Among the enemy, the Mullah's own kinsmen, the 
backbone of his following, had been severely handled. Over 
00 dead bodies were counted on the ground and the pursuit 
IS many more, a large number of Sheikhs and well- 
known men being found amongst the dead. From subaeqnent 
reports, it was found that the Mullah's following never stayed 
their flight into the waterless desert for five days, and few 
reached the wells of Mudug and Bia-Aun 'alivfij- for 


niim'bera died of thirst ty tlie way. TLe Mullali Limself, hia 
Bon, and his CUef Adviser, Haji Sudi, were reduced to makiiig 
uBe of the water found in the stomachs of dead camels, while 
his chained prisoners escaped and his supporters scattered in 
all directiona seeking their own safety. 

No water being found at Courgerod, Swayn'j's force moved Mareh to 
at dawn on the 10th June, down a steep ravine to the plain ^^^y ' " 
below, marching on a made road, possibly of Phcenician or 
Indian origin. It reacted Heli Madu, the first watering place 
since Las Elberdali, some 80 miles back, at mid-day on the 
18th. Hereahaltofhalf-a-day was made in order to fill water- 
tanks, and to enable Lieutenant H. St. G, Boulton, I. M.S., to 
look after his wounded. Beretabli, where a detached portion 
of the Mullah's force which had not taken part in the fight, 
was reported to be, was also reconnoitred, but the horsemen 
reported that the enemy had fled. 

Marching some 20 to 25 miles a dav, Swayne con- 
nected up with liis advanced base at Tifali and moved 
to Burao via Eil Dab, going through the site of t'aptain 
McNeill's zariba at Samala. At Eil Dab the column was 
met on the morning of the 24th July by a party of the mounted 
corps which had returned from Burao under Captains Mere- 
wether and Bruce, and finally reached Burao on the 2yth and 
3fHh July, 1901. During the last loO milea of the return 
journey no good drinking water for Em'opcaiis was found, 
but the Somalis managed to procure water at Eil Dab, whence 
they easdy traversed the 95 miles to Buiao subsisting on 
the water they themselves carried, supplemented by a few 
tanks. The wounded were brought back some 350 miles 
to the coast on camels or on stretchers carried by the prisoner?, 
only one man dying on the way. During the operations the 
force suffered the following casualties : — 


British Officers. 

N.C.Os. and Men. 1 

^^^H KUW in action 

^^^H Accidental death!> 
^^^^H Died fruuk WDunda 
^^^^H from diaeoBC 



^^^P Total 





,— 1 

In his final report on the operations, Colonel Swayne made 

the following observations : — 

SlBrfliiTig The leyies had covered Bome 1,170 milea in tliree montlia, including 

power of ^^f^y^ at ]j„r^_ ^^n^ ^,^^ freqi.eutly marched 30 milee n day. On days of 

Hction, sa at Odprgoeh, on two occasiona in the Aiarsauiah country, at 

1 ICurmis, and on several occaalona in tho All Gh?ri country, andat Ferdiddin, 

^^^ -10 miles had been covered or over. Besides thU, detached seetions asd 

^^^B companies liad travei-eed an aggregate distance of 1,TUU mileH. This does 

^^^1 not include the work of parties of scouts and sjiies, who frequently worlied 

^-^- two days ahead of the force. 

Their The infantrj carried, besides rifle, bayonet, equipment and 100 rounds 

""" containing about a gallon of water. Blankets and superfluous clothes were 

left l«ihind at Burao. Every Britiah officer was mounted. 

Behuriour In Although the men in some cases were excited in action, they soon 

action. Bettled down to work, and on no occasion did the loss caused by the enemy'a 

^^^ .iQe fire ttlect them so as to cause them to heaitttte in their advance. At 

^^^L Fcrdiddin the Somalis, of their own miliative, extricated the maxima from 

^^^H ihe dead camels and worked thein, paying proper attention to sights and 

^^^H trial shots.. They took up new positions whenever the advance of the 

^^^V infantry rendered tliia desiraMc. In the eamo action, the Mounted Corps, 

^^^H which had suffered severely in men and animals, was ordered to temporarily 

^^^^1 fall back on the infantry, but advaoced again ivith tlicm directly a forward 

^1^^ move vras made. 

iThe Boinnlia- Ko attempt had been made to teach thcmen, in the limited time av^Uhle,, 

and movementa necessary for general cohesion. They could march well, 
L and being all more or leas used t-o iatcrtribal lighting, they quickly adapted 


tiicmsehc'S tu our Lwliiia. 'llipy understood llie care and louding of trftiis- 
port animals, could Uvb on meat alone, and oould essily go (or two dajs 
subaistiug only ou the water they themsolves oarried. 

I found no diffionlty in at once finding as many riders aa were necessary 
to ntiliae such poniefl as we were able to hiiy or capture. 

Sorao difficidty occurred at the start owing to there being no non- 
commiaBioued officers or training nlaff av^able, tlie men we eventually 
used for this purpose being merely coast policemen, eonie of whom bad less 
than a year's service. The men learned fast, however, and directly non- 
coramiasioned officers Tiegan to come forward from amongst them, thtco 
was no further trouble. 

It was not advisable nor was it necessary to dragoon the leviea, whone 
mobility was, to a great estent, the outoome of their being an irregular 

Provided the niou arc treated with the same consideration at) ia used Amenability 
in uhe native army in India, they will readily respond by doing their beat, to discipline 
It was unforluDHte that many of the officers eould only communicate witlt 
ttieir m.en through interpreters who, in some eases, were prone ({) mate the 
jnost of their position. 

The ievios were placed under the Eurmah Mihtary Pohce Eeg?ilations Diaoipliiie 
and Somalilaud Order in Coimoil of 1S90. Iljero was very little crime, and 
the punishments, which it was found necessary to inflict in a few serious 
cases of phiodering, having been very severe, a stop was at onee put to 
anything of the load. 

The fever from whiob both British men and officers suffered whilst Health, 
in the low-lying coast counti'y, diaappsared when once the force had left 
Burao, and the percentage of sickness was then very small One or two 
officers soilered from the want of vegetables, but the men were not affected. 

The total number of casualties inflicted on the enemy at MeNeill's Eoemv'a 
zariba and in tlve subsequent pursuit in the Ararsamah and the Ali Gheri totnl losses, 
country, and at Fcrdiddin, cannot have fallen far short of some 1,200 men 
killed and wounded. Some 300 prisoners, including many Cliiefs and many 
Headmen, who were for the most part afterwards released, were also taken. 

The cameto were either given as compensation to the Ishak tribes who Captures : 
had been looted by the Mullah or were handed over to the men, with their how disposed 
consent, iu lieu of pay, thus reducing the cost of the expedition. A large ™' 
number of transport spearmen were ptud entirely in camels, and wounded 
men and the relatives of the dead were in the same manner compensated. 
Compenaatifiii was given for all tribal horse? killed, and others were purchased 
from the trihes in exchange for camels. All casualties in the transport 
were made good, and friendly tribes were given a bonus for services rendered. 
The Field Force for some time lived entirely on its captures. 

The sheep and milch goatg, excepting a small percentage of the fonner 
eaten by the force, were returned to the enemy's women and children. No 
person who applied fot relief was turned away. 

Thus, at the end of operations, our tribes had rcg^ed at least a good 
proportion of the losses previously sustained by tbcm. All services had been 
(8927) F 

paid foi, and our transport and Mounted Corps had been pat on a proper 
footing. In apite of nearly the whole of our horws having been tdlled, 
there were, owing Iti captures and exichangta in lien of camelH, more left 
at the end of uparatians than there were at the beginning. 

The Abyssinian co-operation conaiated, as mraBged, in Mocking the 
wertem side of the conntry. They never actually came in tonch with the 
Mullah, nor were -they Been by our levies. 

Mekomoters were badly wanted for the mauma, but none were, un- 
fortunately, available at Bombay or Aden, and there wcs no time at tha 
last to get them from England. The mBximi bad a triolc of jamming at 
critical momenta, but were quickly set right again. ITie tanlt may have been 
line to the bolts. 

Uufortimately, owing to the dust storms and haze which during 
Api"!!, May and June prevailed, signalling with C-in. heliographs was out of 
the question. Possibly a larger size might have been useful, but none 
were quickly available. 

Gun cotton for enlarging rocky wella, bine lights and signal rocketa 
*"- were kindly supplied by General More-Molyneui, oommandiog at Aden. 

Punjabi I had ordered from India three months' rations for the Punjabis, 

rations. Fiather rations were arranged for by the Indian Commissariat at Aden. 

Unexplored The portion of the country oyer which the fighting took place was 

eountry. unmapped, except in the northern portion, by Major Wellby'a compass route, 

and as we did not march along tlus bat crossed and recrossed it, we had to. 
rely entirely upon native information. 
Guides and Our guides were fiurly accurate in the northern part of the country, 

nt got hopelessly adrift in the country where we got in touch of the MuUah, 
nd we bad consequently to do the best under the circumstances, and rely 
on capturing priiioners and getting information from them. Marches were 
set by conipass bearing, and at night we marched by the stars, 
iledieal alaff. Lieutenant Boulton, I.M.S., was assisted by iwo Indian honpital 

Mali ma. 


lllne lights, 

Operations ot 
ihe AbjB- 


o April the native armoun-rs who happened to bo available oa 
^ attended to the rifles, but in April British Anuourer-Sergean^ 
tn me. A number of iron workers n td been cnfisted and provoA. 

Before concluding the narrative of the operations of the 
first expedition, it is necessary to refer to the co-operation of the 

In January, 1901, the Abyssinians despatched an expedition 
of some 10,000 men into Ogaden, but, owing to defective supply 
arrangements and want of water, the force never got into touch 
with the Mullah, who retired before it into the Ibrahim country, 
and it eventually halted at the Gerlogubi Wells. 

A fresh force of 10,000, ■with only a month's supplies, was 
ifiespatched in May, and arrived on the 24th of that month at 
Eilld Crabro, on the Fafan, where it was joined by two Britieb 
officers, Major Hon. A. Hanbury-Tracy, Royal Horse Guards, 
and Captain R. P. Cobbold, late 60th Rifles. Here con- 
;nts, anxious for plunder, raised the numbers to 14,000, 
the commander, the Kanyazmach Abanabro, was 
esirous of moving via the Webi Shebeli on Mudug, in order 
Wio replenish liia supplies and punish the Adoni on that river, 
who had shown an inclination to join the Mullah. A rumour 
: the latter'a defeat by the British expedition, however, 
[ encouraged him to proceed direct on Gerlogubi, where he 
^wnived on the 11th June. 

In spite of long marches, c.ij., 50 miles in two days, and 
Ijfrequent daily marches of 2j miles, the force eflected little 
beyond the severe punishment of the Ibrahim, owing to the 
natural difficulties of this arid country. Water was generally 
scanty and the heat intense, for the rains had not yet begun. 
In places where water was abundant, e.g., Baligadud, it was 
impure, being the rain washings from the surrounding country 
mixed with animal excreta. There was very httle fodder for 
ponies and mules. No supplies were obtainable except meat, 
to which the Abyssiniana, who bve mainly on grain, were 
unaccustomed, and frequently raids on the tribes, e.g., to 
Galadi and Bur Wells, 35 to 40 miles east and south of Wardair 
respectively, where the Makahil had collected, were failures 
owing to the defection of guides or to the inadequacy of the 
system for the transport of water. Consequently, on the 21st 
June, the force moved south to Faf on the tug Fafan, where 
it arrived on the 4th July, looting the friendly Her Ughaz 
en route. It then returned via Sasami to Karrar, reaching 
the latter town about the eud of the month. 

Major Hanbury-Tracy furnished the following summary of 
the work accomplished in connection with his employment 
with the forces of the Ras Makonnen :— 




Leaving London on the Sth March, I proceeded to Aden by P. ftnd 0. 
Bfeamer, arriring at the latter place on the 17th March. 

On the ISthMaJob I croased to Berbcra, where I spent somo days witb 
Colonel Sadler maldng pTeliminary arrangementa as to the forjnation of m]r 
caravan. Colonel Sadler being of opimon that Berbera would be a better 
base to start from than Zeila, provisions for the men at the latter being a 
difficulty. Acting on his advice I arranged to hire camels aa far as Jig Jiga. 

As it was impos^blo to foretell tho duration of the operattons, I made 
provjaian for a possible absence of nine months for myself and a two month"' 
provision of rations foe my caravan, it being arranged that a further supply 
of dates and " ghi " should be forwarded later on from Brcbcra to Jig Jign, 
which place I intended to use a? my advanced base. 

As it wna known tliat the country in which the Abyaainians were 
likely to opecaio contained but little water, a considerable number of camels 
were aeceaaary to cairy water tanks. 

My paitf consisted of 1. Headman, 4G cameU, 23 attendants and an 
escort of I'Z Somalis, besides my personal servants. The camels and also 
the servants engaged by Captdin Cubbold ate included in thesa numbers, 
amd were uo charge to Goverument. 

Having oompletcli the formation of the expedition, 1 returned to Aden 
to pick up my luiggage, reaching Berbera again on the 2Tth. 

The 2Sth waa spent in making preparations for my start and receiving 
uutructiona from Colonel Sadler, the copy of which is annexed." 

On the 2Qth I left lierhera, and directing Captain Cobbold to proceed 
with the caravan by the m^n road to Jig Jiga, I branched oC to Adadleh 
where Colonel Swayne's Somali levy was situated at that time. I obtained 
front that officer a general idea of bis proposed operations, for the informa- 
tion of Bas Makonnen and my own guidance, and then rejoined the caiavan. 

Jig Jiga WHJi reached on tho 8th April. Here I found the Fitauraii 
BanaguM, who is in charge of the district. Here I discharged the camels 
which had been hired to this point only, and leaving my baggagu Ixihind 
proceeded to Harrar, where the Acting Governor, in Bas Makonnen's 
absence, received me extremely weh. 

Mr. Gerolimato, the Italian Consul, met me on the rond before 
entering the town, and informed me that Bas Makonnen was absent at 
Colubbi, a country seat of his some 30 miloa on the Adis Ababa road, 
where he intended to spend Easter- 
He returned a few days later and had an interview with me at onte, 
when I found hini averse to the idea of allowing Captain Cobbold and 
myself to join the army, wbieli under the ffitaurari Gabri had now been 
in the field since the beginning of the year. He complained of the delay 
in Ibc start of the British force, which, he said, had been promised should 
be in readiness to take the field simultaneously with the Abyssinians, whom, 
he allied, were now worn out by fatigue and the privations they had 
Tandergone, end were not in a state to assist in further operations. 

Aftar sevBtal interviews I thought it beat to ask Colonel Harrington to 

" Not pr.ntei. 


I outer from the Emperor' Menelek nllowiiiy us In proceed, and 
I ttis lie kindly did, and the Bas was ordered to aeJid a freah force to replace 
the array ot Gabri, and to allow os to proceed with all deBpatck 

A fresh body ot troops was now collected to tlie number of 10,000 men, 
who were ordered to concentrate ot Dagaha Msdo. a place on the Ogaden 
border aome diitanre sooth of Harrar, the command beinR jriTen to the 
Kanyaimach Abanabro, who had served with Makonnen at the battle of 
Adowa, where he had diatinguished himself. 

The hospital asaiatant who had been orderod to join me from India 
not being forthcoming, and aa I considered it imperative in the interest of 
the Abyssinians as well as in my own thut a medioal man should accompany 
the force. I asked Br. Martin, who liappantd to have recently arrived from 
Adis Ababa, to join the e^qtedition. I considered that, being an Abys- 
sinian hy birth, his presence would he grateful to the force, and (he Bu 
Tiewed the idea favourably. 

Dr. Martin agreed to my proposal aiiU joined mo at .lig Jiga ou the 
0th May. 

Rbs Makonnen detuled Baaha Ballina and his following as our escort 
and ho joined ua ot Jig Jiga and remained with me till my return to Hatrw, 
■erving me excellently well. 

Whilst completing preparations for our departure from Jig Jiga to 
Join the army we heard again that the Ras was endeavouring to delay the 
departnce ot the troops, and was anirious that we should not proceed nntil 
arrangements were further advanced. This, however, I disregarded. 

I arranged by mounted runners a system of commimication with 
Colonel Swayne'a column before my departure from Jig Jiga on the 11th 
May, leaving all surploa bBfi;pagB at this point. 

I proceeded south towards Dagaha Mado, receiylng on my way a letter 
from Colonel Swayne. who was anxious that a force might be detached to 
■panish the Ber All, which tribe had been causing him aome annoyance. 

The Abyasinian array joined ua ot Dagaha .Mado on the 2Gtli Slay. 
nSt consisted of some 10,000 men, but it was impossible to obtain a correct 
mate of their numbers aa the Kanyaimach himself had but a liaiy notion 
[pf the number of men with him. 

At Bassamani a letter was received from Colonel Swuyue asking the 

jAbyasinians to co-operate in pmiishing the All Gheri, but as information had 

IS that the Blullah was retreating south from the Dolhahanta before 

a British column, I thought it better to lose no time in endeavouring to 

Fent off his retreat by occupying the country around and to the east oi 

Gerlogubi with all possible speed. The Kanyaj.macli concurred, promi^ng 

to punish the All Gheri on the return joumev". 

I alreEidy foresaw thut diflioulties utuat arise in feeding this large force, 
mbcrs had lieen swollen by the arrival of large numbers of vulun- 
'— teers aggregating some thousands. 

A question on this point aoon arose, for it transpired that whereas 
B!41u] Hiiny had brought with them a month's rations, the newly-arrived 
KTolmiteora were ignite unprovided for and had to be fed. A discussion then 



enmied bb w the ail visa tiility of proceeding Bouthwards to the Wehi in 
ssarch of grain or of ^)0^'ing enat on Gerlogubl : aiul as the Mullah was re- 
ported in the vicinity the latter oouree was deuided on. 

On arrival at (Jeriogubi on the 12tli Juno, the Mullali was reported iti 
the thick bush Bome 50 miles east. It was, however, imposBible to obtain 
reliable iafurmatioa. Tbo country was denuded of any Ogaden who might 
have aRorded information, these having fled in tenor at the ap[iroach of 
tho Abyssinians, who had no idea of any system of obtoinin^ inletUgence, 
and were also afraid to move about except in large bodies. 

I urged the Kanyazmaoh to break op bis huge force into three Snialler 
eoluraoB to increaae their mobility and render it Oflaior to feed them, but he 
would not do so. 

Accordingly, the whole army maruhed eastwards some 5(1 miles into 
tho country of the Eer Ibrahim, where it was said that the Mullah had 
Bought shelter. The report of the latter's whereabouts proved incorrect, 
but the Ibrahim who had been supporting him were severely punished, the 
Abyseiniana pursuing them for two days in scattered parties and driving 
them into the handa of Cubnel Swayno's advanced guard, who further 
completed their discamforture and captured aomo 2,000 camels. The 
Abysainisns killed some *200 of the tribe, and some hidden ammunition was 
unearthed and brought in. 

The Mullah's brother and some of his family being reported at Uatadi, 
the position of which is shown on the map, and a large concentration of 
tribesmen being reported there with large quantities of sheep, I advised the 
Kanyaimaoh to send his main body and baggage to (Jeriogubi and detach 
a strong column to Galadi and a second one to B\ir, some 30 miles south of 
Wardair, where the Slekoliil tribes had asaemblci). having beou driven from 
the wella at Walwal and Wardair. He agreed to this plan which wonU, if 
it had been carried out at that time, have resulted in », blow being struck at 
the Hakahil, one of the sub-sections of whom ia the Ba^ori, the tribe of the 
Mullah — and would also have provided plenty of fund for the troops — but 
afterwards changing his mind, led the array, alreadj' half starving, by a 
oircoitouB route back to Gerlogubi. 

We bad warned the Kanyazmach that it was essential for the men each 
to carry a skin of water, and had told lum of the distances which we knew 
through some of our own men — whom we sent with him. No preparations 
for catTying water were made ; the advice of our men was disregarded, and 
he has no one to thank for this miafortnue but himself. He afterwards 
Informed us that it was the will of Ood and be aacepted as such. 

The Kanyazmach now gave orders for parties to scatter themselves 
all over the conntry, and the friendly tribes m the Fafan valley were looted, 
large quantities of cattle and sheep were forthcoming, and the crisis was, 
for the moment, averted. 

The long course of camel meat diet, to which the Abyssiniana are 
imoccnstomed, now showed its eSect, the men being in a weakened, dis- 
heartened and sullen condition. Their horses and mules, owing to the 
scarcity of grass in this inhospitable coimtry, had been grcnlly rpdiiicd in 

I prop 

r fortl 

and it was decided to latum to the vtilley of the FataJi, whera 
grass wan abundant, and to there decide on the best steps to talte. 

Before leaving Gcrlogiibi, a letter waa received from the Officer Com- 
manding at Burao, in wikjoh waa mentioned the report o£ the Mnllaii'a 
capture, and as tlua was corroborated by prisoners and from, other aourcos, 
WB planed some reliirace in it. 

The Fafan waa reached in the first woelt in July. The Kanyaimach 
proposed to proceed south to the Wobi, stating that ha was sure 
pis grain could be obtained there, and that when this was collected he 
proposed to take the army bavk to Harror. since they were unfit for fmrther 
and internal dissensions ^vith his Chiefs had a^en. I did not 
lyself believe it likely that any grain would be obtainable in the Webi. 
country had been devastated by Oabri only a short time previously, 
afterwards conclusively proved that I wai correct in my sup- 
position. It seemed to mo that the Konyaimach'a plana courted disaster, 
for the men were worn out and in a had state generaUy, and if no grain was 
fonnd, it meant that none of them would return. 

I, therefore, at a Coimcil of Chiefs which was held, did my best] to 

the Kanyazmoch from t^iis idea, and tlie Chiefs gave me a pretty 

leral support. Tlio spirit of the soldiery » 

The Kanyazmoch endeavoured to force the hand of his Cliiefa by oaUing 
the volunteers to follow luni, but they, too, refused, and when he con- 
sented to return to Hanar, tbo Ohiefs and the men appeared grateful to ns 
fat our refusal to oountfinanca his scheme. 

At this point we parted company, and returned slowly to Jig Jiga 
along the courae of the Jcrcr. Our camels were in a bad state, all our ponies 
exoeptitig one had died, and tho men had hod a hard time. 

Mr. Gerolimato met us at Jig Jiga, and after a short halt there, whore 
reduced the strength of tho party by dismissing all the men not abaolntely 
[uired, we proceeded to Horrar. 

Tho Ras was abFicnt at Kombulcha, but the Acting Governor gav/i ua a 
reception in his abseniu. 

tl the following day the Ras arrived, and I had an interview with 
in which I gave liim an account of the operations concluded, 
[e stated that the Chiefs and men had appreciated our presence with 
force, and thanked us tor having refused to agree to tha Kanyaanath'B 
nneof proceeding further south when hia force were in such a bad plight — 
ch would have, he agreed with us, ended in probable disascer. 
returned the Kas' visit to Kombiilcha on our return journey to Jig 
when he reoeived ua in a markedly friendly manner and presented 
Durbar, by the Emperor's command, with the Order of the Star of 
iopia of tho second class, and a letter thanking us for onr services. 

Bas hero placed in our charge a zebra, a gift from the Emperor 
lelek, to His Majesty, which, at King Menelek's request, we took with 
Aden and shipped in good condition on board the B.I. steamship 
Manoca," and Uo haa since safely arrived in London. 


After leaving Kombiilcha we returned via Fuyambiro to Jig Jiga. 
At Fuyambiro, where the Kanyazmach has his headquarters, a great 
reoeption was given us by the Chiefs and many of the soldiers who had 
composed the expeditionary force who accompanied us as far as Jig 
Jiga, where they left us with many manifestations of good-will. 

I feel sure that our association with the force has created a personal 
feeling of a most friendly nature with the Chiefs and soldiery. 

Erom Jig Jiga we returned to Berbera. 

On arrival at Berbera the expedition closed with the paying off of the 



FOR THE Second Expedition. — Plan of Operations. — 
^^^H Situation ON the Ist June, I!)02. — The Operations.— 


^^^FErigo.— Return of the Force to Bohotle. 

On the concluBion of the first expedition. Consul -General 
I Hayes-Sadler considered that it would he impracticable to 

! attempt to defend the whole uf the Dolbahanta country, and 
tliat our attention should be confined " to watcliing that 
country and safeguarding against attack on our posts and the 
nearer portions of the Protectorate which may be threatened 
by any further move on the Mullah's part." 

For this purpose he proposed in a despatch to His Majesty's 
1 Government, dated 1st August, 1901, that — 

Burao should be occupied by a garrison of 500 infantry 

and 100 camel corps. 
A reserve company should be quartered at Berbera. 
The remainder of the Infantry should be formed into a 

The permanent transport should be retained near 

The 150 mounted infantry should be disbanded. 
A couple of " pompoms " or 2-7-pr. guns were aiso 
asked for. 

His Majesty's Government in reply stated that they (elt 
unable to sanction the permanent occupation of Burau, or the 
formation of a new corps to hold either that place or other posts 
in the interior. The retention of a force not exceeding the 

b'uB Map II. 


tJon of the 
Local Ford's. 


niunber proposed by the CohbuI- General was, ho we' 
sanctioned as a temporary measure. 

For a brief period the Mullah remained in a state ■ 
quiescence, and on the 25th September, Mr. H. E. S. Cordetri 
{Acting Consul -General), reported that he was about 15 i 
20 miles south of the south-east corner of the Protectors! 
and that there did not appear to be any immediate dang«E 
liis returning in force to the Dolbahanta country. 

On the 25tli October the Mullah was reported to bav 
advanced westwards to Heli Madu, aceompaiiied by 
following of about 500 riflemen and 90O horses. In reportin 
this movement the Acting Consul- General stated that it wa 
difficult to estimate its exact significance, but that it migh 
be a preliminary step to a retirement south into the Hawiy 
country. 4 

All doubt on this point was soon dispellnd, for on Idl 
December Mr. Cordcaux telegraphed that the Mullah wa 
reported to be at Lassadcr in force with advance posts a 
Bohotle, Kirrit, and Gosawein. A few days later (21e 
December) it was stated that he had moved {oiwardiJ 
Idoweina with a large following, composed piincipallj^ 
mounted riflemen, with the apparent intention of m^l 
an attack on the Ishak frontier north and south of Bnia%J 

On receipt of the above telegram, the Foreign Offiofr^ 
formed Mr. Cordeaux that steps were being taken to ivH 
with the fresh outbreak, but warned him to be careful aboii 
assuming the offensive pending the arrival of additiont 

PrepiirBtiuiis In the meantime Lieut. -Colonel E. J. E- Swayne, India 
e"" |.?^'°'"' Army, was appointed to the command of the new expeditioi 
and six offieers of the King's African Rifles were ordere 
out from England. The British Central Africa Protectoral 
was warned to hold in readiness 300 troops and two Maxin 
gun sections, and H.M.S. " Cossack" was directed to pr< 
ceed from Aden to Berbera. 

On the 2Sth December the Mullah was reported to 1 

retired to Eil Dab (about 70 miles soutb-east of Burao), but to 
be stiil threatening to reBume the ofEenaive, His force at that 
time was estimated at 12,000 men, the majority of whom were 
mounted, with about 1,000 rifles. 

Burao was garrisoned by a force of 650 men, and an 
advanced post was established at Huguf, commanding the 
Meriye Pasa east of Sheikh, consisting of fourteen men o( 
the Habr Toljaala, and six sowars of the Coast Camel Corps. 

On the 9th January, 1902. five officers of the King's African 
Rifles reached Berbera, and active measures were taken to 
reorganise the Somali levy, wbich was raised to a strength of 
1,500 men by the time Swayne reached Berbera on 18tU 

On his ariival from England, Swayne reported that owing 
to the continued importation of firearms, the Mullah had not 
only recovered from the losses inflicted on him during the 
previous year, but that he had compelled the greater proportdon 
of the Dolbahanta tribes to return to his domination, thereby 
swelling the number of his following to about 13,000, of 
whom 10,000 were said to be mounted. 

Active measures were at once taken to defend the 
threatened tribes, and arrangements were made with the chiefs 
to withdraw their people from the threatened localities and 
concentrate at Bale-Shala-Shala, '60 miles south of Burao. 

On the 8th February Swayne started for Burao, and 
while on the march he received news of a destructive raid 
by the Mullah on the J ama-Siad- Dolbahanta. On that 
occasion the Mullah's force was reported to be 4,000 strong, 
and to have covered 70 miles on the day of the attack. 

On the 12th February Swayne arrived at Burao, and 
on the following day arrangements were begun for an 
evening march to Balc-Shala-Shala, in order to protect the 
tribes concentrated there. Before the arrangements could 
be completed, however, wounded men from the tribes began 
to arrive, who reported that a dervish force between 4,000 
and 5,000 strong had juat raided tlie live stock at Amudleh, 
killing a large number of people. 

On teceiptoE this information, a coIumTi under Captain (local 
Major) A. G. Sharp, Leinster Regiment, was despatched to 
Amudleh, and catching up the enemy's rearguard, recovered 
£rom 10,000 to 15,000 sheep, but the main body of the 
enemy managed to escape, and Major Sharp's men being 
too exhausted to continue the puramt, the column returned 
to Burao on 17th February. 

Owing to the increase of prestige gained by the Mullah by 
these raids and the demoralized condition of the Ishak tribes, 
Swayne urged the importance of organizing a counteratroke. 
To carry out tliie plan he proposed — 

To raise a new corps of 500 men in addition to the levy 
of 1,500. 

To convert 100 infantry into a camel corps. 

Six additional of&cers and some signallers were also 
asked for. 

During the early part of April information was received that 
emissaries from the Mullah were actively employed in tamper- 
ing with the coast tribes east of Berbera, and that the latter 
were beginning to waver. 

In order to frustrate the Mullah's plans Swayne decided to 
interpose a detachment of the levies between him and the dis- 
affected tribes thus severing communication between the two 
parties. At the same time, in order to prevent the Mullah from 
interfering with this arrangement. Major G, E. Phillips, R.E., 
was ordered to make a demonstration from Burao towards 
Burdab, with a force of 750 men and two maxims. This 
movement was successfully carried out and several chiefs of 
the disaffected tribes were killed. The interposing force then 
returned to Berbera. 

By this time arrangements for the counterstroke againat 
the Mullah were completed, and on 26th May Swayne 
with the force noted below* marched from Burao to 
Wadamago, where he arrived on 28th May. 

• so moonted infantry, 20 camel corpa, 1,200 infantry, 3 tnaTima, 
two guns, 1,000 burden eameU. ' 

The Mullah wa* now said to bs near Baraa with some 
15,000 followers, of whom 12,000 were mounted, with 1,500 
rifles, while his live stock was being driven southwards to 
some rainpools at Damot, in the. otherwise waterless Haud 
district As far as could be ascertained he apparently 
intended to move his non-combatants and impedimenta 
towards the Hawiya country, whither our advanced party 
had already gone, and to fccep back the bulk of his force in 
order to observe our levies and to take advantage of any 
chance that might present itself of raiding our line of 
communications to Berbera. 

In the meantime Risaldar-MajoxMusaFarah had been sent 
with a tribal force of 450 rifles to operate from Dairor against 
the outljTng encampments of the MuUah in the direction of 
Bohotle, and to drive them eastwards off the Bohotle — 
Hawiya road. 

The British force halted at Wadamago in order to give 
time for the Risaidar-Major's flank movement, and on 
receiving information from spies that the Mullah's encamp- 
ments had taken alarm and fallen back eastward to Bohotle, 
messengers were sent to Musa Farah directing him to join 
Swayne's main column at Wadamago. 

Having ascertained by means of patrols that the road 
from Berbera to Mayo was free from the Mullah's horse- 
men, and that there were no indications of any attempt 
to carry out mounted raids eastward, Swayne decided to 
advance on Bohotle on the Ist June, with a view to attack 
either the Mullah's encampment at Damot or his main force at 
Baran. The selection of one of these objectives depended on 
the information brought in by a strong patrol which had been 
Bent out on 30th May to establish contact with the enemy at 
f On the lat June, the situation was briefly as follows : — s 

British Forces. 
Main body under Colonel Swayne. 
■'50 Mounted Infantry 
20 Camel Corps 
1,200 Infantry .. 
3 Maxims . . 
3— 7-pr. guns 
1,000 burden and ration camels J 

Reinforcements under Captain P. B. Osborn, .'ird King' 

African Rifles. 
400 Mounted Infantry andl 
Camel Corps 
50 Infantry . . 

Detached force under Risaldar -Major Musa Farah. 

Tribal Force with 450 rifles — ^Operating from Darror towards 


Buran garrison under Major A. C Sharp. 

lijO Infantry ' „ 

, ,, . , , _ )-iJurao. 

1 Maxim and 1 7-pr, gun . . i 

Las Durnh garrison. 
KKl Infantry .. 

'At Wadamago. 

I On march from Burao to 
I Wadamago. 

1 Maxim 



MiiVnh's Forces. 

12,000 mounted men 
3,000 foot with 1 .500 rifles 
Enemy's live stoi?k and 

I Moving southwards itoi 
I Damot. 

Thp Open]- Swayne's column left Wadamago on the evening of 

*'""■■ the 1st Jime, and reached Bohotle (54 miles to S.S.E.) on 

4th June, a day's halt having been made at Soljokto to allow 

of a reconnaissance towards Baran. 


From Bohotle patrols were sent out to gain tonch with the 
Mullah, with Eisaldar -Major Musa Farah (who was still in 
the west), and witli Captain Oaborn'a detachment, expected 
from Eurao. Whilst waiting at Bohotle a strong stockaded 
fort was built to command the wells and protect the reserve 

The patrols sent out from Wadamago joined Swayne at 
Bohotle. They had met the MuUah's advanced parties at 
Laasader, and reported that they liad killed seven men and 
captured two. The prisoners stated that Baran and Lassader 
had been evacuated by the bulk of the Mullah's force, and that 
after leaving 3,000 horsemen to observe Swayne's force at 
Damot, the Midlah had retired to Erigo (one day's journey 
north of Mudug), whence he had sent half the live stock and 
the families to a place one day's march east of Mudug. Swayne 
considered that this movement indicated a change of plans, 
and that instead of going to Hawiya, the enemy might be 
intending to seek refuge with Sultan Osman Mahmud, who 
was reported by the prisoners to be actively assisting the 
Mullah with arms and ammunition. From the same source 
of information it was further ascertained that 150 rifles had 
recently reached the Mullah's force from Bandar Kasim 
(Bosaso), and that during the past 6 months caravans had 
been passing continually between the Mullah and the 
norlheru Mijjarten ports. 

At this time (4th June) Mndug offered a safe refuge for 
the Mullah's live stock, and Swayne felt compelled to 
make arrangements to cross the Haud desert in pursuit, leaving 
a garrison of 228 rifles and one masdm in the newly-constructed 
fort at Bohotle. If this plan were carried out it seemed 
reasonable to expect that the Mullah's horsemen left in observa- 
tion at Damot would be sooner or later drawn back to oppose 
the British advance ; in any case it was useless to go in 
pursuit of the horsemen, who, owing to superior mobUity,* 

• Tlif mobility of the British forto had at thia lime been Betiousl_v 
diminiahed, owin); to an outbreak of glanders whieli destroyed half tbe 


cuuld eahiJy avoid tiie Brit'iHli lorce, while the remaiuder of 
the Mullah's mounted men would be enabled to raid the Ishak 
country up to the coast. 

On the 7th June, a detachment of 100 rifles and 1,400 
wpearnieu was sent southwards from Bohotle to separata 
the Mullah from some of hia outlying encampments. 

On the lOth June, Eisaldar -Major Musa Fara.h reported 
his arrival at Kuriiiis, ']7 miles to the S.M.W. of Darror, where 
he effected a jimc-tion with the 1,500 men mentioned in the 
preceding paragraph. He stated that he had capttired 1,450 
camels, and had succeeded in obtaining the services of some 
400 Ishak horsemen, and that he had despatched 300 rifles 
and the same number of spearmen in pursuit of the enemy. 
To prevent any chance of Muea Farah'a separated force being 
attacked by overwlielniiiig numbers of the enemy, Swayne 
decided to move towards him with 1,250 rifles, three maxima, 
and two guns. 

At this juncture, His Majesty's Government decided to send 
a small force of Indian troops to act as a garrison at Berbera, 
and on 6th June a telegram was sent to the Consul-General 
of the British Central Africa Protectorate ordering a detach- 
ment of 60 Sikhs, under a British Officer, to be despatched 
from Chindc by the first available steamer. 

On the 10th Jime Swayne left Bohotle, and on the night 
of the 11th effected a junction with the advanced poition 
of Risaldar-Major Musa Farah's levies at a point 20 miles 
south-west of Bohotle. The united force then returned 
to Bohotle, 

On the 11th June, a raiding party of the enemy's 
forces attacked and captured a caravan of Government 
camels Ijrin^ng provisions to Bohotle from Burao, under 
an escort of 50 tribal horsemen and 200 spearmen. The 
escort lost 32 killed, besides a number of wounded. The 
attack took place at Baliwein (28 miles north-west of Bohotle), 
and as soon as the news reached the latter post. Major Sharp, 
the officer in command, immediately despatched 50 riflemen 

on ponies to the scene of the disaster. The ponies, however, 
became exhausted, and the force was compelled to return 
to Bohotle without meeting the enemy. 

On the 14th June fiity aoouta with rifles, accompanied by 
ten horsemen, proceeded towards Damot, and on the following 
day tliese scouts were followed by the main British force, 
with the exception of 238 rifles and 3CX) spearmen mjflsr 
Sharp, who remained in the fort at Bohotle to take charge 
of the reserve of supplies, and prevent the Mullah's horse- 
men from obtaining water. 

On the 20th June 41 riflemen and a number of spearmen 
were sent hack from Damot to reinforce Bohotle. During 
these movements, owing to the presence of large bodies 
of horsemen blocking the roads northwards, Swayne 
experienced much difficulty in conveying information to 
Berbera, and he did not consider it advisable to weaken his 
force by detaching any lai^e bodies. 

The Mullah's encampment and followers, who had been 
threatened by Swayne in his advance towards Damot, were 
now driven into the Haud, but although they, were pursued 
by two separate British columns for 25 miles into the desert 
only a few stragglers were captured. The latter reported 
that the Mullah was at Erigo near Mudug, and that the 
tribes were so distressed for want of water that numbers 
were compelled to leave the Haud and proceed north-east- 
wards to the Nogal. 

When Swayne's force reached Damot it was found that 
the water was practically exhausted, and there was not suffi - 
cient to enable the force to cross the desert. He therefore 
moved north-eastwards to Las Auod. The prisoners 
captured by patrols confirmed the previous reports that a 
large section of the Mullah's tribe had left the Haud, 
and was marching towards the Nogal, eastward of 
Beretabli, and it was further ascertained that the Mullah 
had moved from Erigo to Rohr, and thence north-eastwards 
1^ Eil-1 -Koran preparatory to following the tribes. On 

receipt of this infoimation Swayne decided to proceed east- 
ward to Beretftbli and interpose his force between the Mullah 
and the detacted tribes, with the object of attacking the 
latter fromthesouth and driving them in a northerly direction. 

ConsefLuently, the Britiah force left Las Anod on the 
23rd June, and arrived at Beretabli, 35 miles to the east- 
ward, on the 25th June. On the same night the mounted 
infantry and camel corps, with a number of spearmen, were 
detached under the command of Captain (Local lieut.- 
Colonel) A. S. Cobbe,* to attack some encampmenta of the 
enemy reported to be at Gerrowei (34 miles further east of 
Laa Anod). Unfortunately one of the advanced mounted 
patrols gave the alarm to the enemy, and Cobbe was unable 
to overtake them until they reached Yiwehil, onthe northern 
edge of the Nogal, when the enemy lost 150 men, i.OOO 
camels, and several thousand sheep. The casualties in the 
detachment were seven men killed and one wounded. On 
this occasion the enemy used their rifles well and attacked 

Cobbe rejoined Swayne at Gerrowei on the Ist July, 
having been unable to proceed further owing to the 
exhausted condition of his ponies and camels^ and to the 
necessity for guarding the large amount of stock captured. 
On the following day Major G. E. Phillips, who had been 
sent with tliree companies to Weyiweyteyn (30 miles south- 
east of Gerrowei), returned to the latter place, having 
captured a considerable number of camels and sheep, and 
killed 25 of the enemy. 

The whole column was leasHembled at Gerrowei on the 
2nd July, where Swayne decided to await the rettim of the 
scouts who had been sent out towards Halin, and to get into 

• Captain and Local lieu t. -Colonel A. 8. Cobbf, D.S.O., lat Battalion 
King'fl Airican Rifloa was Chief Staff Officer to Colonel Swayne. He received 
the Victoria Crosa (London Gaif tte, 20th January, 1903) for his gallantry in 
woi'Iiing a njaxim gun and in aseietiog a wounded aoldier under a hot fiie at 


touch with any of the Mullah's tribes who might still 
be dependent on watering places in the Nogal. The 
occupatioa of Gertowei had brought considerable pressure to 
bear on the Haud tribes, but owing to want of sufficient 
glazing for the ponies and for the large amount of captured 
stock, Swayne felt obliged to move again, and on Bth July, 
he marched to Bihen. During the previous night his 
scouts returned from Beretabli and the west, and reported 
that the tribes drawing water from the Nogal in that direction 
had made their way across the Haud to join the Mullah 
near Mudug, and that there were no longer any tribes in 
the Nogal district, except those north and east of Gerrowei. 

Before advancing to Mudug, it was necessary to tate MovemeiitE' 
steps to prevent a repetition of the raids from Halin and the ^^^ "" " 
eastern Nogal into the Ishak country, as these incursions 
were causing considerable unrest amongst the levies, owing to 
the danger incurred by their unprotected families and pro- 
perty. To clear the whole of the eastern Nogal district, 
however, would take considerable time, so Swayne arranged 
while operating in the Nogal to strengthen Bohotle, and place 
a fortified post at Wadamago. 

On the 7th July, the main column left Bihen with the 
object of clearing the Nogal district. It was decided to 
advance first on Halin from the south-east in order to drive 
away the hostile detachment occupying that place, and 
separate from the Mullah, who was at that time located neai 
Mudug, any hostile tribes who might be encountered. 

Moving vid Kallis, the column attacked the Nur Ahmed 
and Hassan Ugaz tribes at Hareyelahu, and drove them 
in the direction of lUig, capturii^ 41 ponies. After 
returning for water to Garserio, Swayne moved to Murr 
(lat. 8° 27' N., long. 48° 53' E.), from whence two columns, 
under Major Q. E. Phillips,* R.E., and Captain Osborn, 

• Major G. B. Phillips, E.E., D.S.O., w 

expedition. He waa subsequently killed in i 

9 second in cominuid of the 


to attacl^l 

King's African Rifles, respectively, were despatched to 
some Nut Ahmed and Mijjarten encampments which were in 
the vicinity of Bohotle. These tribes were driven northwards 
towards Bandar Easim, and a number of live stock were 

Swayne then moved in a north - westerly direction 
towards Halin, detaching bodies of scouts to watch all the 
watering places on the southern edge of the Nogal, and to 
collect information regarding the Mullah's movements. 

During these operations the transport animals sufiered 
so heavily owing to want of grazing, that 1,000 casualties 
occurred among the camels ; the losses were, however, 
made good from the numbers captured from the hostile ■ 

Leaving Afladigid on the 25th July, the column reached 
Lower Halin on the 27th July. At the latter place the 
live-stock and baggage were left under a strong guard, and 
a detached force proceeded the same night to Biyu Gudud and 
attacked the Naliya Ahmed and Nur Ahmed, the pursuit being 
carried into the plain of the Northern Hand as fat as Kol 
Dorran. Some guns and ammunition were captured and the 
tribes fled northward towards some wells about 50 miles 
from the sea. The whole force then returned to Biyu Gudud 
on the 1st August, and the dervish fort at Halin (9 nules 
N.N.E. of Lower Halin) was destroyed. Scouts were sent 
to Shilemadu and Bur Anod to ascertain whether the road ■ 
to Berbera was free from dai^er, as the troops at this time 
were accompanied by a considerable number of live stock, 
amounting altogether to about 12,000 camels, 35,000 sheep, 
besides cattle, and much difficulty was experienced in pro- 
viding 80 many animals with grazing and water. 

On the 5th August the column arrived at Gaolo, where 
Swayne learnt from scouts who had returned from Kallis and 
Gerrowei that the bulk of the enemy's cattle had been sent 
to the neighbourhood of Kallis, owing to the Mullah's 
inability to keep them any longer at Mudug. It was further 

reported that 100 Dervish rilles had also been d 
Gerrowei to observe the movementa of the Biitbh force. 

To meet this situation, a detached column, consiating of 
500 rifles and a maxim gun, under the command of Major 
G. E. PhilUps, was despatched to make a reconnaissance 
towards Grerrowei, BeietabH and HeU Madu, all of which are 
distant some 45 miles from Gaolo. At the same time, 
Swayne proposed to work back towards Las Anod so as to 
re-open communication with Bohotle and Burao, and regain 
touch with the Mullah. This plan, however, was subject to 
alteration according to the information sent in by Phillips. 

. Between the 5th and 20th August the foice was engaged 
in a series of operations round Gaolo, along the northern 
and southern edges of the Nogal, with the object of 
preventing the return of the Mullah's followers to water in 
that district. On one occasion a detachment encountered 
heavy opposition, being attacked by a iorce of about 
200 rifles. Owing to the overcrowding at the wells in the 
vicinity of Mudug, the Mullah's people were reported to be in 
great straits for want of water, and a large number had been 
forced to take the risk involved in loo min g towards Las Anod, 
in which position they blocked the communications of the 
British force with Bohotle, 

As the general scarcity of water proved very trying to the 
large number of men, women, and children, besides animals, 
which encumbered Swayne'a column, he decided to send all 
surplus hve-stock to Shilemadu and Haiuk, escorted by 100 
rifles under Major Osborn. 

On the 7th September, Swayne, writing from Las 
Anod, reported that the road to Bohotle was still blocked 
by hostile tribes, but that Osborn's detachment, on its way 
to Burao in charge of 8,000 animals, had reached Eurdab in 
safety. It was further reported that Yusuf Ali's fort at 
Galkayu had been attacked and captured by a portion of the 
M ullah's forces, and that in consequence of this success the 
ige of the MuUah had considerably increased among 


the southern and western tribaa ot the Mudug district. 
Information had also been received that several large 
caravans of rifles had lately reached the Dervishes from 
Sultan Oaman Mahmud's territoiy. In these circumstancea, 
SwajTie considered it necessary to cross the Hand without 
further delay, and so prevent the Mullah from re-concen- 
trating his scattered tribes aud still further increasing his 
importation of firearms from Mijjarten ports. 

On the 7th September, all was ready to cany out 
this offensive movement, and Swayne only awaited news of 
the arrival of the half of the 2nd {Central Africa) Battalion 
King's African Rifles * at Bohotle before putting his plans into 

On the 10th September, the force moved to Las Anod, 
and then to Tifali, where it awaited the arrival of the 
expected reinforcements from Bohotle, under Cobbe, who 
had been sent to the latter place to make arrangements for 
bringing on the half of the 2nd Battahon King's African 
Rifles and the detachment of 60 Sikhs from Burao. Mean- 
while, PhiOips was operating in the Eastern Nogal in the 
vicinity of Beretabli, 

When his force was complete, Swayne advanced to Baran, 
which he reached at the end of September. At Baran the 
British commander realized that so far as the state of affairs 
between Yusuf Ah and the Mullah was concerned, the success 
of the latter over the former was, as regards the Mudug 
district decisive and, considering that the moment was 
favourable for an advance, he decided to march across the 
Hand on the following day. Writing from Baran on the 
2nd October, Swayne described the situation as follows :— 

The Mullttli, whilflt trying to find a way out of his graiing and water 
difficultioB at Mudug, had Bent dGtaehmonts to negotiate with the Hawiya 
in one direction, and with the Ogadeo in another. The latter is still away 
in the direction of Faf, but the former has met with opposition, and there 


lias been Huycre fighting with t'he Uavriyo. Guns were taken and lost on 
both sidea, but eventually the MuUoh appears to have had considerably the 
beat of it. 

Reports vary as to the number of riflemeu actually with the Mallah 
at Mtidug, eeveral detachments being away. The higheBt estimate ia 
1,200 riflemen, with a large number of spearmen. Although the Mullah's 
siiceena over Yuauf A]i enabled him to more his ponies at onoe to Oalkayu, 
where they managed to get some gracing, a very large number have died, 
and out of aome 9,000 poniea which he is atill reported to have. I think 
very few will now be fit for work. Tho enemy's transport animals and live 
stock have Buffered very heavily, and he has too few oamela fit for work to 
move his encampments away from Mudug. 

'IThe (oroe has been in this neighbourhood for 23 days, awaiting the 
arrival of the regolars wbo left Sheikh on the 1 6th September. I fear that 
tlioy must have been delayed by tranapoct ajid bngg^e difficulties. Trona- 
poi't ia an arid region like this presents a difficult problem, and it has only 
been posaiblo for me to move lergD bodies of men about owing to tho fact 
that not an ounee of food has to be carried for Somalia, and that their water 
allowance ia half Uie usual amount. 

I do not like to wait any longer, as the scouts' information is favourable 
for an advance, and the recent fall of rain in the Haud, whilst giving us a 
cbttnco of finding tain pools on the road, will, at the same time, preaontly 
relieve tho Mullah of his difficulties and enable him to carry off the greater 
part of his horses and live stock. 

Major Phillips' detaclmients has been brought in from Beretabli, 
60 miles distant, and I expect all outlying patrols and scouts in from the 
Eastern Nogol to-mortow. Some Hut Ahmed who attempts to descend 
to the eastern edge of the Nogal have been driven back, with loss, by our 
patrols. Water tanks have already been staged forward 20 miles due south, 
and I propose to start for the march across the Haud to-morrow. 

The arrangements on the lines ot communication will bo as follows : — 
t Sheikh. — A small masonry blockhouse, with two O-prs. in charge of 

police and levies. 
: BuTao. — A strong entrenched post, with 9-pre. in charge of a 

detachment of the levy. 

At Bvrddb.- — A post ot observation of 50 Somali RiQes. 

At BoJioUe.^A. strong masonry blockhouse, with two 9-prs. and a, 

detachment of Sikhs and Somali levies. 
[tBarim. — 75 Somali Rifles and 100 spearmen, with unfit poniea and 
spare live stock. 

. besides, a strong moKunry bhiukhouae at Las Dureh, in 
|B of the levies, blocking the eastern line of approach to Uerbera. 
"Should the men of the reservo battalion arrive to-morrow in time to 
start with us, I would take them on and leave 300 Somali levies and 600 
spearmen to operate in the Eastern Nogal and block all approaches. Should 
' e troops be too late, I would leave them and 250 Somali Rifles at Baran 
of our operations from Mudug and then they would operate 


in Biioh direotion as would enable them to get in on the Hulloh's line of I 


I baiB inf armed Colonel Harringtion that wo laay be eonipelled 

t^ follow the Mullah to tlie Webi, and have asked him to prepare ths 

Abysaiiiians for this, so aa to avoid misnnderataading. 

I much regret that throe- quarters of my Camel Corps and [luntes ore 

at pi'esiint useless, liut hope tJiat they will shortly pick up on the improved 

grazing brought about by the recent fall of raia. 

Caravana of riQes still eoatiuue ba roAch the Mullah. The frequent 

visit? of the ' Perseus,' and her recent aucccas, have, however, hod an 

exeelient effect, and the dhow tialBo in arma is practically stopped aa far 

eastward as Gaxdoful. 

It is much to be desired that these lisits should continue just now, and 

more especially that the Italian coast tie not left for any length of time 

without n ship of war. 

On the 3td October Swayne began his march across the 
Haud, and nothing was heard of the force until the 16th 
and 17th of October when Consul- General Cordeaux 
telegrs.phed the news of an engagement which had taken place 
at Erigo on the 6th inst, The fighting had been severe, 
and Swayne was retiring on Bohotle. This brief account was 
amplified in a despatch by Swayne who, writing on his return 
to Berbera gave the following narrative of the operations ; — 

We advanced from Baran on the evening of the 3rd October. A 
priaooer, tbis day brought in by scouts from Mudug, coufinned previous 
information aa to the fcoquent arrivals of caravans of arms. Shortly atler 
Baran we entered very dense thorn bosh, and this continued for some 
35 miles without a break. On. the 4th our scouts aent back to report that 
thoy were in pursuit of aonio of the enemy's horsemen. On the morning of 
the 6th the tracks of live of the enemy's scouts were found on our left flank 
and followed by our scouts. Our horsemen returned from the front having 
come upon 30 men who ran into the thick bush after losing one killed and 
leaving one prisoner. The liitt«T reported that the enemy was moving up 
in strength from Mudug, but was still two days oS. We entered a clearing 
about 2 miles wide, and in the evening diverged to the right in order to find 
u clear line of advance which prisoners said we could obtain in this direction. 
However, towards 4 p.m. we entered very dense tush and camped at 5 p.m., 
making a thorn zariba. This place is called Awan Erigo. 

2. At night a distant volley was heard, and in the morning, shortly 
after starting from camp, our mounted men, who had remained some 
2 miles to our front during tho night, reported that two of the enemy's 
scouting patrols had flred into each other by mistake. They also informed 
me the enemy was advancing in force and was close by. We were iu 
oxfremoly dense bush, so I decided to move on very slowly, hoping to Cud a 

oluotiug, wluL'li v/an uonildaully ivportod by pcisouers. After about 2 uiilea 
however, the bush, becoming, if anythmg. denser, our uioiinteil men galloped 
in to say the enemy waa advancing. A halt was mode and our fonnatian 
was dressed as f ar at^ the dense biuh and tJio number of our transport eomels 
would pennit. Our fonnation was three Bides of a sqviaro round the trans- 
port, with tliree companies closing up the rear. Our people in treea could 
sec the enemy'a scouts perched in trees about -100 yards off. 

3. After waiting for some tinie, and it being evident that the enemy 
intended to wait till we moved, we again advanced very slowly. Im- 
mediately our outlooks reported the enemy to be advancing froia all sides 
and in two or three minutes the firing began — the enemy running in and out 
amongst (he hushes, firing as they euno and immediately men and camels 
began to fall. The rear companies stood firm, as did also the companies of 
the 2nd King's Afrlean Rifles, two of whleh were on the extreme right, and 
two companies of the 6tb King's African Bifles (Somalia), on the left of the 
2nd King's African BlUeB. The companies on the left, however, fell back 
on the centre in sudden panic, and were followed by one and a-half com- 
panies of the front fatie ; but one half company, whilst the retirement waa 
going on, charged to its front and drove the enemy olf. After thin another 
company of the front face advanced, and the companies on the left also 
returned and advanced beyond the position, I then proceeded with two 
companies of the 2nd King's African RiSes and two companies of Somalia 
and cleared the ground beyond the left rear corner of our formation. 

4. The transport camels, had all stampeded in this direction owing to 
the noise caused by the hring in such denae bush, and some tliouaand camels 
with water tins and ammunition boiea jammed against each other, rushed 
away into the jungle, scattering their loads everywhere. We drove the 
enemy away from the loads and recovered all with a coat of only two 
casualties. In tJie evening I proceeded with one company of the 2nd fOng's 
African Rifies and two of SomaUs to the front, driving the enemy before 
UB for 2 miles, and returning with some 1,300 of oui camels. The Somalia 
as well as the Yaos behaved very steadily. We lost only one man wounded, 
although one was killed and two womided in the zacabi behind us owing to 
the high firing of the enemy. 

B. I regret that the loss of the maxim gon waa not reported to me till 
lata in tlio day, and although every search was made we never reoovered 
it. It never came into action, as the men carrying it dropped it on the 
enemy's sudden attack. 

6. I very much regret the deaths of two very good officers. Uajor 
Phillips, R,E,, was killed whilst rallying his men. He waa at the time 
with lieutenant Everett,* who waa then wounded. Captain Howard" 
was wounded about the same time. Captain Angus* waa killed whilst 
serving his guns, and, after his death, a Somaii gun detachment went on 

• Lieutenant L, W. D. Everett, 2ad Battalion Welsh Regunent. 
Captun T. N. S- M, Howard, Weat Yorkshire Regiment, Captain J. N. 


svrving a, gun, the uCDmy L'litu'giiiy up ao close that their rluthing was act 
na fire by the oaae ahot. We loat 56 levies and 43 truisporl Epeannen 
killed, and 84 levies ajul transport were wounded. 

7- Within a, belt of 20 to 25 yards of the front face alano, I counted 
fl'2 bodies, 40 of whom were recognised as Eajis and Miillaha. The six 
tesdcrs of the enemy's foree were killed, and prisoners subsequently taken 
reported that 135 Dervish riflemen hod been killed, as alao a very macb 
larger anmber of xpewinen, and tliat the woimded were many. These prisoners 
reported the Mullah himaeU had gone back to hiirrf up reinforcements. 

8. On the evening of the 0th we buried the dead in the presence of the 
oMcers and ntade a zariba. Bcouts were sent out and located the enemy's 
scouts on the further side of a small clearing some 4 miles ahead. We made 
a zariba and had a quiet night. My information was that Mudug, the only 
oertaia water in front of me, held by the Mullah, was still 40 miles off, 
some 30 miles of which were through dense bush. Owing to many camels 
having been shot and many having stampeded, our ttaOHport was very much 
disorgoniacd. We could not fight again in this very dense bush with so 
much transport, nor could the transport bo loft where it was, under a guard, 
whilst we advanced t<i Mudug, becauBe it was certain that before our return 
the transport column, which would be sure to be watched by the enemy, 
would be obliged to move for want of water, and would inevitably be cut 
up if attacked whilst retiring through the dense bush. I therefore decided to 
get the transport back whilst keeping the enemy in play by mounted scouts. 

3. Accordingly, on the morning of the 7th, we retired about 6 mdea to 
a pool of ram-water, called Eil Garaf, ia a glado about 6 miles off. The 
evening of the 7tli was occupied by strongly entrenching tin transport 
over tUo water, and it was arraliged that a column, lightly equipped, con- 
sisting of three compoJiies 2nd King's African Rifles and five of levies should 
proceed to attack the enemy, supposed to be encamped some 10 miles off 
in the bush. 

10. On the day of the fight, in spile of the sudden panic on the left 
and along the greater pact of the front, the companiea appear to have 
recovered rapidly, and behaved well when led out. During the 7th, however, 
Uie severity of the fighting had apparently sunk into the minds of the men, 
and on my msrching out with the column on the morning of the 8tii, the 
senior officers reported to me that they could not rely on the men. Scouts 
reported that the Mullali was making ovory endeavour to collect reinforoo- 
ments. Having in view the officers' statements as to the unreliability of 
tlieir men, the very great disadvantages encountered in bush, where often 
not more than four or five men could see each other, oud that even \Fith out 
reduced transport some 400 camels were necessary ; also that the country 
was unexplored, and it was impossible to actually find out the enemy's 
numbers or dispositions, I had to decide wbether I was j ustified in taking the 
I'uik involved in an advance. Should a sudden panic occur again, I don't 
think I could have saved the force or even the transport camp left behind us. 
Under the circumstances, I regretfully decided to give up the attempt, and 
return to our camp in the open, where I knew we could repulse any attack. 

11. Not) knowing how hard the Mullah had boon hit, I intended to wsit, 
howerer, untjl our parties of scouta had been abla to oolleot reliable informa- 
tion aa to the enemy. I was awace that we could always repulse the enemj 
in the open, and it was necessary, aa muoh as possible, to diminish the cSeot 
of the retirement. The transport, after its recent exertions, also was iiuitc 
unfit to march fast imtH it bad had rest, and there were many wounded to 
be attended to. I Boat soouts boolt along all the roada t-o see that they wero 
clear behind lib, and to examinn an altemativo road said to be clear of bush. 
Having heard firing lu tho buah in the night, scouts were sent out early on 
the 9th, and I moved out with tliree companies of Somalis. It turned out 
only to be firing betweon patrols. Soouta sent out on the 8th to the enemy, 
and back along the roads, bad not returned by night. 

12. On the 10th our scouta came in bringing a prisoner, who reported 
that further consignments of rities had just reached tbo Mullah, and that 
men were coming up from all aide^, but could not bo here for some days. 
In the evening the scouts sent back along tho road lichiud ub reported all 
was clear, and that, owing to tho buah, tbo road wo had eome by was the 
only practicable one. On the 1 Ith, arrangements were made to send back 
all sick and transport, whilst the headquarter column, coneiating of threa 
componiGfi of the 2nd Kiug'a African Ki&es and five companies of Somalia, 
remained behind to cover the retirement, at half a day's distance. The 
wounded and transport, with five companies of leviea and the bulk of the 
horsemen, with three British officerB, left at nigbt ; and at 6 a.m. the next 
morning the headquarter column followed slowly, leaving a strong party of 
horsemen behind to observe and liro into the enemy. We reached LaaSuban, 
near Dam.ot, 35 miles distajit. on the night of the I3lh, and there found the 
wounded cohimn encamped, as also some levies sent down to meet the 
wounded column from Bohotle. Except for tho last 3 miles or so the bush 
had been very dense. On the 14th both columns rested, scouts having ' 
reported all clear to the Boufh. On the morning of the 15th the wounded „ , „ ,, , 
column marched oS to Bohotle, followed in the evening by the heodquu'ter ;f Qr(,g to 
column. A party of horsemen was left at Damot to follow after two days ; Bohotle. | 
scouts were also left to stay for a week. We arrived at Bohotle, 45 miles i 
fromLosSuban.ontheovening of the nth, and found the wounded column 
had arrived all well. 

13. The constant importation of arms has brought about the spread 
of fanaticism. When I was ordered out in January lost the only way to 
put B, stop to raids which were reducing our tribes to destitution was to 
organize rapid counter-raids, and this, owing to the urgency of the case and 
the rapidity of movement necessary, and the waterless nature of the country, 
could only be done by levies. The Mullah was driven ont of our Pro- 
tectorate and all our tribes' losses were gradually recovered ; but the 
superstitious awe which attached to the Mullsib's name after his December 
and January raids had sunk deeply ulto the ntiuds of all Somalis — how 
deeply I did not know until the action of the 6th October. I now realise 
that, evea with close training, most Somalis would be deeply impressed by 
the Mnllah'a name, andcouldnotin close fighting bereliedupon> The am- 

I'luyniont u£ rogiiiar lruii|i3, uii tLc other Uftiid, whilst biiiiig extremely 
ospcnsivo, haa very many drawbatka in this diflluult coimtrj. 

It will be observed from the above narrative tliat the 

disorganization of the transport and the moral effect of the 
severe fighting upon the Somali levies rendered a further 
advance against the Mullah a proceeding too hazardous to be 
undertaken without further consideration of the situation. 

Although it was found impossible, after the severe fighting 
at Erigo, to follow the Mullah across the dense waterless bush 
to Mudug, yet his attack was repulsed with such heavy loss 
that he was obliged to desist from further attacks ou our tribes 
and to retire from Mudug to Galadi in Itahan territory and 
the country to the westward, where he remained until com- 
pelled to move by the advance of an AbyBsinian force some 
nine months later. 

During the operations, the headquarters of the expedition 
covered some 1,500 miles, while detached columns marched 
a considerably greater distance. The result of the expedition 
was that all the losses suffered by our tribes had been recovered 
and some 1,600 camels remained available for rations and 
transport purposes, while the enemy had sustained a loss of 
1,400 casualties, a considerable number of prisoners, and some 
25,000 camels in addition to a large number of sheep, cattle and 

Preparations for the Third Expedition. — Brig.-Gbn. 

IW. H. Manning appointed Commander. ^Negotia- 
tions WITH Italy.— Abyssinian Cto-OPERATION. — Plan 
op Campaign, — Control of Opehations assumed by 
THE War Office. — Organization of Field Force. — 
The Operations .—Landing at Ocbia. — Advance ow 
Force from Obbia. — Occupation of Galea yd and 
Galadi by General Manning. — Lieut.-Colonbl 
Oobbe's Reconnaissance. — Action at Gumburu. — 
Major Godgh's Reconnaissance. — Abyssinian 
Advance. ^Concentration of Force at Bohotle. — 
General Manning's Observations on the Opera- 
tions — List op Casualties. 

The action at Erigo on the 6tli October, 1902, and the Prepamtioi 

,-.,,„ ... for the Ihii 

subsequent retirement of Colonel Swajme s expedition to eipeditjon. 

Bohotle created a new development of the military situation 

in Somaliland. It was feared that the cessation of active 

operations against the Mullah would probably result in a 

general rising of the Dolbahanta, and it was clear that our 

levies, though loyal, could not be safely depended upon, and 

that if decisive results were to be secured, it was necessary to 

employ regular troops for conducting the campaiga. 

At tbe time of tlie action at Erigo, the foUowing tioopa 
were in Somaliland under Swayne's orders : — 




Ist BatUlioa Kiag-s Afrii^an Rifles . . 
2ad Battalion King's Airican Riflea . . 
«th Battalion King's African Rifles . . 
T»(val levies 

Sikh. . . 







with two 7-pr. (200 Ibe.) and bix 9-pr. R.M.L. guns. 

As soon as the news reached England, reinforcements 
were sent to Berbera as under :^ 




Date of 


1 Bt Bombay Gransdiors* (from 

1 SudBQeae Company of the 



22nd October 



9tli November 

3rd Battalion King's African 

Rifles (from East Africa) 

6th Battalion King's African 


9th November 

Rifles (from Uganda) 

1st Battalion King's African 
BiBeH (from C^itral Africa) 

SOSikha J 


37th November 

2nd Battalion King's African 

Yaos . . . . 



Eiaea {from Central Africa) 



I Aden The garrison of Aden, with a view to poseible calls from 

[ ^"i^taK"^. Somaliland, was reinforced by the 2nd Bombay GrenadieraJ, 
400 men of the 23rd Bombay Rifles|| and a field hospital, all 
of which sailed from Bombay on the 23rd October. 

The 2nd SikhslT were warned for service, and the Govern- 
ment of India intimated that in addition to that corps they 


were prepared to send from India infantry, camel corps, 
mountain artillery and the necessary lioapitala. 

Brig.-General W. H. Manning, Inspector-General of the 
King's African Rifles, had been directed on the 4th October, 
to proceed at an early date to Berbera, his presence there 
beir^ considered necessary in view of the importance of securing 
the long lines of conmiunication at a time when Swayne BrigadJer- 
might be engaged in carrying out a forward movement against m^"^^„ 
the Mullah's forces at a distance from his base. Arriving aiipointed lo 
there on the 22nd October, General Manning forthwith 
strengthened the Berbera-Bohotle line by sending a company 
of tbe lat Bombay Grenadiers to Sheikh and another to Burao. 

On tbe 30th October he was informed that as the Govern- 
ment desired to consult with Swayne regarding future 
movements, he was to take over command of tbe troops from 
that officer, reorganizing them and strengthening the lines of 
communication. Swayne consequently left Berbera for 
England on the 5th November, About this time six special 
service officers left England for Somaliland, and at General 
Manning's request the force was reinforced by 150 Punjab 
mounted infantry, with two British officers, who sailed from 
Bombay on the 22nd November, and arrived at Berbera 
on the 28th November. During the lull following the action 
of Erigo, the negotiations between the Foreign Office and NogotiatianB 
the Italian Government which ultimately led to the dis- **'' * ^' 
embarkation of a British force at Obbta in Italian Somali- 
land were in progress. On the 9tb August the desirability of 
attacking the Mullah from tbe eastern coast of tbe Italian 
Protectorate had been laid before the Italian Government, 
who, though disinclined to accept the suggestion, proposed 
that a conference should be held at Rome in order to examine 
the situation and decide as to what should be done.* 

• The MarguMi oj Lanedoimt to M. Fansa. 
yom Eicellenoy, Foreign OfBce, Anguat Bth, 1B02. 

We aio moat aaxious to bring to a successful conolnBion the operations 
whjcli we ftTo now carrying on against the Mullah in Somaliland, and our 


On the IStli September, before his departure for England, 
Swayne had telegraphed to the Foreign Office pointing 
out the importance of supporting Yusul AH in the 
Mudng, and snggested that a force of 600 Soudanese and 
four guuB should be landed at Obbia. He waa informed 

military ndviacrs axa of opinioa tliat in order to secuie our object it may he 
advisBble for us to further atrengthea onr foroes. We have accordingly 
added io them a, lefierve of about 360 men, and it ia suggested that we 
might with advantage orgamso a small expedition from the eastern oooat of 
the Italian Frotootorate, so as to attack the Mullah on. more aides than one. 
For this purpose the permission of the Italian GoTemment would bo 

Nothing can, however, he decided, so far afl we are concerned, until wo 
have further news from Colonel Swayne. In the meanwlule, however, 
we should like very much to have your permission to find out whether it 
would be possible to land a few hundred men on the east coaflt. and eapecially 
at a, place called Illig. 1 have, therefore, the honour to oak whether the 
Italian Government would have any objection to our sending a ship lo 
examine the oooet at this point. It would be clearly understood that for 
the presait we ask only for facilities to obtoin information. Should ths 
result be encouraging, and should we come to the conclusion that a divecsion 
of the kind which I have auggeated ia desirable, wo should then approach 
the Italian Govomment with a formal request. 

We should he most grateful for any help which the Italian Government 
may ho able to give us in this matter. 

I have, &c. 
(Signed) lANSDOWNE. 

Memorandvm commuvicated hy M. Carignani, Av^'ist 251k, 1902. 

His Italian Majesty's Government have taken in careful consideration 
Lord Lansdowne's proposals contained in the note of the !)th instant, 
addressed to his Excellency M. Pansa, and the Memorandum handed by 
hifl Lordship to M. Catignuii on the 13th, on the subject of the pending 
military operations in Somaliland, viz., the landing of a few hundred British 
troops at Illig, the blockade of the Jlijjarten coast, the seizure anrl eventually 
the burning of dhowa. 

In the opinion of the Italian Government these measures are all rather 
drastic, and the aucceas of landing troops at Illig is doubtful ; morcorer, 
the experience of the past haa proved the inefficiency of the otiier measuTei 
above mentioned, and the actual situation in Somaliland, too, might render 
them futile. 

The Italian Government, however, consider it advisable 
plan of action, more especially aa the information supplied 
Swayne respecting the arms now in the Mullah's posses.' 

iablo to prepare k 
ipplied by Colonel n 
ion Mid the course | 

that the advance of the season precluded for the moment 

suoh an operation from being carried out, but that it would 
be taken into consideration. 

On the lOth October, the British Government suggested to 
the Italian Government that, as it was important, before coming 
to any decision regarding operations based on th"; east coast, 

of the operationa does not altogether agree with the intoUigence received 
in Borne, and the GoreriuuDntare oxtlemelyonxioijs an to the tlanquiUitj 
of tho Bonadir country, which, nntil now, lias never been threatened by 
tlie Mullah. For this purpose the Miuist^sr for Foreign AlInirH suggests that 
a CooferencQ bo held at Rome in September next, with Sir Benneil Rodd, 
or whoever might be appointed to represent His Majesty's Governracut, at 
which M. Panaa, who will bo then in Italy on leave, and a Ecpresentative 
of the Italian Department of the Navy should be present, in order to 
examine the situation and to decide as to what shoidd be done. 

His doeUency M. Prinetti trusts that the Marquess of Lanadowne 
vill have no doubts as to liis desire of co-operating with the British Govem- 
mcut for the purpose of patting an end onca tor all to the Mullah's rebellion, 
with dne regard, however, to Italian interests in Somaliland. 

The punitive mission of His Italian Majesty's ship "Govemolo" 
sgainst the Mijjartens has been carried out. The culpabihty of Bandar 
Kaaim and Bandar Ziada in the trade of arms has not been proved ; but 
Candala, the landing place of Bandar Khor, conscious of giiilt, maintained 
a hostile attitude towards the " Govemolo," and was bombarded with 
effect. The Miijartca complain strongly of the damage which they allege 
t'olonel Swayne's expedition has inflicted upon them m loss of Ufe and 

Italian Embassy, Laiidtm, Aitguel 25th, lOOS, 
Meinofaitdiim communiealed to It. Carignani [lialian Cluirgii d'.-iffaiTe/j, 
October l(Uh, 1902. 

His Majesty's Government have not failed to give their earnest con- 
wderation to the proposal, contained in the Memorandum commnnicatocl 
by the Italian Embassy on the 25th August lost, for a Conference to he held 
between the two Governments, with the object o£ examining the situation of 
affairs in Somaliland, and deciding on the course of action that might moFit 
lirofitably be adopted. 

They have delayed their reply to this proposal in the hope of obtaining 
from Hia Majesty's Conunissioner in Somahland, who is at present in 
command of the forces operating against the Mullah, a full report on the 
military Mtuation, auoh as would enable tbcm to enter a Conference with 
more precise knowledge oE the existing ciraumstances ; but the latest 
partioiUara received from Colonel Swayae are, in many respects, too meagre 
to render it, in their opinion, likely that a Conference at (he present moment 
d be attended with practical results. 
"»fl27) . --^ ^ g 


to ascertain fully the capabilities of landing places, they pro- 
poBed that a British man-of-war should, during the coming 
winter, pay a viait to the east coast for the sole purpose of 
examioing the porta, eapecially lllig and Obbia. 

The Italian Government consented and in company with 
the Italian man-of-war " Voltumo," H.M.S. " Pomone " 

the difficulty which haa been, and which rauat, probably, for 
some time, be experieaced in aomjuunicating with tha British Commander, 
His Majesty's GoTernincnt feel pceoliided from putauing foe the momen 
the idea of orgajiixing Bubeidiary operations from the east coast with a view 
to hiB BBfiiBtaaoD, more especiftlly as the near approach of the raonaoon 
aod the lack of accurate information an to the practicability of landing 
troojM at any particular point of the east coast, renders it virtually im' 
]iuKaitile to uadcrtaks auch operations during the next few months. 

Ncvertbeleas, His Majesty's Government are of opinion that the question 
of facilitating the success of the miUtary operationa againat the Mullah by 
the employment of a force landed on the oast ooaat, tmd having its base at 
IHig, Obbia, or aome other suitable place, should not bo altogether abondoned 
without further consideration. Such consideration, however, in order to 
have any practical value, must bo based on a careful study of the local 
conditionB, natural and mihtary; and His tlajesty's Government think 
that it would be well, as a neccsaary preliminary to further deliberation [n 
the matter, to ascertun aa fully as posaible the capabihtiea of any tanding- 
placeB which might be available on the east coast. 

In making this suggestion His Majesty's Govonuuont feel confident 
tliat the Italian Government fuUy realise the supreme importance, in the 
inl«reats of both countries, of aporing no eSorts to insure the complete 
suppreasiou of the fanatical moTement which ia disturbing the tranquillity of 
extensive regions under Italian protection at the same time that it endaogora 
the peace and security of the British Protectorate. They hope, therefore, 
to have the cordial concairence of the Italian Government in their proposal 
to take Buoh preparatory measures as would allow of detailed plans being 
framed for facilitating Colonel Svrayne's task — by assisting him from the 
eastern coast — should saoh an eventuality at a future date recoinmead 
itself to the two Governments. 

His Majesty's Government would accordingly auggeet that Mi arrange- 
ment should be mode, with the concurrence of the Italian Government, 
under which a small British ship-of .war, at present stationed in those watws, 
should pay a visit during the coming nint«t t^ the east coast for the solo 
purpose of esamining the ports, especially lllig and Obbia, ivith a view 
to ascertain their capabilities as landing-places and temporary bases for a 
■ small force. At the same time, it is hoped to obtain such further informa' 
tion concerning the situation in Somaliland and the movements of the British 
espediljoo now in the field, as would enable His Majesty's Government — 
if tlie Italian Government agree — to concert with them precise plans for 


carried out thia sorvey. Besides Illig and Obbia, the ports of 
Merka, Brava, KiamaTU and Mogdishu were exanuned by 
one of His Majesty's ships,* but that of Obbia was selected 
as the most suitable, its value being greatly enhanced hom 
the fact that Yusuf Ali offered to assist us there with 6,000 
camels and 300 mounted scouts. 

While providing for an advance against the Mullah from Abj-nainmn 
the east, the desirability of preventing hia escape to the west f'-fperatjoB 
had not been lost sight of. Such a movement on his 
part could best be forestalled by arranging for an Abyssinian 

fatare oo-operation. They will be then quite prapMed to hare tha matter 
disouased at n Conferenoe of British and Italiiitt Representativea, whetliBr 
at Rome or in London. 

The Italian GoTernment can rest asaurcd that in no case doea His 
Majeat/a Govemment propose to take any action on that part of the east 
ooaat which 19 under the protection of Italy, except with her full ooDBcnt. 

M. Pansa to tM Marquess of Lanadoamt. — {Received November Itl.) 
(Translation. I 
My Lord, Italian Embassy, London, October 30th, 1903. 

With reference to the converaationa which I had the honour to have 
vith your I..ordahip regarding the affairs of Somaliland, and to year Lord- 
ship's Memorandum on the subject, dated the 10th ijiatmt, I hare pleasure 
in informing you that I have to-day receired a despatch from the Minister 
for Foreign Affairs at Rome. His Excellency aothorizes me to communicate 
to you the conaent of His Majeaty'a Gorecoment to a Britiah gnn-boat 
prooeedlng to lUig or Obbia, aa suggested by your I^^irdship, in order to 
make a pceliniinary examination of the possibility of lauding troops there, 
with a view to aa eventual dirersion from that quarter against the Mullah. 
The Italian Government hare also directed a ship of the Ro3ral Nary, 
having on board officers acquainted with the coast, to join the British 
gun-boat and assist in the preliminary inreatigatjoa. lu accordance with 
^our Lordship's suggestion, it is understood that this investigation shall 
not prejudice the question relative to the desicabiUty or otherwise of the 
landing of troops end of the contemplated expedition. These points 
will he considered later, according to the ciroum stances into which the tno 
Governments reserre to themselves the right of inquiring in due comae. 

Meanwhile, I should he obliged if your Excellency would inform me of the 
date on whiuh it is int*>nded that the two rossels should be at IUle to h^ii 
Iheir PX[>Mlilinn. 

111. *c. 


t;Sv> Captain Bethell's report (Chapter XIV, 4) a 
IT fol th? purpuac of diseuibsrUatioo. 


1 the advBntflges 

tioD uf Locul 


force to occupy the Tug Fafan Valley, and on IStli November 
Lord Cromer was requested to send to the British Agent in 
Abyssinia a telegram inquiring whether the Emperor Menelek 
would consent to co-operare with us and accept the services 
of British officers to organize the force and direct its move- 
ments. On 13th December the British Agent replied that 
there would be no difficulty in arranging for Abyssinian co- 
operation or for the presence of British officers with the force, 
While these arrangements were in progress, Gi^neral 
Manning, who had assumed command of the troops in the 
Protectorate on the 4th November, 1902, began the reorganiza- 
tion of the force. A supply of rations was forwarded to tha 
advanced post at Garrero. The tribes who usually brought 
in camels for biro were approached, and a large number ol 
animals for the transport of stores was gradually collected, and 
by the 5th November General Manning had organized a flying 
column at Garrero with which he proceeded to Bohotle on the 
17th November, to deal with any attempts oE the enemy 
to interfere with the lines of communication. Bohotle was 
reached without opposition, and most of the levy garrison 
there were relieved and sent to Berbera for disbandment. 
The levy companies were reorganized as follows : — 
Moimted Infantry . . 150 



. . 400— In four c 
. . 150 — For garrisons at las 
Dureh, Elkadalan- 
leh, Shimber Bexris, 
Lower and Upper 
By the 30th November, when the reinforcements had arrived 
in the Protectorate, the strength of the garrisons of the posts 
on the Hnes of communication from Berbera to Bohotle were 
laid down by General Manning as follows : — 
i Company, 1st Bombay Grenadiers. 
1 Company, Somah Levies, 

I J Company, Ist Bombay Grenadiers. 
1 2 Gompames, Somali Levies. 

Garrero and flying Column. 

1 Company, lat Bombay Grenadiers. 
Detachment 1st K.A.R., Indian Contingent, Britisli 

Central Africa. 

2 Guns, Camel Battery. 
Detacbmeot, Bombay Sappers and Miners. 
2nd Battalion, King's African Kifles. 

^^^B 1 Company, Somali Levies. 

^^H Bohotle. 

^^^P 1 Company, 1st Bombay Grenadier?. 

Detachment Ist K.A.R., Indian Contingent, Britbii 
Central Africa. 

During this period the Mullah gave no signs of activity, re- 
ports from spies showing him to be in the vicinity of Galadi, 
probably awaiting the next move on our part. The nature Conraea of 
of this movement, regarding which GL-neral Manning's views 
had been obtained, was the subject of several meetings of 
representatives of the Foreign, India and War Offices. Three 

Irees of action had come under their consideration : — 
1. The defence of the Protectorate without attempting 
further offensive operations against the Mullah, 
2. Further operations against the Mudug, where the 
Mullah had taken up his headquarters. 
3. Operations against the Mudug, combined with a tem- 
porary occupation of the Webi Shebeli. 
Of these, the second, subject of course to the consent of the 
iwilian Government to our moving a force through their 
Protectorate and the Emperor Menelek's willingness to 
M)-operate, was now decided upon. 
I. Briefly the plan was as follows : — 

\ A force was to advance fromObbia and occupy the Mudug. PknoE 
ined there by a column from Bohotle, a mobile column '^'""I'^S" 


hom the combined force would be organized to pursue the 
MoUah into the interior. Meanwhile a body of Abysainians, 
5,000 strong, accompanied by two British officers, would have 
reached the Tug Fafan in order to prevent hia retreat in that 

On the 6th December the Foreign Office handed over the 
military and financial control of the forthcoming expedition 
to the War Office, stipulating that political questions were 
Htill to be dealt with by them and that a Committee of repre- 
sentatives from the Foreign, India and War Offices should sit 
at the War Office to discuss details and ensure Foreign Office 
consent, the accounting of the expedition to be carried out 
by the Indian Accounts Branch.* 

On the 16th December, the result of the Conference at Rome 
being known, it was decided at a meeting of the Cabinet to 
proceed with the Somaliland expedition, using Obbia and 
Bcrbera as bases of operations. It has already been mentioned 
that such a Conference had been suggested, and during the 
second week of December it met and considered the proposed 
plan of action. A memorandum, drawn up by Sir B. Rodd, 

• On the 10th December, a diatribution Bta,tement s 
under (JenBral Manning tci be composed of ; — - 
BlitiBh Officers 

md -aos). 

BritUh Non-commiS8ioned Officers 
Hospital ABBistants 

IRegnlar troopB (Alricon and Indiai 
6th K.A.R,, M.I„ and So]ii«li I,ovi 
Total . . 
C 9-poimders. 
4 7-poundera of 200 ibs. 
II Maiira giina (■4£ 
Animals — 
1(!G riding camels. 
348 ponies. 
eO muleB. 
1,4U truiBport onimala (EXtO fit, iCA ii 
ith four monthi' aiipplie>9 for the irholo. 

H.M. Charge d' Aflaires at Eome, Lieut. -Colonel E. A. Altliam, 
A.Q.M.Cr. (Intelligence Division), and Mr. Eyre Crowe, o£ the 
Foreign Office, was considered by the Italian representatives, 
and upon it certain formuliB were prepared by Sir B. Rodd 
and laid before the Italian Miniater for Foreign AfEaiis, and 
on the tollowing day he consented to its tenm. In doing ao, n^]^^,, 
however, he urged that it should be impressed upon the co-operntiu, 
General Officer Commanding the Obbia force how strat^- 
eally and politically important it was to cut the Mullah off 
from the south, and he recommended that the advance on the 
Mudug should be so directed as to force the Mullah to retite 
either north or west.* 

* Tht Marqiisea of Lanadoione Id Sir S. Rodd. 
(Ejttraot.) Foreign Office, December 6th, 1902, 

In my deaptttoh of the 8tli October, I stated that His Majesty's Govern- 
ment would be ready to enter into a oauference with the Itahan GoTemment 
in regard to the situation in Somalilood as soon as they have received 
Biifflcient infommtioa to ensblo them to do so with a, fiiU knowledge of the 
local conditions on the north-east coast of Africa. 

The results of the inspection carried out by H.M.S. " Pomone," and the 
Italian vessel of war " Volturno," enable them now to enter such Conference 
and, in accordance with the wish of the Italian Oovernment, experts have 
been placed under orders to proceed at once of Rome to assist you in the 
disoiiBsions, in which you will bo guided by the following instructions .'^ 

It seems clear that, upon whatever scale operations against the Mullah 
are undertaken, we cannot predict with certainty that they will result in hia 
captore. He may even deny ufl an opportunity of trying conclusions with 
him, and of inflicting on him eii:BmpIary defeat. In these ciroumstances 
our object must be, if possible, to take some step which will, at any rate, 
strike a blow at the Mullah's prestige, restore our own authority, and 
perhaps oompel him to eome to terms with us. 

It is admitted that these objects are most likely to be obtained by the 
occupation of the Mudug oasis, and that this can be most conveniently 
effected by a column using Obbia as its base. 

Although we are preparod to bear the chief burden of the expedition, 
yet we do not regard the struggle as one in which British interests and 
responsibilities are alone at stake, and we rejoice to find that within certain 
limits tfae Italian Govenunent are prepared to co-operate with us. We 
cordially appreciate the permission to land a force at Obbia, which that 
Government are ready to give. We also regard with satisfaction the]propoBal 
that ItaUan oBicej's should accom]>any tlie Mudug force, which might 

. these arraagements, it was decided that 
the force in Soma'iland should be composed as followa ; — 
ObUa Force. Total,2,^9G. 
From South Afiica : — 

1 Company British Mounted Iniaatry (141). 
1 Company Boer Mounted Infantry (100). 

furtbor be strengtbened by the addition of a, cert^u number of men in tlie 
emploj'ment oE the Italian Govenunent. 

Aa soon as Mudug is occu[iied tliere will, no doubt, be aa opportunity, 
in the Lgbt of any eiperienoe that may have bean gained, to issue further 
iuatructionit to the officer oommonding. 

It may be useful for your guidance in the negotiations to add some 
obaerTationa upon the subsequent conduct of the expedition to which, an at 
present advised, we look forward. This must, of course, to b. large extent, 
lie governed by circumetancea to which I aball briefly advert, but, in any 
case, we contemplate Anally a resumption of the march in a aortberly 
direcUon to our own Protectorate, and ultimately, at the conclusion of tho 
operations, to Berbera. 

How soon it may be wise to leave Sludug must depend upon our success 
In getting touch with the enemy during our advance on that place or upou 
our arrival there. In that case, wo may bo able at once to inflict the 
neoeasary punishment upon him. It would then be poaaibla, if such a course 
recommend itself to the ItaUan Government, to restore Yusuf Ali to the ooii- 
trol of the district under their authority before we more on to tho north. 
For this purpose it would be neoeasary to provide him with a fort, suitable 
annnmeut, and sufficient supplies, so that he would be strong enough to hold 
his own, and to deny Mudug to the Mullah should the latter reappear on 
the scene. In. this event, however, it would seem to be indispensable that, 
at any rate until it could be seen whether an arrangement could be come 
to with the Muilah, Yusuf Ali should receive a certain amount of support. 

I have indicated the later conduct which we contemplate tor the eipedi- 
tion in the event of oiu: suocesaftiUy xmnishing the Mulloh in tho eoursB of out 
advance upon Itludug. It is, however, very possible that he will have 
removed hia cattle from the oasis and will retire in front of ua, ao that we 
cannot being him to an engagement or inflict serious damage upon his 
herds. In that caae it may be necessary for the espedition to remain a 
longer time at Mudug, whilst small forces of mounted troops aweep the 
surrounding country. Even so, he may escape punishment at our bands, 
and we shall have to be content with an imopposod march through the heart 
of hia country to our own Protectorate. Though a defeat of the enemy 
would be much more useful, we may hope that even this operation *ill have 
a salutary eScct in destroyiug hia prestige in the eyes of his followers and of 
raising oor own. (Vc should be ready to take all reasonable precautions 

FromBerbera : — 

1 Company Punjab Mounted Infantry (150). 
King's African Rifles (550). 

to [irevent injury to Italian interests, which, it must be temembered, cannot 
but greatly gain by Any check wMoh our military operations may ijinioao 
upon the growing power of the Mullah. 

SifR. Jloddlathe Marqitus of Lanedoicni. — (Bixdved Daemha IGi/i.) 
Jly Lord, Rome, December llth, 1903. 

Aft«r a proliminary meeting with the SlinistorB of Foreign Affairs, War 
Waiine, and the Chief of the Staff of the Italian army on the evening ot the 
9th inftsnt, it wa^ arranged that Colonel Altham, Mr. Crowe, and myself 
should meet yesterday morning the Director of the African section of tho 
Foreign Office and two staff officers from the War Office and tho Ministry of 
Marine respecttvely. 

After a, somewhat eihauatiye diseuasion of the situation in Somalilonii 
and the proposed plan of action, it was suggested that we should draw up a 
memorandum setting forth the considerations which we had laid before them, 
for their further deliberation with the Minister (or Foreign AffaiiH, I have 
the honour to enclose herewith the summary statement which was then 
drawn up before we separated. 

In tho afternoon Colonel Altham and Mr. Crowe had an interview with the 
Administrator (" Amministratore Delcgato") of the Benadir Company 
in the presence of the Italian Staff Officers and the Director of the African 
section of the Foreign Office. 

I have, &.C. 


The power of the Mullah is a growing one, which, if left unchecked, will 
certainly menace not only the whole hinterland of the ItaUan Protectorali', 
bat also the north of British Hast Afj'ica. The British Government, having 
carefully considered all posiible modes of action, have decided that under 
present conditions only two lines of action ore practicable : — 

(I) To remain on the defensive within the limit of our own Protectorate, 
leaving the Mullah free to extend his power in the interior, that 
is to say, in the ItaUan sphere of influence ; 
. (2) To strike an immediate blow at bis influence by the dispatch of a 
strong column to Mudug from Obbia. 

Madug is at present the hose from which the Mullah is operating, and, 

according to our information, the majority of his force consista of tribes 
who are not disposed to quit the vicinity of Mudug and Bohotle. The loss 
of lifudug would not only greatly lower the prestige of the Mullah, but, in 
U probability, diminish his force to very small proportions, in which ease 
f Tovld cease to be a serious political danEfr to the Protoot orates of 


From India : — 

Bikanir Camel Corps (200). 
1 Section Native Mountain Battery {'2 guns). 
1 Company Sappers and Miners. 
2nd Sikhs. 

1 Native Field Hospital and 1 Section British Field 

two coonUieB. It ia anticipated that a, gruat proportion of his oattte, the 
ohief wealtli of tliB country, will be taken there. 

It IB hoped that vx opportunity will bo found of defeating the Mullah 
in. the vicinity of Mudug. But in the least favourable case of the Mullah 
avoiding on engagement, his power and prestige would be considerably 
broken by the occupation of his base, and hia separation bom. the bribes 
upon whose support he now depends, who would then be reduced to sub- 
mission. In the event of the Mullah withdrawing north or west, there 
would be reaBonable hope of the Mullah being eventually captured. 

In the ovenl of his withdrawing south, he would appear in tho form of 
a disoredited leader, and would be extremely imlikely t<i be able to raise 
again a fresh foUowiug sufficient in strength to tbroaton seriously the 
Benadir Settlementa or the British posts on the Juba ; and it is not, there- 
fore, considered that the advanee on Mudug is likely to result in the 
Mullah Hubaequentiy becoming a menace to those regions, in the security of 
whioh Hia Majesty's Government are naturally concerned. 

It is contemplated that a column from the force occupying Mudog 
should pursue the Mullah in his retirement ; the extent of such pursuit 
must, of course, depend upon circumstances, such as the amount of water 
obtainable in the direction of his retreat. The operations of this oolvuLa 
would be of a nature to intercept any communications between tho Mullah 
and his followers in the north, who could, in the meanldme, if necessary, 
be dealt with by the Protectorate force. 

Other forma of attack have been fully considered, but it has been liniUly 
decided that, owing to climatic conditions and other limitations, if any 
action other than defensive be taken, tJie Obbio-Muddug scheme is the 
only course available. 

The exclusively defensive scheme must aUnost inevitably have most 
serious results in the future for both Governments. The utuatiuu in 
Somaliland is closely analogous to that which existed in the Soudan after 
tho establishment at the influence of the Mahdi. His Majesty's Government 
then tried for many years a defensive policy, which led to so great an inorease 
of the Mahdi's power that a series of campaigns on a large scale bad to be 
undertaken before he was linally crushed. The Mullah is undoubtedly 
following in the Mahdi's footsteps ; he has already conceived large designs 
of absorbing all Somaliland, and eventually building up an omjHre in 
North-Bast Africa. 

Berbera Force. Total, 1,745. 
Flying Golumn of the Protectorate, consisting oE the Sikh 
cootiageat, Ist Battalion King's African RiBea, and the 2nd 
Battalion King's African Rifles ; total, 650. 

Politically, therefore, immediate action aeemsnecesaary, and while it ia 
imponaible to elimiaate Brory imtavourable ohoJioe, the plan submitted 
appears to the STilitary Advisora of His Majesty's Qovemment to nffpr 
the mitiimuin xuik having regard to all the ciroiunstauoea of the oose. 
Rome, Deoembar 10th, 1003. 

Sir R. Rodd lo the Miirqiie^s of Liiisiawne.~{Receiviid December 2WA.t 
My Lord, Rome, December I7th, 1002. 

I have the honour to transmit hiu-awith copy of the note whirh I ad- 
dressed to the MiuLsttr for Foreign AJIiuca. placing on record tho undcr- 
slauding arrived at with regard to the disembarkation of British troops at 
Obbia, and also eopy and trauslation of the note which hia Exeellejiey has 
addressed to me in reply. 

I have. &f. 

Sir R. Rodd lo M. Prinetli. 
M. la Ministre, Rome, December IBth, 1B02. 

With ceference to tho conforeuces wliich we have held on the situation in 
British and Italian Somaliland arising out of the action of the Mullah, I 
have tile houour to plaice on reoord aud to submit for your Excellenoy'ii 
approval and agreement the following considerations -.^ 

The consultations which have taken placo between Colonol Trombi and 
Commander Count Filipponi, acting on behalf of the Italian Governmeat, 
on tlio one hand, and Lieut. -Colonel Althont and Mr. Crowe, on behalf of 
ilia Itfajesty's Government, on the other hand, have resulted in an under* 
Standing tipon the following basis : — 

1'he oiaot route to be followed in the advance from Obbia on Mudug 
and the disposition of the troops employed in this advanoe must 
neoesBarily depend on the latest inteDigenoo of the enemy. The 
final decision on these points must, therefore, be left to the discretiOD 
of the Commanding Officer on the spot ; but it is recognised by 
tho British authorities that it is strategically and politically 
important to cut tho Mullali off from the south. This view would 
be impressed on the General OfBcer Commanding the Obbia force, 
and he would bo instructed to cndDaTour to make such disposition 
of his troops in advancing on Hudug aa would be likely to force 
the Midlah northward or westward. 
TliB terms of this understanding have received the approval of His 
Maj'^sly's Principal Secretary of Rtate for Foreign Affairs. 


lanes of Commoiucation, BerbeTa-Boliot3e : — 
From India: — 

1 Pioneer Repment (737). 

3 CompanieB lat Bombay Gtenadieta (300). 

1 Native Field Hospital. 
From England : — 

I Telegisph Section Royal Engineeis (68). 

These points being establislied. I imderstood that I am authoriziNl to 
inform the Mnrqiioss of Lonsdowne that the Govoramcnt of His Slojestj 
tlio King consent to the disembarkation of a British force at Obbio. 
I avail, &c. 

M. Prinetli to Sir S. Bodd. 


hi 1e Chaig£ d' Affaires, Rone, December 16th, 1902. 

With reference to jour note of the IGth instant, and to the conferences 
which we have held on the situation in British and Italian Somalilond, 
arising out of the action of tbe Mullah, you did me the honour of placing oi: 
record and submitting for my approval and agreement the following can- 
si derations ; — 

The (.-onsultations whicli hare talton place between Colonel Trombi and 
Conunandcr Count Filipponi, acting on behalf of the Italian Gorerrunent, 
on the one hand, and Lieut. -Colonel Altham and Mr. Crowe, acting o 
behalf of Hia Majoaty'fl Government, on tbe other, have resulted in an under- 
standing upon the following basis : — - 

The exact route to be followed in the advance from Obbia on Mudug, 

and the disposition of troops employeU in this advance must nocea- 

sarilj depend on the latest iii1«lligBnce of the enemy. The final 

decision on these points must, therefore, be left t« the discretion 

of the Commanding Officer on the spot ; but it is recognised by the 

British authorities that it is slxategicaUy and poUtically important 

to cut the Muilah oB from the south. The importauce of this 

view would bo impressed on the General Ofllioer Coinman^ng the 

Obbia force, and ho would be instructed to endeavour to n 

Buoh disposition of his troops in advancing on Mudug as would 

be likoly to force the Mullah northward or westward. 

Tbe terms of this underHtandJog, according to your note, have received 

the approval of His Majeaty's Principal Secretary of State tot Foreign 

A (loirs. 

These points being eatablishcd, you understand that you are authorised 
to inform the Marquess of Lansdowne that the Government of H"'" Majesty 
the King consent to the disembarkation of a British force at Obbio. 

I have taken note of this, and I lose no time in informing you tliat, b 

Tiie troops from Iii(Ha and Africa were to be despatcTied 
a3 soon as possible, bringing witli tbem 500 rounds of 
ammunition per rifle, 500 per gun, and 30,000 rounda per 
machine gun, 6 montlis' supplies and obligatory mule trans- 
port (Indian troops). From Soutb Africa, in addition to cobs 
for the Eiitish and Boer Mounted Infantry Contingents* and 
50 per cent, spare, 400 ponies and 400 mules with saddlery 
were to be sent. Arrangements were also made for the supply 
of the following stores :— 2,400 water tanks, 8,000 yards of 
barbed wire in lengths of 100 yards, 500 buckets {for draw- 
ing water from wells) with 5,000 yards of rope, canvas 
watering troughs, portable pumps, canvas water bags for 
troops, light axes, seta of heliograph apparatus, and other 

General Manning was directed to occupy Obbia aa soon 
as possible, whence it was hoped that the movement on 
the Mudug would be feasible about the end of January, 
He was informed that he would be accompanied by ItaUan imiian 
officers wbo would arrange for the future administration of J^'JJ,,'*'*" 
the Mudug after its occupation, and that in advancing there 
he should endeavour to force the Mullah northward as the 
Italian Government were anxious that he should not be 
driven to the south. Lastly, he was told that the Emperor 
Menelek had been asked to place a blocking force of 
Abysainians to prevent the enemy retreating in a westerly 
direction, and that on account of monsoon difficulties, the 
base at Obbia would have to be evacuated not later than 
early in May. 

Detailed instructions, in amplification of the Secretary of 

accordance with the terms and Btipulations whith constitute tho unilpr- 
standing MTived at by the tcclmical BeprDsentatiTea o{ both coiutriea, the 
Royal Govotunent conaents to the disembarkation of a, British force at 

Obhia, who aball take 

I request you 
of Lnnsdowne. 

a that point against the Mullah. 

the Bubstimce of the above to the MarqQFHi 

I huTD, Ac. 
(Siiincd) PRINETTI. 


State for War's t«Ipgram were sent to General Manning an the 
18th December by direction of the Commander-in-Cliief* to 

the following effect : — 
Brig.-SeDernl ^' Withreference to Ihe above telegram (Sacretary of SUte for War's tole- 
UanninE'a gram nf 1 Ttb December, 1902), I am to Btal« that tha object of jour operationa 
nBlnictioiii, ehould primarily be the expulsion of the Mullah from tbe oasis of llitdug. 

which baa formed the base of bia recent raids on the Somaliload Protectorate. 

3. The Italian Government have made it a condition of their assent to 
the diaembarkatioQ of a force of His Majesty's tioope at a port within the 
Italian sphere of influenoe, that so for as the miUteiy situation will pramit, 
the direction ond diatcibutiou of the troops in. their subsequent advance on 
Mndug should ain\ at preventing the BliiUah from retreating southward 
into the Webi Shobell valley. His Majesty's Government have accepted 
this condition, aa it is obvious that the retirement of the Mullah into the 
Webi might result in bis ultimately becoming a serious menace not only 
to the Itaban Protectorate but also to the Jubaland province of British 
East Africa, The details of your final dispositions for the advance from 
Obbia to Mudug must, however, depend on your latest intelligfoice as to 
the enemy's movement-e, and Bie, therefore, left entirely to your discretion. 

4. If the Mullah should be driven from the Mudug or should retire 
therefrom withoot contesting your aeiinre of that district, you should 
endeavour, if Uie conditions of the country and of your force permit, to 
pursue him with mounted troops ; bat this pursuit should not be pushed 
to any greater distance than four or five days' march to the south or wost- 

6. The Italian Govermnent are onxions, if possible, to establish at 
Mudug some form of administration, and with a view to tfua it has been 
agreed between His Majesty's Government and the Italian Government 
that an Italian oSicer will accompany your advance from Obbia as political 
officer. Probably it would be found expedient to reinstate TuBut Ali at 
Mudug, aiL'I to assist him in making his position there secure for the 
future i bnt as to this you should be guided by the views of the Italian 
political officer. 

6. Tou will be good enough to report to the Secretary of State for War 
your occopation of Mudug and the results achieved by that ocoupation, 
with a view to further instructions being issued for your subsequent gnidance, 

7. It is lioped that an Abyssinian force, accompanied by two Eritisb 
officers, will occupy the eastern Abyssinian frontier, and thus act as a stop 
to the Mullah should he retire in that direction. You will be intomied, 
however, by telegram later if the Emperor Mencluk consents to carry out this 

R. You will bear in mind that as the south-west oiDnsoon will make the 
use of Obbia as a port dangerous, if not impracticable, after the end of 
April, it will be necestiary to embark all troops and stores left at that bam 
before that dafc^ The Commander-in-Chief considers, however, that It 

* Field Marshal Eatl Itoberts. 

will probably be desirable that tbe Obbia column Bhould not return to the 
; should marcb tlu-oiigh the country, rid Bohotle, on Berbopa. 
His Lordship ie of the opinion that thia niovpmettt is likelj to liiiTe a Bttlutary 
effect OQ the tribes. 

9. His Majesty'ti Government attach much importance to the oonstma- 
tion of good roada imd the hnprovemcnt of water Gupplioa by the Bioking 
of wells in the Proteotorate, espucinlly on the northern fringe of tha Hand, 
It is believed that If the oountry is opened, up by these m.ejuiB, a feeling of 
scom'ity will be engendered, and the maiiitenBJii:e of internal order much 
facilitated. For thia reason it has been decided to place a Pioneer Regiment 
on the linen of communication from Berbera to Bohotle in lieu of the Bombay 
KMeB and the remainder of the Bombay Grenadiera originally proposed by 
you. You flhould, therefore, impress the importonce of this worh strongly 
on the Officer Commanding the troops in tha ftotcctocate. The work is 
to be taken in hand immediately oa the arrival of the Pioaeer Regiment 
from India. The direction of the roads ronatnrcf^^d and the sites chosen 
for sinking wells must be aelectpd primarily having rogard to military 
considerations ; but, subject to this limitation, tha permamint development 
of the Protectorate must be carefully borne in mind. On this point you 
sbonld consult with Hia Majesty's Acting Commissioner for the Protecbiratc. 

10. Finally, I am to remind you that on the termination of iba opora- 
teons it will be desirable that the British, Indian and the greater portion of 
the African troops should return to their normal stations. You will, there- 
fore, consider carefully what should be the strength and composition of the 
future garrison of the Protectorate, and you will report fully your views on 
these points tor the consideration of Hie Majesty's Government. 

On tlie same date the Secretary of Stat« for India was 
requested to hold in readiness for immediate emharkation 
the troops of the Indian Contingent, wliile it was desired that 
the Pioneer Regiment, which was required for duty on the 
Berbera line of communication, to replace the advanced 
troops about to be sent to Obbia, might be sent to Berbera at 

On ihe 23rd December, after it had been ascertained ludio 
from General Manning that the base at Obbia would be ready "'"' " 
for the reception of troops on the 7th January, 1003, the 
Secretary of State for India was informed that the Indian 
contingent should be denpatched so as to reach there as early 
as practicable after that date. 

Instructions regarding the despatch of the British and South Africa* 
Boer Mounted Infantry from South Africa were telegraphed *^ 
on the 17th December to the General Officer CouunaiKliiig the 



Transvaal and Orange Eivcr Colony, and he was desired to 
report their probable date of arrival at Obbia. 

On the 17th December also, the Secretary of State for 
Foreign Affairs telegraphed to Lieut. -Colonel Harrington, 
H.M. Representative at Adia Ababa, desiring him to inform 
the Emperor Menelek that operations against the Mullah 
(rom the east coast would begin in about three weeks' time, 
and that, in consequence, it was desirable that he should 
take atepa to prevent the enemy from retiring to the neigh- 
bourhood of Abyssinia. 

The proposal to send two British officers to Berbera in 
anticipation of Emperor Menelek's approval, for the pur- 
pose of accompanying the Abyssinian force was mentioned, 
On the 17th January a reply was received from Colonel 
Harrington which stated that Emperor Menelek had 
issued orders for a contingent to be prepared for use 
in the event of the Mullah approaching the high country 
and had arranged to strengthen the Abyssinian posts 
in the neighbourhood of Somaliland. The suggestion 
that two British officers should accompany the Abyssinian 
force was approved. Colonel A. N. Kochfort, C.B., Royal 
Artillery, and Captain (Local Major) E. P. Cobbold, Reserve oi 
Officers, had been selected for this duty, and were 
awaiting instructions at Aden. They were directed to 
proceed forthwith to Harrar to discuss matters with Ras 
Makonnen. These officers reached Harrar on the 
9th February, and were joined on the 13th by Dr. C. Martin of 
the Eurmah Uncovenanted Medical Service, who had been 
detailed by the Indian Government to accompany them. 

The principal steps connected with the mobilization 
of the troops for operations in Somaliland have been related 
above, but in addition to these, many other arrangements 
had to be made before the force could be said to be in a con- 
dition to take the field. 

Detailed information regarding these points will be found 
in the chapters dealing with organization oi commands and 
Unes of communication, services and departments. 


On the 22nd December, 1902, the transport " Hatdari," Tiie 
carrying the following troops * : — 

Officers 19 

Punjab Mounted Infantry . . . . 150 

1st Battalion King's African Rifles, , 350 

3rd Battalion King's African Riflas . . 98 

5t!i Battalion King's African Rifles. . 102 

L 719 

^B 2 9-pr. guns. 

^^ 5 Maxim gun^. 

with six months' stores, sailed from Betbera. This force' 
'which was under the command of Major P. A. Kenna, V.C., 
D.8.O., 2lBt Lancers, was to disembark at Obbia and there 
form a base. 

Major Kenna received the following instructions : — 

The objMts oE the laodinR are us Jrflowa :^ 

1. — (o) To protect Yuauf Ali and hia peoijlr, aa far as posaihle, from 
rqids by th« Mullah. 

(6) To acranne tot the fnpply of transport animals, c^mela and ponies, 
for the nsj of ao eipeditiou proceeding from Ohbia tn tho ioterior. 

(c) To establish a bnse for an expedition laodin? from India or elsEwhera 
proceeding to the interior. 

{d) To obtdiD auob supplies as cnn hi bought for tliB nsi; of thn expedi- 
tion, such IB grain, cattle, sheep, foraee. 

(r) To obtiiin such information as to routeu, water supply, grazing, &c., 
aa will be of srvic? to the foica advancing to tho interior. 

2. The for'*, immediately on landing, will entrench itself as stronely 
as posaiblo, and will mount two 9-pi'. guns And all masiiuH. a strong zariba 
ihoold be made round the eulrenohraent, and every pro'iantioo aBainat a 
■UTfffiBo attsclr should be made. Too much reliance cannot bf plB:ied upon 

* The following also embarked on tha " Haidaci " ; — 

Press cortespondenta 2 

Hospital Assiatanta . . . , . , . . 3 

Storekeeper 1 

Maxim gun carriers . . . . . . . . Q2 

Public followers 03 

Private „ 38 

Horses 9 

Riding camels ., .. -■ ■■ .. 11 
(8927) I 


fha piopln o'f Yiuiif Ali, ftud th? itriutajt prei-autioii:^ ehould be token in 
dealing with tbe^a pooplc. Ni Roaalis ahoiilii ba pmnitted bo outer tbe 
camci, (uid no coliectiou ot peJple should bi! allowed in the virimty of tho 
camp. All dpalinga vit'b tb? Somalia will be tbroui;h Yamt All, Strict 
ordurs will be issued that oo floldi>;ra ol t):o force are to enl«r tliB vilUges of 
the Somnlis. The il1-t>reatment of nativen ay so'.iien ot Uit> Torco u to 
Iw punishcil with sevoiity, ea in hto any ijtorfecoD'W with *iv wnraea of 
the country. Siccp the sufiof»w of the movement will depend in a large 
Qjposuru upon the ^ood fcelinf; «jtabb«hed with the OAtiven, evei} endeavour 
Bhoulu4id made to prevnt [ri^tioti. 

3. The namen of those oativea wiUiog to aell or hire camok will be i.d1^, 
and the number of camela .tr.tilable noted againot their namuB. A Ink piice 
flbould be offered for oamclb on nnle, 'he priee paid in Berbera ia 4I> to 43 
tnpeei. with ropi» and herios complctt, the price maj, however, be less 
in Ob>ia. Ponies, wbieh are oonsidered aa likel; w make good Mounted 
Iniont^y poniea, nhonld also be purchased up to 60 in number. The price 
of such ponn-B in Becliera vaiioii, and depeuds upon the demand Iroui Adidn, 
hence much lower prices should bo cnrrBnt in Obbia. 

4. Arranijementa for the purchaao of grain should be mad.', provided 
that it can be properly atoced. Empty bags should be takin from Berbera 
£oi the purpose of storing grain. 

6. The Intelligence Ofiieer must lose no opportunity of obtaining in- 
iormatioo, and should prOieed as far a£ compatihic with safety along routes 
leading to the interior, accompanied bj mounted escorts of Yusuf Ali's 
people. A tew Sikh.i, who can ride, should invariably accompany the 
lnt«Uigeiice Officer. 

6. The force will not attempt to engage any forces oL the Mullah unless 
threatened by attack in the immediate vicinity of Obbia (By the immediate 
vioinil.y la meant at a radiua of 5 miles from Obbia.) It must, however, 
bo homo in mind that the function of the Obbia foice is the defence of a 
bane, and Ihat itt operations muat be for the present atriotly defensive, 

• 7. When troops ore employed in drilling, or any other duty outside 
tJie fort, strong guards nili always be kept in the fort ; when employed on 
fatigues outnide the foit. men will invaiiably carry their riflea »lung, and a 
proportion of the men so employed will alwai^ be on the alei't as guard, 
EJlen are never to be piled When in the fort each man's rifle is to be 
jJaoBd at the spot which he will occupy, should the fort bo attacked. Men 
will bltep ttl the same spot. In addition to the garriHoorag the walla ot 
the lort, on iuijing picket uf at least 100 men will occupy a central spot 
ill tllB fort, to be used as a reinforcement at any point where it may be 
required. Itflaorve ammunition, at 100 roimdn per man, in boxei, will be 
iaaued to «Hoh company nightly, to be opened and distributed in case of 
nttaoli, Uid will be returned to the magazine in the morning;. 

H. 'I'ht Medwal OlUoer accompanying the force will causa strict orders as 
li' tuulUktiuu to bo Msuvd. The water supply for the force will be chusen 


vary carefully, aiid aucb place or places chown aliould be cocetiilly looked 
after uid enclowid by a zariba, a guard and sentries being posted by day. 

9. Since a large Britieb and Indian foroe (1.600 approximBtely} will 
be loaded at Obbia, » good cH-mpijig lite ohoold be eelected tor thii toree, 
tho proximity to water supply being a neoesBity. 

10. The Kite having been chosen, should bo marked out and cleared 
fljjd krpt clean. Wells should be prepired, and ^ nkftoh ot tho aiw should 
be made and handed to thp Oflic?r C-jQimftoding troupa oj hia ftrrivnL 

11. All pr"))B,rationB Ihnt van be made with the matcrialB available fuf 
facilitntin); iho land.ina of troop') tnd storcn at Obb'a nhould bo nndertitlcen 
at once. GoikI ruiulB from thu Ifuiding plane, to both I'ritiih, Indian, and 
baio camp? should ba made. A stock of firewood should be punhued 
lUld stored imdor n guard for the Indian troops. 

12. The Officer Commaiiding Obbia Fortf will takf with him 10,000 
mpcra lor eipenses. All payments niiist be properly vouched by signed 
receipts in duplicate. 

13. A diary of all evpnts occmriug wil! be kfipt by the ORcnr Com- 
mending tioops, and will be posted to Berbera for the informa.tion of the 
General OfGcer Commanding. SomolQand Field Force, aa opportunity 

14. Watfi-tins taken with the foroe wJl invariably be kept filled in 
the camp, sufficient for a two days' supply. 

16. Every endeavour should be made to purchase spare herioa and mpe 
for oamel loading. 

16. Every opporturxity munt be token to practise the men in drill 
suited to fighting in thick bush country. Great attention ia to be paid to 
fire diacipline. Fatigues must not interfere with this training. 

IT. The Intelligence OfGcer wiU send all information obtained by him 
to Berbera, for the information of General OlScer Commanding, Somalilond 
Field Force, as opportunity offers. 

In order to facilitate the disembarking operations, instruc- Pia< 
tions had been given by the Admiralty to the Commander-in- 
Chief, East Indies Station, to co-operate with General 
Manning, and with this view three cruisers and a gun boat 
had been placed at the disposal of the Senior Nasal Officer 
at Aden. The "Haidaii" reached Obbia on the 26th 
December, where she was joined by H.M.S. " Pomone," 
which had left Aden with lighters on the 22nd, but owing to 
continuous bad weather, the work of disembarkation occupied 
seven days. On this, aa on almoste very succeeding occasion, 
the landing of troops, transport and stores was greatly im- 
peded by the inclement weather and the unfavourable nature 
(8927) 1 2 


ol the spot selected for the disembarkation, but the work, 
which continued without interruption till the last transport 
was cleared on the 16th February, was admirably carried out 
by H.M. Navy under the direction of Captain Hon. A, E, 
Bethell, Senior Naval Officer. (See Chapter XIV. i.) 

On the evening of the 3rd January, 1903, (Jeneral 
Manning reached Obbia, and on the next day landed. 

He then found that the supply of camels, aa reported in the 
reconnaissance of H.M.S. " Pomone," was not forthcoming, 
and it was evident that the numbers under the control of 
Yusuf Ali had been much over-estimated, while, to znake 
matters worse, the tribes of the interior declined to submit 
any for sale through that chief. 

A few words regarding Yusuf Ah, Sultan of Alula and 
Obbia, in explanation of the obstructive attitude of the tribes, 
are here necessary. This peraonage, who, as Governor of 
Alula had fought for several years with some success against 
Osman Mahmud, Mijjarten Sultan, concluded peace with him 
in 1884, when he turned his attention to Obbia. This place 
he captured by surprise with only 50 matchlockmen, and an 
attempt of the Hawiya owners of the settlement in 1885 to 
expel him failed. His transactions by treaty with Italy 
have already been alluded to in Chapter II. With the 
assistance of Italy, Yusuf Ah extended his power inland over 
the Hawiya and partly over the Marehan ; later he con- 
sohdated this extension by the occupation of the Galkayu 
Wells in the Mudug district, and by the construction of a, 
small fort, which he garrisoned with troops armed with rifles. 

To return to the operations, it will be evident from 
what has been said that the situation at Obbia, with 
regard to the question of camel transport, was a serious 
one. Fortunately, however, the arrival there of transporte 
with the Indian contingent ofEered a partial solution. 
Aa soon as the troops had been disembarked, the 
transports were sent to Berbera, and by the 8th Febmary 
had brought back from theie 1,000 camels, which had formed 


part of the transport of the troops on that line, and were, 
without much difficulty, replaced by hire and purchase. In 
the meantime every endeavour was made to induce Yusul Ali 
to fulfil the promise which he had made to supply 500 camels 
by the end of January, it being estimated that this number, 
together with the quota from Berbera, would enable the 
force to advance. In these negotiations General Manning 
-was greatly assisted by Count Lovatelli, the Italian Political 
'officer with the Obbia Force, Captain Finzi and Consul- 
General Chevalier F. Sola, who had arrived from Aden ; but 
promises and threats were equally unavailing, and on the 
39th January it was found necessary to remove the recalci- Yuguf Ali 
trant chief and his son to Aden, whence the Italians aubso- ''"*.'°°, 
quently banished them to Erythrea. The deportation of 
Yusuf Ali, who appears to have been in league with the Mullah 
to place every obstacle in our way, soon had a marked effect 
on the attitude of the tribes, and in three weeks' time 
General Manning succeeded in procuring locally 500 camels. 

On the 14th January, while the arrangements regarding Lieuteiim 
camels were proceeding, a reconnoitring force, under theQ^^°^*,j, 
command of Lieut.-Colonel A. 8. Cobbe, V.C., 32nd Sikh 
Pioneers, equipped with mule transport, was despatched to 
examine the route to Kine Wells, vid El Abelli, an advance by 
which, if practicable, woidd place the Obbia column upon the 
line of retreat of the Mullah, should he decide to fly to the 
south.* Owing, however, to lack of water the route was Po<*s 


• Extraots from Field Porte Order, No. 372, dated I2th January, 1903 : — 
A foroe composed as under will proceed on a recaimaisaance. the data 
and hour of departure to be notified hereafter ; — 

In command. — Lieut.-Colonel A. S. CoLbe, VC-> I^t King's Aftioan 

The IntoUigonce OfGcer, Somaliland Field Force, will detail an offiter 
for iolieUigencQ work. 

The Chief Supply and Transport Officer will make arrangaments for 
iply and transport duties. 

B Senior Medical Of&cer will dttail a medical officer to Bccompany 
e force and will arrange for hospital requiremonta for the force, in com- 
(mnnication with the Officer Commanding rt 


found to be unauitable, and the intention to follow it was 
abandoned in favour of the line G a bar we in, Lodobal, 
Bl Dibber and Dibit, all of which places were occupied by 
the 6th February as posts on the lines of communication. 

The wells at these posts were cleared and water stored in 
tanks constructed ol tarpaulins, and aa transport became avail- 
able sapplies were poshed forward in anticipation of the 

2nd Siths, 60 men (from a Mohammedan company). 
iBt KEng'8 African Rifles. 300 mHii. 
3rd King's African Rifles, 75 men, 
5th King's African Rifles, 75 men. 

Units will take their maxims with them (2nd Sikhs, 1 maiim). 
Reaerro ammunition, SO counda per rifle, carried on mules, will be drawn 
in bulk from ordnance by the Officer Commanding force, and handed over 

Barbed wire and entrenching tools will accompany the force. Officer 
Crommanding, Ist King's African Bifles, will arrange the amount of wire and 
tools to be taken. 

If sufficient transport is available, 30 water tins will be taken. 

Allowance for officers' baggage : 80 Iba. per officer (to ini-Iude his own 
Idt, H days' rations for self, 7 days' for sprvant). 

Indian aoldicra' kit?, 5 lbs. per man. 

No tents will Ire (aken. 

Officers will be allowed ration 
horse, rations for a horse and syce. 

14 days half Indian rat 
1 lb. per man per day will be i 
in lieu of half rations. 

Indian troops will carry 
cooked (two days' rations i 
filled. African troops wiU carry one < 
rations) and water bottle and water bag 

Transport mulea will carry ^ lbs. grain per mnle in addition to 160 lbs. 
load. Grain rations only will be carried for mules. OfRaers must make 
arrangements to carry their horse's grain rations on their horses. 

The five Somali Camel Corps camels, with their Sowara, will accompany 
the force and will carry their own rations and camel rations. 

The Transport Officer will arrange that transport followers will oarry 
one day's rations cooked (two days' half rations), and water bottles and 
water bags filled. 

All troopi and Indian pnblic followers will take two canvas water bags 
per man, one of which will invariably be filled. 

No natives should, on any preteit whatever, be allowed to enter the 
camp, or til comp within the lines of pickets when halted by day. 

,, and, if entitled t 

their persons one day's frill Indian rafjons 
half rations), water bottle and water bag 
rations (two days' half 


approaching advance. From Dibit, 58 miles north-west of 
Obbia, reponnaissancea were made toward Galkayu, 101 mileo 
distant, to the north of which place, in the Galadi district, 
the Mullah was reported to be.* The result, of the recon- 
naissances was the selectionof the route to Galkayu vii} Rhakn 
and Wargallo, places which are 37 miles and 67 miles 
respectively north-west of Dibit. Several intermediate water- 
ing placea were also occupied before the arrival at Dibit 
on the* 25tKT'ebruary of the force under the General Officer 

In thia, as in the previous expeditions against the Mullah, Wat«r 
the question of water supply was one of paramount importance, '"^^ ^' 
Not only did it limit the number of men and animals composing 
the force, but further restricted its line of advance to one where 
wells could be found, and so removed all possibility of intro- 
ducing into the conduct of the operations the element of 
surprise. To have carried a supply in camel tanks and so 
gained some freedom of movement, would, owing to the 
laok of sufficient transport, have been impossible, and in order 
even to meet the requirements of a force adhering to a fixed 

In thick bush ccnmtry the advance will invariahl}' be in square forma- 
tion, with the transport and all followers in centre ; the front and lenr facen 
of the square moving in lines oE seutions at deploying intervals. 

Whenever a halt is mode, the tocoe will invariably hslt in square forma- 
tion, transport in the centre, and strong pioquelH will he thrown ont to the 
front, rear and both flanks. 

Anns will never ba piled. 

Officers' servantfl and all foUowoi's, othec than trajisport followers 
will march immediately in the rear of the transport animals. Transport 
animals will march in several lines ; the number of lines nacessary tieing ■ 
determined by the number of troops available to form the side facta of the 
square, which, when halted, should be able to completely protect the 
transport animals in the centre. 

Hoapitol will march immediately in front of transport animals. 

Arrangements will be made hy the Bane Contmondant to undeavoui 
to keep op signalling communicatians with the force from Gbbin. 

* These rsconnaifsancea were chiefly carried out by the BIkanir Carnal 
Corps, which did excellent work. On one ocea^icn a patiol did 100 milea 
S hcurs on camels, and two days afturwards the aamo oamela eovered 
^BO milea m three days. 



line of communication much labour liad to be expended botli 
in deepening the existing and in sinking fresh welis. 

During the time that the necessary arrangements were 
being made for the advance of the force to the Mudug, the 
troops from India and South Africa arrived at Obbia and 
disembarked. (See Chapter XIV, 4.) On the 17th February 
Coi'iner'^'' General Manning wrote to Lieut. -Colonel J. C. Swann, lat 
Swann. Bombay Grenadiers, commanding the Berbera-Eohotle force, 

informing him that a flying column would leave Obbia 
on the 22nd February and arrive at Galkayu oa or 
about the 3rd March. Swann waa directed to despatch a 
party with sappers and miners and pioneers to Damot, a 
place some 50 miles south-east of Bohotle, and if sufficient 
water were found to send the flying column there by the 16th 
Match. Thence, should communication with Galkayu have 
been opened up, it would be advisable to send, not earlier 
than the 30th March, a strong reconnaissance towards that 
place, which would be met by a force from the Obbia column.* 
In endeavouring to establish communication between the two 
forces the Marconi system of telegraphy, to work which 
parties had been sent from England under Lieutenant A. E. 
Silvertop, R.N,, was to be utilised.f 

* The following wcie the inBtructiona iBBued to IJeut.-Colouel Swtuui i 
Head-quartGi'B, Somaliland Field Force, 

Obbia, 17th PebrHflj-y, 1903. 

1. The Olibia force will advance to Galkayu as toUowa : — 
A flying column leaving Obbia on the 22nd February, arriving at Galkayu 

on or about the 3rd March. 

A column carryirig rations will leave Obbia oa the 4tli March, reaching 
Galltayu I3th March. 

On the 13th March the whole force will be coacoatratcd at Galtayii. 

2. The Mullah's forcea are said to be in the ncighbuurhood of Galadi. 
Ar anon as poaaible after the concentration of troops at Galkayu a force 

willmoTe out against the Midlob' s force at Galadi, thiawiD probably be about 
the 16th March. , 

This force will be able to proceed about .5 days' from Galkayu, towarda 
Galadi, in pursuit of the Mullah. Tbia will be a distance of about SO miles, 
in case no water found, but onaiderably further ahould water be discovered 
on Ibe way. 

I See"page"4S4. 


On the Slat December, shortly after tlie departure of Indian traoiW' 
Creneral Manning from Berbera, the 7tli Bombay Pioneers u^ptera' 
(subsequently the 107th Pioneers) arrived from India, 
and two days later began the construction of a road 
from Berbera to Bohotle, This road was undertaken in 
accordance with the Commander-in-Chief's instructions of the 
18th December to General Manning. (Str page 126.) In addition Woik". 
to working at roads and improving wells, blockhouses of a 
permanent nature were constructed at all the principal places 
on the lines of communication. {See Chapter XIV, 1.) 

Supplies in large quantities, to meet the requirements of Supyliea 
the flying column of the Protectorate at Bohotle and for the 
Obbia troops, who would lat«r be fed from that place, were 
pushed up to Bohotle, 

3. The troops of the flyiag colomn at Bohotle most move down and 
occupy Dam ot, provided that water caa iio obtained there. For the purpoau 
ot aacortaiaing this, a party, with sappers and miners and pioneers, will 
move down at ones to Domot, oairymg water with them to that place, and 
will there form a strongly entrenched and zarlbaed po9t, and dig a well. 
Water is to be sent down regularly from Bohotle for this party. (It has been 
found here that men employed on such labour require at least one gallon of 
water per diem.) 

Should water be discovered, the Bohotle Flying Column {or as many 
men as the water will supply) will occupy Damot. 

4. Shoidd wator not be disoovEred at Damot it may still ba possible 
to occupy Damot by forming tanks of sailcloth, in which water can be stored, 
and convoya of catnels running regularly will keep up the supply. Theaa 
tanhs work well on this side, and, when covered in, little water la lost by 

a. Messengers, both foot and mounted, will be despatched from Damot> 
to endeavour to open up communication between that place and Galkayo. 

guttilarly, messengers will be despatched from Galkayu for the samo 
purpose to Bobotle. 

Every endeavour must al-'^o be mode to obtain communication by 
wireless telegraphy. 

Messengers sent out, both from Damot and Galkayu, will have a dis. 
tinguishing mark. If moimtcd, a piece of white elotb will be tied round 
the neck of the pony, if dismounted a piece of white cloth will be fasteneil 
to the spear. Tiiis will enable messcngeBra to be reoognised. 

Messengers need only carry this mark when approaching a post. 

6, From native information it is believed that many of the Dolbahanta 
flocks have been driven into the Nogal. and that the tribcsnien are collected 

On the 23rd January, the Telegraph Section, w hich sailed 
from England on the 2nd January, arrived at Berbers, and on 
the 8th March the telegraph line reached Bnhotle, a distance of 
2041 miles, conatmcted over difficult country in 41 days. To 
secure telegraphic communication beyond this place 100 milea 
of cable accompanied the section from England, and on the 
14th March an office was established at Daraot. (See 
Chapter XIV, 2.) 

As regards Abyssinian co-operation, it has been stated that 
Colonel Rochfort reached Harrar on the 9th February, On 

with the Mullah in the ncighbourhuod of Oaladi, and are bent on fighting. 
It a also understood that a number of Uijjtirten and other tribes are in 
the npighbourliood of the Amai Wells with their flocks. 

The occupation of Gallioyu and Damot will bring both forces within 
80 milta of one another, and interposed between the two forces of theMullali, 

It is intended to drive oH the enemy in the neighboochood of the Amai 
Walls as soon as Oalkayii ia occupied. The Mijiarten will probably proceed 
west towartls Jeriban. and the operations undertaken on the Ifith Moroli 
toward* Galadi wiU probably have the effect of diiring the Mullali east- 
In this event the line between Damot and Galkayn will probably be free of 
the enemy in any niiiuber?. 

7. Should water, therefore, be found in Damot, and should the Bohotle 
fljing column be able to occupy that plane by the IHth March, and should 
conununicalion with Galbayit have been opened up, it would be advisable to 
push out a Ntrong reconnaissanoe toward? Galtcayu. 

The date of this reeonnais'^adce should not he earUer than the 30th Maicii. 

A similar recannaisHance would be pushed out from Galkayu towards 
Damot to meet the force coming from that place. The opening ap of 
commtmicationa will, however, enable the exact date to be fi^ied, and every 
endeavour must, therefore, be mode to accomplish this. 

8. When messengers are seut through, the latest information of the 
movements of the Mullah, and all news of importancp, moat be included 
in despatches. 

Despatches should be donlieatod, and sent by different ineasengew, 
and numbered consecutively. 

By Order, 

Chief Stag Olfiecr. 

StmitUiland Field Force. 
The Officer L'ommanding, 

Berbera- Bohotle Force, 


the IStli, after a satisfactory interview with Raa Makonnen, 
he reported by telegram that an expeditionary force of 5,000 
selected men would start from Harrar on tlie 16th under 
Fitaurari Gabri and rendezvous at Daghamado, Bome 200 
miles to the aouth-west and situated between the Webi Shebeli 
and Tug Fafan valleys. Aa, however, such a movement would 
take the Abyssiman force beyond its owu border and within 
the sphere of the Italians — a course, the undeairabillty of 
which had been pointed out in the instructions sent to 
Rochfort at Aden — ^the Secretary of State for War tele- 
graphed, on the 21st February, directing him to delay his 
advance until fresh instructions reached him. On the 28th 
February he was informed that the Italian Government con- 
sented in principle to the advance of the Abyssiniana to the 
Webi Shebeli, and Goledi on that river waa reached by them 
on the 26th March. The information which led Kochfort 
to urge Raa Makonnen to send a force as far south as the 
Webi Shebeli had reached him in a telegram dated the 18th 
January from General Manning, which laid stress upon the 
importance of the presence of troops on that river to act as 
a atop against any movement of the Mullah in that direction. 
In addition to providing the column, which Rochfort 
accompanied, Ras Makonnen despatched troops to guard 
the line Jig Jiga-Sasami-Faf, and so prevent the Mullah 
from escaping to the west. 

On the 21st February Cobbe's column* returned 
to Obbia from Elhur and Haradera. That officer, after 
carrying out the reconnaissance of routes to Galkayu, 
had been despatched on the 3rd Februaiy to the south- 
west for the purpose of collecting transport animals belonging 
to Yusuf Ali and had succeeded in obtaining by purchase 
270 burden camels as well as some 200 head of 
cattle. Cobbe reported that he had met no signs of 

■ lOO Punjab Mounted lafmtry, 75 Bikanir CaraiJ Corpa, 1 oompanj 
1st Battalion King's Afririan Riflpa, I company 5th Ba,ttalion King's African 
This reconnaisanncG had been deBpsCched on the 2nd Fobruary. 


the enemy, and as inforraation about the podtion of the ' 
Mullah was very unreliable, it seemed possible that the 
occupation of the Galkayu Welk might meet some opposition 
and 80 clear up the situation. General Manning decided to 
move forward a flying column to seize these wells. 

On the 22nd the advance to the Mudug from Obbia began." 
On that day General Manmng marched to Gabarwein, a 
distance of llj miles, taking with him a flying column, , 
composed aa follows : — 

Mounted Troops, under Maj or Kenna^ 
British Mounted Infantry . . 
Boer Mounted Infantry 
Punjab Mounted Infantry ,. 
Bikanir Camel Coips 


2nd Sikhs 

1st Battalion King's African Rifles, . 
3rd Battalion King's African Rifles . . 

To be joined at El Dibber, Dibit and 
Wargallo by — 
Punjab Mounted Infantry . . 
Bikanir Camel Corps 
Bombay Sappers and Miners 
2nd Sikhs 



• Field Force Order, No, 415, dated 1st February, 11103 :— 

The following will be the scale of baggage allowed (o all oflioera ondl 
troops proceeding to the front ; — 

British officers, 160 lbs i For kit and 10 days' ralioiwf 

Britiah warrant and non-eoDimisBioned V for self and Bervaot, 
oficera, 100 lbs J taken. 

British and burgher troops, 15 lbs. 

Nalivo oflicera and hoapital asaUtants, 25 ibn. 

NHtiye troops and followers, 12J lbs. 

Eatiooa tor officers' chargers will be carried by Supply Dcpartmer 
Transport for the carriage of mesa utensils, &c., will be allowed for, and iat 1 
the carriage of coating pota for rank and file, 

Making a total of— 

Mounted Troops 383 

Sappara and Miners, Inlaatty . 755 

Total .. 1,138' 

together with one section of a British and one section of 
an Indian Field Hospital. Rations for 14 days and reserve 
supplies for 11 days were carried. 

"With this force it was intended to push through to Galkay u, 
the centre of the Mudug region, while the remainder of the 
troops at Obbia, under Lieut. -Colonel C. G. M. Fasken, 2nd 
Sikhs, convoying one month's rations for the entire force, 
was to follow on the 6th March. Lack of transport and an 
inadequate water supply at the various posts upon the route to 
be traversed necessitated this division of the Obbia column 
into two portions, About this time it was reported that the 
Mullah had vacated the Mudug district and that his men 
had filled up the wells at Elfurdan. 

On the 23rd the advance was continued, Lodobal, 13| miles 
beyond Gabarwein being reached at '6 p.m. The direction of 
the march lay nearly due north, at first passing through low 
tufted grass and scrub, and later over several miles of low 
sand dunes. Tlie mounted troojra marched independently 
under Kenna.f 

On the 24th the column proceeded to El Dibber, a distance 
of 17 J miles, while Major K. G. Brooke, 7th Hussars, D.A.A.G., 
in command of the advanced section of the lines of communica- 
tion, occupied Wargallo, 35 miles south of Galkayu, and took 
steps to improve the water supply there. 

* For further details rpguding thu Dumters of the Obbia Pield Foroe 
■oe Chaptei IX, Field States. 

t Sereille was at 4.30 a-m. on 23rd February, but it waa not until 
after an i^arly breakfast that the force took up the lino of march. The 
order tbto and sincu has been to rise at 4.30 a.m. and move oS at 7 a-m. 
The ' going ' for the most port was Treiy toilBome ; at first rough, low, 
tufted grass and scrub, then, later, milt's of low sand dunes, titiug ae the 
■lioreB of ShoeburjneHE. 


Ontlie25tli, the colunm left El Dibber at 7 a.m. At Aolu, 
5J milee to the north-west, the iufaiitry under Cobbe, halted 
for the day to enable the transport camels to water and grass. 
Genera! Maiming pushing on with headquarters and the 
mounted troops to Dibit, 8J miles further on. 

Oa the 2fith the troops at Dibit, wheie supplies for n 
month for the whole force had been stored, were given a halt, 
and were joined there by the infantry fiom Aolu. 

On the 27th, a distance of 16i miles to Inideenli was 
covered, the force moving in square formation. The country 
passed over was open, and the weather hot, but cloudy. 

On the 28th the troops marched to Rhalni, 12J miles, 
where it was found that the water supply was insufficient, 
both for watering the horses of the mounted corps, and 
for fil ling water tanks, required for the forward march. It 
was decided, therefore, to send back the mounted troops 
together with 170 camels to Inideenli, where the animals 
could he watered and water tins refilled. The watering of 
the troops and transport at Rhakn was continued all night, a 
lift and force pump, six of which had been despatched fioui 
England in January, being found of the greatest service. 

On the 1st March the force halted at Rhakn and information 
regarding the water difliculties which had been encountered, 
together with instructions as to the best method of over- 
coming them, were sent to Obbia to Fasken. 

On the 2nd March an advanced force under Major S. R 
Davidson, 2nd Sikh.s, left Rhakn at 7 a.m. for Bhirokhode, 
lOJ miles towards Wargallo, the remainder of the troops 
following at 2.15 p.m. The mounted troops, which had been 
sent to Inideenli on the 28th February, returned to Rhakn 
at 2 p.m. on the 2nd March and were directed to join 
the column at Wacgallo on the following day. 

On the 2nd also, Brooke, fearing that the water 
supply at Wargallo would prove insufficient for the flying 
column as well as for the whole garrison of that post, sent 
foiwatd at (i a.m., towards Galka.yu, 30 men of the Punjab • 



Mounted Infantry and 50 men of the Bikaair Camel Corps. 
under Captain A. Williamson, Indian Army. Thia party 
took with it live days' rationB. 

On the 3rd March the column left Bhirokliode at 6 a.m. and 
reached Wargalloat 12.30 p.m., a distance of 15 J miles, where 
it was joined later by the mounted troops fromRhakn. In 
the evening Lieut. W- H. Evana, R.E., Field Intelligence 
Department, who had accompanied Williamson's party, 
retu.ned to Wargallo, reporting that Galkayu had been 
reached. No enemy had been met with, and while the 
water supply at the Mullah's stronghold was sufficient for 
the requirements of the Obbia column, there was none to be 
found on the road thither. 

On the 4th March the Moimted troops of the flying 
column (175 men) under Kemia, left Wargallo at 
(i a.m. and reached Galkayu at 5.30 p.m. Here they 
joined the small force under Williamson who had con- 
structed a zariba for its protection. The main body 
marched at ti.lo a.m. to a camp 20^ miles distant, passing 
over open country with scrub and bush in places, This 
march, owing to the heat and the limited supply of 
water, was much felt by the troops. 

On the 5th the main body reached Galkayu, where tbe GbIUsju 
whole Hying column was now concentrated. 

The march from Obbia to Galkayu, a distance, by the route 
taken, of 159 miles, had occupied 12 days and had been 
accomplished without opposition, considerable numbers of 
the Mullah's followers having retreated westward on the 
approach of the column. 

Writing to the Secretary of State for War from Galkayu on 
6th March, 1903, General Manning reported : — 

lu the course of the uexi ievi days I hope to be able to locate tbe 
poMtiou of tlie MuUah's force, which, I bohHve, to ho in the nEighbourhood 
of this place. Native spies reported the viciuity of a number of men und 
luumalB OD the mocoiiig of the day of our arrival in Damp ) thia would appear 
to have been a party nho hod comu douii tu souie neighbouring wells Cor 
ihi.^ pui'poH! of wati-Ting aniiuuls. I sent out spies a few houi's after niy 

urival hero to tradi these people, and held a forae of mounted traapa and 
infantry in readtneaa to march out at niglit, if newa of their still being close 
at hand nas received during the night. These series, however, have not yet 
rptumeil, and it is therefore evident that the Mullab'a people i)ave moved 
oS on hearing of our arrival. The occupation of these wella will compel 
the Mullah's force to break up, since the watmitg difficulties will bo very 
graat. The capture of some of the enemys men by our spies will enable 
us to diacotrer vhere the Mullah has fixed his headqnart«rB ; at present 
we have no infonnation on this point whatever, though it is evidout that bo 
is at no great distance from this place. 

To-morrow, the 7th instant, as most of the transport animals return tn 
Dibit to bring up supplies vith the main column, we shall be left with a small 
nmnber of transport animals until the 17th instant. The interval will, 
however, be utilised to thoToughlj' rooounoitro th<! country round, so that 
upon the arrival of the main colmun, an advance will be made at once on 
any collfection of the enemy withm striking distance. 

I have been obliged to ask for more Supply Officers, as the peculiar 
nature of operations in this country, and the long lines of commiinjcntion 
lo be kept open to Obbia, render it very necessary that this department 
should be thoroughly well supplied with a staff, and the move of the flying 
column to Galkayu has disclosed the fact that the staff of the Supply De- 
partment is quito inadequate ; so much so, that on the march up here, 
I experienced much difficulty' in carrying out the proper supply duties of 
the force. 

I have addressed a communication ta the Italian RepresentatiTS 
accompanying the force, asking him to inform me without delay as to the 
date on which he intends to take over the occupation of this place, in order 
that he may notify to bis Government the occupation of Mudug. 

The marches up here have been extremely hot and trying, but the 
troops have borne them well. The mounted troops particularly have had 
OQ arduous time, but Major Kenua's good manageuient hs^ so far resulted 
iu the loss of only one mounted infantry horse. 

The route of our advance is fairly well watered, but oonsiderable 
urganizitioa is necessary at each watering place to make the utmost use of 
the wells possible. 

I shall at once endeavour to obtain communication with Bohotle, vid 
Damot, which place I hope has been occupied by the flying column from 

The health of both officers and men remains excellent. 

In the original inatmctions of His Majesty's Goyenunent 
to the General it waa pointed oat that the expulsion 
of the Mullah from the Mudug was regarded as the 
primary object of the expedition. Should he be driven from 
that district or retire therefrom without contesting ito seizure, 
an endeavour was to be made, provided that the conditions of 

_L. 1 


the country and of the force permitted to pursue Ilim with 
mounted troops to the south or west, but not to a greater 
distance than four or five days' march. Such a course, 
however desirable, could not be carried out immediately 
on reaching Galkayu, for the force then was in no condition 
to occupy effectively the various wells within the Mudug 
district, far less to undertake a pursuit over an unknown 
country against an unbeaten enemy. Lack of sufficient 
transport, which had necessitated the march to Galkayu in 
two separate columns, forced Greueral Manning to halt there 
until supplies and troops could be moved up and so enable 
the advance to be resumed. 

Retaining therefore with the flying column only a Binall 
number of transport animals and thereby rendering it for the 
time practically immobile, General Manning sent back 850 
camels to Dibit, whence they were to bring up supplies 
accompanied by the main column which had left Obbia on 
the 6th March, and was now advancing under Fasken. This 
column consisted of : — 

Mounted Troops — 

British Mounted Infantry . . 


Boer Mounted Infantry 


Punjab Mounted Infantry . . 


Bikanir Camel Corps 


Lahore Mountain Battery (2 guns) 

Bombay Sappers and Miners . . 


2ud Sikhs 


1st BattaKon King's African Rifles . 


5th Battahon King's African Rifles . . 


Making a total of— 

Mounted troops 


Sappers and Miners, Infantry 




of Berbei'ft 

In the interim, General Manning proceeded to send out 
small reconnoitring parties to examine the country in the 
vicinity of Galkayu and ascertain where any bodies of the 
enemy were collected, so that as soon as Fasken's column 
should arrive, operations might be undertaken. Thus, 
Bera, 16 miles to the north-west of Galkayu, Rohr and 
BadweiQ, 30 miles in the direction of Bohotle, were recon- 
noitred, and information obtained that the main body 
of the Mullah's force was at Galadi, while he himself 
was at Dikwein, Intelligence reports showed that the 
Mullah had 2,500 riflemen at Galadi (mostly mounted), 
5,000 to 6,000 horsemen, 16,000 spearmen, and about 4,000 
spare ponies. 

On the Berbera-Bohotle line movements of a similar 
nature were also in progress. On the 3rd March, acting 
under instructions from General Manning (see page 136), 
Lieut. -Colonel Swann had despatched from Bohotle, under 
command of Major J. E. Gough, Rifle Brigade, a flying column 


2 companies 7th Bombay Pioneers,* 

12 men Bombay Sappers and Miners, 

100 men Somali Mounted Infantry, 

50 men SomaU Corps. 

2 Masims. 

Marconi Detachment. 

ove tne 

Gough's orders were to occupy Damot, improve 
water supply and endeavour to open up communication 
with Galkayu. A defensible post was to be constructed for 
the protection of the wells and the mounted troops were then 
to return to Bohotle. 

Damot was reached at daybreak on the 4th March, and 
a small party of the Mullah's adherents driven off, losing 
in their retreat three killed and seven prisoners. On the 

IHn s sfoong sariba was conatmcted, and on 

mounted troops, leaving the inlantiy 
retomed to Bohotle. 

On the loth, Lasakaat« wella, situated some 30 miles due 
south of Bohotle, and on the direct route to Galadi, were seized 
by another force under Lieut. -Colon el Plunketi consisting of 
170 mounted troopa with two companies King's African 
RiSes in support. On this occasion lifteen of the enemy 
were killed and sixteen taken prisoners. As the wells con- 
tained water sufficient only for the small scouting parties o£ 
the enemy, they were filled up, and the force returned to 
Bohotle on the 12th. 

It had been hoped that the Naval party which had been 
sent from England with Marconi telegraphic apparatus to both 
the Berbera and the Obbia forces might have been of some 
service towards establishing communication between the two 
forces, but the conditions of ground and climate in Somaliland 
were alike unfavourable, and on the 20th April the Admiralty 
was requested to recall the detachments. 

On the 13th March communication between Galkayu and 
Damot was established, some Sowars of the Bikanii Camel 
Corps aniving at the latter place with despatches from 
General Manning, and on the 14th March Swann moved 
his flying column to Damot, where a telegraph station was 

On the 17th March Swann received orders from Greneral 
Manning to despatch from Damot to Galkayu a force consisting 
of 300 men of the 2nd Battalion King's African Rifles, 50 
men Somali Mounted Infantry, and 2 guns of the camel 
battery. These troops, who were to be accompanied by 
1,000 camels, 2 months' rations, and at least 400 water tins, 
were to reach their destination by the 25th March, in time to 
take part in the advance from Galkayu. A further supply of 
1,000 cameb was ordered to be collected at Bohotle a'l a 
reserve for the Obbia force. 

(8927) . K 2 

Usin column The main column under Faskcn, wtirli, owing to water 

O^kn^u ^"^ transpoifc difficulties * had been divided into two paities, 

reached Galkayu on the 17th and 24th respectively, and on 

the evening o£ the 25th the detachment from Damot, under 

the command of Plunkett, arrived. 

General Manning was now in a position to move against 
the Mullah, who was reported to' have left Galadi and 
retired to Waidair and Walwal. These places are situated 
some 150 miles to the west o£ Galkayu, and can only be reached, 
ill the dry sea,son, by passing over an almost waterless tract 
nf country, thickly covered with bush. In view, however, 
of Gejiernl Manning's instructions, which restricted his opera- 
tions within an area of four or five daj-a' march from 
Galkayu, it would have been undesirable to have proceeded 
so far; but this had been foreseen by His Majesty's 
Grovemment, who, on the 2l9t March, telegraphed to 
the General giving him a free hand as regards movements to 
the westward, t 

• In a despatch, dated 3rd Apcil, General Mnnumg said : I regret 
fo rpjxirt that great mortality haa occurred among the camel trajiapoct. 
Tho camelB brought roimd to Obbia from Berbera suffered cojlaiderably 
uwlng to tbe impossibility of laftding them immediately ou tlieir arrival, 
HtDoe a hcavyaea was running for some days subsequent to the arrival of the 
transport. The camels, though given 10 days rest and grazing, have never 
entirely recovered. Grazing at tliia time of year ia almost non-eiUtent, 
the whole country being dried up. Tills loss of camels has hampered the 
transport of rations, &c, on the line of commimications, and has compelled 
ine to keep back about IM mounted infantry, 50 Bikanic Camel Corps, and 
the Mounted Batlcry Section on the line of commimicatiooa between Dibit 
and Obbia. 

"f Genera! Manning telegraphed on 7th March from Galkayu (received 
ISth March) lo the Saccetory of State for War :— 

From a prisoner caught tbi<t morning the following iitfomialion has 
been received : The Mullah left Claladi oa tecciipt of information of our 
arrival at Obbia two months ago, and went with ICO horsemen and 40 men 
onfoot to Dikweio, which is near HarrarDiggit, and close to Kusati.WeUby'H 
route Ko. 64. His personal belongings and all his riflemen are at Qoladi 
with the remainder of his horaea. The Dolbahanta and Ali Giiori tribes 
are in strength at Galadi. The Mullah informed the Dervishea that if he 
received promises of support from the Ogaden he would send back this 
information, and that be intended to attack Bohitle. Up to now he hai 


On the 2(3tli March, leaving a garrison oE the 2nd Sikhs Adranre 
t Galkayu, and taking with him the following troops : — w^da^ 
Bank and file. 
British and Boer Mounted Infantry . . 284 
Bombay Sappers and Miners . . . . 20 

2ndSikhs 278 

Ist Battalion King's African Rifles .. 149 
2nd Battalion King's African Kifles . . 300 
5th Battahon King's African Rifles , . 50 

Total .. .. 1,081 
I General Manning marched to Bera, (15 miles) which place 

had been occupied by a party of the 2nd Sikhs as an 
advanced post, on the 19th March. 

On the 27th the force halted to allow the camels, which 

had accompanied Plunkett's force from Damot, to rest 

and graze. In the evening a force of 240 mounted infantry 

imder Kenna, was despatched with orders to push on 

to Dudub, but if unable to advance without serious 

opposition, it was to fall back on the infantry column, 

which would leave Bera next day. General Manning 

expected to encounter severe opposition in the thick belt of 

bush between Bera and Dudub, and although the moimted 

I infantry would probably be able to push through under 

cover of night, he considered it hkely that the large camel 

I convoy which accompanied his infantry would be attacked. 

^^v On the 27th also, acting under mstructions from the 

^^^ffieneral Officer Commanding, Swann had sent out the Bohotle 

^^•-Mnt back no information, anil it is to be presumed tlie Ognili^n tefuse to 

assist him. Haji Sudi and Sultan Nui accompany the Mullah. Haji Sudi 

i« reported to have died at Dikwein ; thia latter report con be taken ob true. 

On Slut March the Secretary of State for War replied : — 

YoumiL; now CQnaider that you have a free hand og^nst the Mullah in 

bU operations to the westward, but restriction imposed by paragraph 4 

of your inatciietioiis of the lath December must apply still to movements to 

Boutfa. Communicate direct to Boi^hfort your wiehea as mgartla 


flying column, under Major A. G. Sharp, Lemster Regiment, 
from Damot in order to intercept any of the Mullah's 
following who should endeavour to enter the Nogal 
Plain when the Galadi force advanced. Sharp's 
operations lasted foi a week, during which time 98 of the 
enemy were killed, 2,000 camela and 6,000 aheep captured. 
The camels were for the most part milch and young, 
only a small percentage being of value for trajisport puxposes. 

Major R. Brooke also was sent out from Badwein to 
endeavour to stop the Mullah from marching across the 
Hand to the Nogal, if he was defeated near Bera. Brooke 
captured a few camels and goats and killed a few of the 

On the 28th, taking with him six days' watei In tanks 
for the whole force, General Manning resumed hia march.* 
Bera was left with a garrison of 100 rank and file of the 2nd 

• Tho force which mnrched out at 8 a-m. from Bera waa composed of : — 

Rank and File. 

Eeatliinart^?ra Staff 

Italinna . . 

Mounted Corps 

Camol Battery 

Bombaj Sappers and Miners . 

2nd Sifchs 

1st King's African Ritle! 



Intelligenoe Department 
Survey Saetion . . 
Provost Maishal 
Veterinary Department 


Supply Department . . 

Total .. 

and 431 (oUoTera. 

347 and I British 

Warrant Officer. 

1 and 1 ABsiatant 


1 (Warrant Ol&oer) 

and oth Battationa King's African Rifles, the original garrison 
of the 2nd Sikhis joining the advance. Beyond the bush, 
open country was reached on the evening of the 28th, and 
the column halted on a grassy plain 19 miles from Beta. 
Feeling considerable uncertainty regarding the water supply 
ahead, as to which no report had yet come in from 
Kenna, the General decided tu send back to G-alkayu 338 
of the 2nd Sikhs, thereby reducing the infantry to 529 
rifles, which he considered an adequate force with which 
to occupy Dudub, more especially ao, as the route before him 
was stated to pass through open country. By this reduction 
another day's water was gained. 

On the 29th the force, starting at G a.m., marched to 
within 8 miles of Dudub, where it bivouacked about sunset, 
after covering 17J miles. At noon a report was received 
from Kenna that he had occupied that place without 
opposition on the previous evening and had captured a 
few prisoners. A later report from the same oflicoi stated 
that he had learnt that a small force of the enemy was 
holding Galadi Wells, whither he intended to proceed on the 
night of the 29th so as to secure the water supply there. 

On the morning of the 30th, the force reached GJakdi 
Dudub, which proved to be 44 miles distant from Bera, and "'^^''P"^''- 
afforded an excellent water supply, sufficient for the require- 
ments of a considerable force. A halt was made there until 
10 a.m., when the march was resumed for a distance of 12 
miles towards Galadi.* During the evening a message was 
received from Kenna stating that he had occupied Galadi at 
8.30 a.m., killing several of the enemy and capturing a few 
prisoners and a small quantity of live stock. On the 31st 
General Manning joined Kenna at Galadi, where the water 
supply proved to be fair and suflicient for a small force. 

From information extracted from the prisoners captured Raiding 
at Galadi it appeared that immediately Qalkayu was occupied "P"™*"""*' 

■ Sixcjmea unilar Cbptiia W. F. Diigmare, U.S.O., were lef t to Kmrciaon 


by the British, the Mullah evacuated Galadi aud retreated to 
Walwal. His live stock, however, which should have followed, 
waa stated to be still in the vicinity of Gumburu, some 30 
miles distant from Galadi. As the capture of camels would 
greatly assist the further advance of the force, Plunkett 
and Cobbe were despatched for this purpose from Gaiadi 
on the 1st and 2nd Apiil respectively, with detachments 
of the 1st and 2nd Battalions King's Afiican Bifles. 
Plunkett moved in a westerly, and Cobbe in a southerly direc. 
tion, where, according to spies, large quantities of live stock 
had recently been seen. With a view to economise the food 
supplies of the Indian and Afiican troops, they were placed 
on half rations of rice or atta, in place of which extra 
quantities of meat were issued. 

In order to carry out his intention of moving further west, 
ward, General Manning was obliged to halt for a brief space at 
Gaiadi, there to collect a sufficient stoie of food.* Thequestion 
of water was also one which had to be solved, for the coliimn, 
which was engaged in following up the Mullah, was now 
about to pass over a district piactically devoid thereof, and 
before an advance was possible, arrangements must be 
made, either to transport a sufficient quantity in tanks, or 
establish along the route to be followed, posts, from which o 
supply could be drawn. Neither of these courses was free from 
seiious objection, for in the one case a lengthy and consc. 
quently vidnerable transport train was inevitable, while as 
regards the other, the establishmentof posts not only weakened 
the force from which they are drawn, but exposed thera to the 
possible risk of annihilation in detail. Yet it was obvious that 
if the force was not to remain stationary in a country where 
water is a commodity only to be met mth at rare Intervals, 
one or other of these systems must be employed. 

General Manning proposed to adopt a combination of 

• Orders were eent to lie ut.- Colonel Bwann (Bcrbera-Bobotle) lo 
il.esi>ateli a conToy of 500 oaitiob to Dudob rid Damot with one montli's 
supplies for 500 Afripsn troops 


both, and establisLed a post 20 miles distant, where water 
for 2 days for the whole force could be stored in addition to 
the necessary amount for the garrison, and a similar post some 
15 irules further on. As soon as both these water depots 
had been established, his purpose was to move from the 
further of them with tanks carrying 5 days' supply, trusting 
to reach Wardair on the third day, where, if report were true, 
ample water was to be found. 

On the 8th April a party of 50 men of the 5th Battalion 
King's African Rifles, under Captain G. W. G, Lindesay, 35th 
Sikhs, carrying with them two days' water for the column 
which was to follow, left Galadi to establish the first of these 
posts 20 miles on the road to Wardair. 

On the 6th and 7th April Plunkett's and Cobbe's forces 
had returned from their raid against the Mullah's live stock, 
bringing with them 1,630 camels, most of which, however, were 
milch. Plunkett had moved out some 36 miles towards 
Gumhuru, where he had found and attacked Bome of the 
enemy's karias, kiUing 36 men. Cobbe returned to camp at 
2 a.m. on 7th April, and reported that he had surprised 
the enemy's karias and inflicted severe loss on them. As the 
remainder of the supplies and troops required for the advance 
on Wardair would not arrive from Galkayn until the 17tb 
instant. General Manning decided to utilise the interval by 
sending forward a strong reconnaissance to endeavour to 
discover the road to Wardair, and if possible occupy that 
place. This decision was come to on the receipt of native 
information that the Mullah had abandoned both Wardair 
and Walwal and had retired to the west or north-west. 

On this point General Manning wrote : — " I felt that this 
advance was the hmit to which I could proceed, since the state 
of camel transport would not permit of any further pro- 
longation of my lines of communication, and I had hoped, 
by occupying Wardair, to be able to seize a number of the 
enemy's camels. I had arranged for the arrival of 350 of 
^e 2nd Sikhs and 70 3rd Battalion King's African Rifies at 

Galadi on the 17th 

the return of the 

inetant, ao ' 
shotild be able to advance on Wardair with 

nearly 1,000 men." 

At 5 p.m. on the 10th April, Cobbe, who was detailed 
to conduct this reconnaiasance, began his march weatward. 
He was accompaiued by the : — 
Ist Battalion King's African Riflea, 120 rank and filft and 

2 maximB, 
3nd Battalion King's African Rifles, 280 rank and file and 

2 masims. 
6th Battalion King's African Rifles, 15 rank and file. 
Camel Battery, two 7-pr. guna, 
together with two medical officers and transport. 

Ten days' rations and water for 6 days at the rate of 
1 gallon per man and 2 gallons per horse were carried. Cobbe 
was directed to refrain from attacking the enemy if there was 
reason to suppose that the main body of his force was at hand, 
but should no strong opposition be encountered, Wardair was 
to be occupied, so as to secure a water supply for the main 
column, which, as already mentioned, was timed to follow 
on the 17th instant. 

Cobbe was further instructed to water his column at the 
post which had been established 20 imles west of Galadi, 
taking with him the garrison of the 5th Battalion King's 
African Rifles, but leaving in charge 1 officer and 10 men of 
the Bombay Sappers and Miners.* 

''Copy o) Inslrvdions for LievL-Coloiid Cobba, V.C, O.S.O., Commanding 
Column detailed in Force. Orders of BIh April, 1903. 

1. All inionnaticm lately received tends to the belief tliat Mulllkk's 
fgrcea ace now in the area of country rnughly eaelosed within the iHiundarieB 
WMdaic, Suryu, Danot. 

ITie Mullah himself, with his personal bodyguard, is believed to bo at a 
spot called lUig, some 18 milea nortli o[ Wardair. 

Wardair is believed to ha 70 or SO mittiB north of Oaladi. 

■2. Your object will be to cfFeot a reconnaisGouce in the direction of 
Wardair and, if no stron;j opposition is met with, to seize and hold that place, 
thuH seriiriag the watei' supply to the Main Columo, wliioh will advanoe from 
GaUdi OQ 17Ui instant. 


On the 1 Ith April 50 men of tlie British and Boer Mounted 
Infantry, under the command of Captain G. C. Shakerley, 
4th Battalion King's Boyal Rifle Corps, left Oaladi to join 

You will refrain from attacking the enemy if you have reason to sappose 
that tlie main body of Ma force is at liand, but it is probable tliat you will be 
in poBBesflion of the wellfi before any important body of the enemy oan be 
conoentrated to meet you. 

Once in posBSBsion of Wardair, and in strong defensive position, you 
I ■kould be able to liold your ovm withoot difficulty, and to inOiat the soreroflt 
I loBsea on the enemy if he ventureB to attack you. 

3. As pTByioualy ordered, you will start to-night with that portion of your 
oolumn detailed to move to-day, and you will reach to-moirow marning the 
water post which has been eBtablished 20 miles towards Wardair. 

At this poBt you will obtain 1 day's water for your column, and on the 
nth instant you vrili proceed towards Wardair, taking with you the detach- 
ment 6th Battalion King's African Rifles now at that post, and leaving ob 
garrison one oificer and 10 N.F.R.* Sappers and MiueiB now at the water post 

By the morning of the 12th instant, it is presiuned that you will have 
accomplished some 38 miles from Galodi, and by the evening of the 12th 
iBBtant, some 55 milee. 

4. The mounted infantry of your column wiU, as already detuled, 
start on the evening of the 11th instant, reaching the water post on tlie 
morning of the 12th. and receiving from it 1 day's water. 

l^e mounted infantry will start again on the evening of the 12lh, and 
will maroh nntil they join your oolumn on the morning or attamoon of the 
13th instant, rcoeiviog that night the first of the 4 days' water supply 
oairied by you for them. 

6. Every endeavour will be made to form a watering post at Gumburu 
(40 miles) by the 0th instant, but it is doubtful whether you will have tins 
or hausf available to store more than 750 gallons, to include water foe 
gairison of 10 men. 

6. Your further proceedings must be left to your judgment, bearing in 
mind the general instructions embodied in paragraph 2. 

7. You will keep the General Officer Commanding informed as to yout 
movements, and, in the unlikely event of such opposition being conoen- 
tiftted as to compel you to fall back, you will, in addition to reporting on 
the military situation, state what your requirement will be in the way of 
Mttet, in order that a water convoy may be despatched without delay. 

8. At present arranged, the Main Column will start from here un the 
17th instant, and should have acoompliahed some BB miles by the morning of 

""'eaoth instant. 

a. FOBESTIER- WALKER, LisiU.-Gdoaei, 

ChUI Staff Officer, SomtUVand Field Force. 

' Native I'ank ai 

I flip. 

t Somali water vessels. 


Cobbe's column, which had reached the water post that 

As it was found tliat the water post had been established 
considerably south of the direct route to Wardair, Cobbe 
marched hb force in a north-westerly direction, and on the 
12th, after passing through thick bush, struck the track to 
Gumburu, This was followed for about 10 miles, when the 
column halted for the night. During the day a few of the 
enemy's scouts had been seen, who, as soon as they detected 
the hostile advance, galloped off. 

At 4 a.m., on the 13th, Cobbe's command pressed on again, 
and by nightfall bad reached a point distant some 53 miles 
from Galadi, During the mid-day halt, Shakerley's party 
of Biitish and Boer Mounted Infantry, which had been 
following in the wake of the column, came up with it, and in 
the afternoon they and the Somali Mounted Infantry were 
sent forward with orders to proceed along the road foi 8 miles, 
it being Cobbe's intention to follow them by moonlight. The 
Mounted Infantry, however, lost their way in the thick and 
high impenetrable bush, and as efforts to communicate with 
them proved unavailing, Cobbe, after coveiing 4 miles, 
bivouacked for the night. 

At 6 a.m. on the followiog day Cobbe attempted to continue 
liis advance, but the bush becoming thicker and the track 
far from clear, he decided to return. While doing so, the 
enemy's horsemen, who so far had held off, fired into the 
advanced guard, stampeding a portion of the transport animals, 
most of which were, however, recovered. The guns were brought 
into action and dispersed the assailants, who were driven 
off by the arrival of the mounted infantry, attracted to the 
scene of action by the noise. The retirement was continued 
til! a place near and to the north of Gumburu Hill was reached. 
From here, Cobbe sent word to General Manning that in 
accordance with hia instructions, he proposed to establii-h a 
post at his present camp, and return to Galadi, bringing with 
him the remainder of hia column. 

On the 15th April heavy rain fell, enabling tanks to be 
filled and horses watered, and Cobbe decided not to march. 

On the 16th parties were sent in several directions to 
reconnoitre and search for water, several pools of which had 
been found on the previous day. Two of these parties, under 
Captains Morris and Luard, consisting each of halt a company, 
met the enemy, who showed fight. The mounted infantry 
were despatched to their assistance and covered their with- 
drawal to camp, losing Lieutenant Chichester killed, and three 

During the day a water convoy, with some extra rations, 
arrived from Galadi, escorted by Captain Vesey and 48 men, 
2nd Sikhs. This convoy had been sent by General Manning, 
who knew that the supply of water which Cobbe had had 
with him would only lastto the 16th. In the event of Cobbe 
not being found at Guraburu, the convoy was intended to 
form a water post there. 

On the 16th also, General Manning heard from Cobbe, who 
reported that owing to the rainfall of the 15th he had decided 
to remain out for some days longer, as he had been unable so 
fat to find the road to Wardair.* General Manning now 
determined to reinforce Cobbe and direct him to return, as 

" The following despatoli was received from Lieut. -Colonel Cobbe at 
la midnight, dated Gumbuni, I6th uiatant, 9.30 a.m. : — 

Since my last letter of evening o£ 14th, I have had rain, and yeslerday 
was enabled to fill up some water tins, and Bo decided not to march biick 
as our scouts wore engaged with the enemy's acDuta yesterday morning. 
- .This morning I sent ; — 

(a) Half company, under Captain Luard, in weat-flouth-weat direction. 

(ft) Half company, under Captain Moms, along road weat. 
I *(e) Mounted patrol north. 

(il) Spies, sonth-soiith-eitst. 

All to look for water and enemy. 

Party (d) have returned and reported water. I am now sending out 
strong escort and empty tins and water baga ; it these are filled I shall have 
full thcoa days' water from to-morrow, not counting convoy which I expect 
to-day. I have heard firing from party (a), and, on a message from party (5), 
I sent mounted itifantry out to them and from them were seat to party (a), 
has come bacit, 8.45, and has tepotfcd that there nas a strong 


he conBidered it would be wiser to advance by a 
further to the north, which, according to native informa- 
tion, led to Walwal and thence to Wardair. 

Accordingly a party of monnted infantry 
detailed to proceed to Gumburu, but on the night of 

loate ^ 

iorma- I 

was I 

of the V 

body of the enemy in the front of them who watohed them but did not 
attack. Pattj (e) has not yet come in. 

I have ordered thD convoy on the road to join me to-night as thc're is 
bush on the road here, 

I am of opinion that the enemy is cnllet'ted in the rery thick bush, 
about 10 milee west of here, in which I was attacked by the horsemen, and 
that they have thrown forward aome bodies of ecouts. 

Captain Moms reports froni the trarkH that there were probably 
200 horsemen and as many footmen. The mounted infantry sent ont 
have come back without reaching party (a). Party (a) bos aent back four 
men and a captured '303 rifle and horae taken from enemy's patrol, and 
Bays he is following enemy's patrol. I am sending out mounted infantry 
again on road, Captain Morris returned to have a go at the enemy, as Captain 
Morris says they are collected not far from camp. I tliink some more 
mounted men oot here would be useful, as I think there Is a good water 
pool (in party (a) direction), which infantry cannot reach to-day, and have 
little doubt that we can find water for them unless all rains cease, which 
seems unlikely. I don't yet know which ts the road to Wardair ; if it is 
the road I went, the bush is very thick and I could not look after my water 
camels with ray present force in it, but if my surauBo ia true I think we could 
raise a fight 12 miles from here. I want to hold this place with all my force 
if water permits, as I can reconnoitre enemy and water, and also it protect 
the 40 odd miles from Galadi wliich passes through a lot of bush. There is 
no doubt the enemy's scouts are the Uullah'a good men from his harona.* 

Party (c) from north back, have gone to north road which runs 
east and west alwut 7 miles north of here. They found no water pool or 

I will say that the bush we got to was very dense, so much so that I 
was with centre of front face and left face and half transport went on about 
60 yards from me when 1 checked force a few minutes and I could not see 
them pass, and later found them all about 300 yards in front of me, a real 
niii up. This wna before we returned baek, and before any enemy met ua. 

So one does not want to go into it with much trflnBpott, which strings 
out so much and stampedes at the first shots. 

'303 rifle captured is one lost at Erigo. 

tHialoB recognise two horses as belonging to the Mullnh's relsiions. 

■■' Hear! quarters encampment. 


17th, before these teinforcemenla could leave, a despatch of 
that morning's date was received from Cobbe, statang 
that he feared that some reverse had befallen a detach- 
ment under Plunkett, which had' been nent out from 
camp to bring in a company o£ the 2nd Battalion, King's 
African Rifles ei^aged on reconnaissance duty. Although 
Cobbe'e despatch gave no details which would lead to the 
conciusion that a disaster had occurred, General Manning 
decided to move to his assistance at once with all avaOable 
troops. Shortly after midnight on the 17th-18th, he 
left Galadi, taking with him 320 men 2nd Sikhs, and 
60 men 3rd Battalion King's African Rifles, and sending on 
in advance 100 mounted men under Kenna, with orders 
to endeavour to push through to Gnmburn. Kenna 
bore a despatch for Cobbe, informing him that reinforce- 
ments were moving on Guinburu, and directing him to fall 
back on the 19th instant, on which date General Manning 
proposed to be within 12 miles of that place. 

By the morning of the 18th General Manning's force had 
covered 20 miles. At 1 a.m. on the 19th Cobbe reported that 
at 1 p.m. on the previous day Kenna with the mounted 
infantry had reached him, and that he proposed marching 
out of Gumburu the same morning. 

Thereupon the General decided to free himself of his 
transport, sending the whole back to Galadi, except the 
camels carrying water, and to form a zaiiba at the camp where 
his force now was, leaving in possession a strong guard. 
Thus unencumbered, and taking with him 250 men of the 2nd 
Sikhs, he marched towards Cobbe, prepared, if the latter'a 
retirement were molested, to render him timely assistance. 

On the morning of the IDth he moved 12 miles, halting at Ueu 
a point about 10 miles from Gumburu, where a message was ^'J. 
received from Cobbe that he was on his way back, 
and hoped shortly to join forces. About noon Cobbu arrived 
with all hifi transpott intact, the withdrawal from Gumbutu 
bviog been unmolested. The retirement was continued with- 
it incident, and Galadi was reached at sundown on the 20th. 


When Of Tieral Manning left Galadi on the. night of the 17tli- 
18th he waa, aa has been stated, only partially aware of what 
had befallen Plunkett'a detachment, but during hia march 
towards Gumburu, messengers despatched by Cobbe made 
it clear that a disastrous engagement had taken place, and 
when the two forces met, further details, based upon the 
evidence of those who had succeeded in escaping, waa 

The following reports from Cobbe and Shakerley give 
a detailed accoimt of the reconnaissance : — 
from Lieut.-CtdoHtl A, S. C'nbltr., Commanding Jiccoitnuinsiiiice towantt 

Wordair, to Iho Chief Slag Olfmr, SomalOand Field f orrr. 
^iir. Galadi, 2Ut April, IKOX 

I hove the honour to report that, in Bccordanco with the inBtmelbiis 
received, I proooeded on the night of the 10th instant from Galadi with a 
force, strength as below,* to the water post which had been eetablifihcd 
on the IStii instant, 20 miles Bouth-wcat of Galadi. I arrived at the post on 
the morning of the 11th instant, and found that it bod been eatabliahed on 
the wrong road, and tflO far to the south. 

I reported that tliia was the case, mid informed you that it was niy 
intention to atrihe ofi in a north-westerly dire:rt on until I shoiUd reach the 
proper road, which, according to the informotion received from the guide, 
Bhould be the northernmoet road from Galadi. 

I marobed across country, taking with rae the dataolunenl, 5th Battalion 
King's African Rifles,-|- who Lad garrisoned the water post, and sending 
scouts to Gumburu, and passed the southern road to Gumburu on the 
morning of tho 10th instant, at II miles from the water post. At 16 miles 
I reached the centre road to Gumburu after passing through thick bush, 
and halted on it. I forwarded a letter from this camp, through the Officer 
Commanding water post, suggesting the reraovoi of that poat, and stating 
I would send book the empty comala direct by the road on which I now was, 
also informing you that two of tho enemy's horsemen hnl bean seen close Ic 
our oarap, from which they had galloped away. 

As my mounted men had given me no news of a road further north than 
this, I decided to move by this road to Gumburu. This is the rood which 
Colonel Plunkelt used when lie raided to Gumburu previously. 

• Camel Battery: 1 Brilish officer, 20 N.F.R. 1st BaltaUon King's 
African Rifles : 6 British olBcers, 116 N.F.R. 2nd Battalion King's African 
Rifles ; 10 British officers, 1 British warrant otficer. 233 N.F.R. Gtb Bat- 
tiJion Eing'a African Rifloa ; 1 British officer, 10 rank and file. Indian 
Medical Service: I British officer. Transport: 1 British officer, I non- 
commissioned officer, 134 assistants, 380 camels, 33 followers. 

t 5th Battalion King's AMcan Rifles : 1 British ofllcor, ^0 rank and file 


^^r the 

In the aft«raoou X stuit the Somali Mouuted Infaatry imdsr Lieutenoat 
Ciiichester, to tlie front, with orders to go about 10 mileb before dark, sad 
marched mjself by moouiight until I reached tlrnn, Liuiit«naut Chicheatcr 
reported that about seven of the enemy's honiumen bad been ae 
seeing our men, tbej bad galloped off ; the scouts whom I had si 
Gumbuiu aiso reported that they had fired on 

I baited here aud suut on eight Ijomoli Mounted Infuutry nich about 
12 foot scouts, to go through the night and oxamine the road ; the scouts 
were ordered Ui wait and report to mo at daylight, while the m.ounted 
iulsntry scouted furtber to the frunt. 

1 started at 4: a.m. on the 13th and moruhed 10 miles, being met at 
varioua poinis by my scouts, who reported that tbe road was clear, and that 
the tracka of the enemy's horsi^men led away to the west. As the guide 
appeared to be doubtful whether we wore on tbe cigbt road to Waidair or not, 
Ireoallod my scouts irom the road leading west, and sent £ve mounted men 
out to (he north-west to look lor oootber ruud further north. I'hey teturaed 
and repeated that, after passing through thick bush, they had fouud a path 
which seemed to be much less used than the one on which I was marching, 
I, therefore, decided to keep on the same road. 

The Britiah andBurgberMouutedlufantry," under Captain Sbakerley, 
joined me at tbe mid-day bait, and, bufore miirubiug, 1 sent bouk 70 camola 
with empty water>tind imder an escort. X reported that 1 was extremely 
doubtful of the road, and that 1 was about 49 miles west of lialadi, but that 
1 should go on till mid-day on tbe next day, and tlten, if X bad found out 
ithiog defiiiite about tbe road to Wardair and the wells, X should have to 
um, as X could not aSard to go furtber with the water which 1 had. 
(Ju tbe alteruooa of the iStb, 1 sent on all the mounted infantry in front, 
ith orders to go about H miles along tbe road, which would enable me to 
^lOBich by moonlight, 1 started at s p.m. with tbe infantry, but shortly after 
Btatting, not seeing tbe tracks of the mounted infantry on the road, X 
inspected that tbey had been guided by the Somali Mounted Infantry on to 
noiUiBra toad, wbich the Somalia bod previously reiounoitted. 1 sent 
camel sowora to loUow their trai;ks aud recall them, who returned 
without finding their troolu, 

Asl wasaoivin Ibick bush and hod no scouts ahead, X baited before dark, 
after 4 miles, and made a zarilia. 'lbre« scouts were sent back to tbe altar- 
noon Damp, to lullDW on the tracks ol the mounted inlantry, with a letter 
recalling them tome. Uhese did not reach the mounts: d iuiau try till 7 o-m. 
At 4uju. on the 14th instant, X sent my remaining u:outba Hburt distance 
ahead, but did not march mysell until dayughi, at li a.m. X advonoed 
shortly, and as tbe bush grew thicker aud the paths dispersed, X decided that 
X could do no more by mid-day, and so ordered tbe column to retire. 

After retiring for about a mile aiLd a holt, the new advanced guard waa 

■ LiritLBb Mounted XufauLry : '2 oliiGers, ill non-cummisaioned officen 
men. i^urgher Aluunted Infantry : 1 -uUiuer, 1^ non-commissioned 
d mcu. 


flred into by the enemy's horsBmen. I was able to collect moat of the 
truiaport into the zariba, but some atampeded, and the tive nompiuues ia 
front dispersed tbs horsemen, who, however, CDntiniied to huig about till 
the mounted infantry, hearing our guns, came up and chased them away. 

T continued the retirement to a place north of Gumburn hill, about 
42 miles from Goiadi, and sent back a letter saying that I proposed to leave 
a, post there and to return myself to Galadi. This letter I sent by two 
Somali Mounted Infantry, who returned saying they had met seven of the 
enemy. I then sent it by 10 British Mounted Infantry. During the night 
I sent out my scouts to watch the bush for the enemy's scouts ; in the 
monung they fired at and dispersed some of the enemy's horsemen who had 
galloped up to them unawares. I decided, on the morning of the 15th, to 
rest the men, who had had a trying time. During the morning it rained 
hard for one hour, and, sending men out, I found some pools, where I filled 
up empty tanks and watered the horses, and I decided not to maroh. I 
received a letterinfonning me that a convoy WM on its way to Oiunburu. 

On tlie monung of the ISth, I sent out half a company to the west, under 
Cftptain Morris, and half a comptmy, under Captain Luard. to the W.S.W-, 
to reconnoitre for the enemy, and to look for water ; also a mounted patrol 
to the north to look for the northern rood and water, and scouts to 8.8.E. 
who retiu^ed and reported water. 

I sent out a strong escort, with camels and empty tins, end obtained 
some water. The patrols came back from the north later, and reported that 
they had gone out 7 miles but had seen no water or signs of the enemy. 

In the morning firing was heard from the direction of Captain Luard'a 
party, and Captain Morris reported the enemy in front, but that they 
retjred and advanced in accordance with his movements. I sent out the 
moimted infantry to him , and when they reached him they saw no enemy, 
and Captain Morris showed them the direction Captain Luard had taken, 
whence firing had been heard. They went in that direction, but saw no 
enemy, and came on some of Captain Luard's men sent bact by bim with a 
note, in which he said that lie had been fired on by the enemy's mounted 
patrols, but had chased them and killed three ponies, captured a rifle, 
wounded some of them, and was following them, but would be back by 
10 a,ni. Captain Morris returned and reported that he had seen the enemy's 
scouts again since the mounted infantry had left him, so I sent half a company 
to follow Captain Luard's tracks and remtorcB him should it bo necessary. 
I also sent the mounted Infantry out to occupy the enemy on the west. 

I sent in a report of what I was doing, also expressing an opinion 
that the enemy were collected in the thick bush about 10 to 12 miles distant, 
where I had been attacked by the horsemen on the 14th, and were sending 
out scouts towards us ; also stating that I wished to hold my post with 
all my force until the arrival of the main coliunn if my water would last. 
I also sent a letter to officer commanding convoy to march straight in. 

As this letter was leaving I heard firing from the mounted infimtry, 
and a messenger came in asking for reinforcements, which I sent out. Very 
shortly afterwards I received another letter from Captain Sbakerley saying 

that Captain Liiard, hearing the firing, had coma up on the flank of ths 
enemy, who had galloped o3. 

Convoy, under Captain Vesey,* oam.B in, bringing hack my letter, and I 
o it another letter, giving the casualties in the mounted infantry, 
le., Lieutenant Cliiohester, killed ; Burgher Hill, B<-vcre!y wounded: and 
iwo Somali Mounted Infantry wounded (one since dead). I also said that 
I would send bock all the empty cornels possible the next day to Galodi. 

In the aftcruoon I sent out a strong reooonaiesance of 200 men, under 
Major Margesson, to see it any of the enemy were about. He wenc about 
4 mileB and saw no enemy. 

I decided to send back all except 150 eamela next afternoon, with empty 
watet-tins, putting my water into a tank. I ordered a reconnaisaancB on the 
morning of the 17tb, consisting of one company 2nd Battalion King's 
African BiHca, under Captain Olivcy, wHich would proceed to the wcat about 
3 miles, and a half company Ist Battalion King's African Rifles, under 
Captain Walker, to proceed to a hill about 1^ miles to the aouth-west, to 
see if the country was clear of the enemy. I made a tank in the zariba for 
wafer about 4.45 a.m. 

I received a report from Captain Olivey, despatched 7.45 a.m., saying 
that he was 3 to 4 miles out, had seen no enemy, but only the tracke of one 
foot man, and that he was coming back. Shortly afterwards I received 
another report, marked S.3 B.m.> saying that the enemy, both horse and 
foot, were advan<:ing, and that he was retiring slowly and required rein- 

I ordered Colonel Plunkett to take out one company 2nd Battalion 
King'sAfrican Rifles and 50 men of the 2nd Sikhs with two maxims to bring 
Captain Olivey in, and a gun was fired to recall Captain Walker. 

Colonel Plunkett started about D.I5 a.m., owing to the slight delay 
occasioned by loading the maxima and distributing 50 rounds extra per man. 
Ab Colonel Plmikett started another report from Captain Olivey arrived 
saying that he was within 1} miles of the zariba and was not in action. 

This was shown to Colonel Plunkett, to whom I had given orders that he 
. was only to bring Captain Olivey back. 

■ I reported the news which had been received to you at 8 a.m., saying 

^ttat I could not send the convoy back yet, and that my eommunicatioas 

might be cut. I also sent a horseman to recall Captain Walker, and 

proceeded with decreasing and strengthening my zariba and entrenching it. 

At 11.45 a.m. Somalis reported that they beard firing ; it was Hcarcely 
andible, but when it seemed ceitaii. that there was firing, I sent out mounted 
Somalia to report — one of them came back about 12.45 p.m. carrying Colone 
PIunkett'B guide, wounded, on lus pony. This man said that the force had 

been cut np. 

I sent more 



to find out n 

wa, and sent a 

report at 


to Galadi, and another at 


p.m., when so 

ne 18 men had returned. 

The fighting 

appears t. 

have been some 

niles from the 



t „.._. 

* -2nd Sikha 

1 British Officer. 48 N.F.R, 


to ttlH BuuuunU of tliemeli WUO returned, and tliu tiring ]w&a barely auUilile, 
being at first mistokea for the wind. 

(■> Colonel Flunkett, afl«r meeting Captaja Olivef, wbicb he Bhould hsve 
done within a. mile of the zariba, must have gone on, taking Captain Olirey 
with him , and bcC3i drawn on by the enemy imtil attacked by the whole of 
the Mullah'a forucs. I did not consider myeeli able to take out reinforce- 
ments to him, as I had about '250 men left and oould not take out more than 
160 men, as even 100 would have bean insufficient to defend our zariba 
BB it waa, ii uiiiously attacked, and any rdinforuements which I could lake 
could not have arrived at the scene of the light until it was over. 

In the afternoon I sent out a mounted patrol to see if they could find 
more stragglers, with ordtirs nut to allow themselves to become engaged with 
the enemy on any account. These went some 3 milea and saw au enemy's 
picquet and at once returned. They were shortly followed by a large number 
of horsemeo, whoaedust could be seen from the zariba. A couple of shrapnel 
were fired which sent them back. 

The enemy made no attack on our zariba, but bad men watching it, and 
at night sent their scouts close to it, where they were Urcd on by my patcols. 
At 1 p.m. on the Itith instant, Major Kenna with 100 mounted infantry 
arrived, giving me instructions to retire if possible on (iolodi, and infoimiug 
me of the arrangements made on the rood, 1 sent a letter informing you of 
my plana, and, after patrolling all round, 1 started aeit morning with oil 
my transport, wounded, &c., and met you at mid-day without coming into 
contact with tho enemy, tracka of their soouts and lii'cs in the west being 
the only signs. 

On the iUth, after the arrival of the convoy under (Japtoiu Vesey, 1 
found that I had full water rations for i days, and was still filling tins from a 
rolnpool, and I could moke my water last six days, so 1 wished to keep all 
my force holding the enemy and covering the advance of the main column 
from Calodi, which I expected would reach me by 'JUth, when I oootidently 
txpcl-ted that the General Officer Commanding would be able to attack the 
enemy within 10 miles from my zariba- Un the 17th, when the enemy 
waa reported in full, I wished to get in thu componiea safely which were out 
Fccomioitring, and then considered that I was quite strong enough in my 
xariba, which it waa extremely doubtful that the enemy would attack, 
and 1 also hod sufficient water to lost me for some days after 1 expected thu 

In the thick hush on tho 14th, I found the left Uauk uompoiky and a large 
amount of transport hod paused within 00 to )>0 yards of me without being 
■een, and got in front of the front face, and later, when retiring, and my 
odvancedguaid was fired on by the enemy, who were very few, and! was able 
to collect nearly all my transport before any shots were Hred Irom a ilank, 
and the transport happened to be in an open patch, even then a few camehi 
stampeded and some loads wore lost. 

1 think it would be a very difficult thing to protect one' s transport in the 
thick bush, and as the number of eamels is found to be as many, if m>t more 
Ihou the numbe' of fighting men when carrying several days water, a ooluuu 


is square fotmatioii in dense bush prootioall^ reBolrsi itself into faurdetAohed 
Bliodies of troops ont of sight and touch of eanh other. There ia little doubt 
\ &a,t the enemy suffered very aeyerely on the I7th, as they made no attempt 
mtio interfere with my retirement on the 19th, nftM 1 had received the rein- 
X foroement of 100 mounted infantry. 

I attach the report of the OGicer Commuiding Mounted Infantry on the 
action of the 10th, and his recommendation ol Riflemrui AUIler, King's lloyal 
Rifle Corps Mounted Infantry, for the favourable consideration of the 
General Officer Commanding. I also wiah to bring to the notice of the 
General Officer Commanding the very able manner in which Captain 
Shalterley, King's Royal BiHe Corps, and Captain Foster, Bur^hei Mounted 
Infantry, coUeoted their men, who were galloping in extended order, when 
suddenly attacked by a large body of the enemy, and also the very steady 
behaviour of the British and Burgher Mounted Infantry, which atone enabled 
them to heep oS the enemy until the appearance of the infantry made the 
enemy retire. 

I also wish to bring to the notice of General Officer Commanding, for his 
favourable consideration. No. A 750 Private Mandelumbe, 2nd Battalion 
King's African Rifles, who brought in No. 883 Private Gomani, who wna 
wounded in the arm, a distance of (i miles to the zariba. 

The following is a list of oaeualties on the various dates ; — 
14th April. — One Somali Guide, slightly wounded. 






a • 

^ o 



^ o 



S a 



^ (N O 

pH C4 pH 

• • • 

• • • 



Q . . . 
(§ • * • 

o o 



:S5p3 « • «| 




i oi 

1 ; 

1^ a 


: -S : : - 8 

; :: : • : : - 

Gum bum, 
Ir, 17th April, 1903. 

I bave the honour to report that in accordance witli orders I proceed«1, 
tm 16th April, 1!K)3, with my pfltcol, strength iw per oiBrgin,* along the road 
running H-est bom. the zariba ; when wo had gone about li miles we 
encountered three o£ the enemy's scouts, we pvirsued them and after going 
about half a mile oame suddenly upon a conaidetahle force of the enemas 
mounted men in an open clearing ; we opened lire and in a very short timB 
I found that they were working round my flanks and rear ; I retired about 
40 yards to amorefaToiirablexiositionandfDrmed asmall cirele, the enemy 
were Ix'tween mo and the sariba, and I bad wounded men and one killed ; 
a hriak fire waa maintained for about three quarters of an hour, the enemy 
showing much courage and persistence, one man and horse being killed within 
12 yards of the circle. I denpatohed a messenger to the Officer Commanding 
Column informing him of our poaition. We eventually suoccBded in driving 
off the enemy at, I believe, a considerable loas to them. About 10 minutes 
after Che firing was over, Captuin Luard, King's African Rifles, came tm 
the scene with bia company, and I have no doubt that the approach of this 
force aaeiated me materially. A force from the nariba arrived lat«r. I very 
much regret to report the following casualties ; — Lieutenant Chichester, 
Somali Mounted Infantry, killed. Trooper Hill, Burgher Conting-nt, 
and two Somalia wounded ; three horses kilted aud seven wounded. 

Two of the enemy's dead were found on the ground and 13 dead ponies, 
but I believe they suKered considerably as moat of the firing waa at fairly 
close range, and several were seen to fail from their horses. The enemy 
being round us some time after the firing waa over, I jircaume they were 
removing their dead and wounded. 

I estimate their numbers at about 200. 1 have brought to the notice of 
the Officer Commanding Column, in a separate letter, the good aervioes of 
Bifleman Miller, King's Royal Rifle Corps Mounted Infantry. 
I am, &D., 
G. C. 8HAKERLEY, Oa^in, 
CommandiTig British {King'e Royal Fiflr. Corps) 
Mounted Iitjaniry. 
To the Staff Officer to Column under 

IJeut.-Colonel Cobbe, V.C., D.S.O. 

Gum burn. 
Sir, 18th April, 1903. 

I wish to bring to the notice of the Officer Commanding Column the good 
BcrvicBB of No. 2566 Rifleman Joabef Miller, 4th Battalion King's Royal 
Rifles (Britiah Mounted Infantry). 

On IBth April, 1903, I was in command of a mounted patrol, scat out 
from the column ; wo came in contact with some mounted dervishes and were 

* British MmmCed Infantry, 1 OfGcer, 4 men ; Burgher Mounted 
Infantry, I Officer, 12_Men; 8 omali_Monnted_ Infantry, 1 Officer, 12 men. 



eveiitnally Bunounited by suviraL hundred. RiUpmnn Miller n-sn ntaiiding 
close to me and heard nlP flay that I was going t/> aend a ineBBaga to the 
Officor Commanding Column ; he immediately volimtecred to c-arry this 
meflflage. I gave him a, letter ; he succeeded in fi;alkiplag through tlie 
enemy's linen at great rial, and delivered the letter to the Officer Oom- 
manding Column, 

I liBve, &o., 
■ G. 0. SUAKERLEY, Oaplain, King's Boyid Ri/U Oorpiy 

I Coinmaluiiitg BriUth SJoaiited Infantry. 

To the sun Officer, 

The Officer Commajiding Column 
Forwaideil to Chief Staff Officer for the fuvoiirahle consideratian nf 
General Officer Commanding. Ilia horse was wounded when getting hock. 
A, S. COBBE, Lii!Vi.-CDlontl, 

Commanding ReconnaUsaMf.. 

Such is the tale, ao far as known, of the first engagement Aoiion 
during this campaign in which our troops measured arms with Gumbur 
the main force of the Mullah Haji Muhammed-hin- Abdullah's 
followers, commanded, it is said, in person by their chief. 
On both aides the losses were heavy, ours being 9 officers 
and 187 men killed and 29 men wounded.* 

It is obviously impossible to state with accuracy what 
numbers on the other side fell in this action. Native report 
is proverbially unreliable, more especially that of the Somali, 
and while some say that the killed numbered but 270, others 
assess them at ten times that total, but on all hands it is 

• The following is a narrative of the Actioj 
1903, estraoted from evidence by survivors 
Enquiry held at Galadi and elsewhere : — 

The focco which muched out of the zariba at Gumburu, under LieuL- 
Colonel Plunliett, on the 17th instant, oonaiated of 48 men, 2nd Sikha, and a 
company 2nd Battalion King's African Rifles, 

About 1 mile from the zariba this force met " C" Company of the 3nd 
Battalion King's African RiHes, under Captain Olivey. The force then 
apparently formed square, with the Sikhs in the front faoe, and marched 
aome 6 miles further to an open spot, wMoh waa surrounded by thick bush. 
The distance of the bush from the square is variously eatimaled from 300 to 
600 yards. The enemy hod apparently collected in this bush, and advanced 
on the square from it. First horsemen, then foot riflemen, and afterwards 
speannen, attaoked the square on all siiles. The horsemen and riflemen were 
driven back, but ammunition beconiing exhausted, the square was broken 
by the rush of spearnien. 


admitted that the number of wounded was very great. That 
the Mullah at Gumbura lost many of hia bravest adherents, is 
undoubted, and is supported by the fact that, despite Cobbe'a 
email force being encumbered with about 1,000 camels, no 
attempt waa made to harass Him in his retirement. The Yaoa 
who escaped to tell the tale of the disaster related how the dead 
bodies of the enemy lay in heaps before the square, a monu- 
ment to the determined valour of the devoted band of 
defenders who composed it. 

In describing in a despatch the occuirences of the 17th 
April, General Manning considered " that under the circum- 
stances IJeut,- Colonel Cobbe acted in the beat manner that 

B the enemy frequently ci 

In spite of the fire of the troops and I 
up as close bs 10 yfuds from the Bquore. 

When the ammunition was eihausted. Colonel Plunkett gaire orders for 
Ihe troopa to charge with the bayonet back to the Eariba. Previous to this, 
however, it appears that many offioera and men had been killed and wounded. 

Some evidence poiata to the front face of the square being first pushed 
back by a rush of apearmen upoa the Sikha, who fought with the bayonet 
but re-formed. At this period of the fight moat of the casualties ocoulred, 
and from the evidence of mitnesBes the whole of the officera were killed, 
together with the two men of the King's Royal Rifles who accompanied the 
force. Captain Johnston- Ste wait, before being killed, told those who could 
to get back to the laribn. 

The fight appears to have lasted some two hours. Colonel Plunkett left 
oamp at 0.16 a.m., and at 1 1,45 a.m. firing was heard in tha distance. This 
would make the Bcene of action about 7 miles from the zariba. The return, 
at 12.4S p.m., of a Somali, who brought in news that all waa over in the 
square, cannot be accepted as reliable evidence, as he proiiably escaped 
early in the fighti and waa brought in upon the pony of the aoout aent out 
to see what waa happening. 

The numbers of the enemy's dead, as stated by witness. Tiny, bat the 
Somali or Yao cannot lie relied upon to estimate numbers with Bjay approach 
t<i exactitude. The Yao can only count up to 10. 

Tha evidence of the Somalia points to the fact that some outside tribes 
(Adonis probably) were engaged in the attack. 

The evidence of the Yao speaks of fair men (probably Arabs) and others 
(probably Adonis), who are negroes, and Somaiis, as having been Been in the 

The whole evidence goes to prove that the fight was a most gallant one, 
and that the majority of the men had finished their ammunition before the 
square was broken by an overwhelmii^ rush of spearmen. 

(Odb company*had 100 rnundB ppr man and the other ISO.) 


he could. Plunkett had marched so far from the zariba that 
to have despatched reinforcementR in time to avert destruc- 
tion would have been impossible and would have ao weakened 
the garrison of the zariba as to render it liable to be captured." 

After the withdrawal to Galadi, the General considered TlieQei 
that to advance at once on Wardair and Walwal was im- *^""" 
practicable, his reasons being that " the delay caused 
by the events at Gumburu had, in any case, too far 
reduced the available rations and transport, while the know- 
ledge gained of the country to be traversed and of the military 
spirit of the enemy would have necessitated a larger force 
was available at Galadi,"* Aa Fasken had reached 

telegram received by the Secretary of Stal« for Wor o 
April, General Manning reported ; — 


runner from Galadi-Damot 
Reconnaiasance ■ townidB Wardair proves that that place is ftbout 
miles from here, and there ia no water on. the way. Country is very dense 
bush, and so fur no road leading to WordBir has been found. To enable me 
to adranoe I should require large number of camels to transport my foroo 
Gorrying water for 10 days. The danger of tliis operation would be an attack 
on convoy camels in dense bush, which could only be very inadequately 
defended, since square formation in very dense bush ia impossible. An 
advance in these circumstanceB would he very risky and might end in the 
loss of transport camels by stampede, and therefore the loss of our water 
supply. Tho bush from here to Gumburu is so tbiclt (hat mounted infantry 
cannot operate in moat places. In any case I should require a force of at 
least 1,000 men, and for this force would require about 2,000 camels ; and 
my total available camels to-day, including those on the liaca of communica- 
tion, is 2,200. The supply of camels from Berbera is becoming exhausted, 
and great difficulties would be experienced in obtaining sufficient numbers 
to enable me to advance and still push up suppUes from Obbia. I am 
reluctantly compelled t« come to conclnaion that I cannot advance on 
Wardair at once, and that such advance, whenever undertaken, would bo 
extremely risky, and in view of large number of enemy collected at Wardair 
I feel that such an advance, with tho force at my disposal, would not ba 
aaSe. We will hold Galkayu, Dndub, Bera and Galadi, and an Abyssinian 
force operating from the west could more easily reach the Mullah, since 
ronte to Wardair on that side is well watered. The condition of most of 
the transport animals ia very poor owing to want of grazing. I had collected 
a fortnight's supplies here for advance to Wardair, but tho shortage of the 
osmels on the lines of communication compels me to send back majority 
tbe force from here to Galkayu, and to utilira every animal to bring 
ipplies up from the base. 

nmtc, ^ 

heedqaarters from (Jalkayti on the 17th,* General Maiminff, 
after d-'ducling Cobbe's losses, hed still with him 1.0S5 

While the movement on Wardair which haa just been 
described was in progress, another of a similar nature was, 
under instructions from the Cleneral, being carried out from 

Major J. E. Gough, who, as Staff Officer, had accompanipd 
Plunkett when he marched to Galkayu towards the 
end ni March, had been selected for the ui.dertaking, 
and was directed to return to Damot and assume commai.d 
of the flying column. Gough reached Damot on the 9th 
April, and leaving there a post consisting ot 60 rank and 
file, 7th Bombay Pioneers, arrived with the flying column at 
Bnhotle on the llth. 

The general nature of the operation which was about to be 
carried out had been indicated by General Manning, and was 
to consist of a movement to the " west and south-west with 
the double object of collecting information and stock, and 
interposing, if necessary, between the Mullah and the district 
to the north and north-east of Hodayuwein." The flying 
column was further to " endeavour, as far as possible, to 
keep up communication with the advanced force operating 
from Galadi." 

In consultation with Swann, it was decided that Gough 
should proceed to Danot, some 75 miles in a straight line 
to the south-west of Bohotle. Reaching there as quickly 
aa possible, he would be in time to co-operate with the 
force under Cobbe, and perhaps cut off such of the Mullah's 

• 2nd Siklis 

lat Battalion King's Africmi RiSea 
3rd Battalion King's African Biflea 
British Field Hospital 

Total, M ranks , . 

following as nuglit, owing to the udvance ut that oliiuer, fall 
back to the north or north-eaat. 

At Danot, according to local report, there was a con- 
siderable pool of rain-water, and the seizure o£ that place 
would provide a. useful pivot tor further operations. 

At 4 p.m. on the 13th April, Gough'a colunni, with Captain 
C. M. Bruce, R.F.A., as Staff Officer and Captain G. M. Holland, 
lOlst Grenadiers, as Intelligence Officer, left Bohotle : — 







Indiirn Contingent, B.C.A 

2nd Bfttt-alion King'a African RiHeB . . 


Supply and transport . . 












and 176 followers. 

They took with them 406 camels, carrying 5 days' water, 

days' rations, and reserve ammunition. 

In a despatch from Bohotle, dated 28th April, iyo3, Qough 
ive the following account of his operations, and the fight ji^^^t^igi, 
at Daratoleh* :— 

Ualti'd at 5.30 p.ui. Dmtanue ot niarcli 4 miles, on tiie KurmJa-Bohotle 

Uo the 14th April, 1>J03, left zariba at 5.30 a.iu-, and marched 14 mil<:H 
ou Kunuia-Bubotla road, wlipre the force halted for tlie midday halt. An 
issue of watec was made, and the spore camels, with empty water-tina. 
Beat back to Uohotle. CoDtiaaed march at 2 p.m., ou KurmiB-Bohotle road, 
for 2mileB, at wliioh point the column strucli oU aouth-wect by west. Halted 
6.30 p.m. Cistanee of maruh, 20 miles. 

Three mounted Somali suouts were sent on to try and get information 
whether there was water at Donot, or if any water in the balia ahoad of the 
column. These men missed tbe column on their return, and arrived at 

On the 15th April, Ia03, left lariba at 5.40 a.m., the mounted troops ol 
the flying colunm, streagth as below, under Major Sharp, caught up the 
infaotrj column and continued their inarcli, keeping about 2 miles ahead 
^rf the infantry. 

'^ tiee page 32U, 






BikanirCamBl Corps •! 

Somali Camel Corps . . . . 1 
SoraftU Mounted lalanttj . . . . 3 



+ ' B5 
' 66 

e 1 86 

Total 6 


16 I 200 

rUa forte left Bohotle at i p.m. on 14tb April, starting afttrthe infaulry, 
in order to aava water, as owing to tliere being no water on the rond every 
drop had to be carried in wafer-tins. At 7.30 a.m. tho column struck the 
Bohotle-Ulik-Walwat road, and continued the march along it. Three 
hours mid-daj halt. I^eft again at 3 p.m., the mounted infantry ponies 
having been given a 4 gallon drink. Diiftance ot march, 21 miles. 

On the 10th April, 1003, m no news of water either at Danot or neigh- 
boitfhood, orders were given to the mounted troops to continue On the 
DHk-Walwal road for 20 milrR, and to make every endeavour to capture 
a prisoner, and to look out well for any balls holding water. 

It no news o( wal<>r at Danot ohtained, the mounted troops to make 
a. raid in a southerly direction, inflict as much damagn on (he encray as 
possible, and then to fall back on the infantry column, who would remain 
at Garrero till the morning of ISth April, when they would fall back ton^ards 
Bohotle to pick up a water convoy. If information was obtained that there 
wa« water at Danot, the mounted troops were to seize the place and hold 
it until the infantry column arrived. 

The mounted troops, under Major Goilgb, left the zariba at 3,30 lum,, 
carrying as much water for the men as posaiblo (i.e., camel corps, 3 days ; 
and mounted infantry, 2 days). 

This force moved 20 miles along tho lllik-Walwal road, and at 11 a.m. 
the Somali Camel Corjis brought in two prisoners, who stated that they had 
met some of the Mullah's scouts 3 days previously, who had told them that 
there was water at Danot, and that the place was held by a few of the 
Mullah's mounted rificmen. The mounted troojH, therefore, continued their 
marchtoDanotfromBeitdali.undcrMaiorGough, one of the prisoners being 
used as a guide. Captain Rolland with the oth?r pr'soaer, who waa taken 
on as a guide (or tha infaolrycolonio, returned to the infantry columa with 
orders to Major Rowlands to continue his march on Danot, but if he reoeived 
no further instructions he was to turn back to Bohotle on evening of ITth, as 
otherwise he would not havo enough water with which to make the return 
journey, and until the mounted troops actually held Danot it was impossible 
to say what the water sopply there actually waa. 

The mounted troops halted at 6,30 p.m., having mar.^hed 32 miles. It 
was found afterwards that this force waa lad considerably out of the direct 

^^H me 


On the ITth April, 1003, the mounUd troapa coatinued their march at 
3.30 a.m., and met the Bohotle-Megsgjifa-Dimot road at 6 a-m., aoms 
14 miles from Megngjifa. At 11.30 a.m., when some 10 miles from Deaot, 
the force hailed, as tho animals were very dona up by the heat and want of 
water. Ten of the best Somali Mounted Infantry ponies were picked out, and 
a patrol of Somali Mounted Infantry aent on to Danot to reconnoitre and 
report on the water. At 4 p.m. two of this patrol returned and reported aa 
follows : — 

" Went to Danot and fonnd Ifi of the enemy's horsemen, thased them, 

capturing nine ponies. Water there only sufficient for the whole 

flying column for three days." 

On this information orders were sent out by mounted measengEra to 

Major Rowlands to return to Bohotle, as there was not enough water to fill up 

tins for tho return journey. The mounted troops continued their march 

to Danot to water up, and to aot on any further information that might be 


Arrived Danot 5.4B p.m., a few shots being fired by the enemy on out 
left flank. Water was found to be more tlian exjiected, although not enough 
for the whole flying polumn. Orders «Tn-, llicrFfore, sent to Major Rowlands 
at n.30 p.m., cancelling previous orders, and ordering up 100 2nd Battalion 
King's African Rifles, 50 Sikhs, 2 MaiimH, reserve ammunition, 100 water 
tins, and all available rations, tho remainder of the column to return to 
Bobotle. A strong zariba was made. 

On the 18th April, 1903, patrols of l^omaH Mounted Infantry were sent out 
west and south-west at G a.m. These retunted at noon with 400 loot camels 
and two prisoners. Tlie latter reported three days' heavy fighting between 
Oaladi and Wardair, and that the Mullah had lost many men. Zariba was 

At 5.30 p.m. messengers received from Major Rowlands, dated noon this 
day, 15 miles east of Megagjifa, sayiui{ that up to the time of wrifing no 
messengera from flying column were received by him, and that ho would 
have to return unless he received orders by early morning of IDth. Bis men 
had been placed on a half issue of water to enable Major Rowlands to stay 

bock at once, repeatmg previous orders re coming 

to Danot 

An Ibrahim was sent to Walwal to try and get information, and camel 
neat wan issued to all ranks as rations. 

On the 19th Ajuil, 1(103, an officers' patrol, under Captain Hughes, 
conaisling of 30 Bikanu' Camel Corps and 10 Somali Mounted Infantry, were 
sent out on Walwat road. Tliis patro! returned at 5 p.m., having gone 
15 miles on the Wnlwalcoad and having seen notliiug. At 12.30 p.m. afewot 
the enemy's hocsfiraen repotted in tho bush close to the zariba. Fifteen 
Somali Mounted Infantry chased them out of it, a few shots being exchanged. 

At 1.30 p.m. a letter was received from Major Rowlands, acknowledging 
leoeipt of yesterday's orders, and saying that he was acting on tbfm. Our 

two previoii!' messetiiiere wi^re afterwards fmm<l to haye eventually fetcheil up 
at Bohotle, 

On the 20th April, 1903, Major RowlandR, with 60 Bikha and 30 2nd 
Battalion King's African Rifles, arrived at our zariba at 1.30 a.m., having 
marohed 35 inilc-e, the convoy being zaribaed at dark about 10 miles from 
Danot The Eikauir Cmnel Corpa were Bent out at daylight to meet the 
convoy and escort it into Daiiot The convoy arrived all correct at 9 a.m. 
A false alarm occurred at noon. The zariba was strengthened and bush 

Ou tbe 21st April, 1I!03, a patrol of 25 Somali Mounted Infitntry was sent 
out at 4.30 a.m. towards Wardair with orders to go on till they met the 
enemy or othecwixe obtained information and to bring hauk a prisoner, if 

Another patrol of Somali Camel Corps was sent to Masara (7} mites 
nouth-weat by weet) to report on water there. This patrol returned at 
8.30 a.m., reporting the water there so filthy that the animaU refused to 
drink it. The SomaU Mounted Infantry patrol returned at 1 p.m. with two 
prisoners, and reported having met 42 of the enemy's scoots 12 miles from 
Danot ; they killed IS and brought back 2 prisoners. The priEoners stated 
a£ toUowB : — 

" Sent out from Daratoleh (2fi miles S.S.E, from Danot) to watch the 
English force and report on iCa strength. Enemy's force at Daratoleh, 
50 mounted riflemen and 300 spearmen, but that they had received further 
reinforcements yesterday." Also staled^i that there hud been heavy 
fighting at Gumburu, the Mullah losing heavily ; also that there was a. 
fresh rain water balli at Daratoleh. 

Tbe Ibrahim who was seat out on^lTth, returned at 2.30 p.m. and 
coaoborated the above story, but said that the enemy had a larjie force at 
Daratoleh, and that (he English force had halted at Gumburu and was 
short of water. 

A report o£ tie aliovB was sent to the Office!' Commanding Lines ot 
Ojuununicaliun, Sohotle, informing him that the mounted troopa would go 
out to Daratoleh to-moirow (morning of 22nd). 

On the 22nd April, 11)03, aa reported in my letter of 21st to Officer 
Commanding Lines of Communication, iiohotle, I Itft Danot at 4.30 a.m. 
with following force : — 

46 Bikanir Camel Corps, 2 ofBcora, with 1 maxun under tjergeant Gibb. 

64 Somali Mounted Infantry "1 6th BattaUon King's 13 officers. 

60 SomaU Camel Corpa / African RifleE 1 1 officer. 

30 2nd liattalion King's African Rifles. 2 officers mounted on Bikanir 
riding camels (behind the camel sowars). 

12 Indian Conlingetit, British (Antral Africa, 1 officei, mounted on 

Lieutenant Horton, I.M.S. 

At 7.30 a.m. we wcTo tired on by the enemy's soouta. llie Somali 
Mounted Infantry chaaed and killrd iwo men, capturing two rifles (Li>e- 
Eufielils} and three ponies 


We lost one pony sliol. One mounted scout of the enemy got away. A t 

B.lSa.m. meagaiucameineontactwith the enemy's scouts, and at 10.20 a.m. 

BCaptain Howard of tlie Somali Hounted Infantry reported a large force of 

V«nemj advancing ta meet, lu: The force was dismounted at once, aoimats 

■p>aced in centre, and the men lining the faces. 

At 10.30 a.m. the enemy attacked in front, almost immediately developing 
the attack on all .■'ides. Owing to thick buah and long grasa the firing n-aa at 
very close range, from 20 to 50 yards being the average range. This heavy 
attack continued till 2 p.m., out men teing most steady and firing welL The 
maidni under Sergeant Gibb was moved from place to place as occasion arose, 
and the enemy always giving way when it opened fire. The enemy attaoked 
in a. most determined way, exposing themselves freely. At 2 p.m., our 
ammunition lacginning to run short, and one of the enemy who waa captured 
by the Somali Camel Corpa reporting that the Mnllah himself waa at Dara- 
toleh, and it therefore being highly iraprobable that the Obbia force were 
either at Wardair or oven threatening the place, I had to decide whether to 
advance further or return to camp. Principally owing to lack al ammunition 
for further big fight, I decided t« return t-o Danot. All the wounded were 
put on riding camels or ponies. About 2. 15 p.m. the enemy seemed to be rein- 
forced and firing began again, and at. 2.30 p.m. the front faee [Bikanir Camel 
Corps) under Captain Walter, and the left face (IhidBattalion King's African 
Rifles) under Captain Townaend, charged about 100 yards info tho buah 
clearing the enemy, who were still keeping up a desultory fire from our 
immediate neighbom'hood. Directly they returned the rear face advanced 
"00 yards, the cnniels, Ac, closmg on mem, and the front and side faces 
retiring, thus forming an elastic sq^uars with the animals in the centre. The 
retirement was continued in this formation through thick buah until 6,30 p.m. 
At 3 p.m., as wo were short of ammunition and were being considerably 
pressed on flanks and rear by the enemy, who had brought np more riflemen 
and spearmen, I sent four SomaU Mounted Infantry to Officer Commanding 
detachment at Danot to send out ammunition to meet us. (Thig foroo, 
under Captmn Barolay. met ns miles from Danot about 11.30 p.m., and 
returned to Danot with the mounted troops.) 

Up to 5.30 p.m. the rearguard and side faces were heavily engaged. Our 
re natra'aJly slow owing to our having to load the wounded on to 

At 5.30 p.m. I mounted the Somali Mounted Infantry (tho then leading 
■ laoe), and they went forward imder Captaia Dickinson and Captain Howard 
a fan shape and then halted, thus clearing the enemy from our aide faces 
OQT again moving. 
1 deeply regret to report the following ofliuers killed : — 

CaptM C. M. Bruce, R.F.A., Staff Officer to flying column. 
Captain C. Godfrey, I.A. [Indian Contiagent, British Central 

The following oftioera are wounded : — 

Major A. Sharp, Officer Commending Somnli Mounted Infanliy and 
Somali Camel Corps. 
(8927) M 


_ •Major H. B, RowlaodB, 2nd Battalion King's A/rican Rifles. 
Cnptain E. M. Hiielips. 14th Lincora, (Bikamir Camel Corps). 
Captain R. E. Townnend, 2nd Battalion King's AJrican Rifles. 
Also the following rank and file : — 

BiknuLT Camel Carps , . . . . . It 

iSoinali Monnted Infftntry . . . . . . 1 

' SomaB Camei Corps . . . . . . 4 

2nd BnttaHon King's African Kiflta . . 4 

Indian Cuntingent, British Central Afrii'a 1 

Total IS 

and lilt- following wounded ;^ 

Bikanjr Camel Corps i 

Somali Mounted Iniantrj- 7 

Somali Camp! Corps 5 

2nd Battalion King's African Rifles . . 7 

Indian Contingent, Biitish Central Africa 2 

Total ■J.'j 

We also lost 17 riding oameln killed and 13 wounded, alaoSponieakillBd 
nnd B wounded. 

During tbc attack on ua between 10.30 a.m. and 3 p.m., foor bayonet 
ekarges were made, two by the 2nd Battalion King's African Rifles, one by 
(he Somali Camel Corps, and one by tho Bikaait Camel Corps and Indian 
Contingent, BriliRh Central Africa. TkesB were made with tlic object of 
clearing the bush, and in all cases sucueeded. 

The firing ceased at about 5.45 p.m. 

The force returned to the zariba at Dauot at K15 a.m. All wounded 
brought in and moat of the dead. 

In conclu^on I cannot spe-ak too highly of the behaviour of all ranks. It 
fould not have been better, the Somaba surprising everyone by thefr steadi- 
ness and dash, the Sod Battalion King's African Rifles having both, officers 
wounded and losing 1 1 men killed and wounded out of 30, and yet full of 
dash and fight. 

At some future time I hope to be allon-ed to bring forward thP names of 
offiocTB and men for the consideration of the General Officer Commanding. 

It is of eoiirse difficult to estimate the force against lis, but 1 think there 
were 3O0 riflemen and probably 400 to SOO spearmen. Tiieir losses must havr 
been very heavy — 150 killed would probably be within the mark. 

We picked up H rifles bolonging to tho enemy, none of ones failing into 
his hand. 

On the 23rd April, 1003, Captams Bruce and Godfrey ware buried close to 
our zariba in the morning. The zariba was strengthened and all water-tins 


Utied. A letter was sent to the Officer Comiaanduig Lioss of ComiuunicAt.inti , 
Bbbotte, Mjrisg that the £71113 oolomn would start to come baok an 
•25th April, unleBs news of the GaJadi force was recpived in the meantimf , 
and anking for a water oonvoy to be sent out to meet the column. 

On the 24th April, 1903, meaaengprs were received from OEScer Com- 
manding Lines of Communiuation, reporting that Coloael Plimkett'a form 
hod been cut up at Gumburu, and the probable withdrawDil of our forces lo 
(ialadi. Orders were at once issued for the return of the column to Bohotlp, 
and letter in duplicato was sent to the Officer Commanding Linc^ of Hora- 
mimioation, reporting this and asking for water a daj- earlier if possible. 
The oolumn marched off at 12.30 p.m., the Somali Mounted Infantry cover in 
the rear and right flank nome 3 to 6 miles out. Halted 7.30 p.m. (IS miles). 
On the 25th April, 1903, left camp at daybreak, the SomaU Mounted 
Infantry flrst sending pat^'ols round the ?»riba at tbe radius of ^ to 1 mile. 
JVIid-day halt in tbe open for odd bour. Zoribaed at 3.30 p.m. at Bslihsliclo 
(21 miles mBTub). 

On tbe 26th April, 1903, left soriba at S a.m. Same formation. .At 
7.30 a.m. raefc messenger from Captain Byrne saying be was at Kabri with 
150 men, 140 water-tins and 12 days' raHons. Captain Byrne had met my 
messengers to Officer Commanding Lines of Commnnication, and had moved 
at once to where I had asked tbe water to meet me. Zaribaed at 5 p.m., 
1 mile from Captain Byrne (20 miles march). 

On the 27th April, 1903, left zariba at 6 a,i 
Zaribaed 5 p.m. The mounted infantry pooies w 
the Somali Camel Corps being sent straight on 
camels. (Distance of march 19 milos.) 

On the 28th April, 1903, left zariba at 6 a.m., and arrived at Bobotle 
10,30 a.pi. All woimded doing well. (Distance of msjcb 11 miles.) 
1 have the honour to be, Sir, 

Your obedient Servant, 

J. E. GOUGH, Major. 
Officer Cominanding Flyiiig Cotiimn. 
'torn the Officer CommandiTig Flging Column, to IH 0/p,ef:r Commutidiiuj 

Lines of ClmimitnieuiiDn, BahcUe. 
ir, Daaot, 23rd April, 1903. 

I should like to bring the followbig incident, which occurred during our 
•turn tio Danot on. the afternoon of 22nd April, to the notice of the Oencrai 
I Officer Commanding, Somaliland Field Force : — 

Owing to the thick bush and tha rearguard having to hold their groimfl 
while wounded men. were being placed on camels, the reargiiori' 
hod got considerably in rear of the column. Captain Bruce, wlio 
was with the rearguard, was shot through the body from about. 
20 yards and fell on the path, unable to move. With bim at thi.> 
, time were Captain Walker, 4th Gurkha Eifles(Bikanir Camel Corp): 

Captain Bolland, Intelligence Officer, Flying Column ; two men, 2nd 
Battalion King's Afr'cnn Rines ; one Sikh and one Somali i.F 
(R927) M 3 

. Joined Captun Byme. 
;e watered (4 gallon diink ), 
to Bohotle to water their 


tliu cttnol corps- In the muantioie Uie uolumn, being n 

of what had happenm. xrere gettii^ fnTther aw&y. Captun 

Rolland ran back tome 500 jsrd« and returned witli help to brin;: 

nff Captain Bmce, while CapUin Walker and the men remaoned 

with CaptMn Bruce, ketplng oB the enemy, who win* nil roimd in 

thethiek bush. This they Euccessfully accomplished, but not before 

Taptain Bruce was hit a epcond time and the Sikh wounded. But 

for their gallant conduct Captun Bruce must have fallen into the 

hands of the enemy. 

I beg to submit the names of the officers for the Ticloria Cios?, and the 

meu of the 2nd Battalion King's African RiAbs and flth Battalion King's 

African Rifles for the Distingmshed Conduct Medal (names of men attached} 

and the Sikh for the Order of Merit. 

I have the honour to be, Sir, 

Yoai obedient Servant. 
J. E. GOUGH, Major, 
Offitcr Cotnmanding Flying Odnrnn. 
The names of the men recommended for (he Distinguished Condnot 
Medal and Order of Merit are : — 

(1) B.C.A. No. 136 Regimental Ko, 2376 Lfljice-Nuk Maieya Singh, 

24th Baluchistan Regiment. 

(2) No. 60 Sergeant Nderamani, 2nd Battalion King's African Rifles, 

(3) Ko. 87 Corporid Sunnoni, 2nd Battalion King's African Biflea. 

(4) Sowar Umar Ismail, Somali Camel Corps. 

Tribe Habr Toljaala (Abohr Abdulla), 0th Battalion King's African 

J. E. GOUGH, Major. 

Offtfer Commanding Flying CUiiutn, 

His Majesty was pleased to confer upon Captains Walker 
and Rolland* the Victoria Cross, while the Sikh was awarded 
the Order of Merit, and the men of the King's African Kifies 
the medal for Distiuguished Conduct in the Field. At a 
later period Gough'a own share in this incident was brought 
to notice by Brig.-Gteneral Manning and he also received the 
Victoria Orosa.f 

On the 24th April a message was received from 
the Officer Commanding Lines of Communication, giving ati 
account of the disaster which had befallen Plunkett at 
Gumbuiu, and directing Gough to withdraw to Bohotle. A 

• "London Gaaelte,".7th August, 1S03. 
t " Loudon Gaiette," 15th January, 19(M. 



convoy of supplies which had started from that place for Galadi 
on the 20th was also recalled, and the water post at Lasakante 
withdrawn, Gough halted at Danot till midday of the 
24th, when he resumed his retirement, reaching Bohotle on the 

■tavB been successively described above, the Abyssinians ' 
had taken no direct part, but it seems probable that their 
presence on the Webi Shebeli deterred the Mullah from carry- 
ing out any intention, which he may have harboured, of 
retiring across that river. Their advance had not been 
remarkable for its rapidity, and on the date of Plunkett'a 
disaster they had reached Mekunna, a spot on the Webi 
ShebeU some 170 miles to the S.S. West of Gumburu. They 
had met with no opposition except at BurhiUi, 30 miles north 
of Mekunna, where they were attacked by a body of 1,100 
dervishes belonging to tribes in the vicinity, whom they 
signally routed, with small loss. In his Staif Diary RocLfort 
gives the following account of the action :— 

Marched nt 6.30 a.u. (4th April) to near BurMlli, distance 20 milesa 
Somo resistunco was expected during thia march, hot beyoiid seeing a few 
tribesmen in tlie hills watching us, who were fired at by the AbyefiinianH, 
nothing happened. This, however, iodaced Gabri to take precautiooa for 
Ilia baggage, and he detailed a chief with 100 men to the high groimd on the 
left to see it saiel3- through ; this proved cJtectQal, About 11 a.m,, before 
the lariha wat [oiuied but after the arrival of the mam body in i 
which is situated on the left bank of the river with one face resimg 
and in fairly thick bush, we were attacked by 1,100 tribesmen on three aides. 
One of their wounded who waa capttured stH,tea that these men wh 
Dervishes and wear as such dii^tinguiahing bands round the head and ami, 
mt by JluUah Sheikhali Sheneeleh, a man of considerable influence 
n Hiran and Mekunna. These Dervishes belong to the Mekunna and 
iJerjele tribes. The attack came as a surprise and severe hand-to-hand 
fighting ensued, lasting 45 minutes, when the tribeemon were beaten off 
and many killed in the water while trying tjD cross the river. The Pitaurari 
did not apparently issue any orders during the fight, but donned his lion 
akin and sat outside hia tent in atate, aurroimded by liis staff. What 
;tioa there was during the action was canied out by the various chiefs, 
e was a great deal of firing and considerable nniae end confusion, but 
jidaally the men rushed into the fight in tho keenest passible way. The 
Kwsult was satisfactory, but if the enemy had been more forniidnlile, I think 


llie Abyssinians would have had reason to dejilore their want o! jireiiaution, 
abscnoe of control and disciplme ; but, on tlie othur hand, there can be no 
doubt that a long Beriea of almost nnbrokon BucccBfiea Binoe 1808 H^ainit 
Italians, Egyptians and Derrishes has imbued them with great confldance, 
and is a factor to he reckoned with. They are too excitable t<i be good 
shots, and prefer their Hwords to their rilles. At the conclnfiion of the fight 
those who had killed their man or men presented theinselyca individually 
before the Fitaurari, dancing a. war danco and proclniming in loud and 
excited tones their devotion to then' Emperor and country, then, bowing low 
in obeisance, they exhibited the apear, shield and bloodstained clothes of 
the slain. The custom of firing a shot in the au; which signifies an enemy 
slain was also observed. It was altogether a very remarkable sight. The 
Abyssinians pursued al! ilay. The casualties are reported as followi : — 
Abyssinians: kUled, 21; wounded, 10. Dervishes; tilled, 301 

woimded, 3, 
I think the Xtervish loss is much exaggerated- 
Doctor Martin is douig all that is possible for the wounded. 

From Mekninna the iorce had moved nortli and the news 
of Plunkett's disaster had reached HooMort at Labbaba 
on the 28th April during a raid which the Abyssinians 
were conducting against the Bagheri tribe. Unfortunately 
absence of water and grass on the Gerlogubi route, a con- 
dition which would continue until a fall of rain, made co- 
operation for the time impossible, and the Abyssinians moved 
to BuseU, camping there until their march on Sheilaba and 
Crerlogubi should become practicable. Rain having fallen, 
they left Euseli on the 15th May, reaching lyaboh, which is 
north of Hahi on the (Jerlogubi route, on the 26th- At this 
place two men who had been present at Gumburu with the 
Mullah's troops on the 17th April stated that their leader was 
now at Bur and that the British were concentrated at Galadi. 
In consequence the Abyaainians retraced their stepa to Hahi 
there turning eastward and making Bur their objective. Biya 
Ado was reached on the 30th after an almost waterless march of 
53 miles through thick bush. The Abyssinian leader, 
Fitaurari Gabri, now decided to move on Jeyd with a strong 
raiding party in order to ascertain if it would be possible 
thence to reach Bur, which, on account of the lack of water, was 
thought to be improbable. Should, however, water be reported 


between Jeyd and Bur, the remainder of tlie Abyssuiians would 
move to the former place and the whole force would continue 
the advance against the Mullah. During Gabri'a absence 
a captured prisoner stated that the Mullah hearing of the 
Abyssinian advance was preparing to retreat to Gumburu. 
On the 4th June Fitaurari Gabri returned with the satis- 
factory report that he had engaged the Mullah's followers at 
Jeyd oa the 3lBt May and lolled 1,000 of their spearmen. 
Regarding this raid. Colonel Rochiorfc reported ; — 

Gahti rttumed Biya X,\o. ITie raiil on tlip Bftgheri at Jeycl was very 
siicceastulatitl tame «3 nBurpriBe, but the Bagheri riflemen who were present, 
numbering about 40, eacaped with the exception of ono of tiieic number. 
Raid to be the Mullah's uncle, who was killed. His rifle, a Martini- Enlield, 
was captured. The enemy's loss ia luported as about 1,000 epeaimen 
killed belonging tfl Ave 9ub-Bcctions at the Habr Sutpiman and the oapture 
of all the remainder, inGluding families, I'ameU and cattle. Some of the 
Abfssiaians have not jet returned bat are gradually coming in, and there 
can be no doubt that the diatrict within a, 30 mile radius of Jeyd has been 
thoroughly cleared. The presence of an Abyssinian force in this diatiict 
haE, I think, proTed eftectiye ia closing the watering places of any importancii 
south of the Gerlogubi-Oolndi line to the Mullah. 

On the 7th the Abyssinian leaders held a consultation when 
it was decided that on account of the deficiency of water on the 
route beyond Jeyd and the shortness of the grain supply, it 
was impossible for them to takf; any further part in the 
present operations. Indeed it had become clear that miless 
they were provided with adequate transport and a sufficiency 
of water tanks their co-operation must necessarily be very 

As Kochfort was in complete ignorance of the general 
situation in Somaliland and as the Abyssinian operations 
had come to a atandatill, ho decided to return to Harrar 
and there obtain fresh instructions. 

It may here be noted that on the 26th April, after the 
telegraphic report of the disaster at Gumburu had been 
received from General Manning, His Majesty's Government 
telegraphed to Rochfort, informing him thereof and suggesting 
that he should move on Wardair and strike a blow at the 


MuUati from the w«at. This telegram, whicH wat* also com- 
municated to General Maniung, reached its destination aome 
days after Rochfort had been forced, as already described, to 
abandon the very movement which the message suggested. 

The history of the third expedition against the Mullah 
has now reached that point where portions of the Obbia, 
Berbera and Abyssinian forces had severally and fieparately 
engaged the Mullah, The insurmountable difficulty of 
cstabhshing communication between these forces had pre- 
vented a simultaneous blow from being struck, whereby the 
power of that fanatical leader might Lave been stamped 
out and his following destroyed. Nevertheless, the losses 
which lie had undergone, more particularly at the hands of 
ihe Abyssinians, had not been without efiect, and though 
at the time when General Manning withdrew to Galadi the 
Mullah's prestige may have seemed in the ascendant, the 
future will reveal that be had even then suffered considerably 
in morale. 

We have followed General Ma nnin g in his retirement to 
Galadi, which place he garrisoned with a force under Cobbe.* 
Then leaving posts at Dudub and Bera, he proceeded to 
Galkayu, where he arrived on the 25th April. His Majesty's 
Goverimient had, in a telegram dated 'iSrd April, expressed 
their readiness to provide reinforcements if required, but on 
the 26th he repHed :— 

Position as follows : Tliere is gairisou at Galadi strouglj entrenched 
and BufBcient to keep oS enemy. Garrison at Dudub rIso Btiongly en- 
trenched. There is gnmson at Bera withallthemoimtedinfantry, tho only 
place grazing ia obtainable. Balance of force here and on lines of cuumimieB- 
tion to the north of Badnein, to the south towards Obbia. I hope to close 

• The garrison left at Galadi under Lieut. -Colonel Cobbe consisted of ;- 
Somali Mounted Infantry. . 

Bombay Sappers and Miners 

Ist Battalion King's AfricMi Rifles 

■Jnd Battalion King's African Rifles 

Urd Battalion King's Africui Bitles 

-'nil ISattalion King's African Eifles . . 1 office 

'\Vith oiip month'.^ rations, 4C0 rounds |ier riHe and 

1 officer and 10 men. 
QoflicecB, lijOuienandii 
3 offipera and 100 men. 
I officer, CO mt'D and 2 

r, .lO rat 
1 ,500 u 


linos SOU tli liy the l.'illi May. cxrcjit Wacgallo, which place it may b 
to hold Batnewliat longer. ReinfoFcemcnts not required, as rnj foico U 
strong enough ; and as soon aa troops forming linea of communication BJTi^'<'. 
I shall be in position to udraace, provided transport in fit and rations will 
lie supplied from Bobotle. lu the meantime, Abye^niaiu ai'c advancing tu 
Wordair and still hold Wchi Shebeti. Miillitli must go cither north or to 
country which the complete evacuation of Obbia leavea opon to him- In 
Bay caae the triboB nenccr to me can bo severely punished for doing this. 
I can co-operate with AbvBSinians when they have occupied Wardair. 
There is no reason for nnxiety. MiEtori.iino to Phinkett's dctechmont ban 
not aSscted mocnJe of African troops, and I believe Mullah's force has suffcri'd 
BO heavily that he in unlikely to iMime near our posts. 

The attack on 17th April was mairily by Adonis, who showed re- 
markable bravery. I consider retirement would be very inadviaabla. I 
have a month's rations here and two months' in Bohotle. Boliotio must 
be able to ration us provided transport con be obtained. Ajn , asking 
.'Sivann if be can do this. A garriaon post in Mudug district will probably 
require to be stronger than I estimated at first, except that Abyssiitian.H 
may inflict heavy loss on Mullah, in which case situation will be improved. 
Dnderstand that Italiaua have wired Rome that men of Mullah have 
occupied Obbia. I have no reason to behove truth of statement. Health 
of troops good, in »pite of hard maicliing and extreme heat. 

Twentj-tour hours later he again telegraphed ;— 

With the camels at present at my disposal and coming over from 
Bohotle in a few days I hope to be able to complete the rolling up of the 
base to Galkayu by the 15th May. The Obbia rations last till 31st May, 
and I shall have by then passed certain number of troops, such as Burgher 
Contingent and aeetion Moimtain Battery, over to Bohotle, from whom I 
have already drawn certain amount of suppUea. Net result is that force 
concentrated here on loth May will be rationed until 14th Jane. Makiny 
allowance for heavy wastage of camels I shall have by 15th May some 
1 ,200 camels available, and in addition a somewhat pro blematieal 600 camels 
which Swann is frying to raise for me. Two months' supplies for whole 
of Obbia force have been collected at Bohotle, with exception of certain 
amount of grain which ia being pushed up. I hear from Bohotle that hired 
transport system on Berbera-Bohotlo hne appears to be in duiger of 
breaking down. I am not fully informed os yet in the matter, but should 
it occur our posilion both here and at Bohotle would be very serious. In 
that event cainels must be imported from India or Arabia for work on that 
side, and I have authorised Swann to act in consultation with Cordoaux, 

Imported camels would be useless on this side, requiring groin, and must 
be watered every three days. Have stated already in my Ko. 115 that 
if you think it impoaaible under present conditions to reach Wardair in- 
dependently of active assistance from the Abyssinians, they must first 
occupy that place. There remain four principal oantingencics. Firstly, 


[HMubilily of co.opecaling «ilb Abysfliniaus iii tho event of llieir having 
been able to occupy Waidait and WalwaL Secondly, poBaibUity of my 
remauuDg in my prea^ut position, denying the Mudug and Galadi to 
enemy's force. Thirdly, poenbility of being able to hold Galkayu or aome 
place in neighbourhood with strong force, and then withdrawing nmtinder 
of trooiw. Foutthly, possibility of having to withdraw all my farce to 

With regard to first coulingeucy there will be required at lea9t 2,000 
camels for my advance beyond Galadi, and 1,000 more for lines of com- 
muuication between that place and GaJkayu. .Vlfio there will be required 
monthly reserve of fiOO camels to rc|ilaco cosuoltieB ; that is to aay, that, 
in addition to 1,'^00 cameU, there will be reijuired 1,900 camels and a 
monthly reflerve of 600 camels. So far, have not toached on question of 
Iteeping Galknyu rationed. To do tliis at rale of a day's supply a day 
Swann would require at least 1,500 camels extra for his present requirements. 
together with monthly supply of 250 camels tor casoaltiefl. Altogether 
tliere will be required by Swann 3,300 camels and 750 camels each month 
alter»ards. In order that I might start from hero with month's supply on 
hand, motit of the camels will be required to bo collected at Bohotle before 
endofMay. Tbisdcmandfareicecda Swann'sresauroes,and lean therefore 
sa; definitely it will be quite impossible to advance to co-operate with 
Abyssinians when the base is rolled up under present conditions of transport. 

With regard t<i second contingency, camels which I shall have available 
would be suSicient for me to heep Galadi and Dudub rationed, and, if 
necessary, sejid reinforcements to these places, or for evacuation of them 
against an action with enemy's force. It would not be, however, avulable 
For ratitming Gallcayu ftom BohoUe, and for this purpose 1,500 camels 
still will be required by Swann to bo collected at Bohotle by not later than 
1st June, a date which would only allow me margin of rations of bread and 
meat for one week. I have nOt yet had time for receipt of reply from Swann 
tomyrequestformformationonthisbGad, butfrom previous correspondence 
it appears to me that I will not be able to obtain full numl>er of camels. 
I have directed h™ to reply directly to jou an well as to me ; but, assuming 
that his reply will be to this etfect. I am of opinion it is quito impossible for 
me to continue to hold Uudub and GaladL 

With regard to third and fourth contingencies, total number of camels 
which I shall have avsilable on 15th May would be sufficient, I calculate, 
for withdrawal of garrison of Dudub and Galadi, and transport of all tha 
ttoopa to Bohotle without making demands upon Swann, which he will be 
quite unable to meet. Water supply, Damot, steady decrease, but Swann 
has been directed to establish water posts at that place and between it and 
Bohotle. Could concentrate all troops to Badwein, and could hold that 
place with strong garrison on existing rations up to 30th June or lat«T. 1 
it is decided to completely evacuate the posts south of Bohotle, I can do a 
by 30th June, provided that movement commenoes directly the base i 
roiled up aud enemy's force will not be active along that line. 

Lastly, OS regards holding the Mudug, I am compelled by fact that 

Mnllah mtiat have gained prestige by Qumburu, and fact that fighting Titlue 
of his atmj miiet now bo cfstiniat^d far higher than formerly, seriously to 
modify views as to t.^^i« point which I have hitherto ejspressed. I do not 
think that a less gamson than 400 would be safe even in a strongly entrenahed 
position. The garrison wouldhave to be Indiansoffightiugraces, as African 
troopE suffer in health by prolonged residence in garrison. Tliis garriBOii ix 
separated from Bohotle by 145 miles, of which 73 miles between Domot and 
Badwein are waterlesa. Parts of route are through thick bnsli. If left at 
BadwBia, which would bo almost sa good a position s IrategicsJly, the distance 
from Bohotle would be 105 miles. Aft^r withdrawal of posts at Galadi and 
Dudnh fiuH stretoh of country would be completely open to enemy's force. 
Convoys proceeding frora Uohotle and Mudug would have to be apcom- 
paaied by very large parlies. The thing is feasible, but will entail lai^ 
iidditioa t« pcrmiment garrison of Bohotle for piu^poae of providing these 
esnorts. On the whole, I am not in favour of retention of the Mudog as 
far as military situatiini is eoncemed. So fai, I havo not taken into con- 
aideration action of Abyasinians. The first two continceucies imder dis- 
cussion are entirely dependent on our own wont of transport, and no action 
of Absysiuians, whether auccessful or unsuccessful, affects conclusion arrived 
at-. If AbysBiuiauB suffer severe defeat the Alullah would probably move 
south-east, but he may possibly penetrate in northerly direction into 
Protectorate, in which case withdrawal of all our troops to Bohotle, as far 
as tranaport admits, of easential importance. Northerly direction, rainy 
season commenced abundantly; even then auchamurch would be somewbab 
risky for him. If Mullah snffera severe defeat at hands of Abysainioua, 
the objection to holding post in Mudug wouM be greatly moderated, 
and sdongth of post might be materially reduced. I have not been 
able yet to get into tonch with the Abyssinians, but message has been sent 
to Kochfort, via Bohotle, urging importance of immediate Abyssinian ad- 
vance on Wardair. In the meantime am making necessary preparations 
for passing all the troops to Bohotle. 

On tile 5tli May His Majesty's Government intimated toCoocBnir 
General Manning tbat in view of all the conaiderationa put jj^i, 'n^. 
forward by Mm, they thought it deaicable that he should con- 
centrate his forces at Bohotle, and that any fiuther opera- 
tions which might be necessary should be conducted from that 
base. They further informed hiTn that on account ot the 
difficulty of transport and supply, it had been decided not to 
hold the Mudug. A few days later, on hia reporting that a 
rumour of the Abyssinian advance towards Gerlogubi had 
reached him, he was given discretionary powers as to delaying 
the retirement from Galadi. 
—Telegraphing to the Secretary of State for War from 

Galkayu on thfi 12fch May, General Manning described the 
situation as foilows :— 
n. Tliu Obbio liuci of ronmiiuiiiialioQ will be completely rolled up by 
IKIh May. Tliu military transport gradually avuilable by completion of 
iihove tor couveyante to Bohotle Imlii of mounted infantry, the section 
mountain battery, and all African troops except the Somali Moim.ted Infantry 
imd iufaulry ab Galiuli. By 31st Uay all the troopa will liave reached 
Bohotle e.^i:ept the troopa in gaJTiBon at Galoda, consisting of 308 African 
■rirapg, and Dudub, oonaiating of 7S 2nd Sikhs and thtiae in garrison at Bers. 
Badw«in uul Galkeyu, consisting of 550 '2iid Sikhs and 50 Uritiah Mounted 
Infantry, with small number of Bikanirs and sappers and miners. Military 
transport which will remain to mo when these moves are oairied out 
together with the assistance which Swann ia able to promise me, will enable 
me to ration with bread and meat all tho troops ia giurisoa at above posta 
until 30th June. After 15th June I withdraw troops from Galadi and Budub 
to Galkayu, and shall then move all the troops to Bohotle in a single mt 
ment as being the only safe raethod after the evacuation of Galadi and 
Dudub. I calculate that with the camels which I shall have in hcuid and 
the (issistajice which 1 can get from Swann, and by utilising the camels of 
the Eohotla flying column, I sbaJI have just enough camela to carry out the 
foregoing muvementa and transfer of all the troops to Bohotle. I have, 
however, directed Swann, in consultation with Cordeaux, to endeavour to 
buy onniclB in fresh and hitherto nntricd directions recommended by 
Cordeaui;, for I have not a large margin to spare. 

By holding Ime of wells, Badwein. Galkayu, Bera, Dudub and Galadi 
until 30th June I am giving Abysainionn best chance of complete succees 
if they arc able to attack and defeat Mullah next month, since, in deejato 
of the fall of a certain amount of rain, water pools are not yet sufficiently 
numerous for bulk of Mullah's forces to scatter. As regards transport on 
the Berbeia^Bohotle line of conimunioationa I have received views of 
t'ordeauK and Swann. The latter has aheady, at my desire, telegraphed to 
you. He considers that if f he force is to be kept nt Bohotle beyond 31st Jnly, 
lie will require 6,000 imported camels to feed it. In addition to tbeso a lal^ 
number of camels would be required for any offensive movement from 
Bohotle. Imported camels require grain and cannot go for a long t 
without water, and therefoic useless for active operations from Bohol 
consequently SomaU camels would have to be employed. As we are 
present imable to procure enough SomaU camels to replace our wastage, it 
seems useless to expoct to procure the number which we should require 
in order to recommence active operations from Bohotle. There nee 
therefore, no object ia keeping the force concentrated at Bohotle, and I 
would suggest that bulk of force should be distributed down line of com- 
luimiuations, where it can be more easily rationed, pending reply from you 
aa Jo future operations. Such a distribution of troops would not raquiro 
0,000 imported camels, but stilt it would require 2,000 or 3,000 comeU. 
have directed Swann to nakfor 1,000 cameU, but these can only be required 


in reserve, and uiilesB tlic whole expeditinnary force is to bo completely 
withdrawn from Siomaliland, leaving beliiiid only garrison* Eerbrr.i- 
ItohnHe lino of commiinicBlion. Thptamele to thpniimtcrlhavo indii'otcd 
nhoiild be imiiorted. 

Througliout May, coveiedby the posts maintained to l,lio 
west of Galkayu, frequent convoys carrying surplus stores 
crossed the Haud, and all troops beyond those actually re- 
'luirej as garrisons were gradually passed into Bohotle. 
These niovementa were effected without interruption 
(HI the part of the Mullah, who was still reported to 
be at Walwal, while his scouts occasionally met and ex- 
changed shots with our own Illalos betoi-e Galadi. 

During May, too, the Italian Government replaced the 
former sultan, Yusuf Ali, of Obbia by his son, Ali Yusuf, 
whom they brought back from banishment in Erythren, 
From him they obtained a promise that he would maiutain 
order both at Obbia and the Mudug, and to assist Mm in 
doing BO he was furnished with some 400 rifles. The question 
of the supply of camels was stiC under the consideration of 
His Majesty's Government, who, on account of the difficulty 
of procuriug a sufficient quantity in the Protectorate, had 
ordered 1,200* to be sent from Aden and 1,300 from India. 

The survey of the Berbera-Bobotle route by Major S. L. 
Craster, K.E., originally sent by the Foreign Office to Somali- 
land in connection with that part of the proposed Berbera- 
Harrar railway, was at this time being undertaken in order 
to ascertain how far it could be made practicable for mechani- 
cal road transport or for a narrow gauge railway. 

On the 6th June General Manning, as a preliminary to the 
withdrawal to Bohotle, issued eonlidential orders regarding 
the concentration at Badwein of Cobbe's force, 
which held the three posts west of Galkayu. Cobbe 
was to move direct on Badwein, picking up en route the 
garrisons of Dudub and Bera, and for this purpose the requisite 



the 8tli. 

transport was despatched to him from (Jalkayu on the 8th. 
Two days earlier the General had noted in hia Intelligence 
Report that not a particle of reliable evidence had been 
received wliich would lead him to the belief that the 
Mullah had ehiited his quarters, but in a, despatch dated the 
29th June he mentions that there had been vague rumours 
afloat that a move into the Nogal Plain was in ccntemplation. 
Little importance was, however, attached by hiiu to these 
rumours, since such a movement was not possible at that 
season unless the water places, then in our posseasion, had 
changed hands, or unless heavy rains had filled up the ballia 
or water-holes. Nevertheless, this very movement was then 
in progress. Repulsed by the Abyssinians on 31st May, as 
already stated, and doubtless dreading lest the blow then 
i-eceived should he followed up by others, the Mullah took 
advantage of a heavy rainfall, and forthwith started on his 
flight to the Nogal Plain, seeking to avoid the greater danger 
by exposing himself, as he rightly conjectured, to the less. 
The Mullah Evidence of this daring movement, though absent to the 

Kogsi. Obbia force, was yet not lacldcg at Bohotle.* On the 8th June 

our advanced scouts at Hagerer came in contact with 150 of 
the Mullah's horsemen ; next day the telegraph line was cut 
at four points between Bohotle and Damot and six miles of 
wire removed, and on the three following days positive in- 
formation came in that the Mullah with all hia followera, their 
wives and stock, was heading across oar communications 
35 miles south-east of Bohotle. 

In the stafi diary of the lines of communication it is 
recorded :^ 

Tlic Somali M.L imtroU siiit outon tlio I ttli instant retiimed at intetwls 
itiiring the moramg. The point at which the Mullah is effecting tho 
iTossIng over of bis live-stock is about 15 milea from Bamot, where he 
has a, strong guard of alioot 1,000 horapinen. Ho hns posts of 100 Iq 
200 men at all the water holes on the line — Loratai -Hagerer — Kudmas- 

• It ia interosling to nolo here that Lieut, -Colonel Swann, Commanding 
LineB of Commnnication, Eerbera-Eohotle force, heard as early as 29th Marnh . 
I!)fl3, from prisoners that the Mullah intended to move into the Nogal. 


Las3,kBiito. At LasuljBn he iias a Strang for^^e. Hs himsslf is evd to be 
waiting at Holi Madu; lie hue about 5,000 horsemen in all rovering the 
movement, and capuble of concentrBtlng on the point at whioli lis is 
cTOBsing within 34 boiira, the greater part boinsj thera in halt that time. 
Ha has Ulaloa and small patrola watching every muvi'raent. 

The opportunity of striking a blow at tlie Mullah while 
engaged in this flank inarch was a tempting one, and it is 
probable that had a force moved against him from Bohotle, 
he would, in order to cover hia flocks and herds, have stood 
and fought. But Swanii, the Officer Commanding 
the Berbera-Eohotle lines of communication, whose head- 
quarters were at the latter place, considered that the number of 
Iroopsatbis disposal' was insufficient to make success against 
the Mullah a certainty, and that with the Obbia force dependent 
for auppliea upon the maintenance of Bobotle, he would not 
be justified in accepting the risk. Moreover, although the 
small post at Damot, cut off from communication, and isolated 
in the midst of a fanatical enemy, caused anxiety, it was 
thought that if seriously attacked it must have already fallen, 
and that a relieving force could not arrive in time to avert 
disaster. For these reasons. Swarm, on the 11th Jnne, 
resolved merely to send a patrol of Somah M.I. to reconnoitre 
the Damot road, taking with it linemen to repair the 
telegraph. On the 13tb the patrol returned having lost 16 
out of 45 men by desertion. It had gone 14 miles towards 
Damot, and beyond tracks of large numbers of horsemen and 
camels, had seen no signs of the enemy. Thereupon, 
Swann decided to despatch in the same direction the flyii^ 
column, made up to a strength of 600 rifles. This movement 
was not, however, carried out, as a letter in the meantime 
arrived from Damot stating that that post was safe having 
beaten oil several dervish attacks. t 

n this date, oxcliisive of sick, 
082 transport animals. (Head- 

" The strength of tho Bohotle garrison o 
was 1,132 all ranka, with 8 maxira guns and 1, 
quarters StaB Diax,v), 

t On the 19th June, Colonel Strann received a letter in Arabic from the 
Mal lah. of which the following m n translation : — 

B Mahomed Abdnllah to the English people : — 

l,BB7 liitra to my words nnd mark them. Firac I st'iiil lliiu letter. 


n For some days conrnmnication with the Obbia force had 
been interrupted, but on the 18th June a messenger arrived 
and reported that Getieral Maniiii^ aud his force were oa the 
march to Bohotle. Leaving Galkayu on the 16th, Badwein 
was reached next day, and there headquarters were joined by 
the column under Cobbe from Galadi. From Badwein 
the force (consisting of 1,47'i combatants, 1,561 foUowera and 
3,627 animals) moved northwards, and croBsing the Haud, 

this is the IJL'st letter ! I svrite about the toroiBr and present doings. We 
KsTO fought tor a year. I wish to rule my own country and protect my 
"wn religion. If you wish Eend me a letter if there is to bo peapB or war. 
Von do not listen to lay words. Liiiton now and (MinBidcr, Before thia 
I have Bent letterB whioh yoa have not li^lened to. We hnvo both mSered 
oonsiderably in battle with one anothor. You hflve heard that the dor- 
rishea have run away. They have not done 50, I h.ive Tuoseil my oamp,- 
but I have not run away. I have got hors.-^. camels and eatt.If. When 
I get news of goad grazing I will go to that place. You aio in Bohotla 
now and before that you went to the Ogailens' country. Before our fights 
I was at Harrardig^it, and have been moviug about according to where 
there was good gracing, from Miidug to Sludug and frora Dank to Danla 
up to the present time. I intend to go from Burao to Berbera. I warn 
you of this. I wish to fight with you. I like war, but you do not. I hBve 
nnth roe camels and gonta and nheep in plenty. Lost year I fought with 
you and Moosa (Musa Farah T) woa with you. Cod willing I witt take 
many rifles bom you, but yon won't get any rifles or nmmimition from me. 
and I will not take yonr eountry. I have no forts, no houses, 00 country, 
I have no cultivated fields, no silver or ROld for you to take. I have no 
HftJScprs, Afonsa (Musa Farah ?) has guined no benefit by killing mj mm 
iind my country is of no good to you. If the country was cultivated or 
oontaioed houses or property it would be worth your while to fight, Tbo 
country is all jungle and that is no use to yon, 1£ you want wood and stone 
you can get them in plenty. There are also many ant heaps. The aun is 
very hot. .Ml you can get from me is war, nothing else. I have met your 
men in battle and have kQled them. We are greatly pleased at this. Our 
men who have fallen in battle have gained poiadias. God fights tor ua. 
We kill, and yoa kill. We fight by God's order. That is the truth. We 
ask for God's blessing. Ood is with (ue when I write this. If you wish 
war I am linppy, if you wish peace I am also content. But if you wish 
peace go away Irom my country to your own. If yon wish war stay where 
ycm are. Listen to my words, I wish to eichange a machine gun tor 
ammunition. If you do not want it I will sell it to someone else. Send 
lue a letter saying whether you want war or peaoe. 



reached Bohotle on the 26th, The transference of the 
Obbia force to the Berbera-Bohotle line had been efiected 
without opposition and with the loss of one sepoy of the 2nd 
Sikha missing, and another of the same corps severely wounded. 
In describing this operation General Manning reported : — 

Tlie in 

I hiwl rcpcived. troiu Hia MBJt-sty'a yetTftary of State 
contrato at Bohotle in view of further operations fcom 

for War ■ 
that plaoi 

I hod oaloulatftl tljBt I eliould have sufficient tranF^port to carry n 
tliis moveinent by cooceutratiug the Hera, Dudu b and Galadi garrisons 
Badwein aiioiit tlio IStli Jimc, and bringing up the Galkayu garriBou. 
Iludwein to joia there on the Bame date, then moving acroaa the Haud 

Theconceulratioaat Badwein was effeotetl on the ITtli June, the reti 
ment from the variouK posts being utunolested. 

Mounted troopa — 

British Mounted Infantry 
Rom ah Mounted Infantry 
Bikanir Camel Corps 


2nd Sifeha 

lat Battalion King's African Biflea . . 
2nd BsttahoD King's African Rifies 
3rd Battalion Ring's African BiRes 
5th Battalion King a African Rifles 
r>etaelmient, Bombay Sap]iers and Jlincn 




nod for the n 

water for uicii anil ni 
across the Hand. 

Before leaymg Caikayu, on the 15th June, I received infonnation 
from Daniot that the telegraph line had been cut in several ulaces north and 
east of Bohotle on the 7tb and 8th Juno, and that bo.iieR of the Uullnh's 
horsoinen were active roiuid Bohotle, and also that Damot had been fiicd 
into by Dervish horsemen, and that a number of horsemen were tp that 
neighbourhood. Bpies sent out from Pamot had brought in the news 
that the Mullah, with his fighting men and his livc-stoeU, had passed between 
Damot and Bohotle on Ihe way into the Kogal Valley. 

The defences of Dajiiot had been eotL'^tdored sufficient for a post so far 
removed from the theatre of operations, hut were insufficient for any [lOBt 
wherever situated. Major Hoskins who lOuimondEd ut Damot, howevpr, 
in the intervals of Dervish activity, placed tlie poet in a thorough state of 

[Ipfeni^c, and tlii- safety a thi: jiOBt and the water supply there, uptm irhMl t 
large force croeaingthe Uaud depended, was due to bis resource 

I decided to moTe out of Badwein on the 18th Juae to cross the Haud ; 
I WHB not Giirc whether the DcrvieheEi had made prcparatione to attack the 
forue on its way to Damot in the thick bunh of the waterlees Hand, but the 
scouting ahead proved, as the force entered the Haud, that the Mullah's 
horsemen had neglected (he precaution of watching the Galkayu rood. 

The march from Badwein to DamotoccupiedfourdByK, the only casualty 
bring one man of the 2nd Sikhs tnissing and one man Beverely wounded of the 
aa,me regiment, the latter bring shot by one of the enemy's mounted spies. 

The arrival of the Ohbia force at Damot must. I think,have been quite 
unexjiccted. Mounted scouts of the Dervishes rode up during the night o[ 
tbo 6th June, close to the Caladi post, and rode off agnin on being challenged 
by the sentrieH. 

These scouts, no doubt, reported that Galadi was still held, and the 
DervisheB did not again visit Galadi up to thetinio nf its evacuation. Hence 
the news of mir concentration at Badwein and march at-ross tlie Uaud to 
Damot [lid not probably reach the Mullah until the force was within a day'a 
march of Damot- 

I halted one day in Damot and reinforced the garriHon there with 260 
rifles and four maxims. I should have brought this garrison into Bohotle, 
since it now served no useful piirposo, but traQBjx)rt sufficient for the supplies 
collected there was not available. The remainder of the column marched 
into Bohotle, arriving at that place on the 26th -Tune, 

The whole of the Mullah's live-stock had not, on the 24th June, crosawd 
our line, and during the march some 400 camels and 2,000 sheep and goats 
were captured, and oonsiderahle loss was inSicted npon parties of the 
enemy mot with. 

On the 9tlth June I despatched a column of 700 rifles and two guns 
to bring in the Damot garrison, which returned to Bohotle on the 3rd July, 
bringing in the Damot garrison and meeting with no signs of the enemy OD 
the road to and back from Damot. 

Owing to the movement of the Mullah hito the Nogal it became 
necessary to strengthen all (he posts on the Eerbera- Bohotle line of com- 
municaljon. I therefore detailed the following garrisons ; — 

Bohotk (400 Tiflxa). 
Bombay Sappers and Miners. 
Ist Bombay Grenadiers. 
3rd Battalion King s African Rifles. 
5th Battalion Kin^ s African Rifles. 
Indian Contingent, British Central Africa. 

^nd Battalion King a African KiHcs. 
* uO Somali Mounted Infan tyr. 


Bnttalioo King's African BiHfs. 

2nd Sikhs. 

The Rarritfou foe tlie posts moved, out from Bohotle in l.wo oolnmnB nn 
the 3rd and (ith July rea]>eclively. 

On mv way from Daraot to Bohotle on tha "iSth June I received a, 
telegram £rotii His Mftjeaty's Secretary of State tor War infocming me of the 
appointment of Major-General Sir C, C. Egerton, K.C.B., D.S.O., to iwmmand 
the Somalilond Field Force. I infonned Major-Generftl Egerton of my 
dispositions and received Ws concurrence in tboro. Pconi Oarrero I pro- 
teeiled to Sheikh and handed over command of the Souialiland Field Force 
to Major-Ceneral Sir t. C. Egerton. who arrived in Bcrbera on the 3rd Jnly 
and assumed command. 

The day before he reached Bohotle, Gfenuml Manning Api>iiiiii.iniii 
received a telegram dated 22nd June from the Secretary o£ "f *'."''5''^- 
State for War cor^ratulating him upon the approaching c. 7i;gertoii. 
concentration of hia force, and the manner in which he and the 
troops under him had overcome the great difficulties incident 
to the expedition. He was, at the same time, informed that aa 
the recent movement of the Mullah had brought the operations 
into closer proximity to the posts in the British sphere, and 
as it had been thought desirable to send reinforcements from 
India and Aden, H.M. Government had decided to appoint 
Major-General Sir C. Egerton, K.C.B., D.S.O,, to command 
the whole force. General Manning was further instructed that 
Iiis operations, until the transfer of the command had taken 
place, should be confined to the protection of the poste 
between Bohotle and Berbera. 

On the 3rd July, the third expedition against the Mullah 
may be said to have terminated. 

In his final report on the operations. General Manning aenerai 
tumiahed the foUowing general remarks :— Mtmnmg'a 

1. It would hardly be possible to exaggerate the difEcultJes connected ^ ~^-.- 
with the landing of stores at Obbia, and their traiXBport from t'le beach to the *P*"' '"'• 
anpply dep6t. a distance of over f of a mile. 

No transport animals oould be ppared for this week, and the tioopa were 
tramcquentiy eniploycd incessantly for six weeks from moniing till nights 
b The Somali hss proved himself a Htat rata transport attendant wlicij 

" m7) » 2 

properly treated and fed. The Transport Depurtmeiit was very fortunate in 
the ofllcers setected and sent out for this duty. They looked coiofully after 
their men and watched over their inlcrestn, the resalt being that a very 
cffieient Transport Department was organiBcd frgm what appeared, at first 
sight, very unpromising material. 

The forrc landed at Obbia with nothing in the way af a Transport 
Department, tmating to the report o! the ability of Vueiif All to provide 
camels and attendants. When it was realised tlmt this promiBo was 
likely to be fulfilled, the raising and cquipmeat of a Transport Department 
had at once to be commenced, and that sueh im efficient tcattsport could bo 
improvieed in a few weeks speaks voluniea for the skill and energy of those 
entrusted with this important duty. 

3. The general plan of the late operations may he briefly described as 
follows ; — 

To prevent the Mullah from breaking away to the Wehi Shebcli. 

To endeavour to confine him to the north and between the British and 
Abyssioian forces, where an attack made by cither would drive him ii 
eoiitact with one or the other forces. 

The Abyssinians occupied the Wehi Shebeli and moved up later trjwards 
Gerlogubi, but failed, from reasons I have already eipluned, to ciml 
contact with, the Mullah near Wardair, where he had fallen back cousequent 
upon our advuico from Galkayu to flaladi and Gumbuni. 

Owing to transport diilicultica and the distance to be traversed acre 
walerlesH bush country, the British force could not again come up with the 
Mullah by pushing on to Wald^ from Galadi, but held the eastern and 
northernlineof water, thereby effectively imcring the Mullah's egtessineithn 
direction, uolesa heavy rain fell sufficient to render him entirely independent 
of the wells which were in our hands, and filling up the bailie. 

Before this could happen I had hoped that the Abyssinians would bava 
occupied Gerlogubi, which ifl only 26 miles from Wardair and WalwaL 
This, however, they failed to do ; but the pressure of their advance from the 
south, and our hold on the Mudugregiun, compelled the Mullah to endeavour 
to eacape ^m bis conGned situation. 

Heavy rain fell late in May and early in June, and filled the line of 
waterholea from south of Bohotle towards the Nogal, This enabled 
the Midlah to carry into execution his only way of escaping by the daring 
eipedient of passing through our lines of communication. The great 
fiuperiorityinniunbera of Dervish horsemen rendered this movement likely to 
be successful 

The flight into the Nogal was covered hy a screen of horsemen, who 
operated north and sooth of Bohotle, with the object of obscuring the actual 
direction of the Mullah's flight. 

Had the garrison of Bohotle been strong enough to have moved out a 
force of 1,000 rifles with a considerable mounted force, the Dervishea wonld 
have had the alternative of fighting to gain a passags for their live,at«ck, o 
giving up the attempt and retiring upon Walwal and Wardair. 

It is my opinion that the attempt would have been abandoned, since 


Dervislica wen.' not in a ponil-on to fight ; shiirdices of ammunition ar.d tlieir 
recent loises at Gumburu Mid Docaloieh Iwing tlw mftin causes ol their 
unwillingness to come in contact witli our troopB again. 

The Mullnli, however, through bia spieB, was no doubt well aware of the 
strength of the BohotJe garriBon, and decided that it wns safe to cross, having 
aatinGed himself that the troops on the Mudug side were still in occupation 
of their poets. 

The DerviahcH, however, executed their move while the troops on the 
Mudug side of the Haud were actually in procejiB of conrtntration at 
Badwein preparatory to the more acrosa the Haud to Damot, and I heard 
from priiionera captured on the mai'cb of the force from Damot to Bohotle 
that the sudden and unexpected arrival of the troops from Mudug had 
completely disconcerted the Derviahei. 

The late operations have been carried out under conditions of extreme 
difficulty.; the arid and watsrleas nature of the country traverBcd has, of 
necessity, uiiposed upon the troops hardships prohably not incidental to 
campaigning in any other country, and this, added to the extreme heat and 
the necessity for long marches to economiflc the issue of or to reach water, ha« 
Bulijeeted the discipline aad training of the troops employed to a very high 

It is a pleasiu^ to me to be able to bear testimony to the excellent 
discipline maintaiaed aad to the cheierful manner in which all ranks havu 
carr'ed out their duties under very tryinK conditions. 

4. I regict that tLie wireless telegraphy sections did noc succeed in any very tangible results. 

This aystem would have been of great use ia many jiarts of the country, 
whero visual signalling is impossible owing to dense bush or to the flatness of 
the country. 

Q. The storage of water in canvas tanks was very extensively made uia 
of throughout the late operations, and proved the only means of watering 
large bodies of troops and animals at one lime, and the only system which 
permitted the concentration of any large body of troops at any one time at 
places where the water supply was limited to one or two wells. 

C. The lift and force pumps, with wired hose, were of groat service. 

7. The carriage of sick and wounded was, to a certain extent, solved by 
the introduction of the new pattern camel Utter for Bomah camels. 

The carriage of severely wounded or serious oa?es of sickness, except in 
dhoolis, ia, however, a problem yet l« be solved. 

8. I have already, in despatches, referred to the eicellent aervicea 
rendered by the Burgher Mounted Infantry ; thcu" knowledge ot country, 
and their adaptahiUty to the conditions of service in Somaliland, made the 
corps a very valuahle addition to the force. I have telegraphed to Lord 
Milnermy high appreciation of thescrvicesof the Burgher Mounted Infantry. 

5. The Bikouir Camel Corps have hkowise been of the greatest service. 
Moat ot the early reconnaissances towards Galkayu were carried out by thli 



The keenness and excellent spirit shown by the native ranks of the corps 
are deserving of high commendation. 

I trust it may be possible to bring to the notice of the Maharajah of 
Bikanir my high appreciation of the services rendered by the Bikanir Camel 
(Jorps while imder my command in Somaliland. 

10. The press correspondents were a source of some embarrassment, 
owing to the difficulty of maintaining a censorship over telegrams sent to 
and despatched from Aden. 

The number of casualties in action of the Field Force up 
to the 3id July, 1903, was reported as foUows : — 









British Officers .,' 12 

„ rank and file : 2 

Indian rank and file . . 56 

Central African rank 123 

and file 
Scxnali rank and file . . ' 5 
African followers . . 14 

• • 


• • 

• • 

• • 


* 1 since dead.* 
■ Private Schwartz, 
Burgher Contingent. 


60 2 





)J3;bisfobobment op the Field Force. — Appointment op 
■ Uajor-Gexbral Sir C. Egerton as General Opficeb 
■ Commanding. — Correspondence Regardinq Plans 
H AND Military Policy. — Transport Requirements. — 
H Organization of the Field Force. — Abyssinian 
W Co-operation. — Concentration of Field Force.— 
Fortified Post Established at Galadi. — Naval 
Demonstration at Obbia.— Formation of Tribal 

I Horse. — Colonel Kenna's Reconnaissance.— Battle 
op Jidbali. — Advance into the Southern Nogal.— 
Concentration op Field Force on the Line Gaolo - 
Halin. — Mullah Retreats Northwards. ■ — Fresh 
Plan of Operations. — Pursuit of Mullah into the 
Northern Haud. — Capture of Illig. — Failure op 
the mljjabten co- ope ration.— termination of 
Active Operations. 
The deciaioo of His Majeaty's Government to increase the 
force in Somaliland, and despatch thither an officer of higher 
tank than the Inspector-General of the King's African Rifles 
had been taken noon the advice of the Commander- in-Cluef, 
Field Marshal Earl Roberts, who felt considerable anxiety 
regarding the Obbia force, when the news of the MuUah's 
march into the Nogal was received in London, on the 
13th June, 1903. 

On the 15th June the following further action, to meet Eeinforee. 
possible eventualities, waa taken : — menu. 

* See Map II- 


1,500 camels, in addition to 1,300 already ordered, 
were to be prepared for early embarkation from India 
for Berbera. 

2 Native Infantry Battalions. ~1 with obli- 

tOO Mounted Infantry {half to be [ gatoiy 
British). i mule 

2 Bectiona 28th Mountain Battery. J transport. 
IJ Field Hospitals, 
were ordered to be warned in India for service in 
300 British infantry and 300 native infantry were to be 

sent forthwith from Aden to Berbera. 
Three months' supplies for men and animals were to be 

The troops ordered from Aden reached Berbera between 
the 21st and 30th June, and on the foimer date, the Viceroy 
of India was desired to send at once to Berbera one native 
infantry battalion and 500 mounted infantry, and to arrange 
for Major-General Sir C. Egerton and his staff to proceed as 
soon as possible to the seat of war. 

The departure of the Buighei contingent for South Africa 
on the 12th June, on the termination of their six months' 
engagement, and the itumber of non-effectives among the 
mounted troops in Somaliland had made it desirable to reinforce 
that arm ffithout delay, and the presence of an additional 
battalion upon the lines of communication was deemed 

On the 27th June the newly appointed C'ommauder sailed 
from Bombay, and on that date a telegram was despatched to 
him by the Secretary of State for War, directing him, after 
conferring with General Manning, to report upon the military 
and political situation in SomaUland and subnut proposals 
regarding certain points, which were amplified in a letter 
of the same dat«, to the following effect : — 

I. In confirmation of tho tulegrara deepatohed to you tliia day by the 
Secretary of State for War, I am directed by the Commaiider- in -Chief to 


reiiuost that on assuming the command of tlir; troops in Snmaliland, y'lii 
ivill confer witJi Brig.-Geucral Majmiiig, and, after fully satisfy ini; 
yourself oa to the position of affairs by iiiqiiiiy and inspection, you will 
report by telegram to the Sesrstary o£ State for War oa tbo following 

(I] What posti should be hold for the defence of the ProtBctorate T 

(2) What (oree is needed to jjarriaon theae posts, and what eUoold be 

its distribution I 

(3) TMiHt mobile force is required in addition to the garrisons of the 

posts, and what shoiild be its composition T 
(4} Is it desirable to modify in any way the oom.po3itica of the force 
now in tha ProtEctorata T 

(5) What are your requirements in transport, supplies and stores I 

(6) How Hoou wili the Berbera to Bohotic road be coinpleted tor 

wheeled transport t 

(7) The following alternative railivay schemea have been proposed: — 
^^^ (o) A line from Berbera to Bohotle. 

^^^^^ (&) A line from Berbera to Haigeisa, vid Adadleh, and tJianee on to 

^^^^H (r) A combination of (a) and (b) by a branch line from Adadleh, 
^^^^V vid Burao, to Bohotle. Preliminary reports as to these sohetnes 

^^^^B have been received from the Acting Consul-Guneral of Pro- 

^^^B toctorate and Major Craster, R.E., but His Majesty's Govern- 

^^^r ment deeires to bo in possenflioa of your personal views as to the 

feasibility, relative advsuit^e and cost of the threo lines. 

(8) What steps do you propose to take to' improve the water siipjiUBS 

on your liiL^ of com^niuiicatioa T 
•JO) You should report fully and frankly on the gErnoral situation in 
Somaliland, both poUtical and military, and on the eHect of the 
operations agiunst the Mullah up to the present date. 
L The Commander- in -Chiet further desires to be informed whether 
tbe Reld Intelligence Department in Somaliland is organised on a satis- 
fictory footing, and whether proper provision of scouts, guides and inter- 
preters has been made. If defects exist, you should itate whether you require 
any further start or othei' personnel to remedy them. 

3- Yon should consider and report in what way the foroa, whioh has 
been placed in the field by the Kmpiror of Abyssinia, canassiat your opera- 
tions, eommunicating also your views to Colonel .lochtoct, C,B., who is 
thn senior British officer attached to that force. 

As the Abys"iniBn troops ate understood to be very deficisni: in com- 
missariat arrangements, and to live on the country nhich they traverse, 
tbe Commander-in-Chief is of the opinion that it is not desirable that tb!*y 
should be invited to cnti^r the British Protettorate. 

On the 29th June, of the remfoccements which had arrived 
from Aden, the detachment of the Hampshire Regiment 



was ordered to halt at Sheikh, while the 101st Grenadiers, 
except 50 men sent to Las Diireh, remained at Berbera. This 
course was rendered necessary since the supply of water upon 
the lines of communication was found inadequate for the 
increased number of troops, 
r On the 3rd July, Sir Charles Egerton disembarked at 
' Berbera, and two days later, before he had had an opportunity 
of conferring witii either General Manning or the Political 
Officer, wrote a despatch, iu which he expressed liis views as 
follows : — 

i. Having so roceatly laniled. in the country, it will, 1 tliink, be imder- 
stood that uot having as yet bad tbe advantage o[ personal conference 
with either the Consul-Generni ot witli Brig.-Geaeral Manning, my 
a|)preciatiOB gf the aituatioo is neeeasarily somewhat erode, and ia Lable to 
i^iilueiiuent nLodJficatiun, 

The situatioLi, aa it appears to iiic from the Uin>ted aoiurceH of informa- 
tion at present available, is as followc : — 

The Mullah, whose prestige appears to have been very greatly ahalieii 
by the heavy losses he has sustained iu his encouaters with Plimkett and 
Gougli and the Abyssiaiaiii, has retired into the Wadi Nogal for the double 
purpose of repleniihiog hia store of arms and aimuunition and of gathering 
fresh reeruits to his standard. He and his foUomitg oro reported to be at a 
very low ebb. both in equipment and morale, and. were it only posaible to 
strike a blow at hiui before he lias time to reuover, in all human probability 
hit) whole power would i^oUapse. 

It. Unfortunately, owing to the enfeebled contUtion of the transport 
animals with General Manning, it is impossible to undertake a fresh series 
of operations until the broken-down transport has been rolleved irom 
lierbera by camels from India. Of these about 1,000 have already arrived 
and 1,800 more are expected in tbe course of the next few days. After 
to days on boai'd ship, during the monsoon, these antmaia wi!l naturally 
require a few days' lest to recover, and it is unlikely that the gieat«r portion 
of theiu could leave Berbera much before the 15th uf the month, by which 
time, too, the expected reinforcements wiU hqve arrived front India. 

4. In tbe meantime. General Manning having left a gai'rison of 400 
men at Bobotle, is concentrating the bulk of hia force at Buroo, which is 
indicated as being the best advanced base of operations against the Wa^ 
Nogul. It is probable that those troops, .wme of whom are reported to be 
suffering from scurvy, will need a rest, and it may possibly be fciond necessary 
to reheve some of them altogether. It is improbable, therefore, that Hctive 
operations can be resiuntil very much before the beginning of August, if 
BO soon. However greatly such inaction is to be deplored, it appears to me 
to Ih' lUiBvoidable. I urn, iu tbe uieantime, diret-ting my uttention to the 


better orgmiuution ol the supply aad transport arrangeuienta, tne iniproTe- 
ment of the water supply uu the liueit oF comiuuiucation, and the general 
organization of the furce under my command. 

5. As regards tlie nature and scope of tlie operation)!, they may be 
briefly summed op oa (oHows ; — 

(n) The re-occupation of Daaiot and Mudug. 

(6) The advance of a atrong column from Bm'oo into the Wadi Nogai. 

TbG ceafOna for adopting tbis plan of operations are based ou the Mullah's 
probable course of action On finding himself opposed by a strong column 
from Eurao. Diaheartened as his following U reported to be from their 
heavy losses, it is likely that tho MiUlob would deaire, if possible, to avoid 
dghting, and would eadeavoiu' to escape to the south to Mndug or Ogaden. 
iij anticipating liirn at Damot and Mudug both these lines of retreat 
would be denied to him, and be would find himself hemmed in between 
these forces, with one or other of which he would be compelled to Bght iu 
order to aecnre his retreat. Both the Dainot and Mudug forces would te 
aufficiontly atrong to resist attack, and as I propose to platH them iu tele- 
graphic communication with each other, and to connect the Burao column 
with its base by a field telegraph line, all three columua would be in communi- 
cation, and could work together to the common end, which would be to 
bring the Mullah to bay and compel him to fight. Could we succeed in 
giving him one crnshing defeat there is every reason to believe that his 
own adherents would surrender him, as it is reported they had mode up their 
minds to do ao on the day of Piunbett's light, had not they discovered that 
his forces had exhausted their ammunition. 

6. It will be seen that in the above I have not taken into account the 
possibility of co-operation with the Abyssinian forces. I understand, how- 
ever, that these have been withdrawn to Harror, and, not knowing how far 
any further co-operation on their pfkrt is to bo relied on, I have not take 
its posaibility into consideration, although it would be a most valuable 
factar in the general scheme. 

7. The above plaJlof operations is ba<jed on military oonsiderations only, 
and it is possible, as I have ^aid above, that there may be political considera- 
tiCHis which would nocessitate its modification. I am proceeding to-morrow 
to Sheikh, where I shall be able to discuss the situation with the Commis- 
sioner and Consul-General, but us a mail is leaving Berliera te-day, I have 
thought it better to communicate my personal views on the situation without 

On the 10th July, General Egertou telegraphed from 
Sheikh to the Secretary of State for War : — 

In reply to the nine questions iu your telegrniu. No. -285 (sec page 201), 
I have conferred with Manning and Cordeaux. The effect of operations 
to date is, genejally, that the Mullah's followers have received very Hevoro 
pimiahmont, and, by tlie good fortune of timely heavy Taiixe, the remainder, 
including the Mullah with his immediate surrouudiogs and pergonal pruperty, 


h&TB eBcdped with some loss of prestige to the Nogni Plain from the pre- 
dicament they were in. between Manning uid the AbyBBiniaas. Ha lias been 
reported to be orgoniHing convoys of arma and ammunition from tlie northern 
porta in the Italian Protectorate to join him in the Nogal Plwn. 

In the abxeniM! of detinito inslructiuna regarding the Govemment 
policy, the following alternative flchcmcs are proposed r — 

Should the death or capture of the Mullah be eaaentially necessary, 
I propose he bo not attacked until the diapoaitiona made fltop bia »ci»«s to 
Ubbia, Mudug, Ward»r. When accompUahed, this practically confines 
the sphere of operations to the Italian Protectorate, and I moit strongly 
urge that negotiations be entered into by His Maieat^a Qovemment to 
make tbe Protectorate available for operation? by ouraelves and our allies. 

An Abyssinian occupation in force of Galadi and Wardair would efiect 
the purpose of stopping the Mullah's access to the south and HOutb-west ; 
and for this proposal I urge that the Emperor Menelek be moved to co-operate 
with me to that end, while I proviaion my conununicationa, organise my 
force, and prepare to atrike in the Nogal Pla'n. In order to secure their 
hearty co-operation it is most desirable to suhatdise the Abyftainiaa force 
and meet its requirements in such matters as rations, camel water-tanks. 
On the other hand, should the policy of the Govemment be to exclude the 
Mullah from, the Protectorate, to atrengthen our own [loaition and effeotivBly 
adminiater the aouth portion, I advocate the eraploynient of a mobile 
force in the Nogal Hain and the establishment of connecting posts and 
communicationa from Burao to whatever position may be eventually decided 
upon from which to dominat«^ the valley. 

The Berbera-Bohotle line would be strongly held by poata, combined 
with a mobile force probably located at Burao, I would also link up the 
Nogal position with a line of posts Hargeiaa^Aik-Garrero, or (should the 
present reconnaiaaance not lind auffii^ient water at Oadweina) Burao The 
west of the Protectorate may beconsidsre.ito be covered from outaide attack 
by Abysainians. The north eaat portion ia almost unexplored, but the left 
bank waterahed of the Nogal basin would seem to offer a convenient barrier 
against attack from the north-eaat. 

This second proposal would involve the reorgonizitioo and reinforce- 
mant of the Abysainians' proacnt force and not require the active uo-opora- 
tion of the Italians or Abysainians. Ita probable effect on the Mullah 
would be to drive him south and to relieve the Protectorate tribea of his 
immediate influence. Probably many waverera amongst the tcibea would 
immsdiately join us ; others would follow when convinced that our occupa- 
tion is permanent. When effected, the regular forces might ba gradually 
replaced by locol corpa under British officers, with a backing of one or two 
Indian regiments,* 

♦ In a despatch dated 14th July, 1003, General Egerton amplified his 
vit'ws on these and other points as follows :— 

In my last despatch. No. S.A, 28, dated Berbsca, 5th July, liM)3, I 
submitted for your information a rough appreciation of the situatjon in 


Two days later General Egerton reiterated hia request 
for one company of Sappers and Miners and two Indian 
battalions, and also asked for : — 

A regiment of British cavalry. 

An increase of Somali mounted infantry from 150 to 500 
rifles, besides other nunor requirements. 

the Protectorate, aa it appeared to me, and of tlie mea^iirea which I ooQ- 
Bidered necessary for a auccMaful campaign, having for its miiiQ objective 
the death or capture of the Mullah. 

2. Since writing that despatch I have bad the advantage of coiinullmg 
with General Manning, Captain Cordenux and other officers of local 

3. The conclusions I have arrived at, after con.iultation with these 
officers, aie, that i£ we are to continue to hold the Protectorate there are 
only two couraea open to us, viz., the death or capture of the Mullah, or his 
final expulsion from Britiah territory. 

4. The ftirmer of these two cournea is the moat Fiatisfactory, but iu 
order to render it probable, or oven posiiMe, it would appear to be iieceasary 
to bar his {loasagQ Huuth by prd,etically holding all the wfUs from Obbia 
westwards to Gerlogubi, by either British or Abysfliniau forces, or a combina- 
tion of the two. This ciiiiTBe, however, presents the politifal or diplouiafic 
diflicnlty that may as regai'ds the nse of Italian territory by ouraelves 
or ou.- allies, though apparently there is no let or hindiauce oiTered iu the 
case of the Mullah, who is not hamppred by political conniderations. 

5. It Ims hccn suggeatod to me, however, that if the line Oerlogubi- 
Wardair-Galadi were held in force by tho Abyssinians, and they were 
prepared to strike eastwards in the Obbia direction, it would not be necessary, 
in the llrat instauco, to encroach directly oa the Italian Protectorate. It 
ia believed that for personal reasons the Mullah would not willingly make 
use of the country between Obbia and Mudug aa hia line of retirement, owing 
to the hostility of loeal tribesmen. The necessity of holding the Obbia- 
Mndug line would therefore be limited to the single contingency of positive 
information being received that the Mullah was actvially using that line of 

6. I propose, therefore, that the line to Galadi only should be occupied 
by the Abyssiniana, a aubaidy baing granted to them to ensure their ready 
co-operation. It might also be neceasary for us to supply them with food 
and wator-tin.1 to enable them to keep theficldand to cover long waterless 
tracts between the varioiia wells. > 

7. They might arrange to take such supplies over at cither }Iargeisa or 
Bohotle, preferably the formei, bb not interfering with our own main line of 
oommuni cations. I am convinced that whatever expense this migh^. entail 
would be money well laid out, jirovided that the death or capture uf the 
Mullah ii cousiJiTcd to bt Biisenlial to the pacification of the counfrj'. 

The first of his supplementary demands he later withdrew. 
(See para. 14 of his despatch of 14th July.) 

On the 13th July His Majeaty's Government replied as 
follows to the several proposals which had been received from 
General Egerton. 

}<. 1'liD sEM-ond )<ulieme tdian at the expulsion of the Mulli^ from tlio 
Pratoctorato and proventing his return to it by means of a I'hain of posts 
from HB^KCisa rid Aik-Garrero to some point not jet decided in the Nogtd 
Valla;. Bohotlc would continue to be beld oa at pcoBcnt. 

0. To ensure the suoeesa of this scheme, however, it would be neeeBBsry 
to detach the sections of the DolbahEintii tribmi, who are now the Mullah's 
men, from their allegiance ; and the only way to do this is by a declaration 
ott tho part of the Government of their intuntion to hold and administer the 
coimtry. UnleHS this is done I can Hce no prospect of iinality so long as 
the Mullah remains alive; and oven were he to die it is jirobable that a 
Bucccsaor would arise in liis place, who would continue tluj rpign of terror 
established by Haji Maborapd Abdullah. 

10. All tho local authorities whom I have conaulted are agreed that tho 
Mullah is hated and feared by tho tribesmeu, and that wore we to maJte our 
Proteotorato a reality by espelling Idra and regularly administering tho 
tountry they would willingly take the opportunity of shaking off his yoke, 
and co-operate with us in keepuig him out of tlio Protectorate. 

11. To carry out either oE these two schemes the following measures 
seem to me necessary : — 

(1) The cotistrootion of a toad suitable for wheeled traffic from Berbcra 

to Bohotle. 
(\!) The improvement of the water supply. 
(31 The eirly resumption of hoetilitiaa agiinat the MldUli. 

12. To this ejid I have asked for tlio following additions to the forces 
now at my disposal or r.n route from India, vii. : — 

A company of Sappers and Miners, 
.\ Pioncpr ri'gimeut. 

jV battalion of infantry. I 

Ali from India. 

13. My reasons for asking for these additions an as follows ; — 
Sappers ajul Minem. — The whole of the Sappers and Miners I propos"! 

to employ, in the first instance, on the improvement of the » 
supply along the main Lne of cojnmunioations. and flubaequeatly 
on such lateral line of outposts as it may be deuided to occupy. 
All authorities are agreed that much water is habitually wasted 
by influfficient storage facilities and watering arrangementa : and 
it is holieved, too, that tho exiating supply is capable of very 
great developmeDt. 


They stated that they were opposed to a re-occupation of 
the Mudiig, as lying heyond the British sphere of respoiwihility, 
but wished to be informed whether, in view of the reports of 
General Manning and others, as to the demoralised condition 
of the MuUah's forces and his want of ammunition, it 
would not be possible, with the troopa now in Somaliland 
and those shortly expected, to organise a sufficient force 

— The oKtrn Piimcer regimeat ia tor work o]i thp Rscb^rtv- 

Bohotl» Toad. At present t!iere ia only one Pioneer regiment 

1 construct the whole 201 miles, including tho heai-y work on 

the Sheikh Paaa, It should be iiot»d that luoal labour ia 

practically iinprocuralilp. 

^it/antry. — The additional infantry regiment is required to uomplote 

my proponed organization o£ tho force into two brignde* and to 

provide an adequate general -reBcrve tar evejitiialitieH. It has 

lieea remarked that meat-esting claasos o[ Indian Irooja preserve 

their health and resist eciirry to a, greater extent that arni-mt<at- 

eatoTB, and I would suggest that a regiment should be sent having 

a considerable Mahomedan (and preferably Pathaii) element, aa 

having fewer scru^iles about tlieir food and water Uiiui men of 

other classes. A regiment of the stamp of the 1 st, 2nd. 4th, Sth, 

20th, 24th, 26th, or 29tli Punjab Infantry is what is required. 

It. 1 had also asked for a British eavalry regiment, but have Hinco 

somewhat reluctantly cancelled this request, an I found that uonsi derations 

of supply, transport and water made its expediency somewhat doubtful, 

useful though it would be in other respecta. 

15. Beside my request for mure troops, I regret that I have had to 
mslie heavy additional demands for transport, for remounts for moimted« 
infantryand camel corps, for a cooUccorps,andfor'faeilitiesforunKliipping 
and landing stores at Berbera. 

10. As regards transport, it may bo asHumed that the Somali transport 
with General Manning'e force, is for the present non-existent so far aa its 
carrjing power ia concerned, though unfortunately its capacity for incurring 
eost still cem^s. It may be looked upon as a reserve, on which to draw 
]nt«r on, but a reserve that will not be available for two or three months to 

17- The Director of iSupply and Transpirt eBtiiuatca the number of 
additional camels that wiil be required in order to fidly equip the mobile 
columns with carriage — water and supply camela, and to maintain a rsserva 
of three months' supplies at posts on the linos of communicatjoa, to bo 
about 8,000, of which it ii desiriihio that, if possible, some 2,000 more oamcU ' 
vhouhl be sLip)ilicd from India, It should be iiotrd that tho Iiidiui camel 
It doublo the luod of the SomaU camel, and will work continuously, 

to enable a damagmg blow to be struck at bim in the Nogal 
Plain. To assist in carrying out sucb a movement, the 
Abyasinians were being asked whether they would undertake 
to make an advance in the direction of thu Mudug. 

Ilia Majesty's Government pointed out that they were 
adverse to any considerable increase of force, in face of General 
JUanning's warning regarding water supply difficulties on the 
lines of communication, but that the Viceroy of India was 
being asked to send an additional company of sappers and 

Lastly, General Egerton was desired to bear in mind in 
forming future plans that the Goverrmient did not intend 
to maintain a large permanent garrison in Somaliland, and 
that they wished that the Berbera-Bohotle road should he 
made suitable for wheeled traffic. 

On the 19th July General Egerton repEed that he 

whereas the Somali camel breaks down under continuoua work, which he is 
not, accustomed to. Hid great advantage is that ho docs not require to bo 
watered more than once Li from three to five days. I abauld, thErefore. 

propose t 

; Indian cornels on the hnes of communication, and to 

equip the mobile columns with SomB'i, Arab, or Egyptian camola. 

18. I am endeavouring to arrange for the local purchase of Somali 
camels, and I am addressing jou on tho subject of mule cadres and additional 
camel corps from India. Thu moles ore wanted for work over the Sheikh 
Patis, which is unauited, (or camels, owing to its Hteepnes*. This objection 

'will disappear when the new road is completed in about two months' time. 

19. MiM^laneous requiremcjitg. — My other requirements ore s coolie 
corps and a short tramway, to facilitate unloading of ntores at Berbeco, ami 
alno a atcom laiuich and a couple of lighters for the sa-tatf purpose. Ai 
present we are di'pendent un Somali labour, which is uncpttain and ospensive. 
There is only one narrow jetty, on which all stores and animals have to he 
landed, and. consequently, there is much congestion. What is required is ft 
tramway and trucks to convey all stores to the beach above high-watt<r 
mark, where they could remain until removed to the ordnance and snpply 
dopAta. At present there is great confusion owing to animals having to be 
li ud d oa the j^Hy- 

■20. Should either of iny proposed schemes- be aonctioncd, and should 
our efforts to Secure suillcicnt transport bo succeasful, T think we might 
very well reueiv active nnfrations almut the end of Ainnist or licgiiuiinx o( 

deprecated the movement of a small force into the Nogal 

as inconclusive, and proposed ultimately to operate towards 
Halin and GeiTowei with two columns, based respec- 
tively on Burao and Bohotle. He hoped to be able to advance 
by the end of August, when the Abyssiniana might be in a 
position to co-operate. He withdrew his request that two 
Indian battalions should be added to his force, but requested 
authority to raise 1,000 local mounted levies. This request 
was granted. 

On the 22nd July the Secretary of State for War pointed 
out by telegram to General Egerton that His Majesty's 
Government were unwilling to commit themselves to a costly 
campaign without some assurance that the MuUah'a power 
would thereby be permanently shattered. 

On the 26th July General Egerton replied that he could 
not positively assert that the result of his operations would 
finally dispose of the Mullah, and that, although the plan 
proposed by bim offered the greatest chance of success, 
everything would depend on the subsequent policy of His 
Majesty's Government. The General then went on to urge 
that the Dolbahanta tribe should be given unmistakable 
signs that we intended to remain and support them by means 
of permanent posts. 

On the 31st July the Secretary of State for War replied 
that the Dolbahanta were not among the tribes with whom 
His Majesty's Government had treaties, and to put into effect 
the poKcy proposed by General Egerton would involve 
assurances of protection which would still further add to our 
liability in the direction which had already coat so much. 
The Secretary of State for War then reiterated the view con- 
tained in his telegram of the 22nd instant, pointing out 
the expense which had akeady been incurred and the still 
greater prospective cost of the proposed operations. 

On the 7th August General Egerton, by despatch, and on 
the 9th August by telegram, urged the necessity of assuming 
a protectorate over the Dolbahanta, and again requested 

that auotlier battalion and additional transport miglit 
be sent. 

Tbe following extracts from the despatch explain the 
situation as it presented itself at the time to the General 

Commanding : — 

Raorgnmiu. 4. Oa my arrival I fauad a miied body of troops, many of thotn in a 

lion of the mucli exhausted ooudition, without ftn a4equat« staS, and without trans- 
force, port. It haa been my endeavour to remedy those defoots oa far as poaaible 
tore-equip the troops that were in need of it, and to prepare a plan of opera- 
liona which aUould be effective in eecuring the peace of the Proteotorate. 
Q. Being unaware of the ultimate policy of Govemmeat ia the Pru- 
PoliticiU coo- lectorate, but seeing that a main road from Berbera to Bobotle waa imdur 
jideratioDB at oonsjderation, that a nurvey for a railway was in iirogresa, and that jt was 
effecting plan ^ireaAy in tontcraplation to send out plant for its construction, I oonolnded 
or operatioin. ^^^^^ .j. ^^ ^^^ lateuliou of the Government to eitend ita inflneace and 
adminiatration to the interior of the country. To effect Uiia and to restore 
order, the firat essential is the final expuleiou of the Mullah and the destiuc- 
tioD of bis influence within the Protectorate, and to this end I have framed 
my plan of operations. 

6. The plan of operationa ia briefly to attack the Mullah with two 
columns, to crush those tribes of the Doibabauta, who have willingly and 
tiersistently BsaiaUd him, and to detach those who ivould othcrwisB be coerced 
luto joining him ; which latter object can only be effeuted by assurances of 
future protection. The outwsj'd and visible signs of this would be the 
establishuient of pgata in their midst. 

7. The map which accompanies this 'despatch, on which the Dolbahanta 
country has been marked out in blue poncd, will show what a threatening 
{HKiition they occupy, not only with reference to the Berbera-BohOtte line, 
but also towards the coast. In the hands of the Mullah they are a constant 
meaace to the [leace of the country ; without them the Mullah ia poweileeB. 
The actual death or capture of the Mullah is so very problemalicat that it oaa 
hardly be taken into consideration ; but to drive him out of the Prot«otM'bte 
is comparatively easy, as also it wouid be to keep him out permanently with 
the (^-operation of the Dolbahanta. 

B. It must not he supposed that in advocating the cstabliahment of 
posts 1 in any way contemplate a prolonged mihtary ocuupation. On the 
contrary, 1 consider it alfords the best means of avoiding it. lb is not 
iateoded that these posts should be largely garrisoned with a view to 
offensive, or even defensive, operations. They would rather be the emblems 
of our supremacy, and form rallying places for the tribesmen, in what would 
then be the very remote oontingeni'y of the Mullah ag^ attempting to 
enter the Protectorate. The important points to hold are Gerrowei, las 
Anod and Badwein (marked on the map* with a red ring), these being tlM 
water centres in the traet of couulry known as Kogal, which forme the 
•Map seat with the deapati^h. 


princi)Hj summer grazing groimdof tlie Dolbahauta, and tlie Mullah's base oi 
operations agaiaat the western and north-eaatem tribes of the Protectorate. 
It is well known that the Dolbabanta tribe are adbBTouts of tile Mullah, more 
throii|{h feur of him than BJly attachment to hia person or fanatical religious 
Rpiritu They are tired of hia cruelljes and exautione, and in the belief of 
those who best know the country, vouid speedily troosfBr their aUogianoe 
to u>t. Shouldlhey do eo, we shall have obtained the best pOBsible guarantee 
for the future peace of the Proteotorate. An essential preliminary, however, 
to all negotiations ivith the tribesmen must be the tactical defeat of tlie 
Mullah and disperaal of his foUowiog, or, should ho refuse to tight, his 
exiiulflion from the Protectorate. In these operations the Dolbahaata will bo 
the chief safferers In both life and property, which will give them, it is hoped, 
a, more wholeeoiiie respeel< fur our power. 

9. luow come, to the means whereby I hope to uSeut tbia object, and my Pisn ol' 
reasons for aaldng for more troops and ti"onsport. My inteotiou is to ojiorate operatioiii. 
in two I'olomna, du'ected on Halinand GerroweiresfiectiTely. 1 had at first 
intended to base these columns on liurao and Bohotte, but considerations 
of water and transport have decided me to base them both upon Olesan, 
about half-way between the two, whence they will both follow tho flame route 
as far as Dariali iu the Las Anod, wiiere it will be nnoesaary to eatabliah 
a strong iati'rmi^diatu post. The strength of each column from this point 
should not be less than 300 mounted troops and 1,000 infantry, while the 
iatermediate [>ost should not be less than 400 rifles, making a total of 3,400, 
or, with fiomo sappers and mmers, say 3,500. 

10. Now the total number of troo{iB at my dis])oaal, British and native, Troops 
including SomaU Mounted Infantry, is just U,000 (when brought up to field na-esaary. 
KDTviFD Btrength), From these must be deducted 725 Pioneers otkd 300 
Sappers, who ore employed on special work and are not available for garrisons 
or convoy duties, and say another 200 for sick and inuffeetives and men 
on special employ {only 3 per cant., a very small percentage), giving a total 
of some 1,200 mm, which leaves 4,800 available for all purposes. Of thew 
the oolumns tokc 3,500, leaving only 1 ,300 for garrisona and convoy duties. 
Now Berbero, Bura,a, Garrero and Bobotlo will absorb some SOO of these, 
Hargeisa and Las Dureh 100 more, Upper Sheikli 150, luBiVing only 250 men 
available for the smaller poets and for the movable columns which I propose 
to form at Olesan or Badwuiu to escort supphos from thenoe to Las Ajiod, 
and to form agBnernireaerve. My calculationa regarding the strength of tho 
coliunns are based on the opinions of General Manning, Colonel Ffldkon, and 
other o&icers of recent experience as to the minimum fighting residuum that 
should bo left after establishing connecting posts, &,c., along the line of 
advance, and I do not think they are eitravagant. An additional battalion 
would just give me that margin of troops in hand which would providefor all 
contiageocies. I would further point out that Berbera itself is unfortified 
and not too strongly garrisoned, considering that it is our only base of 
supplies, and would !k! vulnerable to a raid from the Mahmud Oerad country 
(this tribe is an off-shoot of Dolbahanta, and they are adherents of the Mullah), 
e Mullah lidvc- tht hardihood lo alltrnpt it. The onlv stop we have 

|:(8927) ■ o 2 

ion Is tbe emnU post of La? Dureb. 105 luiIeK from BBrbera, with 
iLf garrison of 50 men. I might dispense with the eitra battalion by utilising 
which would of courae stop all work on the 
operations maj last, and this I am prepared 

the Pionpere as a fighting 
road during the the time e 

w come to the moat important question that confranta ne, v 

I. II. I 

that of aupptiea and transport, and in order to make my requiiements under' 
stood, I will briefly reca{iitulate what that supply and transport has to 
undertake. It has to provide for the d^tily requirements of all the troops 
distributed over a line of 201 miles in length, and to maintain one month's 
reserve for th<^ garrisons at each of the posts. It also has to provide carriage 
for the movable column at present covering the lines of communication, and 
over and above all this to place in readiness two months' supplies at an 
advanced base, which ia situated 135 miles from Berbera, for the 3,600 men 
and a large nimiber of followers who will accompany the (columns, and to 
convEj al! military stores and equipment to any required point. It will 
then have to provide oairiago for tho baggage, nm munition and a month's 
supplies with three days' water for men and two for ahiih hIh for that force, 
and keep up a month's reserves for tho whole force including the columns. 
To fulfil all these objects I have at present 2.800 Indian camels and 3,53A 
Homali camels, of which latter half arc sick, and not likely to be available 
for the next three months. So short of carriage am I, that the mere main- 
tenance of the small movable column of 500 men most seriously hampers 
and delays the work of pushing up au[iplies. I may mention that while 
tbe Indian camels carry full loads of 400 lbs. each, the Somali camels at 
present only carry 160 lbs. In addition I have the two Army Service Corps 
companies which are not yet disembarked, and whose practical utility 
imtil the road Is completed is more than doubtful. What I reqiure, and 
most urgently require, ore more camels. Local purchases are proceeding 
but slowly, and the prompt addition of four more organized and equipped 
cornel corps, viz., :3,80O camels (not 3,500 as you stale) from India would 
be of infinite value to me, and by hastening my advance and consequent 
conclusion of operations would be an indii'cct saving to Qovernment. 

12. Ah regards the co-operation of the Abyssiaions. it no doubt would 
'■ be effective, could it be organiaed in tiiue, but of this I am very doubtful. 

The telegram of the 9th August from Sir C. Egerton was 
answered by the Commander-in-Chief on the 13th August, who 
indicated the objections to assuming responsibility over the 
Dolbahanta tribe, the desirabihty of strildng a blow at the 
Mullah while more or lesa disorganized, before he should 
become aware of the intention to do so through more ex- 
tensive preparations, and the impossibility of procuring more 
camels. Lord Roberts further stated his opinion that an 
additional battaHon was unnecessary, and that it seemed 


important to latse at once a corps of selected mounted 

On the 20th August General Egerton replied that he 
trusted that a request which he had made for 1,000 etkas 
and ponies from India would be met, that he proposed to raise 
a corps of mounted Somalis under British officers, and was 
submitting a fresh scheme of operations. 

On the 1-ith September he wrote that the general idea of 
the plan was to confine the Mullah to the north. This would 
(should the Mulkh remain in his present position) be effected by 
a raid of mounted men, who would endeavour to seize Qerrowei 
and Kallis, while the infantry columns, under Manning and 
Fasken respectively, were moving to their respective positions, 
namely Damot and Dariali ; the latter being the advanced 
supply depot. A report of an Abyssinian advance on 
Wardair and Galadi would be spread, and a movable 
column maintained in the Upper Nogal to protect the 
advanced base at Kirrit. 

On the 19th September Gfeneral Egerton further tele- 
graphed : — 

I now nntLoipate that the equipment of force will enable rae to oommenDs 
nctive operationa in the south-east of Frotectoriite between Uth imd 16th 
October. I am making all prepajHtiona to this end, including stock ol 
advanced base, concentration of troops, and, in anticipation of sanction, 
raising tribal horse. To take advantage of the season, and the present 
position of enemy, any delay after 15th October is to be deprecated as liable 
to modify strategical situation and diminish chances of effectual blow 
being struck by tbe force na at present constituted and equipped. 

My objective must necessarily depend on news I receive of the enemy's 

My dispositions will all point to an occupation of Mudng by my 
force in co-operation with Abysninians if tiey advance. 

I also propose to request Senior Kaval Officer at Aden to emphasiio 
this by a demonstration m concert w:th Italian gunboat towards Obbia. 

According to my present plans, the 13th October is the latest date on 
which my actual line of advance must ha disclosed, and in any case I shall 
be able to make considerable capital out of any advance Abyssinians may 
hare ordered or commenced. The Ogaden have offered assistance to the 
south of the Protectorate. This and the Abyssinians in the south-weflt 
will greatly facilitate my eubpcquent operotions. Before advancing from 
Irtwra-Bohotle line I await orders of His Majesty's Government. 


■e to be m 

, And on 23rd September : — 
I find my pUijs and probftble course operationa, if they sj 
fol, aro ranch hampered by iiiovementB being reB(riated to limiW, Pro- 
tectorale. I do ntit undcrstjind that I am to wait development Abyssinian 
movement towarda Gaiadi, whigh will probably take from two to three 
months. MnUah will hear of thoae movements within three or four days 
of their eommeocement. My stral«gical pOHition after contentrfttion, 
combined with naval doroonstration at Obhia, the Biipportof Ogaden in their 
own country, the dry atato Haud, and the Imowledge move- 
ment, will be fluch as to afford renaonablo prospect oblige Mullah to remain 
north, in which case I can deal with bim from Nogal if restriction r^aniiog 
my purauing him into Italian territory be removed. Mullah has recently 
coercoi Mijjarten, near lUig, and is himself reported to be at Adadero, in 
Italian territory. On nceount of the unavoidable delays in stocking base, 
my advance must be delayed kter anticipated in my previoua telegram. 

The Secretary of State for War replied on 3rd October, 
finally sanctiotiing General Egerton's advance in tbe 
following terms : — . . - _ 

Reading your telegrams No. C81 and No. 720 of 19th nnd 23rd September 
teapBotiveiy, with paragraiJi H of your despatch of 7th August, we under- 
stand yoar plan of operalions to bo to move one column baaed On OleSan 
di^tly against Halin, Bstablish posts on the Nogal Valley, and to move 
a second column first eastward from Olesan io the direction of Gerrowei, 
and Bubsequpntly to the south, re-occupying Mudiig. His Majeity's 
Goverament, for reasons explained to you, have greatly desired to avoid 
re-oocu pyitig Miidiig with British forces, and bad hojxKl that the advonno 
of the Abyssinians, ot which, as you say, the Mullah would hear diKctly, 
would prevent his moving sonth. The Commander-in-Chief doubts the 
expediency of re-occupying and aubflequently vacating Mudilg, Wa do 
not, bowevor, desire to confine your action to the limits of the Irtish 
Protectorate, if for military reasons you think It ueuessary to go beyond 
them. Full discretion is left to you as M the date of advance and the 
dirrctinn to bo taken by your columns, bnt any assurances of protection 
to tribes not now under Britixh protection, or any arrongementa (or flsCab- 
lishing permanent posts must be submitted to the (Jovenunont before 
action ia taken. The recommendations ns to the maintenance of the 
Abyssinian toroe have been concurred in. Yoo aro no doubt in direct 
communioation with Colonel Boohfort. 
To wbich General Egerton replied on Ctli October : — 

Your telpgrnm of the 3rd October received and understood. I had 
not intended actual occupation of Mudug with British forces, but by oocnpa- 
tiim of Damot to induce Mullah to believe that Mndug was our objective, 
and asRumins: that he remains in present yiosition, to place a portion of 
my forcBH on interior lines with respect to Miidiig iu order b> indnee him 


I thank ITiB Majesty's Goveramont for the free hand I have bem given 
rpnarding operations outsido Protectorato. InHtriii^tious regarding eatal)- 
lifhmeTit of pcrmunDnt [losta and assiirancB to tribes undi^rutoorL Am ill 
direct cODiiniinioation with Roohfott throngh Aden and Jibuti, but it U 
s'ow and somewhat oncertain. So Ear I have heard nothing of Abysoiniaos' 
moveracntfi or when they will be ready to adYttiice. AU supply will be 
complete at Kirrit by 28th, and the concentration o£ troops will commence 
as soon as carriage ia avaQable after completion of supplies. 

I shall then be in position not only to advance, but, so far an supplies 
are oonceined, to keep the fietd for aoy period (he operatioof may demand. 
HtB Majesty's (lOTemmcnt will understand propoaad plan of operationB 
muntbeof necessity Isrgclymlliicnced byMidlah'i! own movementa ood by 
oonsiderations of water au pjily. 

Having thua briefly explained the correspondence between 
the General Officer Commanding and His Majesty's Govern- 
ment upon the military policy to be adopted in Somaliland, 
the preparations undertaken to carry that policy into effect 
will next be reviewed. 

The difficulty of procuring camel transport in Somahland Xra^ 
has been mentioned before as a factor ruling to a great extent 
any operations in that country. An ample supply, on the 
hired system, had in the early days of General Manning's ex- 
pedition been forthcoming, but some time before his arrival 
at Bohotle, on the approach of the hot weather, the nomad 
tribes of the Protectorate had begun their periodical move 
from the coast to the grazing grounds in the interior, and in 
conflequence were unwilling any longer to ply for hire. The 
deficiency had to some extent been met by sending 700 Arab 
camels from Aden, and Hia Majesty's Government had made 
inquiries whether help in this respect could be obtained from 
Egypt ; but there, however, from causes somewhat analogous 
to those existing in Somaiilaiid, the available supply promised 
to be both insufficient and costly. In view, therefore, of the 
urgent necessity of placing the field force on a mobile footing, 
and famishing with supplies the various posts on the lines of 
communication, it was decided to make a trial of the Indian 
camel, which, onhke his representative in Somahland, was 
not deemed capable of working several days without water. 
BWas beheved, however, that the wells upon the lines of 


communication would suffice for tis needs, and, as previously 
stated, 2,800 were ordered from India before General Egerton 
arrived to assume command. It was further decided 
to send two Army Service Corps companies, with 80 buck 
wagons, from South Africa. These reached Berbera on the 
31st July, and after some delay, necessary for carrying out 
road improvements, were brought into use, 

Aiter General Egerton had made a close examination 
of the transport requirements necessary to carry out his plan 
of operations, he urged that 100 camel-carts might be sent from 
Aden and India, and in addition four Silladar Camel Corps* 
These carts were despatched to Berbera, but the Indian Govern- 
ment, having already provided five out of nine camel corps, 
were unable to meet that demand. Thereupon, aa before 
mentioned, General Egerton suggested that he should he 
furnished with 1,000 ekkas* and poniea from the Punjab 
and North-west Provinces of India, as well as 1,000 hired 
camels from that country. These camels reached Berbera 
by the 13th and the ekkas and ponies by the 28th October, 
By the beginning of that month, the Director of Supply and 
Transport was able to report that since the 4th July, 
2,362 Somali and Arab and 338 Abyssinian camels had 
been purchased ; that these and the balance left from 
Manning's operations had been formed into three Somali 
and one Arab camel corps and that three more camel corps 
were being raised. The numbers purchased rose steadily 
during November, and by the Slst of that month reached 
6,384, when seven came! corps were actually in working order, 
and an eighth in course of organization. 

No steps were omitted by His Majesty's Government to 
provide the field force with ample transport, but the 
exigencies of the water supply made impracticable such 
devices as the mono-rail system or traction engines or motor 
lorries, all of which came under consideration. 

The Base at Berbera was, however, equipped with a tram- 
way and rolling stock, while a coolie corps of 500 men was 
sent from India, and another of 200 from Aden. 

The survey of a projected railway line direct from Berbera 
to Bohotle had been undertaken some time previous to 
General Egerton's arrival in Somaliland, and when the scheme 
for connecting Berbera and Harrar by rail was taken up by the 
Foreign Office the officer conducting the survey was directed 
to carry out an examination of a possible branch line 
to Bohotle by Adadleh, so aa to avoid the more difficult 

of this railway 
led out in time to 
under General 

route by the Sheikh Pass. The conatructio 
couid not in any case have been carrie 
be of assistance to the military operatio 

AjB the normal supply of water was likely to prove 
inadequate for the large increase of troops and transport, 
water supply plant was shipped from England and was 
installed with satisfactory results at the various posts on the 
line of communication. 

Aa already stated, General Egerton reached Berbera Orpinin 
on the 3rd July, and on the 14th orders providing for a distribu- potos. 
tion of the field force into two brigades, with divisional nnd 
line of communication troops, were issued by him* : — 

DivisioNAi, Troops, 

1st Corps. 

Uoanted Troops British Mounted Infantry, Nos. 1, 

(Lt.-Col. P. A. King's Royal Rifle Corps, 2 and 3 

K Q n n a , V.C., Companies t {attached to 2nd 

D.8.O., 2Ist Lan- Brigade). Somali Mounted Infantry, 

cers). two companies (attached to 1st 

Brigade ). 

* For strength of the tcri'e whon reorganized, me Chapter IX Field 

t Two companies Britiah Mounted Infaatry arrived firoro RmnbgLy oa 
1.1tU July. 

2nd Corps. 

Mounted Troops Indian Mounted Infantry, Nos, 1 and 
(continued) 2 Companies* (attached to 2nd 

Bikanir Camel Corps (attached to 
2nd Brigade). 

. . One sectionf 28th Mountain Battery 

(attached to lines of commiuiica- 

.. Nos. 17 and 19 Companiest Sappers 

and Miners (attached to lines of 

c ommunication ) . 

Ilnfantiy .. ., 107th Pioneers (attached to lines of 


1«( Brigade Headquarters, Burao. 

(Brig. -General W, H. Manning, CB., Indian Army.) 

27th Punjabis.g 

1st, 2nd, and detachments of the 3rd and 5th Battalions. 

King's African Rifles. 

Indian Contingent, British Cfentral Africa. 

2nd Brigade Headquarters, Lower Sheikh. 

(Brig.-General C. G. M, Fasken, Indian Army.) 
Ist Battalion Hampshire Regiment (300 men). 
62nd Sikhs. 

* Two oomponteB Indian Mounted Infantry aniTed frcim Bombay oi 
13th July. 

t This section wfta auhspqiieiitly, on Mttjor-Oener«l Egerton'a reoom 

mendation, provided with oomolH uid camel equipment, and anued nit 

o 7-pr., B.M.K guna of 200 lb. weight (see Chapter XIII). 

X Arrived from Aden on 1 1th AugnaL 

5'Arrived from Bombay on 0th July. 


I Lines of Communication {Berbsra to Bokotle). 
(Colonel J. C. Swanii, Indian Army.) 
'elegraph Section, Royal Engiueers,* 
01st Grenadiers. 

bth Battalion, King's African Rifles, 
As the Mullah was still reported to be near Halin, with his 
haroun at Gmnbum, some 20 mUea east of Laa Anod, orders 
were given for a movable column from the 1st Brigade, 
numbering about 450 men.f to be placed under the 
command of Lieut. -Colonel A. Wallace, 27th Punjabis, 
in the neighbourhood of Wiidamago, so aa to protect from 
raiding parties, the lines of communication between, Bohotle 
and Burao. The reconnaissances effected by this force con- 
firmed the reports of the absence of any of the Mullah's 
karias west of Eil Dab, and in consequence it became possible 
to reduce the garrisons upon the lines of eommunicatiou 
south and east of Burao, thereby minimising the strain upon 
the supply and transport department, and at the same time 
increasing the number of men available for carrying out road 
improvements nearer Berbera. 

This redistribution enabled stores to he collected at the 
advanced base, at Kirrit, while great progress was made in the 
strengthening of posts on the commmiications, and on the 
road from Berbera over the Sheikh pass.f 

" Aiinnniited from England on ISth August. 

ti.R. — In additica to the troops ehonn above drafts were tent from 
India to CQmileto the lOlst Grenadiers, the I07th Pioneera and tlie Blknnir 
raniol t'or] B, and a Field Park, Rojal Engineers was also sent. 

t One tniniiauy Britisb Mounted Infantry, 30 Somali Mounted Infantry, 
4 Gom[iajiies '27tli Punjab Infantry, 20 (to be raised to 30) lilaloa ; 15 days' 
aupplies to be maintEuned by column, transport for &vj days' supplias and 
two days' water to be kept with column, 

i It may l)e briefly stated tbat the months of July, Angust, September 
and October were entirely taken up with the work of organiiation of the field 
force, landing stores aad supplies, the purchase of transport and Temoonte, 
Mirin g native levies, making roads, developing the water aoppiy and storing 
g. Rid pushing up sii|)plinH to the advanced base at Kirrit, ISOmUes from 

On the 13tli July, General Egerton liad been infonued 
that co-operatioQ by the Abyssinians was in course of 
arrangement with the Emperor Menelek, and, in order that 
full advantage of it might be taken. Colonel A- N. Rochfort, 
R.A., was ordered to proceed to Berbera to confer with him. 
In the meantime, as the Abyssinian contingent most 
necessarily ent«r Italian Somaliland in order to reach the 
Mudug, the consent of the Italian Government was asked 
for and given, on condition that the force should be 
accompanied by their representative and withdraw to its own 
borders on conclusion of the operations. 

On the 21st August, after conferring with Rochfort, 
General Egerton telegraphed that the timely co-operatioii 
of the Abyasinians appeared doubtful, but that, if it 
was considered desirable, he recommended that all necessary 
arrangements should be left in the hands of Ras Makonnenin 
return for a subsidy, and that the only supply in kind should 
consist of 1,000 wat«r tanlra, the necessity for which had 
already been pointed out by Colonel Rochfort. 

His Majesty's Government, who, through the Britisli 
Agent at Adis Ababa had been informed that a fresh con- 
tingent would be furnished in order to take part in the coming 
operations, decided to reimburse the Emperor Meuelek on 
account of the expense to which he would be put in mobilizing 
the force. A sum of 15,000/. was therefore remitted to hint 
and his consent obtained for seven other officers to accom- 
pany Rochfort, viz. : — two pohtical officers, one officer 

Berbera. This lost was a, tedious process, as, owing to the deficiency cl 
trsllsport, it was not for a long white that the balances mode bcsdwaj ags^'t 
thp daily conBumption, notwithstanding the line ot commiinieatioina from 
Shrikli to Bohotle having been denuded of every man that could prudeatlf 
be willidraun. It was not until the end of October that the colleclion of 
supplies had sufficiently far advanced to justify any forward movtment. Tliei 
onlymobilisid force between Berbera and Bohotle at this period was B small 
luovftblo column of mounted infantry and infantry, which was placfl 
tirstly at Wadamago and aubeecjuently at EilDabto cover tbeadv-ancid btin 
at Kirrit. (Extract from General Egerton'a despatch of 5th April, IB04.) 


interpreter, one Royal Engineer Officer, and three medical 
officers. In addition to the subsidy, 1,030 tanks, 5,000 
water bottles, several pumps and other water appliances were 
provided, in order that arcang^msnts might be made for 
obtaining, storing and tranaporting water before crossing 
the considerable stretches of waterless country which 
would have to be passed over on the southward march, 
Despite the efforts of Bochfort, and of the British 
agent at the Abyssinian capital, the progiesa in mobilization 
was slower than anticipated, the delay being partly due 
to the prevalence of high prices for transport camels and 
partly to the jealousy which existed between the Emperor 
Menelek and Raa Makonnen. On the 1st December, 
therefore, in order to stimulate the latter to greater efforts, 
authority was telegraphed to Rochfort that he was at liberty 
to expend a sum o£ 7,500i. in payment by results, and on the 
3rd of that month, he was able to report that the contingent 
had, on that day, marched south from Babili {see page 251). 

On the 22nd September General Egerton received 
intimation that the Emperor Menelel; had been asked to co- 
operate by sending a force to occupy Walwal, Wardair, and 
Galadi. He had gathered from Rochfort that he was not 
sanguine about the AbyBsinians being able to teach Galadi 
much before Christmas, and as he was then hoping that the 
British force would be able to advance early in October, 
he did not set much count on their assistance. When, how- 
ever, the General realised that there was no chance of his own 
advance taking place before the end of October at the 
earliest, and being convinced of the necessity of a stop being 
placed in the south if any decisive result was to be expected 
from the campaign, he determined to establish a strong post at 
Galadi, with the double object of denying the wells there to 
the Mullah, and of encouraging the Abyssinians to cross the 
waterless tract of 80 miles between Wardair and Galadi 
which it was certain they would never attempt if there were 

Ldaceer of finding the wells occupied by the Dervishes. 

TtieiB was also the hope that our oocupation of Galadi would 
encourage Ali Yusuf, the Saltan of Obbia, to occupy the 
Galkayu welJa. 
" On the 26th October,* therefore, ordets were issued tor 

. attached ftom 

•Extract Sroro. Operation Orders: — 
Upper Bheilch, 26iA Oetoba; 1903.— 

14. — 1. When the garrisons of the lines of conunimication have bAMi 
posted as in Operation Orders 10, 11, and 12, the remainder of the foice 
will coQoenttate by 8th NoiFember as follows ; — 
At Bohotle. — lal Brigade : — 

lat King's African BilleB, 
2Dd King's African Rifles. 
3rd King's Africiui Rifles. 
No. 6 Company, Somali Mounted Infantry. 

mounted troops. 
King'a Afrioan Rifles, Mountain Battery, 2 guns, attached froru 

diyiaiooal troops. 
Detftohment No. I Company, 3rd Sappers and Minora, ailscliiil 
from diyit^onal troops. 
At Garrero ! — 

No. 4 Company, Somali Moiinti'd Infantry, of mountpd troopa. 
Al Wadamago. — 'Znd Brigade : — 

let Hants, 3 companies. 
52nd Sikhs. 

27th Punjaliis, 5 romymiiieB. 
Movaile Column. 

Qommandii^, Liont-Golonel Wallace, 37th Punjiibis, StsS 

Officer to bo appointed from column. 
27th Pnnjabi.'*, 3 companies. 
107th Pioneers, 2 companies. 
At Kirrit :— 

Headquarter staff. 

Section, 2Sth Mountain Uattory, attached let Brigade. 
No 19 Company, 3rd Sappers and Miners (half company al & 
Bab) atUched to lat BHgode. 
At Oleaan (with detajihment at Dabr Ualol). — Mimnltd Troi/pt ; — 
No. I Corps, Mounted Infantry (less 4 and S companies, SomaU 

Mounted Infantry]. 
No. II Corps, MoDiit«d Infantry, 

Manning's Brigade to concentrate at Bohotle, and the 2nd 
Brigade at £il Dab and Wadamago. A naval demoast ration 
was arranged foe at Obbia, and armi were issaed by the 
Italian authorities to Ah Yusuf to strengthen his occupation 
ol Galkayu (see Chapter VII). At the eame time, secret 

At Her.—iloanied Troapa .■— 

No. m Corps. Tribal Horee. 
No. IV Corps, Tribal Horse. 

2. Comtnandt. — Nos. HI and IV. Corps, Tribal Horse, will come 
undnr the oommind o£ Officer Commaading Mounted Troopa witii uSect 
from 5tli November. 

3. Momiae.nts. — Will lie carrind out on Boalsa of bf^gago and pro- 
grammeH notified to General Officera Commanding and OIBcbch Commanding 
Mounted Troopa and Tribal Horne. 

4. Wattt. — Water tanks will bo snpplied by the Director, Supply 
and Transport, at Blkudalanleb, for troops moving thence to Kirrit and 

Upper Sheikh, 31ri Oetober, Ii>03. 

16.— I. In ooQtinnation of OpiTatioa Order Nu, \i. the lat Briyadi: 
at Bohotle will be reinforted aa folluiva ; — 
I B y 8«t November.— 

^^^^^L (a) To rejoin No. I Corps Mounted Infantry :^ 
^^^^H Half Company British Mounted Infantry from Eil Dab. 
^^^^^ No. 4 Company Somali Mounted Infantry from Qarrero. 
^^^^^) Officer Commanding Mounted Troops and Staff. 

The reKt of No I Corps, Mounted Infantry (1 company Somali 
Mountisd Infantry to be detailed to to-inforce the Bohotle 
Telegraph section, with 100 miles of cable. 
1 Section, No. 17 Company, 3rd {tappers and miner.''. 

2. No. 11 Corps, Mounted Infantry, will proceed vifi Kirrit, to re- 
inforce the Bohotle garrison, arriving there 10th November. 

3. The General OOicet' Commanding and Staff, 2Dd Brigade, will 
accompany the 1st Hants to Wadamagu, 

4. The following alteration will be made in the disposition of the 
2Qd Brigade :— 

lat Hanta, 3 companies, to Kil Dab on 9th November. 
52nd Sikhs at Lower Sheikh 1 To nt 

Section, 28th Mountain Battery at Upper > , ' 

,rr^., , ""^ I further orders. 

Sheikh J 

5. No. IV Corps, Tribal Horse, will eoncentrate at Gubalu instead 
of »t Bar. 

orden were ixeued to Manning for the march to Oaladi, ftll the 
details of which, as regards troops, transport, water, &e., had 
been carefuJIy worked out at headquarters, so that there should 

fl. Command* : — 

(a) Tba General OfGc«r Commioding Ut Brigade will dsUil 
Lieul.-Oalonel A. 8. Cobbe, X.C, D.aO., Ist King's Afiicu 
Rlfleii, to commtttid the Bohotle garrisoD. From d&te of 
his taking over the duties, this irill fonn a detached comrnud 
under the direct ordcn of the General Officer ConunaodiDg. 
Somali Field Force .• 

(6) The movoblo column will be almrhpd to the 2nd Brigade. 

(«) NoH. in and IV Corps, Tribal Hotsp, will be attachfd I" 
Iho 2nd Brigade with effect from 6th Soreniber. 

7 aupjiiu.— 

(a) No. II Corps. Mounted Infantry, will be rationed up lo 

30th NOTcmbor from Klrrit. 
(6) The lit Hantc will be rationed up to 30th November from 
t/ppw SAwH. 3lrf Otiober, 1803. 

JO,_l, The iBt Brigade will march from Bohotle on lltPi Xovcniher, 
ordT to oBtahliah a post at Gal ad i. 
•i. Tmopi.— 

(a) General Officer Connaanding, ist Brigade and Slafl. 

nUicor Commanding. Mounted Troopa and Staff. 

X'o. 1 Corps, Mounted Infantry (leas 1 company, Somali Mountcii 

Infantry, with Bohotle garrison). 
No, IT Company, 3rd Sappora and Miners, 2 sections. 
King'n African Rifles, Mountain Battery, 2 guns. 
Ut King's African Rifles. 
Qnd King's African Rifles. 
;lrd King's African Rifles, 

'(6) To be detailed for garrison of Galadi : — 

Commanding, BrBvet Major J. R. M. Matsb, 

LincolaBhiro Regiment. 
Staff Officer, from the garrison. 
Brilish Mounted Infantry, 1 company. 
King's African Rifles, Momitain Battery. 2 guns, 
tiomali Mounted Infantry, 1 section (25 rifles). 
King's African Bifles, 250 rifles and 2 manms. 

Command anil 
componitioa ut 
diKirotion of 
Q.O.C., Ist 


e.A.,of iT.ii.oa 

" Sniioqucntly L'.eut.-Co'ouel Cobbe b 
a^neral Uanuiiis and Major Biooke was left 

ba no (lelay, auil uo ohaiioe of the deatiaatiun. of the brigade 
leaking out prematurely. So carefully waa the secret kept, 
that even the troopa themselves were ignorant ot their destina- 
tion, while the rest of the force knew nothing of it nntil it was 
an accompHshed fact. 

Manning's orders were to march to Galadi, establish there 
a strong fortified post, anA, having done so, to rptnrn with all 
despatch to Bohotlc. 

The concentrations ordered (with the exception that the 
section, No. 28 Mountain Battery, and the 52nd Sikhs, had 
been directed to stand fast tor the present, so aa to minimise 
supply difEculticH) were completed on the Uth November, 
the 1st Brigade being at Bohotle and the 2nd at Ed Dab and 

(c) The Officer Commanding, Bohotle, will arrange for an eaeort 
for the empty tranaport, retiirniag from the third stage. 

3. Sliig.— Commander Cnroy, Royal NilTy, Proviot SrarsliBl. will 
aceom.pany 1st Brigade. 

4. Amtnunitioa. — ■( 

(o) Por the garrison :— 

Per rifle, Kegukra 500 rounds. 

L Pet rifle, Dlalos 100 „ 

(() For the remainder of the Brigade : — 

Per rifle, Regialarfl 400 n 

Per rifle, Haloa 100 

Per maxim 10,400 


S. Supplite. — For men and animals :■ — 

(a) For the Qaladi garrison, till lat January, 1004. 

(6) For the remainder of the Brigade, 20 days from 1 1th November. 
0. Water.— 

(n) Tor six days at 1 gallon per i 
other than oamcla. 

(6) Watei equipment to be left at Gakdi 
days' water for men. 

and 2 gallons per animal, 
carry at least two 

7. TraMpori.— 

(a) Operation scale, e:(cept that officers will take one servant 
and one riding animal only, Boldien being made available 
batmen, or grooma, if neooa-iary. 


Wadamago wUli the headquartora of tliu brigade at the latter 
place. On the 11th November, Manning advanced with the 
following force : — 

General OfScec Commanding Ist Brigade and Staff. 

Headquarters, mounted troops and Staff. 

Nob. 1, 2 and 3 Companies, British Mounted Infantry. 

One company, Somali Mounted Infantry. 

Two guns. King's African Rifles, Mountain Batterj-. 

1st, 2nd and 3rd Battalions, King's African Rifles. 

68 Illalos (native scouta). 

Galadi was reached on the 15th November without opposi- 
tion, but after a most trying march, owing to the great heat, 
the density of the bush, the scanty allowance of water, which 

(6) I«t and 2nd linu tiunsport, as in Operation Standing Ordtrs, 
No. 29. 

Post ammunition and Snpply Colunm— Oamela. 
(c) Empty transport and water tsnka to be returned to Bolwile 
front third stage. 
At diBoretion of f (rf) To bo left with Galadi garrison : — 

G.O.C., Ist First and second line transport to carry M 

Brigade (1175 J days' supplies and aopplemtinted by camelB to 

8.A., dated I carry post ammunitiou, and the water eqvp- 

17JI.03.) t Jnent in !>ara- 6. 

8. Medial. — Medical arrangements will Lo for the same periods f 

Upper Sheiiih, 30tA November, 1903. 
23.— Reference Operation Order, No. 16. 

1. Diatribvlion.—K)a return of the Ist Brigade the tioopa at Bulw''° 
will be distributed as foUowH : — 

At Bohotle.— 

Iflt Brigade and Nub. 4 and 5 Conipaniee, Somali Mount™ 
Infantry, attached from Mounted Troops. 
At Wadamago, Ain Abo. Eil Dab, and Oleeon. — 
Headquarterfl, Mounted Troopa. 

No. 1 Corps, Mounted Infantry (less Nob. 4 and 6 CompMi"'' 
Somali Slomited Infantry) and No. 2 Corps, Mounted InfanU)'' 

2. MoBenmds. — The Mounted Troopa to be in position by I'"' 
1st Decembei. 

3. jSujJjrfie*.— The Mounted Itoopa will draw supplies from liio Jirigjul" 
Supply and Transpiirt Offiisr, 2nd Brigade, 

Iiad to bo larried fot both men and animals, and liie almost 
total absence of grazing.* 

While this movement was in progress orders had also been 
given for the occupation of Damot, but it was found this could 
not be effected owing to the deficiency of water. Damot 
was, however, aeveral times reconnoitred by mounted men, so 
aa to keep oar troops en evidence in that direction, as it, to a 
certain extent, covered Manning's exposed flank. 

Manning remained three days at Galadi, where a strong 
post was established. Dudub was reconnoitred by the 
mounted troops, and found clear of the enemy. Our Illalos 
also recoimoitred Galkayu, where a small post of Ali Ytiauf's 
men was found. Having watered his camels and refilled his 
water tins, Manning commenced his return march on the 

■Estrai-t froiu Staff Diary, 1st Brigade: ; — 

liith November. — At daybreak lollowinfT ttoops undBc Ci>loiiel Kciiriii 
wPrD ordered to puab on and occupy the wella at Ualadi : — 

British Mounted lufuntry 'Ml 

^^M Iith SoniiLh Mounted Infantry, oua section S(t 
^^ Illalos 41) 

Following ioatnictiona elao given lo Colonel Kenna : — 

■ 1. To send Liitk information to meet tlie column regarding 
occupation of Galadi. 
2. To despatch on tbo morning of the 16th instant a patrol of 
50 SoniBll Slouol^d lufantry and 20 Ulalua, in direotioii of 
Dudub, to search fur tracks and signs of the enemy. 
The cohmin marched at 5,25 a.m., and raid-day camp was formed in 
the Taloli Plain at 10.18 a.ji. The match waa resumed at 3 p.u. For 
the first part the country was fairly open, then dense bush and elony gt«und 
was paased. 

Coloimi halted for the night at camp SG miles south of Bohotle, at 

At 8.25 P.M. a letter from Colonel Kenna was received, reporting 
occupation of Galadi at 1 p.m. to-day. 

He reported that he has seen no signs of enemy or stock en rovie or 
of any at Yegalio oc Galadi. Galadi was deserted, aave for two wandering 
(8927) P 2 


iiftcriioon of the i8th November, Icavbig tte following garrisun 
with rations up to the end of the year in Qaladi : — 

Commanding— Brevet Major J. R. M. Marsh, Lincolnshire 

Ko. 2 Company, British Moiuited Infantry. 

25 rifles, SomaH Mounted Infantry. 

Two gUDs, King's African Rifles, Mountain Battery. 

250 rifles, King's African Rifles. 

25 Dlalos (native scouts). 

Manning returned to Bohotle on the 2ith November. On 
the way, his mounted troops fell in with a raiding party oi 
the Mullah returning to the Haroun with hve-stock captured 
from the Ogaden. A skirmish ensued between the Somali 

OgadenB who were taken prieoaors. Tliose mea stated thej had left tha 
Mullah three niontha' ago in the Nogal, that the nearest Somali karias 
are two days' march south and south-west of Galadi, and these water ^t 
Walwal and Wardair ; thattbeMullah and his Haroun are north of Haud ; 
that thera is no one at Dudub, and Yuauf Ali'a Illalos hold Galkayu. 

Colonel Kenna also reports that the shallow or sweet water Wfllla 
appear dry, and that some of the others appear to have wat«r in them, 
but the water is very foul. He further reports the country tor several 
miles round Galadi is as dry as a bone, and grazing animals will be very 
difficult, if possible ; he reports that the fort is intact, and neither Galadi 
or Yegallo appear to have been visited since our departure last Juno. 

16th November. — Column left camp at 5.20, and at oneo came oc 
to tho stony gromid which surrounds Yegallo. 

Yegallo was reatbed at 8.45 a.m. Old packing eases were lying 
about and shelter points standing as apparently we had left it in June last- 
There was no water in the wells and no graiiog. 

Betwfien Yegallo and Galadi the going mau very bad, the gcound 
being strewn with stones and large bouldcra, and the hush was very thick. 
Galadi was reached in the evening, and a zariba viae formed on tbc 
south aide of the well area. 

As reported by Colonel Kenna, the fort was intact, and had the appear 
aacc of not having been visited sinco wo Isst occupied it. The heat wi» 
intense, and tho glare from tho white ground blinding. The fort ia squaw- 
ahnped, with sides about 70 yards, with massive stono walls and stone head 
cover. It has a double zariba. 

On inapeoting tho fort in the evening it was decided to build on ti 
t«o zaribas for the British Mounted Infantry ponies and SomaU Mounted 
Infantry aud transjujtt ; also io erect a barbed wire fencing roimd the tort. 


Mounted Infantry and the Mullah's party. The British 
Mounted Infantry moved to the sound of the firing, on whioh 
the Mullah's men made off, leaving some four or five dead on 
the ground. Owing to the density of the bush it was impossible 
to follow them up, but 38;j camels and a large quantity ot 
sheep and goata fell into our hands. The camels were subse- 
quently returned to the sections of the Ogaden from which 
they had been taken. 

As an additional measure of precaution, and in order to N 
induce an impression that we were landing a force at Obbia o 
simultaneouF.Iy with our occupation of Galadi, General 
Egerton arranged with the Senior Naval Officer, and through 
him with the Senior Naval Officer, Italian Navy, for a com- 
bined naval demonstration at Obbia. This took place between 
the 14th and 18th November, when Commander Pears, R.N., 
appeared before Obbia with H.M. ships "Perseus," "Por- 
poise " and " Merlin," and H.I.M. ship " Galileo." The 
Sultan showed himself very friendly disposed and anxious to 
assist to the best of hia power, though he pleaded that he had 
not sufficient rifles to occupy Galkayn. He was afterwards 
given arms for this purpose, and at Captain Pears' suggestion, 
he was also supplied with a monthly ration of rice and dates 
conditionally on his continuing to hold the Galkayu wells. 
This the Sultan effected without opposition on the 12th 

Early in September offejs had been made by some Ogaden u 
headmen who had come into Burao to assist the British by ^ 
raids, conducted on tribal methods, as soon as active opera- 
tions had begun. The offer was accepted after reference 
to TTi.q Majesty's Government and to the Government of 
Abyssinia, the latter, under whose suzerainty the Ogaden 
tribes nominally are,, but stipulating that no arms 
should be issued to them. Having been assured on this 
point. Captain R. G. Mimn, 3Gth Sikhs, was deputed to pro- 
ceed to the Ogaden country in order to give the movement 
ita proper direction, and to prevent raids being conducted 

against friernUy tribes. He was accompanied by a small armed 
escort, and was subsequently joined by Lieutenant I. S, C. 
Rose, King's Royal Rifles, as an assistant. Although Muim, 
who seems to have acted with great tact and judgment, could 
never persuade these people, in spite of their promises, tfl 
attack any of the Mullah's raiding parties, his presence Lad a 
distinctly deterring effect on the latter, and gave confidence to 
the tribesmen in his immediate neighbourhood. He remabed 
with them until the middle of December, when, finding it 
hopeless to get them to do anything likely to be of use, he left 
them, rejoining headquarters at Eil Dab on the 8tb February. 
His departure was the signal for a general migration westward 
of the people among whom he had been living, showing 
confidence his presence had given them. Lieutenant R086 
subsequently joined Colonel Rochfort with the Abyssinians. 
■ropr.scil In-order to complete the barrier against a southern move- 

irrlig'"" inent of the Mullah,* General Egerton telegraphed on the 
ITth December requesting that, when the naval demonstra- 
tion against Illig, which formed part of his plan, took place,, 
a garrison, from Aden, of 350 rifles with one month's provisions 

" During all this time the Mullnli and tiie majority of his karias (trilMji 
encampments) had remained in. the Eastern Nogal, in the area known a 
Kobo, roughly comprised in the triangle Halin, Gerrowei, Kallis. IDt 
strategical position hero was a very strong one. It was secure flora aaf 
possible danger of siuprieE!, and he nommanded the main toutes to the wnitb^' 
there being notliing to prevent him moving to the Mndng, to the Hawiyk. 
or to Itio Webi Shebeli, if the rains gave him a favourable opportun 
'if croBsing the Maud, while his seizure of the Italian port of Illig gftf^ 
liim H footing on the coasts which would enable him to obtain supplies ai 
I>OKBibly, ann.8 and ammunition. Moreover, an advance against 
the west left the option of fighting entirely in bis own hands. It was obvious, 
therefore, that om' stra(j?gy mliat be directed to keeping him up north, ^thor 
hy occupying, or inducing him to behove we hod occupied, the lina of wi 
vbicb stretch aurose the Southern Haud from Oerlogubi on (he Abyssini 
liorder to Obbia on the sea, or by getting the Sultan of Obbia and ther 
Abyssiniana to occupy them in our interests. As a matter of fact, ■ 
actually happened was a compromise between these alternalivps. whieh, 
however, Bueceeded almost beyond espcitnlinii. [Extract [mm General, 
Ejerton's dpspofeh of nth April, IStM.* 

miglit be sent to occupy that place temporarily. Illig, whicli 
lies near the mouth of the Wadi Nogal and some 200 milea 
up the coast from Obbia, was reported to be held by the 
Mullah's followers, and although it seemed possible that ho 
might retire thither when our force advanced, the project 
of placing a garrison there had to be renounced on account 
of the impTacticability of landing them at a time of year 
when the north-east Monsoon is at its height. 

While the net was being thus gradually drawn round the M 
Mullah, he, with his Haroun and the karias still remained in "' 
the Northern Haud, whither, as already described, owii^ to 
the heavy rainfall of the previous June, he had been enabled to 
proceed. Hut the autumn rains had failed, leaving many of the 
wells dry and grazing scarce, and to recro.?s the Southern Haud, 
except in small and mobile parties, was now impossible. This 
circumstance favoured the British Commander, as it prac- 
tically relegated the Mnllah and his hordes to the North and 
gave the Abyssinian force time to block the route which 
he would most probably follow should he eventually fly to the 

These precautionary measures having been described, it p 
ia necessary to resume the history of the preparations for 
advance of the force destined to deal directly with the 

In order to open up more rapid comnmnication with the 
Abyssinians, the telegraph line was extended from Ecrbera 
to Hargeisa, and a branch line constructed from Kirrit to Eil 
Dab, a point in the Nogal Plain to which the movable column 
had moved on the 8th October. 

The raisii^ and organization of the Tribal Horse into two 
corps, the 3rd and 4th, had been completed early in November, 
when they had come under the orders of the Officer Command- 
ing Motmted Troops. In addition, a levy of 280 Miisa Abukr 
was raised by the Consul- General and placed under the com- 
mand of Brevet Lieut. -Colonel C. J. Melliss, V.C., 101st 
Grenadiers. .A. certain number of rifles were also distributed 


to this tribe, whicli hail suffered sev(irely at the hands of tlie 
Mullah'a raiding parties. 

The general advance waa not yet, however, to begin, 
Consequent on the diversion of such a large amount of trans- 
port to Galadi, and to the fact that the General had under- 
taken to supply the Abyssinians on arrival there with a 
month's grain, which was now being pushed up the line, the 
work of stocking the advanced base waa falling somewhat in 
arrears, the demands temporarily exceeding the supply, 
There was, therefore, an imavoidable delay before a further 
advance could take place and, tliis being the case, General 
Egerton decided to postpone the advance until the arrival of 
the Abyssinians at Galadi where they were expected at the end 
of the year. In the meantime several reconnaissances were 
undertaken from Bohotle and Eil Dab, in the course of which 
several minor collisions occurred between our mounted inen 
and the enemy's Illalos, who had now become very active. 
Our information, too, regarding the Mullah's own movements 
began to be more definite. A strong reconnaissance, under 
Lieut. -Colonel A. Wallace, 27th Punjabis, had fixed upon 
Taguri as the best intermediate post between Eil Dab and 
Dariah, which latt«r waa then regarded as the first objective. 
An outpost had already been established at Badwein to cover 
Eil Dab and give timely notice of any movements from east- 

Early in December it became known that the Mullah had 
established a strong outpost at JidbaU, some 50 miles east of 
Eil Dab, and towards the middle of December our scouts 
repotted that it was being reinforced. Easken was accordingly- 
directed to send a recormaissance of mounted troops to Jidbali, 
with an infantry support halfway between that place and 
ISadwein, the whole under the command of Kenna, com- 
manding mounted troops. Hia general instructions were to 
endeavour to ascertain the numbers and position of the enemy, 
but not to commit himself seriously should they appear to 
be in force, in which case he was to fall back on the Infantry 
and return with the whole force to Badwein. 

In pursuance of these instructiona, Kenna left Bailwebi E«MoiinBU- 
on the evening of the 18th December with the force noted LU^t.-CoI. 
below,* and pushing on with the mounted troops, he arrived Kanna. 
close to Jidbali before daylight on the 19th. Numerous fires 
showed the enemy to be in considerable strength, and Kenna 
distributed hia force so as to threaten the front and both 
flanks. At daylight a heavy fire was opened by our troops, 
which the enemy lost no time in returning, occnpying a lino 
of bushes near their zariba, beyoud which they coufd not bo 
drawn. Kenna estimated their munbers at 1,'WO footmen 
and 200 horsemen, the majority being armed with rifles. 
After some three hours' desultory fighting, reinforcements for 
the enemy were seen coming from the north and east, and 
Keima, in view of liis general instructions, fell back upon his 
infantry support which, at that time, 8.30 a.m., was only 
some 9 miles away from Jidbali, having marched 28 miles 
since the previous evening. In the evening the force marched 
for Badwein where the momited troops arrived at 9 a.m. 
and the infantry at 11.4.5 a.m. on the 20th December. 

Writing from Jidbali. 19th December, 10.1.") a.m., Kenna 
reported :- 

I ( 

itli I 

if.1 I 


.i'r A.M. to-duy at Jidbali, wlicro 
emy. A lieavy firo opened on them 
I, most df wiiom had riHes, including 
bo drawn on beyond aonio scattered 

numerous &ica Indicated large forco of 
aL 6.30 a.m., brought out aoiae 3,000 a 
200 horsemen. The footmen declined 
)>Bsbes close to their main zariba. 

2. During three hours' desultory fighting the enemy frequently 
offered a good target of which full advantage was taken, at ranges down 
to 400 and 300 yards. 

3. In view of aitualion and successful result I did not feel justified 
in pushing home the attack. I am therefore retiring to Badwein which the 
mounted troops will reach by dawn Ki-morrow and the infantry a few houm 
later. I am sending out Home fresh Tribal Horse from Badwein to see the 
infantry into that plate. 

• Moimtcd troops : Ilritish Mounted Infantry, OB ; Indian Mountnl 
Infunlry, 97 ; Tribal Horse. 200 : Biknnir Came! Cflrpfl, fiO. 

Support : 1st Battalion Hampshire Regunent,. 100 ; 27th Punjabis, 

Rutions for eight days for men and animals. Water for two days toi 
infantry supporl:, Ammiinition : 400 rounds per rifle, 12,600 per maxim. 

^^^^H I. iScvcral jirisonrrs were taLcn, but die<l before renohing me. Two 

^^^^H of these stated that tha force at Jidbali was on itn way to attAok Badwtiti 

^^^H which tho Hiillab Baid was weakly hold. 

^^^^B C. Two men of British Moaii1«d Infantry are wounded, a** per attachnl 

^^^H return, and a few Tribal Horsemen ore at present misung. 

^^^^1 G. The enemy eecm to have plenty of ammunit-ion, of whidi they 

^^^^1 were very lavish, and full of fight. It is impossible to accurately eBtimato 

^^^^1 their loiH, but men were repeatedly knocked over at fihort range and ods 

^^^^1 officer alone ttounted 3.') bodies. 

^^^H Owing to the wildnesa of the enemy's fire our casualties* 

^^^1 were very slight. The enemy's loss was believed to be con- 

^^^1 Biderable, and w)» subsequently reported as about 180 kilted 

^^^B and wounded.f 

^^^1 The reiionnaissance was admirably carried out, the in- 

^^^1 formation acquired was found most valuable, while the 

^^^1 marching of the infantry (5G miles in 44 hours) was a vpry 

^^^1 satisfactory feature of the performance. 

^^^1 The result of this reconnaissance reached General Egerton 

^^^1 at Kirrit on the 21st December, and on the same day he 

^^^1 received a letter from Rochfort, from which he gathered 

^^^1 that, owing to the great difficulties they were experiencing 

^^^1 in the matter of water and transport, it was hopeless to expect 

^^^B the Abyssinians to arrive at Galadi within the time calculated, 

^^^1 or to defer the advance any longer on their account. The 

^^^P Mullah was known to have moved from Adadero about the 

end of November, and the Haroun was now reported to be at 


Witlidrawiil This fact, and the presence of the hostile force at Jidbali, 

KarriBon and secmed to point to a resolve on the Mullah's part to move 

con<»nt.rB(ion northwards, the Jidbali force being to cover the passace of 

• Uritiah Mounted Infantry, 2 men wounded, 1 miaaing ; Tribal Hor^e, 
2 killed, 2 wounded. 

+ Lieut. H. A. Carter, lolst Grer.adiers, wm awarded the D.S.O, for Ma 
gallajitry on this occasion, but Bubeequently this award wan cancelled and 
IJeut. Carter was awarded tho V.C. ("Ijondoa Gazette," Dec. 9(h, 1004). 
He had sared the life of Private Jai Singh, and hix act was described by 
Liont-Col. Kenna ait " the finest and mifflt brilliant individual act of valour 
performed in iJie Somali campaign." Subndnr Uliniro (li7i(ir wn.^ also 
awarded the Order of Merit on tljis gccnsion. 


liis kariaa. On the other liand, however, the bulk of his 
camels and a large number of other hvestock were known to 
be still in the Southern Haud. General Egerton resolved, 
therefore, to recall the Galadi garrison, which had practically 
fulfilled its object and which was running short of supplies, 
to concentrate the remainder of Fasken'a Brigade and Keona's 
mounted troops at Eil Dab with a ■\'iew of attacking the 
Mullah's force at Jidbali, and to move Manning's force into 
the Southern Nogal. Orders were issued accordingly. Eil Dab 
forming the advanced base for the Nogal, and Wadamago that 
for Bohotle. 

In order to withdraw the Galadi garrison a convoy had to 
be sent from Bohotle to take down carriage, water-tins and 
supplies for their return journey. On the 30th December 
the troops noted below*, with the convoy, left Bohotle, and 
reached Galadi unopposed on the 4th January, 1904. The 
whole force, including the garrison, then returned tiO Bohotle, 
which it reached on the 10th January. After filling up 
water-tins it proceede<l to Eil Dab, where it arrived on the 
loth January. 

Owing to the absence of the Galadi garrison and convoy, 
Manning's command had been reduced to one company 
Somali Mounted Infantry ; 550 rifles, King's African Rifles, 
30 Sappers and Miners, and 100 Illalos. With these he was 
directed to movef, under secret orders, from Bohotle, vi£ 

• Coininanding : Major L'. W. O'Urj-cn. i!7th Punjiillis. 'J'rooiffl ; 27th 
Pimjabia, 100 riflea ; No. 4 Ccmpany, Komaii Mounted Infantry; Indian 
t'ontingpnt, British Central Afrira and 5th Ealtnlion King's Afritan Eifles, 
1.^)0 riflw; Illalos, -25: 2 maxims. 

t Extract trora. Operation OrdtrB : — 

ES Dah, \at Jau'wry, 1004. 

32. — Marcli Orders. — 1st Brigade. 

1. The 1st Brigade wiU leovo Bohotle, vis LisRadpr, on liic .Wi .Tftnnnrv, 
to uporato in the Southern NogaL 

2. Troops.^ 
No. 5 Company, Somali Mounted Infantry. 
King's African Rifles Infantry, am rifles. 
ZnaloB, 100 nfles. 

M, No. 17 Company, 3rd Sappers and Itinprs. 

LasBatlcr. to Yaguri, where a post was to bo pstabliHlied ami 
wht-rc he would meet reinforcement and supplies. In the 
meantime a careful watch was being kept upon the enemy's 
force at Jidbali, which was reported to be daily increasing in 

TliD CTiiiToy (Operation Order, No. 31) will eomo undw tlip oidcre 
oE Uio General Officer Commanditig. let Brigade, on Birival at Higloli. 

3. A post of 100 rillos, 27th Pimjabifl. will be pstabliahed at yagiipi 
Mipplemenfcd liy IlialoB, dctaJlEd by the .^Bflislont Qiiarfermast^r-Gpntral, 

4. The telegraph will be laid from "EW Dnb to Yaguri, and 40 miles 
of line will bo at the diaposai of the GJeneral Ofiifer Conimanding, lat Brigadr. 

5. Water. — Two days' wafer in tanks tor men. 
33.— March Orders. — 2nd Drigado. 

1. The 2nd Brigade, aecompaiiird by HcadfiuarterB, Somali Field 
Forcf, will advance from Badwein on the 8lh January (or opcratioua in 
Korthem Nogal. 
3. Troopa.— : 

ilounlnd Troops. 

No. I Corps, Nob. 1 and .1 Companies. 

No. n Corps, Nob. and 7 CompnnicH, and Bikauir Camel Corps. 
No. in Carps, Tribal Horae. 

2Stli AFoiintain Battfiy, 2 gun-i. 

Hants R«giment, half battalion. 
■ No. 19 Company, 3rd Sappers and Minera. 
27th Punjabis, halt battalion. 
52nd Sikhs. 

2 Mosim detachmonls, lOTtli Pioneers (to he deffliled from 
BoLotle garrison). 

3. Sapjilies. — Rations to 22nd Janiiary. 

4. Water. — One day in tanks for animals, olhcr than cainnls, two 
days in tanks for men, 

5. Engineers. — fln arrival at Jidbali, the Sappers and Minora will bo 
placed at tho disposal of the Commanding Royal Engineer, for work. 

a. Tdegraph.— Tho line will bo laid to Jidbali, and 36 miles of lin.. 
will bo placpd nt the disposal of tho General Officer Commanding, 2nd 

34. — Lines of Commimicntioa Orders. — Bobotle will come nndec the 
orders of the Offieei Commanding, I.iiies of Communication, with effect 
from (he 5th January, 1904, 

minibers, bo muuli so aa to iudiioc Gluiiyi'iil Egurtoii to siippusu 
that he would probably be opposed by the Mullah's main fighting 
force. On the 6tli, therefore, he directed Manning to drop the 
bulk of his supplies at Yaguri and to meet him on the 9th at a 
point 20 miles east of Badwein, with the troops given below,* 
with 5 days' supplies and 2 da.ys' water for men. On the 'Jth 
January General Egerton Icfb Badwein witli tlio foUowiug 
troops, and met Manning at the rendezvous about noon :^ 

* On the Gtli January the following operalLOD ordi^r was Issued : — 
The QeuL'rat ORicec CommandiiLg has rcaKon to bclirvo that llie MuiUh 
ia holding Jidbali in considerable strength. 

2. Tho 1st and 2nd Brigades will rendoiTOus at the 20th mile from 
Badwein, on the road to Jidbali (3 miles west of Turgol, and about 12 miles 
west of Jidbolij by 5 F.u., on the 9th January. 

The force will be prepared to advance within striking distance nf 
JidbaU during the night of tlie Uth, parking all iinpedimcnla at the 

3. The 1st Brigade will aoncentrale at Yaguri on the 7th January 
and bivouac within 4 miles of the rendezvous during the Qth January. 

(o) Troops:— 

King'fl African Eiflea. , . , 550 rifles and <i maxims. 

Somali Mounted Infantry , . 125 rifles. 

Gadabursi Horse . . , . SOO rifles, 
(li) Suppiies, — For five dayd, for men and auimols. 
(c) Water. — Two days for men, in tins, 
(rf) The remainder of the 1st Brigade supplies to be left at f agori, 

under 200 rides of the 27th Punjabis. 

4. Tho 2nd Brigade will leave Badwein on the evening of the 8lh 
January and reach the rendezvous in the early morning of the fith Jiuiiary, 
the mounted troops following the infantry. 

(a) Svpjiies. — Five days. 

(6) Water. — Two days for men and for animals mth infantry ; one day 
for men and for animals with mounted troopd. 

5. On arrival at the rendezvous the moiinled troops of llio 2iid Brigade 
will become a separate command. 

0. The General .Officers Coounanding 1st and 2iid Brigailes and Officer 
Commanding mounted troops will meet the General Officer Commanding 
Somftliland Field Porca at the rendeivoufl at G p.m. on tho 9th January. 

U The General Ofioec Commanding will accompany tho 2nd Brigade, 


Mounted Tboofs. 
Lieut. -Colonel Kenna, V.C, D.S.O-, Commanding. 
No, 1 Corps, Noa. 1 and 3 Companies, '■ 

British Mounted Infantry ., 201 | 
No. 2 Corps, Nob. t) and 7 Companies, 

[-1,180 rifles. 

Indian Mounted Infantry and 

Bikanir Camel Corps . . . . 445 j 

No. i Corps, Tribal Horse . . 45i I 

Illalos SOJ 

2nd Brigade. 
Brigadier -General Fasken, Commanding. 
No. 28 Mountain Battery, 1 section. 

Hampshire Kegiment, ^ battalion, . 237 "| 
27th Punjabis, ^ battalion 

52nd Sikhs 578 j- 1,222 rifles. 

ird Sapfers and Miners. I 

No. 19 Company looj 




Orders were then issued for the next day and arrangement: 
made for the protection of the baggage and supplies, which 
would remain at the bivouac until sent for. 

At 5 on the lOth January the force moved off in double 
echelon formation as under, the front and right flanks being 
covered by No. 5 Company, Somali Mounted Infantry, and the 
Gadabiirsi Horse, the left flank by the Tribal Horae : — * 

• Eitract £foiQ Operatioo Orders ; — 
Camp, '■JO milet cast of Badxein, SIh January, IfltM. 
40.— March Ordcca.— 1. The 1st and 2nd Brigades and Wuu 
Troopa will advaiiue on Jidhali od 10th January. 
Eonse. — To be sounded by 1st Brigade, 4 a.m. 
M«rch. — ■' Advance " to be toucded by 1st Brigade, 6 A.a. 


saml SlUw. 
Maxim., a. 


K^tb MounWIn Il«lt*rj', a i:..iin, 
BesBiA'c utiiiiuiiitloii. 

*■ Max'iL,6.' 






3:ni I'mijihw. 


All baggage, water-tius and other impedimenta were left 
behind in the bivouac under a strong guard, consisting of 
two sections. Mounted Infantry ; 210 rifles o£ various corps, 
and two maxims, the whole under the command of Major 
W. B. MuUins, 27th Punjabis. 

, the head at 

2. The Moimted Troops of lat Brigade wiU in 

iand cover the front and Saoks of the force. 
3. The force will be formed at 4.45 a.u. 
(a) Iiifaiitry in double echelon from the 
tho ocbclon 200 yards east uf cainp. 
H (b) 2ijd Brigado Moimted Troops, under Officer Commandiiig, 

V Mounted Troops, ou the left flank, 

■■k (a) The echelon will be guided by Q2od Sikhs, adtancing by the 
^K right on Jidbali. 

^M (6) DirectioQ to bo given by Coiptaui Haol«r, Royal Engiooers. 

Hft The force wdl halt foe 10 minutes at the end of each hour's marchiog. 
^tQ- Anmimtiiion. — 
^F lat Brigade.— All animimttion in unit charges will accompany 

^V Snd Brigade and Mounted Troops. ^ — First reserve with units. 
^H Second rcacrvo will move in the centre of the echelon, under 

^H Brigade arrangemcnta. 

^^ 7. Hospital equipment and all transport of unit^, other thaji anununi- 
tion detailed above, will move in the centre of the echelon under Brigade 

1st Brigade on the right, 2nd Brigade in the centre, and Alounted 
Troops on the left. 


At 8.30 a.m. the advanced scouts reported the eiiemy ii 
force at Jidbali, occupying the neac edge of a depression in 
the ground, and forming, roughly speaking, a large 
circle of some 2i miles circumference. 

The General then sent for Kenna and instructed him to 
make a wide turning movement to the north, so as to threaten 
the enemy's right flank and rear and cut off his retreat. 

The echelon continued to advance imtil within 800 yards 
of the position when it halted. The enemy could now be seen 
lying down in the grass or amongst the scattered bushes to the 
north. In the meantime the mounted troops had come into 
contact with the enemy who stretched a good way to the north, 
in the scattered bush, and heavy firing was heard from that 

The enemy lay perfectly still until, just as the B^uare 
halted and the men were told to kneel or lie down, they 
opened a heavy, though ill-directed fire. The guns now came 
into action shelling the enemy's main zariba and also firing 
case into the bushes on our left front which were only some 

. Cainp Guard, — 

(a) Commanding, Major W. B. Mullins, 27th Punjabis. 
(6) Trooju.— 

I section, Britiah Mounted Infantry In j- 

1 section, Indian Momited Infantry I . ■ ..... 

J Mounted Infantry- 
60 rifles. Sappers and Miners "[Detailed by 2nd 

I niatiirt and 100 riiieB, 27th Punjabis] J Brigade. 
1 maxim. King's African Bifles .. ..Detailed by 1st 

Ill addition to the above, a sufBcient party from each unit, for 
charge of unit baggnge. 

(c) The camp will be ready to march an€ join tbe force when- 
ever ordered up. 

9. Water in cbaguls and one day's rations will be carried with tho 
echelon under Brigade arrangements. 

10. Telegraph cable will accompany the Headquarters of each Brigade. 

11. The General Officer Commanding, Somali Field Force, will move 
in rear of 52nd Sikhs. 

13. Ligbta out oa 9th January, at 10 p.m. 

ItlX) or (iOO yards distant. The Hampshires and 27th Punjabis 

^^sre then thrown forward so as to bring their fire on them. 

"lie Dervishes then hegan to advance in regular skirmishing 

Carrier, making short rushes from cover to cover and there 

r^y^ng down. A few got up to within 400 yards of the square, 

■^ut were unable to face the heavy rifle and maxim fire that met 

j^-liem, and this attack died away. In the meanwhile the Somali 

•^"flounted Infantry and the Gadabursi Horse on the right 

-*iad got too close np to a body of the enemy by whom they 

"^were suddenly rushed while dismounted, and a good deal of 

^i^onfusion ensued, in the course of which Captain J. R. Welland, 

' -^.A.M.C, was killed while attending to a wounded hoapitai 


When the attack on the left front failed, two determined 
aniahes were made on the front and right flank of the square, 
Taut they were met with such a terrific fire from rifles and 
^Maxims that the charging enemy could not face it, and at 
10 a.m. the whole mass broke and fled pursued by a hot fire, 
until it was masked by the mounted troops who were advancing 
across our front to take up the pursuit. This was carried on 
with great vigour by Kenna, over about 18 miles of country, 
until both his ammunition and horses were exhausted, when he 
rejoined the infantry which had advanced to a point about 
900 yards beyond the Jidbali wells. 

The enemy numbered from 6,000 to 8,000 men, probably 
representing the pick of the Mullah's fighting dervishes, and 
their losses, from reports subsequently received from prisoners 
and deserters, were far heavier than were originally reported, 
possibly double the number. There were 668 bodies counted 
on and near the position on the second day after the fight, 
while those killed in the pursuit were probably in exceas of 
this, but the number could only be roughly estimated. 
Owing ti) the men on the faces of the square lying down, 


awHrticul Ihc V.C for hiR gil 
7th June. 15)04). 




and to the Hgh fire of the enemy, our casualties were slight, 
except in officers, of whom three were killed and nine wounded 
oat of a total of 27 killed and 37 wounded of all ranka. 
Biualties The casualties were : — 

Captain Hon. T. Lister, 10th HusRars. 
liieutenant C. H. Bowden-Smith, let Battalion Hampshire 

Captain J. R. Welland, Royal Army Medical Corps. 
G Native rank and file (Indian Regulars). 
14 ,, „ (SomaK Irregulars). 

1 Indian follower. 

Wounded Officers {severely). 
Captain and Local Major P. B. Young, Commanding 2nd 

Battalion King's African Rifles. 
Brevet-Major G. T. M. Bridges, R.A., Commanding Tribal 
' Horae 
Captain G. C. Shakerley, King's Royal Rifles, Commanding 

No. 1 Corps, Mounted Infantry. 
Captain E. H, Llewellyn, 2nd Battalion, King's African 

Rifles, Adjutant, 
Lieutenant H. H. R. White, King's Royal Rifles, Adjutant, 

No. 1 Corps, Mounted Infantry. 
Lieutenant H. E. Eeinhold, 27th Punjabis. 
Lieutenant A. E. Andrews, 1st Battalion, Hampshire 

Wounded. Officers (slightly). 
Majot and Local Lieut. -Colonel G. 1. Forestier-Walker, 

Assistant Quartermaster-General, Intelligence. 
Lieutenant and Local Captain G. R. Breading, 3rd Battalion 
p King's African Rifles. 

Wounded {other rmtks). 

Rafive ranks— Rei 

' Native Officers, 13 rank and 


Followers, 2. 

The force bivouacked at a well about 2 miles bey ondJidbali." 
Owing to water difficulties, and to the necessity of waiting 
for Manning's supplies from Yaguri, and for the 2nd Brigade 
supplies from Badwein, it was found impossible to follow up the 
enemy next day. Indeed, at one time the water prospects 
seemed so gloomy, owing to the wells being choked with 
rubbish and with dead Dervishes, that it seemed questionable 
whether the force could continue the advance in this direction, 
tlie country oeyond being reported waterless for many miles. 
Owing to the great exertions of the Engineer staff five wells 
at Jidbali and Adur were cleaned out, and by midnight 
all the horses and ponies had had a drink, though not a 
full one. 

On the 12th and 13th January, Manning, with the mounted 
troops and King's African Eifles, marched to Dumodleh where 

• The following is aii e.xlract from the Rtaff Diary, Int Brigade, regarding 
the action at Jidbali : — 

•Jth jMinary. Colujnn left camp lit 5.10 a.m., heading for a point 
20 milea east uf Badwein, oa the -TidbMi road, and led by the Brigade 
Survey Officer, Captain Hunter, E.E. 

At a quarter to 8 a.m. tlie dust of the 2nd Brigade advancing to the 
tendezvoua from Badwein vs^ seen, and Illalos were snnt out in that direction 
to get in touch with them. At o'clock we croaacd the trocka of the former 
reconnoitring party to Jidbali (Colonel Kenna's force), and the column 
wheeled to the right astride the tracks and halted, forming mid-day camp- 
Shortly after, the 2nd Brigade, with which were General Egerton and 
Headquarters Stefi, passed our camp about a, mile north of iia and halted. 
Doling the evening we moved over to the hcadquaiters and 2nd Brigade 
romp, occupying front (east) portion of zariba. Here we got our English 
uiail, aiid orders were issued for attack on Jidbali the following day. 

ArrangCTuenta matle for leaving all irape'Uraenta in Turgol camp to 
follow us in the evening, and one masim and deta/!hment 3rd Battalion King' » 
.\£ricaa,Itiflea detailed for camp defence. 

Sunday, lOth January. At 4.30 a.m., tlie front and fiwikB were 

scouted by the flth Somali Mounted Infantry (front) and Gadaburai Uorso 

(Hank^l. and were reported clear. Kleanwiiile the division formed up in 

(8927) Q 2 


AdTuioo into 
(lie EouUiern 

abundant water was iound, and on the 14th Hudin was 
reconnoitred. No traces of the enemy, except dead bodies, 
were met with. Deserters stated that on receipt of the 
news of Jidbali, the Mullah fled to Halin where he had ordered 
all his karias to join him. This might be with a view to 
going north, or, on the other hand, it might indicate a move 
towards Kallis and lUig, or the Southern Haud, In either it appeared to General Egerton that his best plan would be 
to endeavour to anticipate the Mullah by seizing Gerrowei and 
Dariali in the Southern Nogal, a procedure which would place 
his force strategically on interior hnes as regards KaUis and 
Illig, and between the enemy and his kariaa in the Southern 

Orders were issued accordingly. The mounted troops 
were directed to push on to Adadero by forced marchee, 
supported by Manning's Infantry. The 2nd Brigade, accom- 
panied by the General and his staff, was directed on Dariali. 
The sick and wounded were sent back to Eil Dab, and the 

double echelon, the 52mi Bitha leading, the Hampsliiro Rpgimeat and 
27th Punjabis oa the left, the iHt Brigade on the right and retir. In 
the centre the field hospitals and transport animals (except luiit hoalritol 
and ammunition camels which Bccorapanied units). 

The 5th Somsli Houuted Infantry then beoame the advancetl E00Dt« of 
the diTision, and the Gadabursi Morse the right and left flankitig paiUes. 
The remainder of the mounted troops were massed in rewervo on tlie left 
fiank of the infantry. 

Tlie distribution of (he 1st Brigade was as follows : — 

(In the right Hank, — Detachment 3rd Sappera and MiuerB, under 

lieulenant Bovel, B.E, ; the lat Battahon King's African SiOtt 

and two maxims, commanded by Colonel Cobbe ; and the Srd 

< Battalian King's African Hiflas (T5 riBea), and one maxim, under 

Captain Brea^ng. 

On rear guard. — The iJod Battalion King's African Kifles with twi> 

maxijiiB, tomraonded by Major Young. 
Till- fiirce moved off at 5.10 a.m., over a «ide, open and imdulating 
plam. At S.4C A.M. the advanced scoula reported tie enemy in strcaigliL 
in JidbaU,\their advanced line occupying the ridge on the west (near) side 
nt the donga. Tlie mounted trooi>s, undsr Colonel Kenna, were now Kent 
lorwa-d, and formed up about a, mile to the left front of the infantry Bad 
<■!! the rij^bt Houk of the enemy. At i>.21 heavy fire van opene<l by the 


telegraph cable, which had been laid as far as Dumodleh was 
roiled up as far as Badwein, whence it was to be brought along, 
via Yaguri and Dariali, to Headquarters. In the meantime 
a detachment was sent to Yaguri, with aU spare cable, to link 
up Yaguri and Dariali. This was accomplished by thd 18tli, 
Dariah being ociidpied on the 17th January, and the lines of 
communication established through Dariali and Yaguri to 
Eil Dab-Kirrit and Burao, 

General Egerton, telegraphing to the Secretary of State 
for War on the ISth January from Dariali described tho 
situation as foUows ; — " Manning, with King's African Rifles, 
proceeds by forced marches to Gerrowei ; Kenna, with mounted 
troops, to Adadero, thus forming column along southeru 
Nogal. I hope to anticipate Mullah should he try to get south. 
We are already between him and a large portion of his karias. 
Our only anxiety is whether supplies will hold out, but no 
effort will be spared to make them do so." 

mounted troopa on tlio Bovcral lines of DerviBhes wMeh. oould he aeen by 
them Uolding the far ridga of the donga or advoneing a.ctoaa the balli. 

Heoawhile the troopa closed up iato square tonaaUoa and graduall,* 
advsnoed to within 800 yards of the Decrish position, when tho heads of 
their riflemen extcaded along the ridge could be plainly .-leBii- Here tho 
square halted and tho fight began at about a quaj'ter to 10 a.m. Although 
the enemy's front line *a9 continually reinforced, they were unable to 
advance in fscB of the terriSc fusitade from the front face of the square. 
Much execution was done by the maxim worked in Ihe right corner of the 
square by Sergeant Gibbs. let Battalion King's African Rifles. On the 
groups of DervishcB taking uovcr behind the acatttred cliiuips of bushes 
aurroiinding the square. 

One entiro group of nine meji was wiped out in a moment by this 
maxim (their bodies were counted afterwards lying in a heap behind tlio 

Finding they were beaten in front, the DsTTishcs then made a ileier- 
mined advance on the right face of the square, which became hcivily 
engaged, and Captain Breading, 3rd Battalion King's African Rifles, and 
BBTeral men were hit. The firing of the enemy was high, but, while missing 
the front and right faces, the rear face, which wan not firing at all, was gettirg 
thtir fire, both tho Commanding Officer and tho Adjutant of Ihe 2inl Bat- 
talion King's African Kifles getting wounded. 

'llie enemy were now repulsed on all sides and were In full flight. 
The mounted troops now swept down on them and the straggling mass of 
fugitives closely pursued were lost to view. 

JO As information pointed to the {act of the Mullah being Btill 
";°nWTT°i;n in ^^^ neighbourhood of Halin, orderB were issued on the 20th 
January for the Ist and 2nd Brigades and mount-cd troops to 
concentrate on the line Gaolo-Halin on 25th January. In 
accordance with these orders the Ist Brigade occupied Halin 
on the 25th having marched by Gerrowei, Biyo Maddu, and EI 
Gorreyu. Communication betweentlie two forces was estab- 
lished on the 24th, the 2nd Brigade and headquarters having 
reached Lanle on the 23rd via Arde JifHfta. The 1st Brigade 
had a slight sMrinish near Halln on the 25th capturing a 
leading chieftain of the Dolbahanta. During the following 
week the 1st Brigade advanced through the Bosaso Pass and 
the 2nd Brigade through the Anatie Pass and joined hands 
on the Northern Hand, no signs of the enemy being seen.* 

•Eitractfl from Oporaticin OrdiTa ;— 
DarUUi, 20(ft Janmiry, IBO*. 
83.— Oreratlon Orders.— 

1. The lat and 2iid Brigades and Mounted Troops t' 
ia the neighbourdood oE Qaulo-Halin on the 25tli Jauuary. 

2. The Ist Brigade and Mounted Troops moving bj Adadero (undra 
Hpecinl inBtrui'tions) will reaoli Kambsyti on the 24th January aod gsin 
touch with 2nd Brigade. 

3. (a) The Qud Brigade joined by 00 rifles, Bikanir Oamel Corps (now 
at Dorisli), will gain touch with Ut Brigade on the 24th January. 

Ift] Boiii^ — 

Slat January, evonijig, to Kurtinio. 
2and „ „ Arde Jiffiftft. 

23rd „ „ I^anle. 

24th „ „ Tagaboi. 

(f.) Suppliim. — In Brigade iliargo to Slst January, a£ in Opei'ation 
Order, No. 79. The 50 rifles, Bikonir Camel Corps, in (a) rationed by 
Advanced Supply Dop6t, The eurplus rations in Advanced Supply Depfit 
in charge oF a Supply and Traaspart subordinate 
Id) Watff.—ln tanks, one day for men. 

4. The General Officer Commanding, Somali Field Force, will aeeom- 
pany 2nd Brigade. 

84.— March Orders.- The '011011™!,' Moiuiicd Troops will join 2nd 
Brig.ide; — 

(a) Cominanding, Jlnjor J, E, M. Marali, lintoln Regiment. 


General Egcrlon being now convinced from the indications ilullali 
round Halin and from information received, that the Mullah ^^Hiwardi 
had retired northwaraa, determined upon the following 
couKe : — 


To concentrate the whole of the 1st Brigade at HaJin to Plan of 

^^^L hold the Northern Kogal. modiOei!. 

(6) Troops.— 

■ 2 Company, BcitiHli 

Mouatod Infantry 
. i Company, Somali 

Mounted Infantry 

(less 25 rifles) J 

I. 5 Company, Somali Mounted Infantry, 50 rides, now ai 

Dariali, 21st 
Janun^, from 

(c) JtoiUe. — 22nd January, join the 2Qd Brigade, 

(d) Sv-pjiiea. — Rationa up to and for the 22nd January, from 
Advanced Depat, From 23rd January, rations to be drawn ftom surplui 
rations accompanying 2nd Brigade. 

{e) WaUr.—la tanks, 1 day for men. 
85, — Convoy Orders. — 3,200 mannda of suppUoa will Yie fcntnyed 
from Dariaii on Soth January, to reach Gaolo on 2Sth idpni. 

100 rifles, Hmts- 
100 „ 27th Punjabia 
100 „ 63nd Siklis. 

26 „ No. fi Company, Somali Mounted Infantry. 
Suppliei. — As required. 
Water, — In tanks, one day for men. 

80. — Advancai Linos of Corainnnioation Orders. — Reforenco Opera- 
tion Orders, Noa. 37 and B4. The advanced Lines of Commnnication is at 
it constituted as follows : — 
||) Staff.— 

Officer Commanding, Advanced Lines of Communication, Mnjor 

W. B. Mullina, 27th Punjabis. 
Section Staff Officer, Captain H. H. F. Turner, 2nd Lanceri'. 

EU Dnb. 
Li No. 3 Company, British Mounted Infantry, halt company. 
52nd Sikhs, 100 rides. 

King's African Eillea, Mountain Battery, 2 (P'"*. 
King's African Bitlc^s SO liaoa. 


To withdraw the 2nd Brigade and mounted troops viu 
Haisamo and Hudiii to Eil Dab, and thence to 
Sheikh, where a column was to be organised to ad- 
vance via Las Dureh towards Jid Ali and Tag Gebi. 

No. 3 Company, BritiBh Mounted Infantry, half company. 
Sappera and Miaera, detBcbment. 
King's African Rifles, 200 rifles. 
Sappers and Miners, 15 rifles. 
27tb Punjabis, 50 rifles. 
G2nd Sikhs, SO rillex. 

No. 4 Company, Somali Mounted Infantry. 25 riHos, en route. 
Tribal Horso, 168 rifles, en roviB, 
Camp Danan Qaolo, 27£i JnaTinry. 1904. 

100,— March OrderB.— 1. (a) The 1st Brigade will march on llii- 
following programme : — 

28th January, to foot of Bosaso Pasa. 
30th January, reach Anane Pass via the Sorl 
(6) Impedimenta of 1st Brigade will be left in the neighbourhood ol 

(c) Spare water carriaga and any other spare tranaport will be sent 
at once \o Danan Gaolo accompanied by all Bikanlr rifles not required tnr 
garrison duty at Halin. 

2. (u) The 2nd Brigade will march on the following programme : — 

28th January. — Reinforced by I Company, Mounted Infantry 
(detailed by Officer Commanding, Mounted Troops), to Tain. 
29th January. — Reconnoitre the Anana Pass. 
29th or 30th January.— Join hands with 1st Brigade. 
(6) Sujyptia.—To 4th February. 

3. (a) The Mounted Troops, less 1 company with 2nd Brigade and 
dismounted man, will march from Danan Gaolo to Kansoga on 29th January 
and reconnoitre Haisimo district on the following days. 

(6) Sttpjiiis.—Ta Sth February. 

4. Signallijig. — Communication will be maintained l^etween 
Brigade, 2ud Brigade, and Mounted Troops, also with Field Force Head- 
quarters at Danan Gaolo. 

|j. Field Force Headquarters will be at Danan Gaolo. 
101. — Advanced Linea of Communication Orders, 
(a) A post will be eatabhshed at Danan Oaolo. 

(A) Oarriuon 100 rifles {detailed by 2nd Brigade) and the 

balance of the Bikanir rifles, returning from Halin (Operation 
Order, No. 100 (1) (c)). 
2. A telegraph office will be opened at Danan Gaolo on 2Slh instant. 

9!o form a movable column at Eil Dab. 

To roil up the telegraph line and evacuate all posts In 
the Southern Nogai. 
JTo eetablifih a signalling post in the neighbourhood of 

Orders to the above effect were therefore issued to the 
troops on the 29th January.* The Ist Brigade, reinforced 
by 400 rifles and 2 gims, King's African Rifles, returned to 
Halin, with orders to deny the Nogal to the enemy and inflict 
all possible loss on him by raiding Dervish stock. 

The 2nd Brigade preceded by the moimt«d troops, marched 
^lia Hansoga, Hiidin, Badwein, and Burao to Sheikh, after 
estabhshing a signaUing post at Bur Anod, near Hudin. 

All these movements were completed by the 22nd February. 
while headquarters were estabhshed at Berbera on the 18th 
of the same month, by which date the first phase of active 
operations may be said to have terminated. 

'Eitrttut from. Operation Orders ; — 
Camp Danan. Oaolo, 29(A JanuuTj/, 1B04. 

103. — Operation Orders.— When the Ist and Sod Brigadea have 
joined lianda at the Aoane Paaa (Operation Order, No. 100), the lat Brigade, 
including 45 rig©s, SappocB and Miners, and Nos. 4 and 6 Companies. Somali 
Mounted Infantry, and IHalos, will remain in the Nogal Valley. The 2nd 
Brigade, prei^eded by Monntod Troops, lesa No. 4 and 5 companies, Somali 
Hoanted Infantry, and 50 rides Bikanir L'ameL Corp, will march to Eil 
Dab through the Haisimo district, with a view to fntiico operalions. 

104. — let Brigade Orders. — I. The lat Brigade will reUeye the Danan 
Gaolo garrison with Somali Mounted Infantry by 2 p.m., on the 31st Jannary. 
2. AmmunUion.— For [at Brigade, 500 ronnda per rifle. 30.400 
rounds per itimifti 

Suppiiea.— Por 1st Brigade, till 29th February. 

Transport. — For Ist Brigade, for seven days' auppliea for men and 
uoiniaJa and one day'.? water in tonka for men. 
L Seinforeemtttt^. — For Ist Brigade. 

((*) The King's .-Urfean Rilles Moimtain Battery and detach- 
ments of King's Afrifan Rifles and Somali Mounted Infantry 
at Wadamago, Eil Dab, Yaguri, and Dariali will, under the 
orders of the Officer Commanding, Lines of Communication, 
and Advanced Lines of Communication assemble as soon as 
possible at Dariali and proceed at once to join the 1st Brigade 
via Arde Jiffifta. 

Ihs Mulish 
for fichling 
■t Jidbdi. 


It may not here be out of place to consider why the Mi 
made s staad at Jidbali. The seasoa had been a very 
on?, and there ivas graB.'i only at Halin and in the 
Nogal. The Mullali had therefore roncentrate.d his foroetf 
ill the North Eastern Nogal and had estahliahcd a strong; 
ontpost at Jidbali covering Halin. He was aware that it bs 
was driven out of Halin his only possible line of retreat 
across the Northern Haud, towards Jid Ali or the Tug Qeln. 
There was no grazing in the Southern Nogal, and south o£ 
that was the waterless and difficult country of the Southern 
Hand. It was therefore of special importance to him to preserve, 
his poMtion at Halin. Ho apparently considered the 
open country round Jidbali more favourable to his forces tha)t> 
the Halin country which was much more broken. Should H 
be defeated at Jidbali he would, at any rate, have time to pr 
pare for his flight northwards. 

Probably the above comprise some of the reasons wl 
led to the fight at Jidbali, and the Mullah, now realising th 

{!•) AmiiiimilioH.—^m rounds ppr rifle. 

(«) Traiuport.^Far seven days' supplies foe uipti i 

and DUO day's naler in tanks for men. 
{d) Convoy. — Post amnmnitton to raise that on lat Briga) 
tliargo to 500 rounda per rifle (eicopt Illaloa} nnd 30,100 ro 
Iier maxim. 
(t) Supplies.— For wliolo of Ist Drigado to 20th February, 
lOT). — 2nd Brigade and lloiinted Troo]ja Ordera. — 1. Tho 
Officer Commanding, 2nd Brigade, in communication with Officer 
manding, Mounted Troopa, will leave Hansoga on Ist February and ml 
via Hudin, to roach Eil Dab on or alxiut the 10th February. 

3, Tha Officer Cominanding. Mounted Troopa, in communication 1 
General Officer Cominanding, 2nd Brigade, will preeede the 2nd Bi 
and will reconnoitre the nortli of BiLr Anod, reaching Eil Dab 
the 10th February. 

3. The Company of Mounted Infantry noiv with the 2n(i Brigade 
rejoin the Mounted Troops at Eansoga. 

4. S^pplieg. — To 10th February, the balance being drawn from Di 
Gnolo, under Brigade and Mounted Troopa arrangements. 

5. Trmi»poH. — For 10 days' rations for men and animals, and 
day's water in tanka for men. 


I must leave the Nngal, nitidc preparatinns for his flight 
nortliwa rda. 

The Tfisults of the operations were — tactically, the defeat RMultof Hib 
and rout of the enemy at Jidbah — materially, his Josses in "'*"' 
men and rifles and the losses that he and his people have 
suffered in live Btock— and morally, the loss of prestige of 
the Mullah himself, and the d5raorahsation of his fighting 
dervishes — while strategically, he was hemmed in between 
our column and the Mijjarten, who were professedly hostile to 
him and his cause. 

Before proceeding to describe the. second and last phase of 
the operations, it is necessary to refer briefly to the events 
which took place outside the operations from the time of the 
battle of Jidbah to the termination of the campaign. 

During January the progress of the Abyssiniana had been Abjeain 
slow. On the 18th of the month, Rochfort had reported 
that the Abyssinian force had reached Wardair on the 14th, 
but had been obliged to withdraw to Gerlogubi for want of 

108. Advanced Lines of Communication Orders. — (a) The Genera! 
Officer CommBading, 3nd Bdgade'i will leave a, post in the neighbourhood oE 

(6) Troops.— 

1 Royal Engineer OffiriT and 10 riHcs, Ssppirs and Miners 
150 rifles, Infantry. 
Signalling party. 

(c) SujFpiiej.— To 29tli February. 

(d) Trattsporl. — For spvt'n days' supplies for nioji and animula, and 
for one day's water in tanks for men. 

107. — iSiynoHinf?. — The General Offlu^er Cominandrng, And Brigade, 
will fix the post near Hudin with a. view to maintain communication with 
tliB lat Brigade and with Eil Dab. 

The General Officer Commanding, Ist BriKOde, will open communica- 
(ioa with Hiidin by helio, if possible, oatabliahing an interniadioto post i£ 

The General Officer Commanding, Ist aod 2nd Brigades, will fix tho.10 
l>o8ts in consnitation with the Survey Officer. 

The Officer Corf nvanding, Advanced Lines of Comtaunicatron, will 
open comniimii^fttion with Hiidiii from Eii Dab. 

Saval demo 
Uratiun at 

fiupjiliea. From the latter place, Rochfort telegraphed to 
Uenerttl Egerton on the 3l8t that the Abyssiniana were retiring 
to tlie Fafan on the following ciay, and thence to Hilowen on 
the Webi Shebeli. Aa they would thus for the present be 
outtiide the zone of any possible co-operatdon, Rochfort 
aaked for the General's instructions. These were to the eSect 
that, j>ending further development of the operations about to 
be undertaken by our troops, the General hoped the 
Abyaainians would remain at Gerlogubi or on the Fafan so as 
to deter the Mullah from planning a move to the south. Accord- 
ingly, the Abyasjniana concentrated at Gorahai on the Fafan 
on the 7th February. Here they kept the field until the 24tli 
March, when, in view of the retreat of the Mullah across the 
Northern Hand, the force returned to Harrar. 

The Mullah, after crossing the Northern Haud, was 
believed to have established his headquarters at 
Jid All. He and his people having suffered so severely 
in their flight across the waterless tract of the Northern 
Haud, it was considered unlikely that he would attempt 
to retrace his steps until the rainy season set in, whicl* 
it might be expected to do about the middle of April* 
The coast tribes, viz., the Habr Toljaala, the Habr Gerhajia, 
the Vv'araangti of our own Protectorate, and the Mijiarten. 
tribes of the ItaUan Protectorate were all professedly hostile 
to the Mullah, and Sultan Osman Mahmud, the most in- 
influential man of the Northern Mijjarten, was understood 
to be willing to co-operate actively by preventing the Mullah 
from entering the Mijjarten territory. There seemed, therefore, 
a fair chance of General Egerton being able to compel the 
Mullah again to risk a battle or to surrender without fighting, 
provided he was denied an asylum in the Italian Protectorate, 
and measures to this end were taken. 

Between the 10th and IJth a naval demonstration at lUig 
had been made by His Majesty's ships, but in the absence of 
an Itahan ship no bombardment took place. The Senior 
Naval Officer proposed to land a naval brigade at Illig, but thia 



proposal was postponed until General Egerton had conferred 
with the Naval Commander-in-Chief. 

Early in February the question of offering terms to the 
Midlah was considered, and after obtaining the views of the 
Government, a letter was forwarded by General Egerton 
to the Mullah on the 20th February informing him of the terms 
on which his surrender would be accepted. These were that it 
the Mullah surrendered with two maxims and 1,400 good 
rifles. Ilia lite and the Uves of his family would be spared, 
his future residence being appointed by His Majesty's Govern- 
ment. It is, howeverj doubtful whether the General's letter 
ever reached the Mullah, 

During February the Naval C'ommander-in -Chief was asked 
to leconnoitre Las Khorai on the coast east of Eerbera, witii a 
view to ascertaining whether that place was suitable for the 
embarkation and disembarkation ot troops and stores. 
Favourable replies being received on this point. General 
Egerton and Admiral Atkins on -Willes conferred together at 
Berbera on 18th Febiiiary, and arrangements were made for 
the estabhshment of a garrison at Las Khorai. 

On February 8th, General Egerton telegraphed from Eil 
Dab to the Secretary of State for War his future plan of 
operations. He proposed to send a strong colunm under 
Fasken from Las Dureh to work through the north-eastern 
portion of the Mahmud Gerad country, east of Jid Ah, and 
thence to operate in the Warsangh country, while another 
column, under Brooke, was to operate from Eil Dab. On 
completion of Fasken's work his force was to embark at Las 
Khorai and return to Berbera about the end of March. As 
the Nogal was held by one brigade, he considered that the 
probable effect of these operations would be to drive the 
Mullah out ot the British Protectorate when, if Osman 
Mahmud acted up to his promises, the Mullah might be 
captured or his force destroyed. 

As preliminary measures to this plan, the General arranged 
with the Consul -General to call upon the Warsangli Sultan 

Lan Khorai. 

to hold out &^aJQSt the Mullah and thus prevent supplies 
naching him from that direction. The Protectorate coast 
was to be watched by His Majesty's ships, and the Italian 
naval authorities requested to co-operate hy preventing 
supplies reaching the Mullah through Italian ports. But ou 
the 30th Januari' the captmn of the Italian ship " Voltumo" 
had bombarded the Sultan's houses at Ras Hafun. south of 
Cape Gardafui. This was done without the authorisation of 
the Italian Government and the captain of the " Voltumo " 
was recalled. This action, however, interrupted our com- 
munications with Osman Mahmud, made his attitude doubtful, 
and caused the Government to prohibit the crossing of the 
; As it was also necessarj' tor the complete sucoeas of the 
operations that the troops should be free to cross tlw 
Italian border and operate in Italian territory, the consent 
of the Italian Govemment was duly sought and sub- 
sequently obtained, although too late to effect the success of 
the operations. 

On the 23rd February H.M.S. "Perseus" was placed at th» 
disposal of the General Officer Commanding with the view of 
communicating with Las Khorai and establishing a temporary*' 
]X)3t at that place. Consequently on the 27th February » 
detachment of 90 rifles under the command of Captain P. G. 
Grant, R.E., with Lieutenant W. H. Evans ua Intelligence 
Officer, embarked for Las Khorai, where a fortified post was 

On the arrival of the 2nd Brigade and the mounted troops 
at Eil Dab on the 8th Februarj-, consequent on the orders issued 
at the end of January, a movable column was formed, to be 
under the direct orders of tlie General Officer Commanding^ 
the Somaliland Field Force. The column coiiaiated of : — 
'^ Commanding. — Major R. G. Brooke, D.S.O., 7th Hussars, 

Staff Ca plain. —C&ptaln C. G. W'oodhouse, 12(ith Ealu 
chistan Infantry 


Troops :— ■ ■ : 

Headquarters No. II Corps " j 

Mounted Troops, Nos. 6 and 7 I To be detailed by the 

Companies Indian Mounted In- !» Officer Commanding 

fontry. i Mounted Troops. 

Bikanir Camel Corps, .50 rifles. J 
Detachment, No. 17 Company 3rd Sappers and Miners. 

t27t!i Punjabis, 1 Double-, 400 rifles to be detailed by 
Company. > General Officer Commanding 

52nd Sikhs, 1 Wiiig. J 2nd Brigade, 
_, , ., , , rTo be detailed by As.si8taiit 

Ulalos, as available up „ . r, it 

< Ouartermaater-Oeneral, in- 
to 100 nfles. 1 r^„- 
L telligence. 

Amtmtniiion.SOO rounds per rifle in regimental charge. 
Transpori.—'Foi 7 days' supplies, men and animals, and 3 
days' water for men. 

On the 26th February the ]jaa Dureh Column was ordered Liin Durch 
to concentrate at that place on the 8th March. It was com- ° "°"'* 
poaed as follows : — 


mtandijig. — Brig. -General C. (i. M. Fiisken, Command- 
ing 2nd Brigade. 

f. — ^Headquarters Stail, 2nd Brigade, joined by Com- 
mander E, S. Carey, R-N., Provost Marshal, and 
Lieutenant L. W. D. Everett, 6th King's African 
Bifles, Intelligence Officer. 

ed Troops (from Berbera) : 
Headquarters, Mounted Troop 
PKo. I Corps, Headquarters and 250 rifles. 
T' British Mounted Infantry, with 15 per cent, spare ponies, 
r Ko. II Corps.— Bikanir Camel Corps, except those with 
movable column. 
Mounted Levy, 100 rifles. 


Infotlry (from Sheikh) :— 

Commanding. — Lieut. -Colonel A. Wallace, 37tli Punjabis. 
Staff Officer.—Ftom the Command. 
Frmn 2nd Brigade : — 

Hants Regiment, 250 rides (dismounted). 
27th Punjabis, 350 rifles and 2 Maxima. 
u2nd Sikhs, 250 rifles and 2 Maxims. 
Fnym Lines of Communication :— 
lOlet Grenadiers, 2 Maxims. 
107th Pioneers, 150 rifles and 2 Maxims. 
Sappers and Miners, 50 rifles. 
Delated bij Assistant Quarter m/isler -General, 
gence :— 

Illaloa, 100 rifle.8 and CO ponies. 
Ammuniiion. : — 
;J00 rounds per rifle (except le\-ies aud Illalos). 
i2,tiOO rounds pe.r maxim. 
Poet Reserve : 100 rounds per ritlt at l-as Dureh ; 
balance at Berbera and Sheikh. 
Transport : — 

Mounted Troops. — For 4 days' rations and 2 days' water 

for men. 
Infantry.— For 4 days' rations and 1 day's water for men. 
Supplies. — To 5th April. 
Water Tanks.~To complete equipment for 2 days' water 

for men throughout. 
Transport. — Camels, as required, for supplies and water 

On the loth March both the above columns advan«rcd, with 
El Afweina as their common objective, which they reached on 
the 16th March, having seen no trace of the enemy on the way. 
It was then arranged that Brooke's Column should move viit 
Daringahiye towards Danaii blocking the routes to the south 
and south-west, while Fasken should operate northwards to 
Jid Ah, and then eastwards and a OSlJle6iBt JSj the Giebi. 


Colonel Melliss, V.C, who, with 250 (Musa Abukr) levies," 
was at this time in oommunication with Faeken, having 
moved from Dubbatad when the column left Las Dureh, 
received orders to move round on the left flank of the column 
to the north of Jid Ah, 

It was not till the 17th March that information was received 
regarding the Mullah's movements. Many of his karias 
were reported to have been in the neighbourhood of Jid 
Ali, but he himself, with the Harounf, had been at Kalgoraf, 
near Danan. It was only on the 15th that he received news 
of our advance, when he precipitately retreated, sending 
messages to his outlying karias to follow liiin to Baran, which 
is on the borders of our Protectorate, in the angle between 
the 49th meridian and the 10th parallel of north latitude. 

On the 19th March Fasken's Infantry came across a raiding u 

The raiding party, who fied on the approach of our troops, 
subsequently fell into the hands of Major Beresford with the 
Tribal Horse, and Captain Shakerley's company of British 
Mounted Infantry, who handled them roughly, killing 53 
Dervishes and capturing four prisoners, 23 rifles, 500 rounds of 
ammunition, and 27 camels, our only casualty being one 
horse killed. 

All reports of prisoners and deserters confirmed the news 
previously received of the Mullah's hurried flight from Kalgoraf 
towards Baran, and that his intention was, if still pursued, 
to make for IlHg, via Earmadobe. This seemed to show 
that he was uncertain of the attitude of the Mijjarten, and that 
he was not aware of the presence of the 1st Brigade in the 
Eastern Nogal. 

Fasken arrived at Jid Ah on the :ilst March, his 
mounted troops having reached there the previous day. 

• TliEse levies had been raised by the Consul- General in conaultation 
with General Egerlon tot political reasons. They were cafabliBheii abojit 
100 miles east of Borbern, near TJnbbatad, (See pitge 4-£f>), 

t Headquailers enennipment of the Mallah. 

»27) E 

^V 358 

^^H The Infantry had averaged 17 miles a day since leaving Sheikh 

^^H on the 7th of the month. Leaving Melliss to hold Jid All with 

^^1 his levies, Faeken pushed on, vi'i Bihen, Habera, and Domo, 

^^H to Ausaneh, preceded by the mounted troops, who reached 

^^H Higli Gab on the 2!>th. The latter had now struck upon the 

^^H direct line of the Mullah's flight, which was marked by a trail 

^^H of dead men, women, and children, camels and stock, aban- 

^^H doned water-vessels and household utensils ; all testifying to 

^^H the hurried nature of his flight and the desperate condition 

^^H to which his following was reduced. 

^^H From Higli Gab the Tribal Horse and Illalos reconnoitred in 

^^H a westerly direction, coming across some belated Dervish 

^^H karias which had not been able to join the Mullah, and killing 

^^H some 40 or 50 spearmen, from whom they captured 500 camels 

^^" and 800 sheep. The mounted troops rejoined the main column 

Fftiluro of at Ausaneh on the 29th March. There was now nothing more 

to m»-op«raS! ^ ^^ done, operations across the Italian border having been 

prohibited. There were no signs of Mijjarten or Warsangli 

co-operation. On the contrary, there was reason to believe 

that supphes had been sent to the Mullah from nearly all the 

coast ports between Wakhderai and Bosaso, Fasken's transport 

was weak, the road to Las Khorai, to which place he had been 

ordered to send the bulk of his infantry and dismounted men, 

was known to be exceedingly difficult, and there were already 

signs of the rains setting in, which would hamper movements, 

if not render them impossible. Under the circumstances 

there seemed nothing for him but to withdraw. On the 4th 

April the whole column was therefore concentrated at Baran, 

whence, on the 5th April, the force separated, the infantry 

marching to Las Khorai to embark there for Berbera, while 

the motmted troops, with all surplus carriage, retraced their 

steps via Jid Ali, El Afweina, and Las Dureh, Baran being 

held by Melliss's levies. 

Manning's Though, owing to the conditions of their relative positions, 

opera ions. ^^^ inunediate pursuit of the Mullah devolved on the troops 

of the 3nd Brigade and the Eil Dab column, Manning's troops 


had been by no means idle or stationary. A strong fort had 
been constructed at Halin, patrols and reconnaissances had 
been sent in all directions, and Kallis and Gerrowei visited. 
Signalling communication was established between Eil Dab 
and Hudin and El Afweina, the latter enabling Manning to 
keep in touch with Brooke's Column, and, through him, 
with Fasken. In the course of these movements the Somali 
Moimted Infantry and Ulalos succeeded in rounding up some 
10,000 head of live stock, captured 11 rifles, and accounted for 
over 200 Dervishes, our losses being slight. 

Manning's disposition of his troops was skilfully made, 
so that notwithstanding the long line he was watching — 
which extended from Hudin on the west to Kallis on the east — 
strong movable columns were available at Dumodleh and Halin 
to operate in any given direction, while a system of permanent 
patrols insured timely notice being obtained of any Dervish 

On the 7th April GeneralEgertonreceived a telegram from Italj 
the War Office conveying the consentof theltalian Government atroHThe 
to operations being continued into Italian territory, subject to border, 
certain conditions, and directing him to continue offensive 
operations. Instructions were according issued on the 8th to 
Fasken to remain at Las Khorai until further orders, and to 
Brooke to concentrate his column at E I Afweina and to send out 
orders to the mounted troops to stand fast in the neighbour- 
hood of Jid Ali, where he was to join them after concentration. 
Orders were also issued to the Ist Brigade to maintain their 
position jn the Eastern Nogal as long as possible. At the same 
time, owing to the emaciated condition of the transport, the 
imminence of the rains, and the difficulty of pushing up 
Bupphes, the General Officer Commanding Ist Brigade was 
given discretionary powers to withdraw to Eil Dab should the 
difficulties of maintaining himself prove insuperable. These 
were indeed already very great, all supplies being short, and, 
thongh large captures of stock had been effected, an epidemic 
(probably plenro-pneumonia) had attacked the sheep and goats, 
(8927J K 3 

so that for meat rations even the officers had to rely npon 
amela' flesh and such game (very little} as they could shoot. 
However, by utilizing all carriage— a meaeure which rendered 
the brigade temporarily immobile — the troops were re-supplied, 
but at immense cost in transport, and consequent deterioration 
in mobility. 

On the 9th April the mounted troops of the Las Dureh 
column and the Eil Dab movable column were placed 
under the command of Kenna (who had returned from 
Berbcra), and directed to proceed to the neighbourhood of 
Bat with Las Khorai as a base. The strength of the force was 
IWO mounted troops, 500 infantry and 150 Somali irregularB, 
with rations up to and for the 2nd May, After sending 
back all the surplus carriage under escort to Las Dureh, the 
Eil Dab Column linked up with the mounted troops at Baran 
on the 19th April, and halted to await the arrival of reinforce- 
ments and supplies from Laa Khorai. At this time tBe 
Mullah's movements were imknown. The latest authentic 
news of him was that he was at Bilbilo, in the Italian Pro- 
tectorate, a watering place about 70 miles south and by east of 
Bosaso (Bandar Kaaim), from which point he was known to 
have received a certain amount of suppHes (dates, rice, and 
tobes) for the Haroun. His karias were scattered about 
wherever they could obtain water and grazing. Large 
numbers had deserted him, and had sought refuge with the 
coast tribes. The Ogadens, Marehan and Mahmud Gerad 
had fallen under the Mullah's displeasure, and, after killing 
munbers of them and looting the remainder of such stock as 
they possessed, he had turned them adrift in a starving and 
destitute condition. Many of these had surrendered them- 
selves at our posts, asking for safe conduct to their own country 
and demanding food. 

It was obvious, therefore, that the Mullah's army was no 
longer formidable from mere force of numbers, while its 
morale as a fighting body had been utterly destroyed at 

Jidbali. Informatioa had also been received that, under 
instructions from the Italian Government, Osman Mahmud 
and the Mij jarteoa were taking the offensive against the Mullah, 
and a letter was received from Osman Mahmuil to aay that he 
would attack the Dervishes if our column was not withdrawn ■ 
Rain having fallen generally enabled the Mullah to move pretty 
well where he chose, and it seemed probable that he would 
either move into the Northern Hand and remain there until he 
saw an opportunity of getting across the Nogal, and into the 
Southern Haud, or that he would move towards lUig. The 
instructions to Kenna were " to endeavour by every means to 
locate the position of the Haroun, and having done so, to try 
and surprise it by long-diatance marching with his mounted 

On the 25th April, after establishing a post of 180 rifles at 
Gharra, Kenna marched to Lojipahu {9 miles south-east of 
Baran), Here some scouting parties which had been sent out 
some days previously were met with, and they reported that a 
portion of the Haroun was at Biliyu, some 28 miles distant. 
This was reached next morning at dayhght after a troublesome 
night march, owing to heavy rain, boggy ground, and swollen 
watercourses. Here a few footmen only were found, who 
reported that considerable numbers of the enemy's horses and 
camels had moved south-west from there on the previous 
night ; that the main portion of the Haroun (and presumably 
the Mullah) had been at a place 15 miles W.S.W. of Baran, 
but had moved south on the 2ith or possibly earher. After 
proceeding some 10 miles further on the tracks of the camels 
without finding any of the enemy's riflemen, Kenna came 
to the conclusion that he was on a false trail, and turned 
off to Baran, leaving the SomaU irregulars to round up stock. 
On the 27th he rejoined the Infantry and convoy at Biliyu. 
These had marched 46 miles in two days, over very bad and 
heavy ground. 

It now became apparent to Kenna that the state of his 
supplies and transport would not admit of more than one final 

effort, with mounted ttoopa only, to find and strike the enemy 
on the Northern Haad. There was no certain information u 
to tha looaSity of the Haroun, or even of the direction which it 
had gone, but prevailing opinion was that the most probable 
place was Kheman, 50 mOes S.S.W. of Biliyu, where there was 
said to be abundance of water. Should there prove to be 
water there, it would at any rate enable the troops to push on 
further, even if no enemy were discovered. 

Accordingly, at 6.30 p.m., on the 30th April, Kenna started 
with 240 Mounted Infantry, 40 irregulars, and 160 Bikanir 
Camel Corps, arriving at Kheman next morning. Hew 
there were a few stragglers from the Haroun, who stated that 
the Mullah, with the main portion of the Haroun, had kept a 
more easterly course, at first towards Halin, but hearing tb»' 
our troops were still there he had turned towards Illig, Tl*' 
water holes at Kheman were all dried up, though there we*^ 
signs of camels having watered there some two or three day 

No water being available, and no certain news of any beinj 
found nearer than HaKn, there was nothing for Kenna but tf^ 
return to Biliyu, which he reached at 8 a.m. on the 2nd May, 
the troops having accomplished 100 nules in 38 hours, with only 
one gallon of water per man and none for animals.* 

In the meantime, the scouts and Tribal Horse, who had 
been sent out on the 27th April to round up stock, had sent back 
on the 28th to Biliyu to ask for assistance. 100 Mounted In- 
fantry started at once and joined them at dawn on the 29th at 
EIHaga, 30 miles west of Bihyu. Only a few of the enemy's 
spearmen were found, and some 800 camels were rounded up. 
These men subsequently turned out to be Waraangti who 
had been out with the Mullah, but not wishing to follow him 
southwards, had broken away with the intention of getting 
back to their own country. Notwithstanding their having 
been MuUah'a men, the Warsangli Sultan, with true Somali 

* It should, bowerer, be noted tliat Uiei'e wua pleuti/ of greea grailag. 

effrontery, aubBequenfcly put in a claim tor the 800 camels, 
on the ground of their being tribal property. 

On arrival at Biliyu, Eenna received orders of recall and 
accordingly started on the 3rd for Laa Khorai, which place 
he reached on the 11th May and embarked for Berbera. In 
the meantime the 2nd Brigade had returned to Beibera, 
while the 1st Brigade, after evacuating Halin and Dumodleh, 
reached Burao on the 23rd May. With the return of Kenna's 
Column active operations ceased, and the e^iediticHL of 1903-Oi 
came to an end.* 

* Extracts from Operation OrderB : — 
Berbtra, 21th AprS, 1904. 

132. — Diatribution Order. — The Ist Brigade are eipectod to reaoh 
Ei] Dab about the 8th May. 

The Headqamler? and all available details of the King's Afrioau 
Riflea will proceed to Boroo. The King's African Rifles depat irill be 
moved to Bnroo from Garrero, which post will be abandoned, 

133.— Morable Column.— (o) On the nrriyal of tho lat Brigade at 
Eil Dab a movable column will be formed there. 
(6) Commanding, Major P. B. Osbom, D.a.O- 

Staff Officer, from the column. 
(c) Troopi.— 

Nos. 4 and 6 Companies, Somali Mounted' 
^^^ 300 rifles, Ist King's AMoan lUfles 

^^^L 2 gaaa. King's African Rifles, Mountain 

^^^^B Battejy in charge of Ist King's African 

Detailed by Officer 
Commanding, Ist 

3d by Officer Coru- 

100 rifles of the Eil Dab garrison, detail) 
mending, Lines of Communication. 

[tt) The Officer Commanding, Movable Column, 

of Communication garrison at Eil Dab at a strongtli of 50 rifles and 
should the column move out, these will be relieved at once by 60 rifles 
from Wadamago." 

Berbtra, 2SiA AprU, IB04. 

134.— Embarkation Order. — (o) Lieut. -Colonel P. A. Kenna, V.C, 
D.S.O., will, in communication with the General Officer Commanding. 2nd 
Brigade, return at once all surplus transport to Las Khorai, and concentrate 
his force there not later than 14th May, with a view to its embarkation for 
Berbera acoompanied by the Las Khorai garrison. 

{b) The General Officer Commanding, 2nd Brigade, will arrange for 
the embarkation of hia force with all surplus transport and withdraw it to 
Berbera. leaving La-t Khorai before the arrival of Lieut. -Colonel Kenna'a 

f utlra 

Sir Charles Egeiton, telegraphing on the 9th April, Iiad 
informed the Secretary of State for War that he could not 
tnfuntatn Manning In the Eastern Nogal beyond the end of 
April. This was due to the weaknass and the broken dovn 
state of the transport, and owing to the fact that, after tie 
beginning of the rains, the country would become very difficult 
for camel transport. 

On the 12th April he further telegraphed to the Secretarj 
of State as follows : — 

" Reports from both Fasken and Manning as to the state ot 
both troops and transport confirm me in my opinion th»* 
further operations at this season are impossible. If tU^ 
rain sets in in the Nogal the withdrawal of the troops ther*' 
will become an impossibility on account of the deep nature c^-^ 
the soil, as also will be the supplying of them in the presen 
advanced position. The conditions attached to the tardy^ 
consent of the Italian Government to operations being^ 
conducted in their territory could not be complied with j 
without active co-operation of the Mijjarten, which to be 
cfTective should have been undertaken sooner, some three 
weeks ago. 

" Under the circumstances I strongly urge withdrawal of 
the troops from the advanced position. The Mullah haa been 
outmanoeuvred and forced north. His military power was 
broken by the decisive defeat at Jidbali. Subsequent 
operations in the Nogal and pursuit in the Northern Hand 
have completed bis rout, driven bim out of the Protectorate, 
and dispersed his followers. The Dolbahantas are scattered 
and are at present without proper and tribal organization 
and are, to a large extent, disorganised refugees among the 
Protectorate tribes The Mullah, with practi- 
cally only his Ali Gheri following, is a discredited refugee in the 
Mijiarten territory, at the mercy of Osman Mahmud. His 
actual capture by the field force is, under present conditions, 
in my opinion impracticable 

" It is under these conditions that I advocate the cessation 


of operations, the reduction of the field force, and the early 
relief of the units required for the support of the civil admiiua- 
tratioQ, to enable it to take advantage of this present lavourable 

state of aSairs." 

In reply to this telegram the Secretary of State for War 
telegraphed on the I5th April that he concurred in the views of 
Gieneral Egerton as expressed in his telegram of the 12th, but 
*' the operations already ordered for the capture of Illig and 
dealing a last blow at the Mullah are to be carried out." 

Throughout the second phase of the operationa, the reports Eipeditioi 
of prisoners and others were moat consistent iu pointing out '" '*' 
Illig as the Mullah's first objective should he be driven from 
the north of the Northern Hand, He was known to have left a 
garrison of some 200 riflemen and 500 spearmen there, and to 
have fortified it against attack by land or sea. It was beyond 
striking distance from the Nogal Plain, from which it is sepa- 
rated by very difficult country, and by a belt of dense waterless 
bush, extending from Kallis almost to the coast. It formed, 
therefore, a safe and convenient rallying point for the Mullah 
and his people, and for this reason General Egerton had more 
than once urged its destruction by a mixed naval and military 
landing party covered by war ships. On the 3Ist March 
General Egerton having again pointed out that he considered 
Illig should be definitely denied to the Mullah, the consent of 
the Italian Government was finally obtained, and a combined 
naval and military operation was decided upon for the capture 
of the village, an account of which is given in Chapter VII. 

Though the capture of the Mullah or his surrender was not 
achieved, the great and continued exertions demanded from, 
and moat cheerfully undergone by all the troops — British, 
Indian, and African— formed a striking feature of the 



Blockade of thb Coast.— Eeconnalssance op Iluq and 

Obbu.— Naval Operations. — Captoee of Iluq. 
A HiSTOHY of the campaigns in Somaliland would be incom- 
plete without mention being made of the asBistance which was 
afforded by the Navy. 

During the first and second expeditions naval co-operation 
in connection with the mihtary operations was mainly con- 
fined to the presence of one of His Majesty's ships, which was 
stationed oft Berbera for the protection of that town and lor 
occasionally visiting the ports along the Protectorate coast. 
In the early part of 1902, Lieut. -Colonel Swayne represented 
to the Foreign Office that the Mullah was receiving consider- 
able augmentation of strength from the supply of arms and 
anmaunition through the coast ports east of Berbera. Con- 
sequently, steps were taken by the Admiralty to exercise 
control at British ports over the movements of local craft by 
occasional patrols, while the Italian Government were requested 
to do the same along the coast of the Italian protectorate. 
4 L^ These measurtis were carried into effect by H.M.S. " Cossack " 
\A£iinJi*y^ ft and the Italian ship " Govemolo " respectively, between 
*M**y-ij. ' Bandar Kasim and Kas Alula. The Commander of the 

f" Cossack" reported that arms could easily be landed from 
dhows between Karam and Cape Gardafui, a distance ol 
some 350 miles, and suggested that more effective measures 
should be adopted. 
Blookade of In April, 1902, instructions were issued to the naval 

commanders to take such pohce and punitive action ia 


co-operation with the Italian authorities as they nught 
oousider Qeceasary to prevent the impoitatiou of mimitioiia 
of war to the Mullah. In compliance with these orders, 
H.U.S. " Perseus " and " Cossack," assisted by the 
" Govemolo " estabhahed a blockade of the coast, with aview 
to searching and capturing any dhows which might be 
trafficking in arms on behalf of the enemy. In one of these 
expeditions an important capture was made, of which the 
following account is given by Commander E K. Pears, 
H.M.S. " Perseus " :— 

Commander Pairs io Rfnr-Admiral Boaanqiiel, 

" Peraeua," at Berbera, 
Sit, 5th June, 1902. 

In cantiauatioQ of my general letter of tke ^^ad Maj laat, I have the 
oonotir to report that I left Berbera at G F.u. on the 2Tth May, first em- 
harkmg, at Captain Cordeaux'a lequeat, the Sultan of Laa Khorai and hia 
suite, and proceeded to Hais, where, next morning, I met Lienteoant 
liudeaj'B dhow, which had completed its cruise to the eastirard and had 
returned to Hais to meet me i all dhowa met with had boon boarded, but 
no caiue was found to detain any of them. 

2. Taking the crow, gun and Btores of this dbow on board the ship, I 
left her at Haia in charge of her oativo crew and proceeded eastward, meeting 
Ijeutenant Bevan'a dhow which had also complete its cruise without 
results, near Bandar Hashau. 1 removed the crew, gun and stores from 
this dhow also, and ordered her native master to take her to Haia and await 
my arrival there. 

3. I thi'D proceeded to Las Khorai, arriving at 7 P.U., and there 
diaem-barked the Sultan and hia attendants. The Sultan having made hix 
Bubmisaion at Berbera to the Conaul-GcQural, the blockade of the Waraangli 
porta haa now ceased- It is iatetestiog to note the success of this measure, 
which brought the Sultan to hia knees far more eEFttctively than any bom- 
bardments could have donii. He returned to his territory on excellent 
t«rmB with thu Uonsul- General, and it ia quite posalble that before long he 
will request that a customs station may ha established at Laa Khorai. 

4. I left LasKhocaiat 9 P.M. on the 28th, and returned to Haia, where I 
arrived nest morning, meeting there the two hired dhows. The ahip 
having now cruised thcee times each way along the coast, and the two 
armed dhowa having cniiaed independently for nearly a fortnight, every 
dhow mat with being searched in vain, I am convinced that for a time at 
leaat the traffia in'arms baa ceased as far as the British Somali coast is 
ooncarned ; a wholeaoma fear seema to have been established locally, 
though I have infurmaUon that Arabs at Jibuti are still aa ansiuua to supply 

a the Mullah is to obtain thaui. 

S. I therefore determined, ptsadiog ray retuni to Berbera »□ the 7th June 
(in uoordanoe with Colonel Swavae'i verbal reqaest that I should be at 
that port from the Tth lo the I4th June to protect the tora from any 
ooiiQler- attack by the UuUab), to diBraJM one of the hired dhowa and try 
the effect of a cruise on the Arabian coast with the other oae. I thought 
it advisable to communicate first with the Political ReBidont 'at Aden, and 
also to ageertain news of the eipocted Italian mao-of-wat " Galileo." 

0. I accordingly loft Hais at 8 A.U. on the 20th May, with the larger 
hired dhow in tow, and pro[«eded to Aden, where I arrived at 4.30 4.H. oa 
the 30th. I communicatod wit)i the Resident, who concurred in my pro- 
{■osed programme, and with the ItaUan Coiisul*Qeneral who informed me 
that the " Qalilec " hod been detained owing t« an infectious disease on 
board, and would probably not anive before the 4th June, This delay is 
unfortunate, for Colonel Swayne is counting upon the " Galileo " to convey 
iSuttau Yueuf Ah to the east coast in time to co-operate with him against 
the Mullah, and it is to be feared that the Sultan will now be too late. 

7. At 7 P.M. on the 30th May I left Aden with the armed dhow and 
proceeded along the Arabian coast to the westward. Off Haura, at 6 p.m. 
on the 31st May, I dropped the dhow, with Lieutenant Beran in oommand, 
with orders to proceed to Haura and Irka, and thence eastward along the 
coast to Shukra, searching all dhows met with. I then proceeded in the 
ship to Ash Sheyt (Shahar), arriving there at 8 a.m. on the ist June and 
searching all dhows there ; thenoe proceeding to Hokalla, where T anchored 
at 1.30 P.M, the same day. All dhowa here were searched, and I delivered 
to the Medical OtSt^r o( the town [a native of India) some disinfectants 
sent by the Resident at Aden on account ot the recent outbreak of pb^ic 
in this place ; he informed me, however, that it is now free of the disease. 

8. Leaving Makalla at 4.30 p.m., I proceeded to Balahaf, where I arrived 
at C A.u. on Monday the 2nd June, and found no dhows ; thenoe along the 
coast to the westward to meet Lieutenant Sevan's dhow. She was sighted 
at 4 P.M. with another dhow in tow, which she had captured. The sea 
was too heavy to allow the dhows to coma alongside, so I took them in tow, 
while Lieutenant Bevan came on board to report the oircorastanCBfl. The 
captured dhow, which was bound from Jibuti to Bir Ali — a small harbour 
near Balahaf— was found to be carrying ; — 

03 rifles (Graa and Martini-Henry). 
8,325 rounds of rifle ammtinition. 

2G rounds of Wincho6l«r ammunition. 
2S rounds of pistol ammimition. 
20 casks (about 1 cwt. each) of sulphm'. 
A number of pigs of lead. _ 

9. A copy of Lieutenant Sevan's report of the capture is attaohed. I 
regret the loss of life, hot it seems to have been unavoidable in order to prevent 
the dhow from escaping, and Lieutenant Bevan appears to have acted with 
forbearance and judgment, I beg to bring to your favourable notice the 
Bervicea o£ this officer, who has carried out with mifls^ging zeal |and energy 


an armed dhow, and who uaptured alao the suspicious dhow 
ia Somali coast reported in my last letter. 

I. I had intended to go on to Sliiikra, but being hampered by the two 
n low, a strong south-westerly breeze and considerable sea, I decided 
d direct to Aden, where I arrived in the outer anchorage at 7.30 p.m. 
A 3rd June. 
ft, Oa the morning at the 4th I proceeded into the inner harbour and 
ir the dhow and stores and the two wounded men (who had been 
IT the doctor's care) to the proper autboritioB. I had ordered coal to bo 
alongside early the neit morning;, but, on receiving a letter, dated the 
30th May, (com Captain Cordeaui, urgently requesting me to go over at- 
■oon as possible to Berbera For the protection of that town, I completed with 
GO&I at once and left Aden at S p.m., arriving at Berbers at 1 1 A.u, on the 5th. 
I 12. I found all quiet at Berbera, No news had been received from 
Colonel Bwayne since the 29th May, when Captain Cordeaux heard that he 
and the whole corps left Burao on the Siith, the MuUah with 7,000 horse 
and 7,000 foot and 1,600 rifles then being at Baran, 120 miles south-west of 
Burao. Colonel Swayne added (hat the Mnllah might mid north to Berbera, 
a movement that he would be unable to prevent. Berbera being now 
absolutely denuded of troops, and the Muilah being liJtoly, if he intended to 
attack the place at ail, to attack before Colonel Swayne could get up U> hhn, 
Captain Corduaux had requested the presence of the ship. 

It is very unhkely that the Mullah will attack Berbera while a man-of-war 
is iiero, one of his chief advisers being an ex-naval interpreter. Sinee 
writing to me, Captain Cordeaux has received 500 rifles from Aden, and 
intends organizing a native militia, whit^h should be capable of defending 
the place unaaeisted. I propose to remain here until the IGth instant, by 
which time I hope the situation will be clearer. 

13. lam sending directions to the Commanding Officer, H.M.S. " Dryad " 
(on h:tT arrival) to cruise along the Arabian coast and search all dhows, 
after conferring with the Reaident as to which ports to visit. With reference 
to jour telegram of the 3rd June, which I answered by telegraph on the 
4 th June, I do not think another ship is requited for this service, as pracUoally 
all local traffic east of Aden ceasea soon after the soiitb-west monsoon com- 
uiesces, and I find many dhows already preparing to haul up. But our 
CBpture of a dhow with arms on the 2nd June shows that the traffic is not 
over yet, and the " Dryad's " presence on the Arabian coast, tor a few weeks 
at least, is desirable. 

=. The health of the ship's company is rccy good. 

I havD, &o. 
(Signed) E. R. PEABfi, 

CotmnandeT and Senior Navid Offica; Aden Divifion. 

Lieutenant Bevan to CommandeT Peart. 

" Perseus," 3rd June, 1Q02. 
fun the hraioiir to report that at I f.u. oa Monday the 2nd June, 
fc omfsbig in the armed dhow undpr my command off Ras Aulaki 

^^^H (Arabian coast), a dhow wa.s Bight(<d about 1| milea fium tLe sbore. When 

^^^H I got withm about 200 yards from hor, I hailed and ordered her to tovet bet 

^^^1 sail, at the sama time hoUtiug the white ensign ; be immediately altered 

^^^1 course for the ebare, aad I then Bred a blank charge, and he at once retutDcd 

^^^1 tbe fire witb rifles, at least three men firing, and some ot the bullets hit the 

^^^H dbonr. After another blank charge bad been fired with no result, I gave 

^^^H the order to fire shell from tbe 3-pr., endeavouring to bring down his mast ; 

^^^H but, aa she still continued firing, I gave the order to Sre at her. After firing 

^^^H a few ahats her sail came down. I then ordered cease firing ajid ran along- 

^^^1 side of her, when one of her orew again fired at one of my men. 
^^^H We found her loaded with arms, ammunition and barrels of sulphur. 

^^^1 I regret to say two oF her crow wore killed by 3-pr. shell and two wounded 

^^H by our dfie fire ; these were tbe only men in the dhow at the time ol capture, 

^^^H but Charles Alderton states that he saw some men j ump overboard after her 

^^^1 nail came down. I attended to the wounded men, transhipped her cargo, 

^^^1 and took her in tow ; lay native crew buried the dead men at sea. At 

^^^H 4.20 p.u. we sighted H.M.S. " Perseus," who took both dhows in tow, the 

^^^H two wounded men were taken on board and attended to by the Staff Surgeon- 
^^^H All the bluejackets worked hard and well, and I would specially mention 

^^H Wright HaUtead, Petty Officer, 1st Class ; Charles Alderton, leading 

^^^H seaman ; and James Bnssell, A.B., who manned the 3-pr. and were expoied 

^^H to the enemy's fire. 

^^^^^ I have, Ac. 


Ber^nnais- 1" October, 1002, the villages of Dlig and Obbia were 

"1"^.".^-^"'^ reconnoitreii by H.M.S. "Pomone," witli a. view to ascer- 
Bud Obbift. ■' 

taining the capabihties of thoee places as a base for military 


l)L.i,».i,siru- During November, 1903, H.M.S. "Perseus," "Merlin" 

■ ' and "Porpoise," accompanied by the Italian ship "Galileo," 

carried out a demonstration at Obbia in order to co-operate 
with the land forces under General Egerton by maintmning 
the idea that operations were also projected from the coast. 
Xaval openi- The following extracts from official despatches give an 
interesting account of the naval operations which were con- 

L ducted during this period under the direction o! the Naval 

* The disembarkation at Obbia during January, 1903, under naval 
rangements is described in Chapter XIV, 4. 

^ ' 

Commawitr 6'ijiiHi to Kear-Aittntrai Alhnum-Willef. 
" Mohawk," »» Aden, 
\ (Telegtaphic.) Tth December, 1903. 

On amval at Bandar Kasim on 5th December, learned mordcr (of) 
Liontenant Carlo Oraban, Italian Navy, at Durbo. Ptocoedod thither. 

Id the sbBmce of Italian man-of-war, landed 70 men with anna and 
demanded satisfaction (on) behalf (of) Italian GoFeroment. 

Being unauccessfid, bombarded, attacked, and partially burnt village, 
tilling approximately 20 natives. 

Caanalties : Commander dangerously woimded, one marine killed. 
Admiralty have been informed. 

Rfor-Admirai Alkinton-Willes to Commander Pear), 
(Telegraphic.) 11th December, lOOa. 

Investigate and report fully by telegraph all ciroumstonaes connected 
with death oE Italian officers at Durbo ajid subsequent attack on tliis place 
by " Mohawk." 

Commander Pears to Rear-Admi-al Atkineon-WiUes. 
(Telegraphic.) Aden, Uth December, 1903. 

With reference to your telegram No. 29, following information has been 
obtained from Commander Gaunt in hospital : — 

No man-of-war here when " Mohawt" arrived, bat understand official 
report has been forwarded- 

Italian Lieutenant at Dvirbo, 3rd December, in armed dhow, ordered 
cativee to hoist flag (obstructions removed) ; refused; opened fire on tbem. 

Natives returned heavy fire on dhow leaving. Lieutenant was killed and 
four men wounded. 

"Mohawk" called at Bandar Kaaim for news on the lith Deoeiuber, 
Hearing above report, and having communicated vith Kultan and warrnnt 
ofBcer oE dhow, who acquiesced, and having embarked one of the crew of 
armed dhow, with Italian flag, proceeded with despatch to Durbo, arriving 
2 4.M., 6th December. 

Landing party landed at dawn. Commander Gaunt iotervi6w[ed] four 
Chiefs and demanded 100 rifles and two Chiefs should be dealt with by 
Italians, and threatened in case of refusal to burn village. 

Preparations had been made for lighting, and Chiefs refused any 

After one warning shot, six Q.F. 3-pr. ehelU were lired into village and 
landing party advanoed. Natives fired on tne landing party but were 
driven oS with considerable loss. 

Commander Gaunt was dangerously hurt io the Qiigh, and Private 
Stanton, Boyal Marine Light Itifantry,~{dlled early. 

Village waa then [t burned] and landing parties re.embarked, and 
" Uobawk" procaeded to Aden. 

CommandtT Ttn\ 

Rcar-Adntirai AtkinMn-WiUe.1. 

" Perseus, " at Ad^i, 
Sir, 13th December, 1903. 

In continuation of my gancrft! letter, dated the 28tli NoTeraber, 1903, 1 
hnve tho banonr to report that I left Bfind&r Alula on the 2Sth. November, 
at 3 F.n. (the " Porpoise" leaving shortly afteriFarda for Aden), and pro- 
L-Dodod to Bos HaCua, South Bay, where I anivod at 7 AM. on the 29tU, 
finding there the Italian cruiser " Oidtleo." 

'2. The Captain of the " Galileo " came on iioard and informed me that 
he had been obligeid to raise steam at Obbia on accooat o[ tbe bad weivtber, 
nod that, being short of ooal as well aa provisions (with lome of which ho 
had been anpplied by the " Porpoise"), he was compelled to proceed to sea 
and return to Aden. 

3. As for the anme reason ho was miable to return to Obbia, and as I felt 
sure, though I had no direct iostriictions on the anbject, that General 
Kgarton desired that Ali Yuaiif should havo the 230 Italian rifles for tlio 
defence of Oftlkayu without delay," I asked the Captain of the " Galileo" 
to let me take one of his officers to Obbia to act as Itahan Gepceeentattva 
and see to tho issue of the rifles. This he agreed to do (coirespondencc 
on tho subJRct is attached), t and, after receiving Sub -Lieutenant Ferrari 
on board, I sailed at 11 a.m. for Obbia, where I arrived at 5.30 a.m. on the 
1st December, tinding there H.M.S. " &lerlin." 

4. I lauded at 6.30 a.m., with Signer Ferrari and lieutenant Evans, R.E., 
tbe Military Intelligence Offlcer (whom I received on board this ship on 
arrival), and called on the Sultan Ali Yuauf. Thelatl<?r immediately agreed to 
accept the 250 rifles on the condition of occupying and defending tho GEdkayu 
Wells, and promised to send a force there at once. The rifles and ammunition 
were landed the next day, and on the 3rd December a force of 320 rifles 
(tho Sultan having added 70 of his own) started from Obbia tor Galkayii, 
the Sultan sending word also to Hurrounding tribes to join this force, the 
command of which was entrusted to Ism an Shannarkar, the Sultan's 

fl. On the 8th instant, messengers arrived from Isman Shannarkar, who 
hail reached the Mudug district, saying that large numbers of tho Mullah's 
lloeks had arrived at tho Mudug Wells and were accompanied by an armed 
cKcort. His owik force had now increased to 170 riflcfl and 1,000 spearmen, 
and ho was going to attack the enemy at once, and occupy, if possible, tho 
Galkayu Wellf . 

0. Tho arrival of tha Mullah's flocks at Mudug indicated with so 
certainty an early move of the Mullah himself in. that direction ; eo (after 
waiting a day for the " Mohawk," nhich I expected at Obbia on the 8th) 
I sailed on the 9th foe Berbera, to inform the General OfRcet Commanding, 
Somaliland, leaving the " Merlin " at Obbia. 

• See page Z23. 1 fJSoi jrinted. 

7- Having been ossutmI, boUi at Rns Uafim and Liy Ali Yusuf at Ubbia 
Uie,t Illig had been abandoned by the Mullah, I decided to call there on my 
way and maJte certidn of the facts, if possible. Ali Yusuf, at my request, 
had, an the 'ind December, sent meBsengers to Uli^ tu tell the people there. 
if friendly, to hoist a white cloth and send a, aurf boat out on the approach 
of a BritiEb or Italian maD-of-war. On my arrival at Illig on the 10th, 
however, these things were not done ; an the oontj'ary, considerable niimbera 
of riflemen were seen to be taking up positiana behind the rock« on each side 
of the beach, with the evident intention of resisting any attempts to land 
a party. This action, and the large niunher of armed m.en seen in lUig 
(the iKinual population of which consiata of 30 to 40 families engaged in 
fishing), convinced mo that the place is still held by the Mullah. A large 
stone xartba, at least 200 yards in length and 6 feet in height, sunuouuta the 
cMa. It is viable from the aca and shell conU bo thrown into it by ahije ; 
but the only effective way to eotnpcl the enemy to evacuate the place would 
be to leave a, blockading ship at the anchorage, thus defeating the object 
of the enemy in holding the place, i.e., to obtain supplies and Hjumuoition 
by aea. Landing at Illig by ships' boats is at present out of the question, 
owing to the heavy sea now prevailing. 

8. llaviug reconnoitred Ulig, where I did not anchor, I proceeded on 
my way to Berbera. Oil Gardafoi, on the 1 1th instnnt, I met H.M.S. 
" Mohawk " nnder the command of her First Lieutenant, who come on board 
and informed mo of the cause of the delay in her arrival at Obbia, viz., 
the action taken at Durbo in consequence of the murder of the Italian officer 
oonunanding the armed dhows, and the woundmg of Commander Gaunt, 
necessitating the " Mohawk's" return to Aden. I ordered the " Mohawk" 
to proceed to Obbia and await rehef there, to enable the " Merlin " to bring 
any further news up to Berbera without delay if neecasury. " Mohawk's" 
letter of proceedings is attached, 

S. Carrying out a quarterly passage trial between Gardaf ui ant) Berbers, 
I arrived at the latter place at lOp.u. on the 12th, and telegraphed a summary 
of news to the General Officer Commaading, to whom I also forwarded a 
letter practically identical with paragraphs 1 to 7 above. I left Berbera 

111.15 F.H., and arrived at Aden at '2 P.M. on the IStb, finding here 
i£. "Pomone" and the Italian cruisers " Voltumo" and " lAimbardia." 
K I have, S;c. 

I (Signed) E. R. PEARS, 

K Commander and Senior Nufol Officer, Aden Divieion. 

SaUiiig Orders. 


Having can'ied out your pros 
traffic on the SomoU cOiL^t, you i 
than the 30(h instant. 

,t Las Khorai, 

SIst NovcmLer, 1903. 
nt cruise for the prevention of the nmis 
■e to proceed to Aden, arriving not later 


'2. On Ihu arrival at Adcii af HiM.S. " P(ir|N>ige." you trill traaaCor the 
iluttua and MuTMpondenoe relating la the omiEt ttaffio to Commajider 
llutliom, and after receiving as much coal as yoM con carry with safety, you 
•re lo leave Aden c»i the 3rd December luid proceed to Raa Hafun (South 
Lay), wh*tp I iUall nieet yoo on the 6th l>ecBmbM. 

'.I. I have informed the General OiBcm Commanding the Somaliland 
Field Force of your proposed moveraents. and re<|ueated him to send to mo 
by you hia latest wishes as to the oo-oporation of His Majeaty'H ahipa in his 
plans. ¥(ni should, therefore, not leave Adeii until after the arrfval of the 
B.LM. steamer from Berbers, due at Aden the 3rd December. Should no 
oomuimication from the Ocnoral OfRoec Commanding reach you by her, 
you are to frooeed to sea without wwting further. 

4, You are to bring the Rua Hufnn mailfl for " Perseus" and " Merlin." 

fi. letters of proceedings nre to lie forwarded to me. 

(Utgncd) E. B. FEARS, 

Voimimndfr and Haaor Naval O^err. Airn Divmoa. 
Coiiiiiinndec Ernest F. A. IJaiiut,, 
H,M.S. '■ Mohuwk." 

Alternlinii to Sailing Orders. 

'■ Persons," at 8ea, 
(Mcn.o.) •nth November, 1903. 

With rcforoDfo to your sailing orders dat<>d the 2ist November, 1903, the 
General Officer Commanding Somaliland Field Force having requested that 
the concentration at Shg may be deferred and the demonstration at Obbiit ' 
onntinued, I shall not meet you at Ras Hafun as liefore arranged but remain 
it Obhia, to which place yon are to proceed on your deportore from Aden 
on the 3rd December. 

You should arrange, however, to call at Rbb Hafun ou your way, and 
obtain there any information aa to the Mullah's movemcnls nnd action of 
the neighbouring tribes, and ascertain, if possible, the cxisling state of 
aftairs at JUig. 

(Signed) E. R. PEARS, 

Commander and Senior Naval Officer, Aden Division. 
Commander Ecaeet F. A. Gaunt, C.M.Ci., 
H.M.S. " Mohawk." 

dl to Commattder Pears. 

" Mobawk," at Aden, 
^, Sth December, 1903. 

'■- In accordance with your Memorandums of the 2Ut and U7tb November, 
[ have the honour to report : — 

1. Alter receipt of urgent tek'grotns from General UScer Commanding, 
Somaliland Field Force, H.M.S. " Slobiiwk " left Uoibora the iflJth November, 


arrivmg at Aden the following day. During the passage carried out half a 
quBrtOT's torpedo pracWoe. 

3, At Aden reoeiTed 194 tona at ooal, including upper deck cargo. While 
*t anchor aiming practice was completed for the quarter. 

3. On the 3rd inetant, the " Dalhoi;aie" having arrived, and mails for 
" PetaeuB " and " Merlin " and summary of intelligeute trom General Officer 
Commanding having been received, giroceeded. 

4. In compliance with wish of General Officer Commanding, menlioued 
in his telegram of the 27th ultimo (copy attached), ciiUed at Bandar Ka^ioi. 
Notliiug could bo ascertained regarding the riflea said to Iki received by the 

At Jlandar Kasim, Imving becu informed that lieuteuoiit Carloa Grabun 
of the Italinn dhows had been murdered at Diirbo, proceeded on behalf of 
the Italian Government, arriving there at 1 i.>i. on the Gth instant. At 
6.30 on the Ttb [I Qtb] instant, representatives of village wore sent for 
to hold consultation. 'E'wo Oilofa arrived on board and asked for con^ 
sultation to be held on shore. 75 officers and men were landed, and two 
Chiefs and 100 rilles demanded. After a lengthy consultation this waa 
refused, saying thoy would rather iight. Accordingly two shells were 
fired over the village. The enemy thep commenced ride-fire. Three- 
pounders were then ordered to fire on the village and rifle-fire commenced. 

5. The engagement lasted two hours. 

asnaltiea : — 
p Killed— 

Private John Stanton, R.M.L.L, Ch 1253 
kDangeronsly wounded^ 

Commander E. F. A. Gai 

t, C.M.C;. 

^B ^ 


^^^^Km easualties of the onejn; were approximately 20 killed. 
^^^^K On Commnjider Gaunt t>eing wounded I took command, and, havmg 
^^^mied the enemy und pattially destroyed the village, returned on board 
nt 10.3S A.M. 

7. Owing to the heavy surf the boat containing the body of Private 
Stanton was capsized and the body sank. I sent two boats tu recover 
body, but at 12.30 p.m., liotldng having been seen of the body, and owing 
to the critical condition of Commander Gaunt, after reading burial service, 
I proceeded at 25 speed for Aden, which waa reached at P.M. on the 7Ui. 
S. I immediately landed Commaodor Gatmt, and completed with coal. 

iving Dl tons. 

9. I propi^B leaving for Obbia at 9 A.u. t 
k The health of the ship's company ia 

r, calling at Raa HaE u 

I have, &-!., 
(For Commander, sick), 


I'rvm Amiiiliiid Qiuirler'iiastcr-Ueneral jur InU^ij/utcc to Cuitinaiuhr Pavs. 
(TolegraphiD.) 27tli Novambur, W03. 

lliraliim duaecters to Bohotle from Uultah utsert that Mullah ajid OEiaan 
Mnhmud have patched up their quarcol, and arms have commenced to 
arrive again. Ten rifles arrived at Haroun from Bosaeo on 18th November. 
I don't believe it; but It nuuld be moat valuable if jou could ascertain 
whetlier tboro is anything in it. Latest infonnatioa from same source 
places Mullah still at Adadero on the IRth instant. 

Comiruiivkr Pears to Bear- Admiral Athittiton-Wiliee. 
" Peraeiis," at Aden, 
Sir, IDth Dcoerabar, 1903. 

I have the honour to report aa follows on the reuetit disturbances at 
Durbo, the main facts of which wore reported hy tulegraph to yourself on 
tlio 7th iiifltant. I have obtained the particulars from, the Italian Senior 
Naval Officer and Commander Gaunt. 

2. On the 3rd Decumbor an Italian armed dhow was at Durbo, nnder the 
cioniuiaDd of Lieutenant Grabau, of tho Italian Navy. This oSicer caUed 
upon the chief men to hoist the Italian flag. This they refuse to do 
without first consulting the Sultau, which would have involved a delay of 
Bumc days, lieutenant Graban insisted on immediate compliance, mider 
pain of bombardment. As tiko Chiefs persisted, the armed dhow opened 
fice on tho viilagt. After this a<;tiun Lieutenant Graban niade sail on the 
dhow in order to depart, and, in doing so. tiie dhow canie mthin about 
250 yards of the beach. The natives now emerged from cover and opened 
fire on the dhow with rifles, killing Lieutenant Grabon instantly and wounding 
four men. The petty officer in charge proceeded to Bandar Kosim and 
reported the occurrence to the armed dhow there, and then went on to 
Aden with the body of Lieutenant Graban. 

3. On tho 5th December the " Mohawk," on her way to Obbiu, called at 
Bandar Kasim for news desired by the General Ofilcor Commanding, 5omaIi- 
land ; the Officer of the Guard heard of the above affair and reported it to 
Oommander Gavmt, who proceeded to interview the petty officer m charge 
of the Italian armed dhow statione<[ there, and^lso the Native Governor 
of Bandar Kasiin. The latt«r refused any assistance ; the Italian petty 
officer concurred that immediate action was desirable, and lent to Com- 
mander Gaunt one of bis Somali crew with an Italian flag, so that Italy 
might be represented in any aotion taken in her territory. Commander 
Gaimt then jsoceeded in the " Mohawk" to Durbo, arriving at 1 A.U. ou 
the 0th. A boat ouiue off at dayhght with a Somali trader not belongiog 
lo the place, who acted at intermediary between Commander Gaunt and the 
Ohiefa. Tho latter declined to come on board tho ship, but suggested a 
eonferenue on shore. A number of armed natives being on the beach — 
gome being seen in a rifle pit commanding it, which points to previous 
pieparations for resistance — Commander Gaunt landed with a party of 

ntl, Scaving them on the beach, selected an open piece ot ground 
close by for the coofecent-e, where the Chiefa agreed to meet him. Com- 
mBnder (3aunt statt-d to them that ho wna unting on behalf of the Italian 
Government, who were in friaodly co-ope mtioa with the British, and 
demanded, in conaeqiienco of the altnpk on the Italian armed dhow, that 
two Chiefs ghoidd como on board, to he taken Imfore the Italian nvithorities 
and that 100 rifles should bo handed over. 

4. The Chiefs' only reply was to offer la ■submit these demands totbeir 
Sultan, from whom a reply would be roceived in six days. The women 
had been removed from the village, and men armed with rifles were arriving 
every raoment. Commander Gaunt therefore said : " I will now fire a hig 
gun over your village as a warning : it you then offer no terms, I -shall firo 
fix S-pounder common shell into your village and advance and bum it ; 
yon will not be attaekcd unless you first attack ray party." Shelter was 
then taken by both sides ; the heavy gnns having been fired, the landing 
(lai-lv, having wfuted tor the time agreed and for the light gims to be fired, 
advanced and were nttaoked by rifle fire, which was replied to. 

Commander Gaunt was shortly afterwards severely wounded in the 
thigh, and ordered Lieutenant Powell to continns the atlaolt. The nativei 
were driven from the place, the village partly destroyed, and the party 
rc.embarked, witli the loss of Private Stanton, R.M.L.I., killed. Com- 
mander Gaunt's condition being dougerous. Lieutenant Powell, after 
searching without success toi the liody of the marine who had been Ullod, 
whioh had fiillen into the sea owing to the capsizing ot the boat in which it 

"til December, and 
I the l-^opean Gpnoral 

■- to till' Adjuiralty iiud 
reply, proeeeded 

had been placed, returned to Aden, a 
landed Commander Ciaiint, who won ceoei. 

.'). The " Moiiawk " having reported the oi 
Commander-in-Chief, and waited until the 9th ii 

to Obbia, in accordance with her sailing orders. I met her off Cape Gardofui 
on the 1 Ith and received her letter of proceedings, wliicli I forwarded to you 
on my arrival at Aden on the I3th. 

8, Commander Gaont's wound is a very serious one, the ijone of the thigh 
lieing smoJ^hed ; he has snftored considerable pain but is progriosing 
favourably. It is unlikely that be can be moved for at least two months. 

7. The Italian Senior Naval Officer at Aden jnd the Captain of the 
Italian cruiser "Voltumo" have in conversation espressed to me their 
high appreciation of Commander Gaunt's gallant and prompt behaviour in bo 
rapidly and vigorously avenging the death of the Italian oflioer. I think 
that the efiect upon the natives along the entire coast will be a good one. 
impressing upon them the reality of British aiid Italian co.operation in the 
present campaign against the Mullah and in the measures being carried out 
fot the suppression of the arms traSic and maintenance of order on 11ie 
Somtdi coast. 

I have, lic, 
(Signed) E. R. PEARS. 

CowmiivJcr and Saiior Naval Officer, Aden Division. 

Lieiitetumt PoimB to Commando' Pfan. 

" Mohawk," at Aden. 
Sir, .^th Jamiurj. 1004, 

la coinpliauce with jo\a MomaraDdiim of the itth loHtcuit, I havo tlie 
tonouc to report : — 

ThepartylandedatDaibodnthoethuitimuaoosiatedofCsptainE. F. A. 
Gannt, C.M.G., Ijeatenanta Frank Powell and Motria E. CochcsDe, Staff. 
SorgeoQ Charlea S. Faoey, and 7'2 men, viz. : — 
42 rifles. 

1 petty officer of a company. 

2 eiploflive party. 

1 sick berth steward. 
4 stretcher party. 
I bugler. 

1 Captain's coxswain and 17 raannes. 

The morinea were commanded by Sergeant John Byrne, R.M.L.I., who is 
included in the number landed. 

On the Captain returning from tlie conference with the Sheitlia to liis own 
forces he ordered me to open the men into skinilisMug order. 1 placed the 
mftrinea under Sergeant Byrne on the right, Lieutenant Coohranu with 
maxim and about 10 rifles in centre, and I took the remainder of the riHeinen 
uii the left ; this formed the party into a continuoii.'! line. 

Immediately the first shot went into the village the natives, who had 
moanwldle taken good cover in a nuUah, opened fire at a distance of between 
80 and 100 yards; I had previously charged magazines and immediately 
returned their fire. Within the first five minutes of opening fire Captain 
Gaunt was wounded ; personally I did not see him fall, as 1 had extended 
to the left with, about 20 men as I saw soma rifle pita, and with that a 
the cover afforded by the houses on the extreme end of the village was able 
to enfilade the enemy. 

After seeing my men on the left well posted in good cover I returned 
along the lino, which hod previooaly made three or four sharp short rushes, 
and from Lieutenant Cochrane leamod of Captain Gaunt being wounded 
and earned to the rear, where he was being attended Ut by Slaff-Surgeon 

I knew the Captain's wishes, so kept the men in their position until after 
about, when the firing, which had been very heavy, begnn to 
Hlaeken ; I then ordered the men on the left to burn and destroy aa much 
of the Ttlliige as possible. 

I advanced the fightmg Une a little, but not far, as by thLi timo the amoke 
which was dense, was blowing along our line from the village, which bad in 
several places been set on Are by shells as well as by the men I bad ordered. 
Porttires were used, hut with little effect, the ordinary mateh being fonnd 
more useful. 

The enemy hod by thia timo practicallj disappeared, soatteriQg nmong 
thp hills in their rear ; I did not advaooe to pursue them, it being inadrisoblo 
owing to our Isfk of knowledge of the country, and therefore signalled to 
the boats to close, as by this time the village was burning lieroely and we 
had killeil and wounded a good many. 

I estimated about 20 to 30, but have lately heard at Bander Ka!<im tliab 
ST were Idlled, presumably ineluding the bombardment by Italians. 

i signalled to ship to keep up heavy shelling into the village t 
heads while men vece embarking. I tltea returned towiuds the booch, but 
kept B good number behind whilst cutter, which had masim, was beinglooded 
with our men. I ordered this cutter to lay off and cover the remainder of 
did embarkation with her maxim in caae of a rush. 

The aea hod risen conaidetably, and tliere was muoh more difficulty iu 
embarking, but the galley was the only boat swamped and at the time liad 

Whilst towiug IiBT oB she ca)iaized, aud I regret to say tlio body of 
Piival^ Slauton sank. 

On returning l« the ship I sent two boats to try and find the body, but 
after two hours recalled them and read burial service ; I then proceeded 
(or Aden. 

Private tjtanton was shot Ihrough the liead aad killed instantly, within 
five minutes ot ojiening fire. 

I have, &o., 

LieuleaaHl in Artiny Comtaaiul. 

From the lOth to 13th of January, 1W)4, a uaval demon- 
stration was made off Illig, but in the absence of an Italian 
ship, no bombardment took place. 

During February, 1904, in connection with the iinal 
phase of General Egerton's operations. Commander M. Hill, 
H.M.S. " Perseus," was engaged in arranging for tho 
establishment of a military post at Las Khorai, mention 
ot which is made on page 475. 

In the meantime, Eear-Admiral G. L. Atkinson-Willes, 
Naval Comjnander-in-Chief, East Indies Station, who had 
arrived on the coast, concentrated the ships of the Aden 
division at Bcrbera and other ports of the British Protec- 
torate, with a view to co-operating with Sir Charles Egerton 
in bringing the fourth expedition to a close ; and, so fat 
as the combined action of the two services was concerned, 

a waa effected by the capture of Illig. 

It will be remembered that in the account of the second 
' phase of the fourth expedition, given in Chapter VI, the 
Mullah was driven out of the British Protectorate and fled into 
Itahan territory, abandoning eveiyihing that might impede 
his retreat. The Mijjartens, who dwell in this part of the 
country, were reputed to be hostile to the Mullah, and they 
had undertaken to harass oui common enemy should he seek 
refuge in their midst. They,' however, had no power of com- 
bination and lacked the necessary initiative to stiike a decisive 
blow, and so long as our troops were prevented from opeiating 
in Italian territory, the elusive prophet had a aafe line of 
retreat open to him. Sir Charles Egecton, who had 
often urged the destruction of lUig by means of a combined 
naval and military operation, represented the situation to 
the home authorities, and sanction was obtained from the 
Itahan Government for a British force to land at IlHg, in the 
presence of an Italian warship, and drive out the Dervishes 
at that place. 

The force was under the command of Rear -Admiral G. L. 
Atkinson-Willea, Naval Commander-in-Chief, East Indies 
Station, and comprised H.M.S. second-class cruisers 
" Hyacinth " (flag-ship) and " Fox," the third-class cruiser 
" Mohawk," 125 men of the 1st Battahon Hampshire Regi- 
ment, under Major S. C. F. Jackson, D.S.O., and a sraaH 
■ field park under Captain W. B. Lesslie, R.E. Captain R. G. 
Munn accompanied the force as military staff officer to the 
Admiral, and Major F. Cunliffe Owen, R.A., and Lieutenant 
W. H, Evans, R.E., were detailed as intelligence officers. 

On the 15th April Bear-Admiral Atkinaon-WiHes con- 
ferred with General Egerton at Berbera, and 125 rank and 
file of the 1st Battahon Hampshire Regiment were embarked 
under the command of Major S. C. F. Jackson, D.S.O., to 
garrison Illig when captured. The troops were distributed as 
follows : — 25 in the " Mohawk," and 100 in the " Hyacinth," 
with their followers, and eight military officers. On meeting 
the " Fox," 50 of the troops in the " Hyacinth " were trans- 
ferred to the former ship. 


On the IGth April the " Mohawk " left Berbera at 5 p.m., 
with orders to anchor ofE the Gallule River* at 5.30 p.m. on the 
2()th, displaying lights after dark, so as 'to enable the other 
ships to anchor on her, and to serve as a blind to prevent 
the Dervish garrison at Illig becoming aware of their arrival. 

The " Hyacinth " and the " Fox " arrived ofE Cape Bowen 
at 6.20 P.M. on the 20th, and without displaying any lights 
anchored at 9.52 p.m. in 5J fathoms close to the " Mohawk " 
and opposite the landing place, which had been previously 
reconnoitred by Commander H. Jones, H.M.S. "Pomone," 
and whose sketch enabled the Admiral to anchor his ships in 
the position selected. 

On aniving at the anchorage, the Admiral issued the follow- landing 
ing orders and instructions for the operations next day : — orders 

" Hyacinth," at Illig, 
_; 20th April, 1904. 

No. 49. Memorandum. 

The following arrangements in connection with the operations at Illig 
to-morrow are communicated for information and guidance : — 

2. The second division of the landing party will form up in column 
quickly and silently in the following order : — 

(1) Seaman battalion. 

(2) Medical party. 

(3) Guns and escort. 

(4) Marines. 

(5) Hampshires (as rear guard). 

3. On overtaldng the advanced party and reaching the Plateau, the 
following formation will be assumed, on the order being given by the 
Admiral : — 

On the right . . Seamen, with reserves and supports in rear. 

In the centre 

On the left . . Hampshires „ „ „ 

In the rear of centre. 

Between the line and the reserves, flanked by their escort. 

4. The foioe will move in an extended square, with its left flank on the 
cliffs. The left will direct. 

Medical party 
Guns .. 

* See plates 13 and 14. 



The OffitfTB Commanding H.M. Ships ireterU, and 

Officers Commanding Units of Landing Party, 

Landitig Arrang.^meiita. 
Subject to 111 odiB cation on the spot, the following aro the proposed 
arrangemenfs ; — 

1. At early dawQ — soon after 4.30 a.oi.^ — tho " Hyucintli' b " uilvan<ie 
party in charge of Flag Captaiu will lanil and ouiiupy the ndjaoent ridge. 

2. The remainder of tho force will land at dawn and aasemhle on the 
boacli under Commander Phillimore. 

3. When diBembarkation is complete, all wilt march and join np with 
advance party, the Flag Captain joining the Admiral. 

4. Or the beach the following will be done (under lieutenant Allen) : — 
{<[) Boats will lae towed to within 30 yards of the beach, then ateainboat 

slips tow and boats turn, and when in position let go the anchor 
and back in on to the beach, and the troops land. 
The boats will at once haul out to the anchor, and the steamboat will 
get them in tow and take them back to the Bliips. 

(b) If there is any difficulty in gBtting a boat off the beach, it is 1^ duty 

of the party who landed in that boat to shove her off into deep 
water, even it they get wet in Bo doing. 

(c) Boots and socks may, if desired, be carried round the men's necks 

aad put on on the beach ; this does not apply to the advance 

5. When disembarkation is ooroplote, lieutenant Allen will retura to 
" Hyacinth," boats return to their ships, and will either be hoisted or towed 
by the ships to the anchorage off Illig. 

6. Boats are then to take in filled water -breakers and cases of rifle 
ammunition ready to replenish the brigade. 

7. " Hyacinth" will detail a steamboat and cutter especially for the 
wounded, who will betaken to " Hyacinth" and hoisted carefully on board — 
derrick to be ready. 

N.B. — All the water-breakcTB in every ship ore to be thoroughly rinsed 
out before Thursday. 








Plate I3.y 

To Face ps^e 283. 

'. IV zejss ZBfio. 

Wi'fflZ ATTangrmcfUa jitr Landing at ISiij. 

.iiageon Draper of H.M-8. " Foi;,"^and Sii.^w— u>— -. 
*tj'ai:'mtli," with the first line of uttock and three Siok Berth 
_. '^'"ith sbi Btretohera sad six beorors to eaoh. 

r^^*«i» McCarthy, K.A.M.C., and hia Asaiatant Surgeon with tlie 
J^^*"^ Regiment ; he hta with him two Btrctchors and bcarerB. 

a- man falls out wouniod, ho will be conveyed, after reoeiving 
_^^*^," to the reserve line, and transferred on board H.M.S. " Hyacinth" 
. ^^* jioaaible (probably after arrival at second anchorage). 

outter with awnings spread, in tow of a atoam pinnace and flying 
Sag with a red cross, will be in roadinpaa for that purpose alougsido 
to be sent in when retjiiired. 

stretcher party will carry 10 pounds — equivalent to one gallon — 
water, tor medical purposes, in canvas bags. 
woimded men will be transferred to H.M.S. " Hyacinth," and the 
th the forecastle will be reserved and fitted temporarily as a 

BT the charge of the Senior Medical Officer, H.M.S. " Hyacinth," 

i^ek Berth Steward. The Medical Officer of H.M.S. " Mohawk" 
OB tnard his ship for hospital work when required. 
Imats will carry a plentiful supply of water, aa in all probahilily 
utter the work ia done, will be eshaiisted. 

I will be worn over the straw iiata as ailditiuua prol-oi tion 

whether water ia carried in boats or by men on shore or 

K fareolKTs, a tin pannikin in to be attached to each breaker, nnil 

yt ihonid have one in the proportion of one to each strctuher or 

d off to carry water ; said water is only to be drunk out of these 

A not out of the water bags and chaguls. 

ll apytaraitaa of tht coant. — Cliffs, 150 feet high, rise abruptly fi'oni 
L Bseept at nilg village and at Middle Beach, where there are narrow 
d in front of the cliSs. 
a Qallule River (3^ mileij from Qlig Bi\ the crow fUea) the cliffs are 
vby the ravine down which the river runs. 

i the cliffs is an immense undulating plateau, but it is doubtfiLl 
C It filla, risea or is more or less level 

The OaUiUe nifer." 
ie landing takes place at tfie month of the Gallule River, where the 
k ia sandy but there are rocka and a bar, and probably surf will be 
I wnnitlg. The guides aay they know the best landmg place. 

The aides of the ravine are of white honey-corabed rook and 100 feet high, 
tml tliey can be climbed at the south or DJig side, though apparently with 
ks difficulty. 

The path is o£ griTel and rather rough but withniit big ptoncs in it. 
It ia Btraight with a. gradunl rise. 

There are deep pools near tho mouth of the river, tmd it is neeeaBary 
in pluneB to wade through about a foot of water. 

Beyond half a mile from the mouth, the river has to be continiiHlly 
oroBsed, for it Bpreads itself into many amall streams. 

At 1,000 yardH from the month (the guides say " after »ot more than an 
hour's walk"} a natural road leada up to the aotith (or tOig) side of the 
raviae to the platoau abore. 

The road is of aolid roclt, 10 yards H-ide. Mounted poiiiea or loaded 
oamele caa go up it easily. 

The Plal^u. 

Tho guides say that one can see the Blup on reaching the platesii, and 
tliat the ahip is kept in Eight all along to the zariba above the yiUago. At 
any rate, it scema clear that a man c«n keep up commuiiioation by walking 
along the top nf the cliifa. 

The zariba can also be seen from the place where the plateau ia reacbed 
on emerging from the Gallule Eiver. 

The road from the river to the cliffs above llltg is of fina sand, witli small 

lUig ViUagt. 

At tho head of tho clifta, above the Tillage of lllig, are aomo worka wliere 
the enemy may be expected to be found. 

It i9 not clear whether these works consist merely of a wall of loose st^nea, 
about 6 feet high, fronting the sea ; or (1) such a wail with two or throe 
others at right angles to it, but with thtf back left open ; or (2) one or more 
encloBorea surrounded by walls of the above description. One of the 
guidos lately formed part of the Mullah's garrison in lllig, and he states 
that two enoloaiirea weJ^ at that time being built. 

The walk are said to bo not loop-holed, and the riflemen show their 
heads above when firing. 

The village of Ulig lies on the beach 150 feet below these works. A 
steep path down the cliff leads from them to the tillage. 

In the clia the riflemen are sMd to station themselves inside four or 
five caves, which they use as rifle pits. Tho largest cave is in the face of tho 
clifTs, some distance up, and oommunicates by a passage with the zariba 
above. A path leads from it down tho face of the cliff to the village. 

The Oarriaon. 
The garrison is said to consist of 200 or more men, most of whom are 
probahly armed with riHes. 

FrobMe Movemenls of the Enemj/ vfhen Beaten. 
Some of t^e guides say that the enemy will probably get away to a high 


























































































O tlui BUutlt-WLIiL lit Ulig, IJ 

a awa; on the iiUteau ti 
«3^ver for lliem there, 

Mudah'f Proj^rli/. 
There 13 said to be a Urgi; stock, of sidas and wliiili;.^' blubber bclaDging 
t-o the Mullah stored in lUig, [irobablj hidden in the caves. 

G. L. ATKINSON-WILLES. Rmr-Admiral. 

I9th April, 1904. 
TAe Commandinj Officer of ea:k unit, for iT.fonnatioii. 

At 4.30 A.M. on the 2l8t April* the boats of the "Mohawk" 

X3iade a feint to land on Middle Beach (a little strip of sand 

^bout hali a mile to the north-west of lllig village), as a 

Dervish picquet was observed there, and it was desirable to 

divert their attention from the real landing place near the 

entrance of the GaUule Rivet. At dawn, about 5 a.m., Captain 

Son. Horace Hood, R.N. (Flag Captain), in charge of the 

advance party of 100 seamen and marines of the " Hyaeinth," 

and one maxim gun, landed with his men on the beach, 

covered by boats mounting field guns and maxims. The party 

was towed ashore by steam laimches, which, on account of the 

shallow water, bad to shp boats when about 30 yards from 

the shore. The boats were then backed in and anchored up 

to within about 20 yards, from which point the men had to 

wade. Proceeding unopposed, the party seized the plateau 

above the south bank of the river at about 5.25 a.m. To do 

this, it marched up the gorge formed by the liver and 

took up a position on the plateau at 1,000 yards from the 

landing place. At this point the enemy was first seen, some 

20 of his scouts being observed in the distance. An advanced 

picquet was now thrown out to an eminence on the right, 

communication with the flag-sliip established by signal, and 

the remaindei of the force awaited.t 

Commodore T. Bisio, Italiaji Senior Navul Officer at Aden, arrived off 

lllig at daylight on the 2Ut, and, as req^neeted by the Admiral, anohoied 

ulT lllig otter watching our force disembark. 

+ SeeplitoU. 

The disembarkation of the landing party now pro- 
ceeded as rapidly as possible, the boats returning for the 
rest ot the men as soon as each was cleared. Owing to an 
increasing suit, none but the advanced party got on shore 
without getting wet up to their waists, and some up to their 
necks. The landing,* therefore, took two horns, being accom- 
plished without accident, except that the " Fox'a " cutter 
was temporarily swamped. Admiral Atkinson -Willea landed 
at about 5.45 d.M., and at once climbed the cliffs, followed by 
the remaindei o( the troops. On arrival at the plateau, the 
Admiral established himseli on the left, while Hood with 
his party held the right. As the men came up, they took 
up their positions as previously ordered, and as soon as all 
were disposed as indicated in the accompanying Bketch,f 
the order to advance was given at about 7.40 a.m. The 
troops moved on a front of about three-quarters of a mile. 
Hood assuming command of the seamen and marines, and 
Jackson that of the Hampshire detachment. The plate-au, 
upon which the advance was made, was very hard, rocky and 
generally level, and the ground sloped away from the cUffs. 
The sun was very hot. A few Dervish scouts were observed 
to be watching our movements, but on finding u^ in strength 

'Lanjling Stale. 










■'llvapinth" .. 





1 ^3 








"Moliawk" .. 




, 122 


HnmpfibirfB . . 








Somali Fitld Force Staff 


Plate 15. 


AIC£3 50 

*liey retired bo their works on the heights above Illig village, ■' 
-Alter marching about 3^ milea some rising ground was reached, 
^nd at about 9 a.m. oui scuuLs repurted that the enemy had 
retired £rom his outlying " gurgis " to hia zaribas and stone 
forts or towers, which soon afterwards appeared in sight. 
The Hanipshires were ordered to halt, whilst Hood was 
ejected to move to the right, reinforcing the fighting line 
iwitb thu reserves, and then to throw his right forward, 
AVheii this movement waa completed, the Hampshiies with one 
maxim, were on the enemy's tight flank, and the Hue extended 
across the enemy's rear and oveilapped his works. The 
force was now halted for a short rest, and during this interval 
the Dervishes, iti their position, began to blow horns and 
Bhout defiance, while their women and children were seen 
fieeing to safety. On the force advancing, the enemy opened 
Cre, and as the troops got within 250 yards of the works the 
firing became very brisk. In addition to the rifle fire the 
enemy used an old gun, which discharged canister at the 
advancing line, which continued to move in splendid order. 
By now the fire had become very hot on both sides, but the 
men were not to be denied, and continued to advance 
in short rushes. When about 100 yards from the enemy's 
defences. Hood, who had previously closed in and wheeled round 
his men so as to take the works end-on, gave the order t« charge 
when the Hampshires and the whole body of seamen and 
marines dashed at the zaribas and turned out the enemy in 
gallant style. The Hampshires entered the works near " E " 
on the sketch,* the bluejackets and marines at " G," where 
tiiere was a second gun embrasure. The actual assault and 
occupation of the hostile works did not last long, but small 
parties of Dervishes held the two stone forts obstinately and 
caused several casualties before they were overpowered. The 
maxims were brought to bear on the flying Dervishes, who 
were seen running down their communicating walla and 
passages, and many were killed and wounded ; 58 coipses 

^^^2 ' * See iiiate 10. 

beiug iifterwards lound aud several wouuded received medical 
attention. The British and Italian flags were then hoisted 
on the wall of the zariba. 

Such close fighting, and the subsequent fighting in the 
village and the caves, caused the troops to Buffer some 
casualties, which amounted to 3 seamen killed, and 10 
seamen and 1 marine wounded. When at 9.45 a.m. the 
enemy broke and fled, many of them took shelter in the 
caves, on the cliti sides and in the huts in the village 
from whence they fired on our wounded who were being 
embarked. The cavea were cleared and the huts set on fire 
by the seamen and marines of the " Hyacinth " under the 
direction of Hood, who, taking a south-westerly direc- 
tion, followed the fugitives up for about 1^ miles, the 
shipa filing upon the enemy seen near the cliSs. This 
work was not completed till 11.30 a.m. During this 
operation Hood, with Mr. A. G. Onslow, midshipman, and 
No. PO-yi46 John Edward Flowers, Corporal, Royal Marine 
Light Infantry, of the " Fox " entered the cave from which 
they were fired at and cleared it in a hand-to-hand encounter. 
Major C. H. Kennedy, R.M.L.I., who was an eye-witnesa of 
this incident, gave the following account : — 

A marine and a lilueiaukot pu-ssiiig a burning liiit were fired at. 
Mr. A. G. OdsIow, Slidflhipman, with the two men at one* opened fire, and, 
after several abots, firing ceased, but. after a pouse, firing wna again opened 
by tbe o<^cl1paIlts of the hut. Captain Hood, who was on the lieach at the 
time, then went up with aeveral men who opened fire. After scveial volleys 
had been fired into tlie hut, the firing still continuing, Captain Hood gava 
the order to charge, and called on nioro men to follow. He hiznself dashed 
in, aoeompBnied by Mr. Onslow, through the burning hut, and with' hiB 
aword attacked the men in the cove, the whole time being practically nnder 
fire. He fiist used his sword and then his revolver, and Mr. Onslow bayonetted 
the thu?d inan. During theadvnnce tbefour matins were carried by theii 
urewB who kept up with the advauoing line during the attaclc. 

Tbe village of lUig as a fortified place was entirely 
demolished, together with the adjacent cavea, as it was con- 
sidered too formidable a stronghold to be held by any natives. 
The natural strength of the enemy's works was surprising, 

and snbBcquent inapection showed that an attack from 
the beach oppoaite Ulig village would probably have proved 
disastrous owing to the natural advantages possessed by the 

Captain Hood, R.N., in hia report to the Admiral on his 
own movements during the capture of Illig said : — 

It wa? too dark to make out clearly the beach, but the whito siirf 
breaking on the sand abowcd up in contract to the black rocks in time for 
the boats to be turned and anchored ; and the advanee party disembarkod 
expeditiously and lined the beach under cover till sufBcient were ashore 
to advance. The place chosen was the actual mouth of the river. Men 
were wet np to their waist, and in some casea up to the neck. 

The advance party moved off up the river, clambering up on the left 
bank, then crossing on the left bank, and up to the level of the cliffs, by 
which time they were alnut a mile inland. No enemy wore sighted, though 
the bed of the river had been recently visited. 

A poutiim was taken up which was in view of the ship of the landing 
beaeh and of moat of the pathway up. 

When all were assembled, the force moved over towards you (the 
Admiral) then on top of the cliffs overlooking the sea. 

In accordance with your orders tlie Naval Brigade were 
detached to make a. detour to the right, bo as to envelop the defeneea of 
Illig. They moved off in fours, imder my orders, and, when well round, 
advanced towards the sea (and Ulig), and halted when the left fiank of the 
Marines was abreast of the Hampshires. No men had faUen out, and the 
carriage of the maxim guns and ammunition boxes was a marveUous per- 
formance of dogged courage. 

The advance was directed by the left, and, on fire being opened by the 
enemy, the advance continurd steadily, until the HampehircB opened fire, 
when fire commenced all along the line of the Naval Brigade, who advanced 
by rushes and graditaUy swung round the right flank. The two comapnieB 
of the " FoK " (in rMervo) were moved right away to the right flank, so as 
to intercept the fugitives in that direction. The advance was ooatinued 
by short rushes until it appeared that the fire of the seamen was endangering 
the left of the line, when I ordered the charge, and in an instant the whole 
Ime of the Naval Brigade surged like a sea over the walls. 

Finding that many Dervishes were escaping along the cliffs to the 
right, I directed all aeamea and marines to follow along the top of the cliffs j 
many Dervishes were shot and several were killed. 

In accordance with your orders a company of seamen were detached 
away to the southward and occupied an adjacent ridge. The fleeing 
Dervishes could he seen and were engaged at long range, but with little 
resnlt ; Lieutenant James rem^ed in charge on the ridge until all signs of 
le enemy had ceased. 

(8927) I 


Aa tliK enemy's riflemen in tbe village prevented tho embarkation of 
tbe wounded, oU the avfulable Beamen of tlie " Ejacintti " with Lieutenant 
BockhouBe and Boine mariiie>s of all ships advanced down the hill, firing 
was going on from the village, ao the force approached to within 100 yards, 
and, aft«r tiring a few volleys, luahed the nearest huts and Bet them alight 
Firing atill continued and t\ro men were wounded, ao, when possible, voUeyti 
were fired before approaching the huts, which wero finally all set alight 
after OBcert^ning that no one remained inside. 

The men rested on the beach, but, aa sniping still continued from the 
village, I collected a few men, with Mr. Onslow, Midshipman [speoiat 
report), and cleared a cave, the entrance of which was covered by s wicker 
hot. It contained three men, all riflemen, who were then killed. 

A party oE seamen and marinea were then token up the cUffs to the 
northward ; riHe piti, facing the sea, were Found in all the caves and openings 
on the side of the cliff, and were demoliahed, tbe stones being rolled down 
into the sea. 

It being then nearly 2 r.ti., end tbe men having been on tbe march 
since 5 AM., T conferred with Major Jackson, and, having ascertained that 
bis camp was seom'p, gave orders for tbe embarkation of the Naval Brigade 
leaving" 50 marines nnd tour maxims, imd 
the defence. 

Captain F. S. Pelham, H.M.S. " Fox " to whom the com- 
mand of the squadron had been transferred after Admiral 
Atkinson- Willea had landed, reported to the Admiral : — 

After the landing of the brigade this morning I hoisted your flog on 
board this ship in accordMice with your orders, and the squadron proceeded 
to take up their assigned positions off Illig, " Fos" being shght !y delayed by 
the swamping of her cutter on shore. 

Owing to tbe height of the elilfs but little could be seen of thn general 
advance of the brigade, except for the left flank, which waa almost con- 
stantly in view, and the movements of the Mullah's people as they retired 
into and through the north-west comer of the zariba. When tlio loft 
flank halted at about 300 yards from tbe zariba, theie was a regular exodua 
of women, who mostly fled to the southward. 

At » A.M., when fire was opened, the advance of tbo left flank was in 
full view ; and the advance of four imits of the Hampshire Regiment was 
very bold, and they eventually took cover actually against the outer wall 
of the zariba itself, under what appeared to be a very heavy fire. At this 
time there was a riisb of a large number of the enemy down to the cave 
just] below but, owing to the proximity of the Hampshire Regi- 
ment, I was unable to 0[>pn Sre on Ibese men from the ship ; and also the 
cave being only just bebw the ridge as seen from the ship, I was afraid of 
hitting our own men, who on. the right and centre must have been in the 
line of fire of the cave and outer wall of the zariba, A very hot fire now 


(tppparrd to be raging in ivhich ve eontd distinctly henr the maxima tnUog 
part, mill this continiiml up to 9,30, whn) there wu a general oessation of fire- 
As the enemy retired to the soiithward they dlBpcrscd all over the 
elifia, through oavea and beliind rocks, and aoine down on the bwtch. I 
therefore opened firo with a 4'7iooh aim, ruid oh the enemy attempted to 
assemlile they w?re at once diBpcrxed iinil liarricd, but, oviog to tlie nature 
of the groiind, it is iiupo^ible l^i vslimatfl the numbers ai^poiiiit^ (or. 

Deaultory firing now cnntinued from the brigade as the; searched 
cliSa and oaves, brealiing into a sharp brii«h close to the village, which wai 
then set on fire and biirned. Ilonte were then sent in for the wounded, in 
accordance with yotir signal. 

Lieut. -Colonel S. C, F. Jackson, lat Battalion Hampshire 
Regiment, furnished the following account of the capture of 

From obBcrvationa taken on boruil ship it wan known that a larjie stone 
zariba had been cons true led on the top of the cliffs at Illig, and that a 
steep path led to the beach where a strong elone barricade had been con- 
strncted. The landing was said to be bad, owing to the Biirf, and the 
strong defences, if held, would have materially added to the difficulties of 
effecting a landing on the beach of Dlig itself. The Admiral therefore 
decided to disembark the force at the month of the Gollule Birer,utuated 
soma 3i miles north of Illig. The ' Moliawk' hod arrived oS the village 
ftbout S.30 P.M. on the '20th April, and the ' Hyacinth ' and ' Fox,' steaming 
without lights, stealthily reached the anchorage at the mouth of the Gallule 
Bivcr at 10 f.h. At 4 o'clock the next morning the work of disembarking 
the landing party began in the dark. Captain the Hon. H. Hood, B.N., 
landed first, with a covering parly of bluejackets who ocaupied the plateau, 
160 fe«t above the landing place. Thus protected, the whole force, ninn- 
bering some 540 rillcs with four maiims, was quietly conveyed ashore in 
the ship's boats. The boats were lowed by the steam pinnaces as near to 
tho shore as the surf would permit, each boat was then an chore I imd Bwung 
stem on, and soliliers, sailors and marines, all fully accoutred, waded ashore 
through the surf. By 7.40 a.m., the whole force was concentrated on the 
top of the plnteau, the ground of which is formed of solid rock and is destitute 
of vegetation, 

The sailors with three maxims were on the right, the R.M.1,.1. in the 
centre, and tlie Hampshire detachment with one maxim gim woa on the left, 
keeping toiiuh with the edge of the oliffs and directing tho adyflnco. A 
few of the enemy's scouts were seen retiring towards Illig, but it was not 
known whether the position was hold or whether any resistance would be 
ofiered to the advance. Our progress wof somewhat delayed by the maxims, 
which had to be carried by their crews, but after an hour's marching wo 
IMched a ridge from which the enemy's position could bo plainly seen, 
B yards off. Two small forts or blockhouses and soyoral stone 

il) T 2 

wallfl Doiild he made out, atid it now tetanie evident that we were to be 
opposed. A conch shell wbs aniinded from behind the fort walli, and baimciB 
were waved nboTe the parapets, but the detcndets kept well imder cover 
and not a shot waa fired aa we moved over the ridge into a loiig sjid shallow 
hollow. The Admiral decided to turn the position, and, while the blue- 
jackets BwuQg round to the right, the Morinea and Hampshiroa upproaohed 
to within 80 yards of the position absolutely under cover, though their 
scouts were fired upon as they reached the crest line, A nnmber of the 
enemy were in a small loopboled onctoKure, in the centre of which stood a. 
■mall tower with three tiers of loopholes, and the rest of the Ulig garrison 
fired upon the advancing troops from the safe cover of a double row of stoce 
walls. About 100 yards further on another blockhouse protected, the 
south-west comer of the enemy's works. The first of these two hloothouses 
was evidently the key of the position, and from this little fort the dervishes 
kept up a heavy fire on the naval and military contingent. They had an 
ancient oarronade with which they fired canister with considerable noise 
but without any serious efteot. Tliis position was soon carried, aa the 
troops charged over the outer wall and put the defenders to flight. The Bailors 
lost three of their number during the advance across the open, the rest of 
the attacking force being bettor protected by the folds in the ground, did 
not lose a man. There were still a few deterniined men in the little tower, 
who had barricaded themselves in and were firing at random through the 
loopholes at the soldiers and sailors below, who could not at jirst find an 
entrance into the building. Lance -Sergeant Hawn, of the lat Battahon 
Hauipshlro Regiment, seized a hand axe, staved in the small door, crept 
through the nnrrow opening, awarmed up the inside of the building and 
disarmed three desperate Dervishes, one of whom bad just fatally wounded 
a sulor below. The Hampshire detaelunent was left to hold this part of 
the position, while the sailors pursued the Somalis who had evacuated the 
second blockhouse and were bolting over the edge of the cliffs down to tho 
village. Muay o£ the enemy crept into oaves Mid huts, and ns Captain Hood 
with his seaman battalion followed them up. they were received with a warm 
llro, and several instances of gallant conduct were recorded, for those 
among tho Dervishes who hod failed to escape were detRTmined to sell 
their lives dearly. Mr. Onslow, a Midshipman of tho ' Hyacinth,' after 
two JIatinea had been shot down at the entrance to a cave, ran along a 
narrow ledge under fire and cut down the two occupants. About dO of the 
enemy's dead were counted about the defences, and in the village, and a 
considerable number of prisoners and rifles were captured, as well as several 
stacks of skins which the Mullah was in the habit of sending down to Illig 
from ' up country,' to serve as current coin for the purchase of food and 
munitions of war regularly brought to him by friendly dhows. 

The works proved to be of considerable strength, and consisted of 
two rows of slone walls from 7 to 10 feet high and varying from 4 to 6 feet in 
thickness. They were very cleverly designed to cover the blockhouses from 
the fire of ships at tho anchorage ofF the village, as well an to oppose a landing 
on the beach. Two batteries had been erected on the face of the cliffB 


allow tha vUkgiki and in tbeao two old guns were found loaded up to tiie 
mulElc. There were bIiio wveral rillu pita luid Hhelter treuchps od the stevp 

bIo]>c ; and tlicre is no doubt tliat had the tarn landed on the beach at Illig 
it would have mot with a very warm reeujition, iind it would have been 
no easy job to soalo the heights and take the jwaition by afrontal attack. 
The barricade on the beach was of considerahte atrengtb, about 200 yardv 
long, and luopholed and |irovid«l with a small passage in the centre. The 
Adntiral's deciaion to laud at the mouth of (Jallulc River was sound, and 
ao;^oimt«d for the small numbers of t'asualtiex among our force, viz., 3 Eeamett 
killed, 2 Marines and 10 seamen wounded. Somewhat luckily for db the 
det^loea were not completed, for a long line of wall had been traced out 
wbii^h would have completely surrounded the works and made the task 
of turning the position a ditHcuIt one to accompllBh without guns. 

We heard from the prisoners that a party of <10 rillcmeu bod gone out 
on s raiding expedition the day before, and though messengers bad boeS 
despatched on the arrival of the cruiaora over night to recall these warriors, 
they bad evidently deemed it prudent not to return. We were considerably 
handieappcd in not having any mounted troo|» to follow up the enemy 
in his flight, but the difliculty of lauding ooiuials through the surf at Ulig 
was known to be bo great that none were sent with the force, 

Now-a-days, combined action by the army and navy is of somewhat 
rare occurrence, Mid it is probably some time since the men of a British 
infantry battalion have been shipmates, have landed and have fought ride 
by side with sailors. It is pleasant to be able to record that the best feelings 
of Domradeship existed between the representatives of both <iervices during the 
fortnight they worked together. 

After the capture of the village, the Naval Brigade 
returned to the ships during the afternoon, the surf 
being sufficient to make the men get wet up to the 
neck. The embarkation, however, was completed by 
D P.M. The Admiral decided to leave ashore 50 men under 
Lieutenant P. H. Colley, R. M.L.I. ; four maxima with their 
crews, under Lieutenant F. O'B. Wilson, R.N., of the 
" Hyacinth," and the Hampahires to garrison Illig, the whole 
under the command of Major S. C. F. Jackson, who erected a 
small atone zariba for hia force, food and water being landed 
from the ahips. During the night searchlights were trained 
on the shore from the ships. While the embarkation was 
proceeding small parties of Dervishes were seen on the clifia, 
and were dispersed by shell fire from th6 ships. 

On the following day a large working party was landed to 
demolish the enemy's fortifications. The " Hyacinth's 



boats, manned and armed, searched the cliffs during the fore- 
noon, while a £orce of Hampshires and marines and a maxim 
worked in conjunction along the cliffs. Boats, manned and 
armed, were also sent from the " Fox," under Lieutenant 
S. H, Radcliffe, to clear the caves on Middle Beach, and to 
destroy the defensive works found there. 

In the afternoon the " Fox " was sent with an Intelligence 
officer on board to Obbia, taking a letter from the Adnural to 
Sultan Ali Yusuf, asking him to persuade the Isa Mahmoud 
tribe, to whom Illig formerly belonged, and who are friendly 
to the Italian Govenmaent, to reoccupy the place. The Sultan 
sent a letter to the tribe accordingly, a copy of wluch he trans- 
mitted to the Admiral. 

During the morning the " Mohawk " proceeded 10 miles to 
sea and buried the men who unhappily lost their lives during 
the assault. 

On the 23rd April the Italian sloop " Volturno " sent a 
party of bluejackets under a lieutenant to help in the work of 
demolition.' This party worked very well with our men, 
and the loyal co-operation of Commander Lorrecchio, the 
officers and men of the " Volturno " was much appreciated. 

On the 24th the "Fox" returned from Obbia, and the 
"Volturno " sailed for Bosaso, taking 17 refugees. 

By the 25th the enemy's defences were demolished, and 
all fugitives found were collected. 

The swell which presages the south-west monsoon having 
increased daily, the Admiral considered it prudent to with- 
draw the garrison, as it would have been in^iossible to continue 
to feed and water the force ashore from the ships, and 
embarkation was becoming very difficult and dangerous. 
Provisions for the refugees who wished to remain at Blig 
having been landed, the embarkation oE the force ashore was 
begun at 10 a.m., the working party being first dealt with, 
then the garrison, and, lastly, the rear-guard with the ensigiL 
Before this operation was completed four lines of breakers 
had risen, of which the second one from the shore was some- 
times over a man's head. To add to the difficulties the current 

■ WftB nmning so etrongly to the northward that a considerable 
Biiaiii had to be kept on the stem lines from the lieack to 
keep the boats head to sea. The boats, however, got away 
i^iularly and well, armed cutters with maxim gmiB and 
picked rifle shots covering tbem to put down any attempte 
at sniping. When everything was finished, the last boat 
to leave the shore, a pinnace, filled with men, was swamped, 
owing to the stemfast being eased prematurely. The 
" Hyacinth's " steam cutter, backing in to help, got a rope 
foul of her screw and went on the rocks, where she was beaten 
to pieces by the surf. Captain Hood therefore gave orders to 
reoccupy the heights temporarily, and for three boms the 
officers and men struggled with the surf in their efforts to refloat 
the pinnace. It was eventually decided to leave the two 
boats for the night, and all the party were re-embarked before 

At 6 A.M. the next morning the surf having abated, the 
Admiral sent a party, covered by two cutters with maxims, 
to recover the pinnace, which was done by a party under 
Commander 8. R. Drury-Lowe, of the " Hyacinth." The 
steam-boat, however, was a complete wreck, except the 
boiler, which, being under water and in the surf, had to be 
abandoned, for the rollers set in again at 8 a.m. 

At 9.30 a.m. the " Hyacinth," accompanied by the "Fox," 
sailed for Berbera. 

The enemy's killed and wounded, counting only bo^es 
actually found, was 58 killed, 12 wounded. Of the latter 
six being villagers, were left at Illig with food, after receiving 
medical treatment. The other six — four of them Dervishes 
— were placed under the doctor's care on board the 
"Hyacinth," and removed to the Military Hospital at Berbera 
Of the refugees, in accordance with their own requests, 
li were sent to Berbera in the "Mohawk," 17 to Bosasoin the 
Italian sloop " Voltumo," 50 went inland to join their relatives, 
being provided with three days' rations, and 50 refused to 
leave Illig. The latter were left there with a week's rations. 


and the huts which had sheltered one garriaoii were left 
standing for them. A young woman, two little boys, and 
a little girl, were received for passage in the " Hyacinth " 
and transferred to the charge of the authorities at 

The arms and material captured included : — 
26 French Gras rifles, bearing date 1874. 
6 muzzle -loading Arab rifles. 

1 Martini -Metford, with "B.C.A." marked on it — 

evidently one of those captured by the Mullah at 
Gumburu or Erigo. 

2 muzele-Ioadii^ carronadea ; 
2 banners ; 

11 surf boata (subsequently destroyed), and about 3,000 
skins belonging to the Mullah. 

i Fiaijj FoEcH, , 

a ALL Con- 

Berbera, Uth April, 1B04. 

1. The following notes hove been compiled from information fumiahed 
by Commaadoc Jones, B.N., and Captain Blair, Intelligence Officer, in 
November, 1902; by Captain Bethell, B.N., in Det'Omber, 1903; by 
Lieutenant Evans, Intelligence Offloer, in February, 1904 ; by CommodotB 
Bixio, Italian Senior Navat OlGcer, and from other aouroes. 

B, — General Desfription of Ihe Coast n 

r lUig. 

a. TheviBageoflttig— 

(a) Position. — Dlig lies in north, latitude T° 49' 44*, and east, longitude 
49° Sfy. (l^om observationa talcen on bkoie by lieutenant 
Bevan, B.N.) 

(li) Peacription. — The village itself ia of tko usual type of Somali Jisbing 
villBgE, and normally consUts of some 40 huts, but the Dervish 
garrison has probably caused an increase among these. It is 
situated at the base of limeetone oliffs, some 150 feet high, and 
is sepiirated from the sea by a narrow atrip of beach 50 yards wide 
and 300 yards long. 

At ft 



^stance of two miles the village can hardly be made out 

withuut the Hid of glssaeB, owing lo th« prevaihug tawny hue of 
both forpgrouiid and bopkgrauDil. 
t^) Country behind Qlig, — From the aumniit of the cUHa an immense 
uoduUling plain strotcheB westward lo the hoiizon, the groond 
bring mostly aoliil rock covered with loose stones. 
(((] Water supply. — Tlie water supply of Illig apparently consists solely 
ot a nngle small well at the foot of the oliSs, and some 200 yards 
east of the village. The water in the well is only 3 inches deep and 
is quite insufficient to supply even a small force, 
(e) Defence?. — Taptwo Bcthell, B.N., who inspected lUig from the sea 
on the lOth December. 1903, atotes :— 

A Urge atone zariba on top of the cliSe at lUig is plainly 
visihb hom the sea. The sea frontage appears to be over 200 yards 
in length ; the walb, which are about feet in height, forming the 
sky line as seen from a ship. The cliffs here are obout 150 feet high,* 
■o that even from the masthead it is not poaaible to see into the 
Eoriba or beyond the front wall; but, yiowed from some distance 
at sea through a glass, its shape appears to be square, and its front 
wall about 100 yards from tho edge of the cliff. A steep path 
down the face of the chff leads to the beach where the village is 

Lieutenant Evans, R.B., lutelligence Ofliccr, who inspected 
lUig from the " Pomone," on 15th February, 1004, gives the some 
description of this w^U, in which, however, he remarked two 
openings. Ho added that it is impossible to t«ll from the sea 
whether this is a single wall giving frontal defence only, or a 
completely surrounded st^me zariba. 

It is obvious that Capttun Bethell's description must be similarly 

Both officers received somewhat vague inlormation to the effect 
that there was another stone building further inland and invisibLe 
from the sbb. This is corroborated by thu reports of deserters and 
spes forwarded from other directions, who state that there ore two 
stone "houses." The use of the word "house" would imply 
that the wall seen from the sea is, as Captain Betbell thinks, 
merely the front of a completely enclosed building. 

Captain Biiio forwards a sketch which, in addition to depicting 
the above wall, also shows a wall with two openings ia it, which 
directly covers the village on the beach. 

lieutenant Evans alludes to a barricade in front of the village, 

and draws a thing which may represent a wall such as Captain Blxio 

describes and which uiay not. 

(/) Ecaoorcos. — Commander Jones, in November, 1902, found aomo 

13 or U. surf boats in Elig or its yicinity. lieutenant Evans, in 

' See Plate 16 as to height of cliffs and other details. 

Keiii'uary, I'Mi, could only luake out uiie tirawii up un liie IicsikIi 
behind the biuricade. There may, however, have been moru 
boats which lie could not see, but he does not state whetUor it is 
Itoasiblo to Bee behind the barricade which he mcntiouB. 
(y) (Jam ping ground. — There is no site for a good camping ground on the 

3. Middle beach. — About b^lE a mile to thu west of Illig there is aootbEr 
sbip of hcach, longer than that at Illig. The (.IUIb preaent the samo ap- 
pearance ; the beach ia apparently uniiaed and there in no water supply. 

i. GaUuU River— 

{a) General deEcription.— The river runs in a ravine with banks 100 ieet 
high of white honeycoiabcd roek. The bed of the river ia of sand 
or gravel. The mouth of the river is some 3J miles west of Illig. 
There is a bar at the mouth which prevents boats going up the 
river at all, even at high tide. Near the mouth there arc some 
very deep pools. Beyond halt a mile from the mouth the river 
has to be continually croased, for it spreads itself into many small 
itreams. At 1,000 yards from the mouth there is a natural flat 
road of solid rock on the right (south) bank, 10 yards broadi, 
leodiog from the river up tfl the plateau at a sloj* of 1 in 10. The 
upper portion of this road would have to be slightly improved. 

Ih) Water supply. — 800 yards from the mouth the water is good and 
drinkable. It ia ample for any force and the quality is good, 
though the taste is slightly brackish. 

(e) Camping ground. — There is a very good camping ground above the 
; it ia 200 yards square, fairly level and smooth, and could ho 

aft place for a oamel 
np could be easily defended. It 
ample stones to make walls in a 

uicreascd to any bIkc. There 
lariba near the camp. The en 
is not overlooked, and there an 

, NoTB. — The report (Bl^) omits to state whether the camping 
ground is on the right or left bank, but £rom internal evidence 
it appears probable that it is situated on the right, or south, bank. 

[d) Fuel and gra;cing. — There is not a good supply of fuel at hand, and 

it would have to bo brought in from about G miles off. 

(e) The surrounding country. — An immense and imdulntjng plateau 

extends west and south-west to the Guremaile Desert. This 
plateau is stony for tho most part. To the north the country 
becomes much broken and intersected by many deep ravines, 

n. The Nogal Siter— 

(i) General description. — The mouth of the Nogal Eiver is about 10 miles 

from Illig, measured along the coast, and 9 miles in a straight line. 

In November the river just flows into the sea at low tide. Neai 



the mouth there are many quicksands, and scrub and thick bush 
grow in the bed of the river. 

Hie banks are precipitous, and there are a few deep {)ooLs in the 
river which spreals itself well over the bed. 

There is a smcdl village called Khil on the right (south) bank, and 
another called Karim on the left bank. 

(b) Landing places. — ^The shore is steep, and although landing is {jossible 

there is no point at which it would be easy. 

(c) Water supply. — ^The water is impregnated with salt, strongly ai>crient, 

and, in the opinion of the Medical Officer of the " Pomone," of a 
quaUty undesirable for drinking use. 

Near the northern village there is a stream called Harariey, ' 
which contains fresh water ; quality not rei)ortcd on. 

id) Fuel and grazing. — ^Fuel is ample, and the grazing was found to be 
good in November, 1902 (a wet year). 

(«) Camping ground. — Owing to the broken nature of the country it 
would be difficult to select a good camping ground. 

6. Erindera — 

(a) General description. — Erindera is some 4 miles north of the Nogal 
Bivtf . Hiere is a small breakwater and a narrow strip of sandy 
beach, and beyond that an overhanging precipice. Dhows bound 
for mig are unloaded here duimg the north-east monsoon, the 
stuff being carried to Illig in surf boats. 

There are some half dozen small huts on the beach. 

(6) Resources. — ^Lieutenant Evans, in February, 1904, saw six surf boats 
drawn up on the beach, and piles of food and cloth, which were 
being hastily carried up the cliff by women. 

0. — Notes on Disembarkation (Commander JoneSy R,N,, November, 1902). 

7. Points where landings might be effected. — ^There are three points in the 
neighbourhood of Illig where a landing might be effected — 

(a) At the village itself where there is a beach about 300 yards ii; length. 

{b) About half a mile to the west of Illig where tbere is a longer beach 
(described under the title of " middle beach " in paragraph 3 of 
these notes). 

(c) On the beach at the entrance of the Gallule River. 

On all of these beaches there is a surf constantly beating 
(November), and it would be impossible to land in ordinary boats. 

8. Native boats available. — ^There were some 13 or 14 native boats available 
in November, 1902 {see paragraph 2 (/) ). These boats are about 25 feet in 
length, float very high in the water, have sharp overhanging bow and stern, 
and are built in a sharp V-shaped section, the planks being fastened to the 
timber and to each other by cord in place of nails. 

The boats are worked by seven men with paddles. The men jump out 
and haul the boat up as she takes the ground. 

TliB boats are very a'aJib mid iiuulJ lie tttsily upoet, and uoL more than 
8 Of 10 soldiet's could bo Wideil at a time, according to the state of the Burf . 

It ifl not poBsible to beach dhowa anywhere at lliig, and they miiEt also 
anchor outside the breakers. 

it. Anciorage and weather at lUig. — There is excellent shelter from the 
BOuth-west mooBODn, but the bay ia quite open to the north-eoat. 

Large transporta could anchor at little more than, a mile from laoding 
placea ; the bay ehoata very regulsJ'ly, andl have had it carefully aounded. 
There would be no danger in appruiu^hing the shore until a depth of 
7 fathoms is obtained, and then to anchor (for a steamer drawing 25 feet). 

All accounts agree that the wind is less during November and December 
than in January and February, after which it again improyes until the burst 
of the south-west monsoou. Then, I am infonned, a heavy swell sets in, 
dming which the beach at Dlig provides a better landing place than the 
other two beaches. 

It ia probable also that, with a strong uorth-eaat wind, the Blig beach 
might be used whotf that at Gallulc was impracticable. 

10. Proposed method oj landing. — I would propose to prepare two rafts 
oE casks and timber, each of 36 casks (54 gallons), laxbed under a strong 
timber frame. Work planked over. Lay down anchora outside the s\irf 
and warp the rafts from the anchor to and fro to the ahote throiagh the surL 
Ordinary boats or a steam tug to convey troops and stores from the trans- 
ports to the rafts. 

The early morning and the forenoon are the best times tor landing. In 
tho afternoon the wind is stronger and the surf greater. 

D. — Diecuesion of posaible Landing Places. 

11. Teehnical, — From Commander Jones' report (paragraphs 7 to 10), 
it would appear that ia November disembarkation at any one of the three 
pionta mentioned by him would be difficult, and oould only be accomplished 
by means of surf boata, and that during the south-west monsoon the beach 
at Illig itself might be capable of being used wheu that at the mouth of the 
Gallnle Biver would be impracticable. 

It is believed that during the present intermediate soBflon of tho " tilal " 
landing at any one of the three points would be much simpler than when 
Commander Jones reported on tho place. This is, however, a technical 
naval question into which I am not qualified to go. 

12. Military eortsideratitine. — Apart from the important [raint regarding 
the opposition which might be ofEered to a force disembarking at Illig itaolf, 
there appear to be two great objections to the landing being efleuted at that 

(a) There is no soitable campmg ground, and tho total standing room 

appears to be very limited. 
(6) Mote important still the water supply appears to bo altogatiia 

Similar reaaona militate against the selection of the " middle bcaoh." 


On the other hand, the Gftllulo Rivta-, 31 miles to the wisat of lUig, uECords 
a good camping ground, and an esoeUent water supply eiiBta within half-a- 
mile of the proponed Eite. 

A landing there could not be ao easily opposed, and an advance from 
that point along the top of the cliRs would turn the stone wall defences 
iibove the village if they prove to be merely single walls providing frontal 
defence only. If tho walls turn out to be the front faces of stone zaribas, 
the attacMng force would be at any rate in a far better position to a,asault 
them than if it disembarked at Ulig and climbed the clifFa under lire. 

It would be necessary to carry water from the Gallule River, aa there is 
none t^ be foimd en roiiU. 

The nature of the country between the Oallulo River and the clifia 
overlooking Illig is unknowTi, but nullahs must be expected, and the actual 
difitanoe to be marched may bo very considerably more than the 3J miles 
ot coast-line distance. 

The reported want of fuol in tho immediate neighbourhood of the proposed 
landing place is a drawback which will require special arrangements to bo 

I Attention should bo drawn to the remark (paragraph 4 (u) ) that the 
wc portion of tho road leading up to tho plateau requires to tic slightly 
Koved. This may, however, only refer to camel transport. 
E. — EthnographiaU NoUf. 
13. Prior to tho Mullah's raid, Illig and the surrounding country web 
ifly inhabited by the Musa laa section of the laa Jlahmud (nicknamed 
Isi Rioh on account of their largo holdings in sheep and goats). The left 
Mahmud is nnmerically the strongest of the three main divisions of the 
I Mijjarten, the Osman (or Isman) Mahmud and the Omar Mahmud coming 

next in order. Practically, however, the Osman Mahmud are by far the 
strongest division, not only on account of being the family tribe of the 
paramount Chief Osman Mahmud, hut by reason of the numbers of rifles 
which they possess, and on account of the fact that the important trading 
ts of Bosaso, Handa, Baa Eafun and others, belong to tbem. 
The principal " jilibs" of the Musa laa living normally at or near Illig 

Mahmad. Ba WorsangU, living at lUig- 
Mahmud, Ba WorsangU, living at Illig. 
Ba Aurtableh, Ba Idayun, living at Gallule and Illig. 
Ba Morohon, Ba Idayun, living at Gallule and Dlig. 
Shirouan, Bo Idaynn, living at Gallule to Nogal. 
Samattar, Ba Idayun, living at Gallule to Nogal. 
Jaralto, Ba, living at Gallule to Nogal. 
Musa Adhi, Ba Idayun, living at Gallule. 

Hosein (or Ba Dolbahanta), Ba Idayun, living at Garad to Ulig. 
^amarkab, Ba Idaynn, Garad to lUlg. 
L In addition, a few Omar Malunud, chiefly traders, used to live at DUg. 

The Isa Mubnoiud DarmaJlf euknonledge a ui 
llogianop to the piiramoutit Sultaa OBiaan Mahmiid. 

V.—Bteeni Evtut 


14. About the middle nt lant August the Mnllfth, who h&d been ^tting 
donri in the south -etisf«m Nogal, moved with a forte omountin;;, aoeording 
to report, to 3,000 mounted m^n, on Illig, wid absolutely cleaned out the 
place. Over UOO &0ijnrten lue said to have been killed, 100 rifles captored 
(on exaggernljon}. and the whole of the very nuinecouH flocks and herds token 
ftway. Tlio loot was driven away to the Nogal, and os is usual, the un- 
fortuoato Muaa Isa had to follow, and became nominally Dervishes. After 
the fight at Jidbali, and tha retreat to Jid All in the north, most of these 
people are believed to have broken away and to be in the coast comitry to 
tliB north of Ulig. 

IG, .\fter the rud the Mullah returned to the Nogal, leaving at Hiig a 
garrison which has been mEuntained until now. (For estimate of strength, 
Kt paragraph 22. ) Before his departure he gave orders for the construction 
of the two stone hoEiaes, forts or eDclosures, which have been already reported 
on. When the MuUah retreated north, as the result of our operatiiHis in 
the Nogal, the garrison found itself cut off, and, as a conaequeuoe of the 
waterless state of the Northern Hand and the presence of the Ut Brigade 
at Halin guarding the Nogal water supply, it has hitherto been unable in 
rejoin the MuUah. 

16. Chiefly in coneequcnce of this raid, and partially because of the 
ootiiig of some of his caravans, Osman Malimud, the paiamount cbieE 

who had always hitherto been on the most friendly terms with the Mulluh, 
changed his attitude, and has nvaae then, nominally at least, professed 
bitter enmity to him. 

17. On the 14th Ootobur, lfl03, tho Italian warship "I^mbardia" 
visited Illig and sent two boats to the shore ; when ncariug the Iwaoh (bo 
interpreter swam on ahoie. Almost direetly afterwards fire was opened 
on the boats from thu rooks close to the village, and the ship recalled the 
boats. The ship at once opened fire on the village and on the stone wall 
crowning the cliff, and contJnued tho bombardment until sunset The 
interpreter, who had just landed when Are was opened, swam cut to and 
regained the ship. The " Lombardia " continued the bombardment on the 
following day, hut was unable to ascertain what results had been achieved. 

Oo the rutiim journey from Obbia the "Iiombardia" slowed down 
opposite Illig and was able to observe that the garri-ion, or at any rate the 
party told off to resist disembarkalion, had he«n largely inoreased anoe her 
previous visit. 

18. At the end of October the Captain of the Italian naiship " Coatit 
reported that he hod arranged with Osnian Mohmud for a combined attack 
on Blig, to take place during the first 10 days of November, the Mijjsrten 
to advance by land and tho ships to bombard the place. 


Owing to our own movements at this juncture, wo asked that this attack 
shonld be deferred for a few days, and eventually nothing came of it. 

19. A few days ago the Italian authorities reported that Osman Mahmud 
had lately sent a small force down to attack Illig and gain possession of it, 
and that the expedition had been apparently unsuccessful. 

20. Our latest news from Ilalin, dated the 9th or 10th April, and requiring 
confirmation, is that refugees rci)ort that the Dervish Karias are trekking 
across the Northern Haud towards Kallis, and that the Mullah and 
Haroun had left the Darror Valley and had gone towards Illig. Even if this 
be true (and it is most probable) it must not be taken that the Mullah 
will, of necessity, actually sit down at Illig. He may content himself with 
some position such as Unkud, said to bo 20 miles up the Nogal River, 
where there is a water supply ; or, if sufficient rain has fallen, ho may 
merely sit down at the most convenient ball (rain pool) out of immediate 
striking distance of Blig. 

It may, however, bo taken as probable, almost as certain, that, after 
his movement across the Northern Haud, he must sit down somewhere in 
the vicinity of the Lower Nogal before moving on to his ultimate 
objective, which is believed to be the Hawiya country and the middle and 
lower Webi Shebeli. He is uudoubtedly in a very bad way, he has had 
considerable (though possibly much exaggerated) defections from his 
standard, his ponies and burden camels have suffered severely, and he 
realises that he will have to brush through whatever opposition Ali Yusuf 
ia capable of offering. Personally, I do not believe that this opposition 
would amount to very much, but the Mullah is rei)orted to fear it, and he 
18 bound to take it into serious consideration. 

G. — Mullah's Property at lUig. 

21. Various accoimts have been received from different soiurcos, all 
disagreeing as to details, but all agreeing that some time ago the Mullah 
sent the bulk of his skins to Illig, and that they are still there. There may be 
something in this, and it must not bo forgotten that skins represent the 
Mullah* s chief source of revenue, and are converted into arms, ammimition, 
food and clothing. Inasmuch as they are very bulky, it would be impossible 
to rapidly remove these skins, and they should become a certsdn spoil, 
unless they have already been taken away by dhow. They would probably 
be hidden in nullahs or in caves and clefts in the cliffs. 

H. — Estimate of the Dervish Force at Illig, 

22. The garrison. — ^When the Mullah returned to the Nogal after the raid 
on Ulig, he left there, as a permanent garrison, 100 mounted riflemen. He 
subsequently reinforced this garrison by a fiurther 100 men. The garrison 
was again increased in October last, owing to the proceedings of the " Lom- 
bardia," and in November it was reported to consist of 400 men with about 
150 rifles. 

Recent events have here, as elsewhere, had the effect of causing a wastage 

smoDg tlie Dorvishes, and last month the garriaon was reported to have 
dwindled by deeerlion to aomfi '200 men with under lOO rifics. 

Some fishermen put off to Commodore Bixio tlie other day ofF Illig, and 
stated that the Dervish garrisoa was now very Bmal). 

23. The Mnllah's main farce.— Oar latest (unoonfirmed) news is to 
the effeet that the Mullah moved from the Darrar on the 3rd April, 
maMng {or Illig. U that ia so, aud if he has not aat down on the way, hp 
should now be at ITlig or in its vicinity. I therefore give the following 
notes on tha strength of his following : — 

Aft<!r the fight at Jidhali it was estimated that the Mullah still had 
1,400 rifles and Bome 5,000 good fighting men. Many of these men, witii a 
proportion of rifles, drew away ot were left with the Kariaa in the Soiithern 
Haud, and it is believed that, when turned out oE the Jid Ali di&lriot last 
month by General Fasken, he did not muster more than 3,000 or 3,fi00 
lighting men and 1,000 rifles. 

Since then all reports agree as to a large number oE desertioue having 
taken place, and the latest Bosaso news puts hia flghting strength at not more 
than 800 men, 200 to GOO rifles, ajid 200 ponies. This is an nnderestimate, 
I think, and I should be inclined to reckon on a possible 2,000 men witii 
800 rifles. But it is really all guess work, as we have had Uttle or no reliable 
neWB of him since the Mullah entered Mijjarten territory. 

24. ReeaU tvonts at Illig. — News roooivod at Bosaso from two nephews 
of Sultan Nor, who deserted from tho Haroun at Maddl, near the Darror 
on 1st April, WBS to the ofiect that the Musa lEa Mahmud Mijjarten 
had had a big Gght with the Dervish garrison at Illig, and that many had 
been killed on either side ; actual results not known. 

AU Yusuf ia reported to have built a fort at Oape Garad and another a 
Galkayu, and ia prepared to fight the Mnllah should he go south. There has 
been a good deal of rain lately at Illig. 

25. Mvllah'a movements (extra special edition). — The sante infonnonta 
state (and are corroborated by two other deserters) that the Haroun was 
preparing to leave Madda on the 1st, but was only going to Ishbo Sbuban, 
10 miles E.S.E., and that tho Mullah did not mean to go to Dlig, not only on 
account o£ the waterless journey, but because he had been frightened by 
the news of the fighting there. 

As these men left the Uaroim on 1st April, their news as to actual events 
does not contradict that given in paragraphs 20 and 23, as to Us having left 
the Darror Valley on the 3rd April. 




t Each of the " small " wars in which BritiBb troops find 
> often engaged against semi -civilised or savage 
has its own characteristics, and the operations in 
Soma Ul and formed no departure from the general rule. 
The special feature which characterised the four expedi- 
tions against the Mullah was that they involved the 
double task of suppressing a collection of lawless and hostile 
tribes living within and outside the limits of British territory, 
and of overthrowing a dangerous alien foe, who, from an in- 
determinate position and with a still more indeterminate force, 
threatened the peace and integrity of the British and foreign 
protectorates in Somali land. 

Owing to this pecuUar nature and position of the enemy 
and to the geographical position of British Somaliland, 
surrotmded as it is on its land frontier by foreign protectorates, 
the campaign resolved itself into one of expediency, com- 
plicated by poUtical considerations which placed no small 
difficulties in the way of the commanders by neutralising 
their plans and preventing the campaign from being brought 
to a speedy and satisfactory conclusion. 

Having briefly dealt with the cause of the war as affecting 
its general conditions, and, as the principal political, strategical 
and tactical considerations which influenced the mihtary 
problem in the several expeditions have been fully presented 
in the preceding chapters, it is only necessary here to re- 
"^ (89271 u 


capitulate and give prominence to some of the more important 
points from which lessons may be leamt in a struggle con- 
ducted against such an enemy as the Mullah, and in a country 
which possessed such exceptional features as Somaliland. 

In considering the strategy to be adopted in Somaliland 
warfare a distinction should be drawn between expeditions of 
the nature of those despatched against the Mullah, and petty 
punitive or coercive measures undertaken against single tribes, 
such as the expedition in 1893 against the Aidagalla, and in 
1895 against the Rer Hared (Habr Awal Jibril Abukir). 

The operations against the Mullah, though commenced 
on a comparatively small scale against what was apparently 
regarded at the outset as an insignificant foe, were, in their 
later stages, carried out against a strong force of well armed 
fanatics, combined and controlled by a single individual 
whose prestige, foUowing and resources bad increased with 
his success to such an extent that in the final phase of the 
operations we were obliged to place in the field a force of 
some 6,000 regulars and 1,000 to 1,500 irregulars. Here the 
object was the destruction of the enemy's fighting force, 
and the strategy was aimed at bringing it to battle. Owing, 
however, to the disinclination of Somalis to come to close 
quarters — unless they can attack by surprise — and to their 
great mobility (70 miles being covered in a day by mounted 
and 40 to 50 occasionally by dismounted parties), it was 
found to be difficult even with mounted troops, to infliot 
heavy losses on them in men. Small formed bodies were 
sometimes surprised by our patrols and advanced parties, 
but such surprises were exceptional owing to the enemy's 
system of spies and scouts, the latter being often 50 to 70 
miles ahead of the main body. 

I For petty punitive and coercive operations against single 
tribes, or against a number of disconnected sub-tribes, com- 
paratively small forces were found to suffice, and the strate^ 
adopted had for its object the capture of the enemy's material 
;3— his Hocks and henk, on which Somalis are almost 


entirely dependent for their food, uie&t and milk aa 
the occupation of their permanent weUs, on which during the 
dry season the esdstence of their camels, cattle and sheep, 
aa well as of their ponies depends. The usual mode of action in 
such cases was to send ahead the mounted troops, who might 
be required to march some 90 te 120 miles in 48 hours, in order 
to efiect the capture. The transport in the meantime was 
left with the dismounted portion of the force, which, protected 
with a strong zariba, occupied some important source of water 
supply. As there is little union between the various sub- 
tribes and clans the measures indicated above were generally 
followed by the submission of the sub-tribe concerned, and, 
if continued from one sub-tribe to another resulted in the 
Bubjugation of a wide area. 

In addition to the exceptional characteristics of the 
T, the question of water supply was a dominating 
throughout the four expeditions. It confined, in 
Ijie dry season, the movements of our troops to certain 
lite and known lines of wells, unless sufficient trana- 
t could be collected to carry water. Even then permanent 
pBter could not be left for more than a few days at 
'^irae. At the same time the water question hmited the 
Mullah's movements, though not to such a degree as those 
of our troops, for an irregular body of men like his, possessing 
an intimate knowledge of the coimtry and its water resources, 
could be scattered over a large area and told to concentrate 
at some given point, while many considerations of supply and 
transport render such a proceeding impossible with regular 
troops or with troops under any definite organization. Again, 
in most parts of SomaUland "living on the country" was 
impossible with any considerable body of troops. This diffi- 
culty more or less tied a commander to his lines of communica- 
tion, whilst the Mullah, whose followers subsisted chiefly 
I camels' milk or camels, was practically free to move an 
WjOB pleased. It must be realised therefore that many of the 
iinary rules of strategy do not apply to these expeditions. 
(8927) " u :! 

well as ■ 

First and 



On the other hand, the general principleB of tactics as used 
in savage warfare apply to those as to other expeditions 
against an undisciplined enemy. 

After water supply, and closely linked with it, another 
factor in the operations was that of tranbport. In a country 
which is not practicable for wheeled transport the pack animal 
was the only possible means of transport with a field force, 
for no carriers were available. 

The success or failure of an expedition depended, therefore, 
largely on a thoroughly well organized system of transport, 
the selection of a suitable pack animal, and on hia treatment 
when obtained and the amount of water and food which he 
requires to keep him in working condition. To equip a force 
with hastily improvised transport was incurring grave risks, 
besides being an economically wasteful proceeding. 

Many other points call for attention, such as the organiza- 
tion of an efficient system of intelligence and of efficient means 
of communication, the necessity of careful and tactful dealings 
with the surrounding tribes and the importance of a well 
organized base and hues of communication, and the fact that 
mounted troops, or, at any rate, troops which can be rapidly 
transported from place to place, are above all others necessary 
in a country like Somahland. 

It is instructive to see to what extent the above con- 
siderations affected the conduct of the several campaigns. 

With regard to the first and second expeditions, it is 
pleasing to record the courage, endurance and untiring energy 
which prompted a handful of officers in command of small 
body of hastily raised local levies to penetrate into a practically 
unknown country and seek out an imknown but determined 
enemy. But it is difficult to beheve that the nature and 
conditions of the undertaking were adequately realised 
and appreciated at the time. The theatre of operations 
and the resources of the district for mihtary operations were 
practically a sealed book, the preparations for the campaign 
were incomplete, the organization of the force was im- 

set, the line of communication was (iangerously weak, 
while the adminiatrative services were more apparent than 
real. It is not unfair to say that the success of the operation 
so far as it went, was due more to good fortune than to suitable 
and scientific preparation, and Colonel Swayne may be con- 
gratulated on having managed to extricate himself so success- 
fully as he did from a difficult and hazardous undertaking. 

The reasons for such ill-prepared enterprises are not far to 
seek. Small wars of the kind in question generally break out 
unexpectedly and in unexpected places, and the local system 
of military or police organization is often unsuitable or in- 
adequate to meet satisfactorily such a contingency. It is, 
however, due to the commander of the force to note that, owing 
to the political exigencies of the situation, his instructions 
prohibited him from dealing effectively with any reasonable 
chance of success with an enemy who was free to operate 
from almost any quarter of the compass. 

The third and fourth campaigns against the Mullah afford Tliinl anj 
an interesting study in strategy and of the great difficulties expudition*. 
which beset a genera! who has to conduct operations in a va^t 
country devoid of almost all the resources of civilisation, 
where every pound of food for the men or forage for the 
horses and pack animals has to be laboriously brought up 
from a sea base to the furthest limit of operations (a distanco 
of some hundreds of miles) on pack transport, and where, as 
happened more than once, as much as five or six days' water 
for men and animals had to be carried, as well as the rations, 
ammunition, ordnance and engineering stores, which form the 
indispensable impedimenta of an army in the field. 

These difficulties were increased by the heterogeneous com- 
position of the force, consisting as it did of British and 
Indian troops, of South Africans and Somalia, for each and 
all of which classes a separate scale of rations had to be 

The strategy of the third campaign was mainlv based on Third 
two considerations :- "peditioa. 




To prevent the Mullah's retreat to the Webi Shebeli, where 

it would have been difficult to follow him, and to drive 

him north into or towards British territory and to deal 

with him thece. 

To hem in the Mullah's forces by a simultaneous advance 

from the south-east and north by the British, and 

from the south-west and west by the Abysainians. 

In order to attain the first of these objects it was deemed 

necessary to land a force on the east coast of Italian Somaliiand 

at a point sufficiently far south to threaten any attempt of 

the Mullah's forces to retire from the Mudug district to the 

Webi Shebeli. It was also necessary to direct the Abyssinian 

movement in the first instance south towards the Webi Shebeli, 

and thence north towards the line of wells from Mudug to 

Galadi, and Walwal and Wardair. 

The selection of a spot at which troops could be landed on 
the east coast of Italian Somaliiand sufficiently far south to 
satisfy the first object was limited practically to Obbia. as 
it was considered politic and desirable to support the Sultan 
of Obbia {Tusuf Ali) who was professedly hostile to the Mullah, 
and who had a considerable following among the Mijjarten 
and Hawiya tribes which dwelt in a country which might be a 
possible line of retreat for the Mullah towards the Webi 
Shebeli. Moreover, it was also reported that the Sultan of 
Obbia coiUd supply the British force with the necessary 
transport and other articles of supply for its move to Mudug, 
in both of which services he eventually failed. 

The plan of campaign was to advance to and occupy 
Mudug, open communication across the Hand with Bohotle, 
close the lines of commimication from Obbia to Mudug, and 
depend upon the Berber a -Bohotle line for further supplies 
il necessary. 

The country from Obbia to Mudng was absolutely imlmowu. 
The route from Obbia to Mudug had to be discovered, and the 
watering places on the proposed line of advance, when dis- 
covered, had to be developed and made possible for the 



of ( 

^K Tl 

of the whole loroe to Mudug. Preliminary recon' 
icea in several directions were, therefore, necessary 
mainly to teat the accuracy of native information as to the 
watering places on the several routes. There was also the 
question of the rainy season. Tlio period during which 
operations against the Mullah could be effected was limited 
to five Diontha— January to May, 1303. During these months 
the Mullah was confined to distinct watering places, which 
;ra known. After May the rainy season began and the 
uUah was free to move over areas which, though impassable 

want of water in the dry season, were rendered easy by 
the filling up of the ballis or waterholes, 

Much, therefore, had to be compressed into five months. 
It was imperative to close the base at Obbia before the burst 
of the south-west monsoon early in May; since that place, 
even in the best months, was by no means an ideal landing 
,^lace and would become in the south-west monsoon ira- 
ble of approach. 

The landing at Obbia during the north-east monsoon was 
laborious and tedious undertaking, and much time was 

laumed in that operation. Yusui Ali signally failed in his 
►bligatioiis to provide transport, thereby necessitating the 
"bringing round of camels from Berbera, hastily collected on 
the Berbera-Bohotle lines of communication and temporarily 
disabling the transport on that line. Although this dif&culty 
did not greatly delay the advance at the time, it necessitated 
a modification in the original plan of moving to Mudug, for, 
in place of the 6,000 transport camels which it was anticipated 
would be available from all sources at Obbia, the total transport 
fell far short of actual requirements. 

The route to Mudug, when finally reconnoitred and fixed 
upon, was gradually occupied with posts, and supplies and 
stores were pushed on ahead. The water supply on this route, 
however, was very precarious, and only with most careful 
organization was made to equal the strain put upon it. 

Camel transport from India was offered for the Obbia 


force, but was not accspted as it was then believed that 
Indian camels could not move unless watered daily or at least 
every other day. Such a procedure on the Obbia-Mudag line 
was impracticable, and left no alternative but the employ- 
ment of Somali camels, which could travel for many days 
without water. The transport service in Somaliland, as well 
as the water supply, was a governing factor in the operations. 
Had it been possible to obtain locally transport sufficient to 
replace casualties in a large force, one of the problems of 
campaigning in Somaliland would have been solved. It was, 
however, the fact that though the country .contained immense 
herds of camels, the proportion of burden animals to milch 
and eating camels was small. 

The occupation of the Mudug district compelled the 
Mullah to fall back from Galadi to Walwa! and Wardair, 
where he was, as regards the British forces, separated from 
the latter from the east by nearly one hundred miles of waterless 
country, covered by dense bush ; and by a similar stretch of 
country from Bohotle in the north. As regards the Abys- 
sinian forces, the enemy was less well placed, as his anxiety 
was to escape from the Abyssinian advance from the south- 

The occupation of the Mudug was not, however, sufficient 
to render the crossing of the Hand from Bohotle to Mudug 
a safe proceeding. There existed several large watering 
places between Damot and Walwal and Wardair, where the 
Mullah's forces could water and launch attacks agiinst convoys 
crossing the hundred miles of desert. It was, therefore, 
necessary to occupy Damot in the nijrthern part of the Haud, 
Badwein in the southern part of the Haud, as well as Galadi 
and the intervening wells to the west of Mudug. 

Thus, by the middle of April. 1903, the Muhah found him- 
self hemmed into the Walwa! -Wardair district, but it was 
difficult to approach him from the east or north, while to the 
west and south-west he was open to attack from the Abys- 
iB, who, however, were further away than our forces. 


The two actions at Gumburu and Daratoleb, however, cleared 
the situation, and showed that the MuiUh had reached the 
limit of his strategic retirement, and was compelled to stand 
at Walwal and Wardair and to fight in that neighbourhood, 

The unfortunate action at Gumburu prevented for the time 
a further advance from Qaladi, and the immense strain tlirown 
on the slender transport service, due to the long lines of com- 
munication, made it shortly afterwards apparent that the limit 
of the British advance from the east had been reached. It 
was necessary to set free as much transport as possible to 
close up the Obbia-Mudug lines of communication before the 
burst of the south-west monsoon. The Abyssinians were 
urged to press the Mullah from the south-west and west and 
were making their way towards him. If they could reach hJm 
before the break of the rains he must give them battle with 
his avenue of retreat closed in eVery direction. 

The Abyssinians, however, were unable to come up in time ; 
the rains broke and filled the waterholes, thus giving the Mullah 
his one loophole of escape to the north, which he promptly 
seized and eJrtricated himself from a difficult position. 

Strategically, the operations of the third expedition were 
successful. The Mullah was driven north into British territory, 
where, in January, 1904, he was brought to battle and severely 
defeated. The maintenance of our hold of the line from the 
Mudug to Galadi, from Bohotle vid Damot to Badwein to 
the very last moment achieved the intended result, except 
that the Mullah was allowed to take refuge without inter- 
ference in the Nogal. This may have been unavoidable, but 
it is open to question whether the significance of the retreat 
of the enemy across the Berbera-Bohotle lines of communica- 
tion was adequately appreciated and taken advantage of by 
the commander at Bohotle. 

As regards the Abyssinians, they carried out their part 
of the operations in so far that they blocked the way to the 
Webi Shebeii. Their inability to co-operate at the final stage 
when the Mullah was inunqhile at Walwal and Wardair by 


actually attacking him is explained by the distance which 
divided them from those places. It is clear, however, that the 
pressure of their second advance compelled the Mullah to 
extricate himself by the daring expedient of breaking through 
our lines of communication ; whilst the advent of the rains 
permitted him to move independently of welb. 

To come to the fourth expedition, by the end of July, 
jn03, tlie situation was as follows : — The Mullah was believed 
to be in the eastern Nogal, and it was reported that he and 
liis followers were greatly dispirited by the losses sustained at 
(luraburu and Daratoleh, while his camels and floclcs and 
herds were in a state of exhaustion, so much so that it waa 
beheved in England and urged upon the commander of the 
British forces that a sudden dash with mounted troops only 
would terminate the campaign. 

Even had the Mullah's plight been as bad as was reported, 
the commander was in no position to make a sudden dash in 
any direction, having neither the troops nor the transport 
nor the supplies necessary for the conduct of such an operation. 

Strategically the Mullah had all the advantages. Separated 
from our nearest outpost by about 150 miles of country lie 
could calmly await the advance of our troops and either fight 
or decline to fight as seemed best ; for there was no con- 
taining force to keep him where he was, while the whole of 
Somaliland to the south from the Nogal to the Equator was 
open to him. 

Our force, on the other hand, was in the worst strategic 
position possible. Our front was to a flank, with our base of 
supply at the extremity furthest from our line of advance. 
There was then no advanced base of operations from which 
even a small force could operate, while for convenience of 
supply all troops that could possibly be spared had been 
brought down the line towards the advanced base, leaving om- 
outposts completely en fair, and tmtil the transport waa 
increased and equipped there was no hope of an advanced 
base being established. The situation was not a hopeful one. 

^-^ *'!^ 


^^^Bteantime reinlorcementfi, Euppliea, remomito, &c., &c., 
^^Hned in the country, and also a welcome addition in tho 
^lotm of tho Indian Camel Transport, which eventually became 
' the backbone of the transport service. The whole force was 
reorganised into brigades, staffed on the Indian system, and 
as soon as the supply and Transport Department declared 
themselves ready to begin Kirrit was selected as an advanced 
base and the work of afbcking it began. Tliis advanced base 
was subsequently moved to Eil Dab, which was found to be not 
only a better source of water supply but better situated 
in every way for a base of operations in the Nogal which 
it was evident must form the theatre of war if by any possi- 
bility the Muliah could be forced to give battle. 

The problem that daily confronted the General was, " How 
is the Midlah to be prevented from going south in which case 
it would be impossible for our troops to follow him ? " 

One obvious suggestion was the landing of a containing 
force at ObbJa, but this did not suit the poUtical situation, 
and the General was notified that whatever was to be done 
must be carried out by the troops on the spot ; and it was also 
added that such operations must be confined to British territory. 
It was pointed out that the Mullah's position even then 
was on the borders of British territory and so long os be 
remained there it was impossible to strike a blow at him imder 
these conditions. 

After considerable parley with the Italian Government 
it was conceded that such places as it was found necessary to 
occupy in the Eastern Nogal or to the south of the Protec- 
torate within the Italian sphere of influence might be occupied 
for the temporary purposes of the operations. With this 
concession the General had to be content. 

In August, 1903, negotiations were entered into with the 
Abyssinian Government for a force to co-operate with ours 
by occupying the southern line of wells, which stretch, roughly 
speaking, along the seventh parallel of latitude from the 
Abyssiniiin border to the Mudugs at Walwal, Galadi. and 



Galkayu, the possession of one or more of which would be 
absolutely necessary to the Mullah should he elect to move 
south. The denial of these wells to him, combined with the 
hostile attitude of the Sultan of Obbia, whom we had subeidiBed 
and supplied with a certain amount of arma and ammunition, 
would no doubt have decided the MuUah not to attempt 
such a risky move and to trust rather to hia preaent distant and 
inacceasible position to deter our foftea, of the number of 
which he seemed ignorant, from moving against him, or should 
they have the temerity to do so they would assuredly be 
crushed, as they had been before. 

There waa thia advantage in the situation, that it would 
give the Abysainians more time to get round, but there was 
also this disadvantage, that a good autumn fall of rain in the 
southern Hand before these wells were occupied in our interests 
would almost certainly induce the Mullah to move to tho 
south. It was evident therefore that aorae means must be 
devised to induce the Mullah to believe that the southern line 
of wells were being held against him. 

To thia end every endeavour was made to give publicity 
to the fact of the Abyaainiana being on the move (though as 
a matter of fact they did not move till considerably later), 
while, with the conaent of the Home and Italian Governments, 
a naval demonatcation was made at Obbia by all the available 
warships on the station, when a great show of landing men and 
atorea (the latter being bags of rice and dates for the Sultan 
of Obbia) waa gone through, with a view to impressing the 
Mullah's spies with the idea that a force had actually landed. 

At the same time a further subsidy and supply of arms 
was promised to the Sultan on condition of his occupying 
the Galkayu wells. 

No doubt all these reports, probably in a much exaggerated 
form, eventually reached the Mullah, and in conjunction 
with what followed made him believe the southern line of wella 
to be effectually barred to him. 

As time went on, the reports received from our r^resenta- 

I tiv« 1 

live with the Abyssinians made it quite clear that there was 
no hope of their being able to reach even the western-most 
wells (at Walwa! and Wardair) before the end of the year. 

The General therefore decided to occupy Galadi with our 
own troopB, and to this oiid a scheme was worked out in 
secret under which General Manning's brigade shoold concen- 
trate at Bohotle by the beginning of November, march across 
the Haud to Galadi (112 miles), and having estabUshed a 
strong post there, consisting of infantry, mounted troops 
and maxims, should retrace his steps to Bohotle. 

All this was successfully carried out with the result that the 
Mullah was completely deceived and so deprived, at least in 
his opinion, of the strategical advantages he at one time 

Another factor now appeared upon the scene which, for 
the time being, aSected the strategical situation considerably 
in our favour. This was a quarrel between the Mullah and 
the powerful Mijjarten Chief, Osman Mahmud, who under- 
took, on certain conditions, to keep the Mullah out of Mijjarten 
territory. If, therefore, we could succeed in driving him up 
north there was every likelihood of his ultimately falling into 
our lianda. 

On his rettirn journey from Galadi, Manning had fallen in 
with a strong raiding party of the Mullah's, which he attacked 
and dispersed, killing several of them and capturing all the 
booty which they had carried of! from the Ogaden country. 
Many of the enemy fled to Galadi where several more were killed 
though others escaped, and it is probable that it was from these 
men that the Muilah obtained his first authentic news of our 
occupation of Galadi. 

Owing to the bull; of our troops being still kept as fwr back 
as possible on the lines of communication for convenience of 
supply, the Mullah seems to have had little knowledge of the 
real strength of the forces arrayed against him.. Believing 
Manning's force to be at Bohotle, and Galadi to be our main 
army, he conceived the idea of cuttinc our lines of communioa- 


a attack in the direction of Eil Dab. and to this end 
began to concentrate Jiis fighting men in the neighbourhood 
of Jidbali. 

General Egerton's next care was to anticipate the Mullah at 
the southern passes of the Nogal and press him northwards. It 
was hoped that with the waterless Northern Hand behind him, 
the possible hostility of the Mijjarten tribe, and the certainty 
that large portions of his stock were still in the southern Nogal 
he would try and make one more desperate effort to defeat us ; 
but, whatever the Mullah's own intentions may have been, his 
panic-stricken followers had no taste for further fighting, and, 
by the time the columns had joined hands on the line Gaolo- 
Halin, the Muliah had already commenced his disastrous 
flight across the Northern Hand 

The strategical situation was now as follows : The Mullah 
had been forced from the line of the Nogal, now held hj 
Manning's brigade, which watched the whole country between 
Hudin and KalMs. The Mullah's following was occupying 
the various wells and ballis* along the edge of the Northern 
Haud, chiefly in the Warsangli country and west of th« 
Mijjarten country, which the Mullah avoided until he should 
succeed, as he hoped to do, in making terms with Sultan 
Osman Mahmud. 

A force under General Fasken was being concentrated at 
Las Bureh to operate directly against the Mullah, while s 
small movable column was moving from Eil Dab on El 
Afweina to watch the western edge of the Northern Haud. 

It seemeilj therefore, that if Osman Mahmud adhered 
to his engagements to prevent the Mullah entering Mijjarteii 
territory, that is to say, crossing the Italian border line, that 
he must of necessity faU into otir hands, as ivith Manning holding 
the Nogal he would hardly venture to attempt a second flight 
across the Northern Haud. It appeared, therefore, that he 
niust either fight or surrender, unless rain fell, which would! 

* DcpresBions t^ontaLQing nat.'r. 


P Enable him to cross the Notthern Hand diagonally in a eouth- 
caet directiou to lllig, where he had established a strong 

I fortified post. 

I In the meantime, on the 27th February, a telegram was 

despatched requesting permission to operate in Italian terri- 

i tory. The answer to this was not received until the 7th April, 

when permission was accorded by the Italian Government, 
but too late to be effectively utilised. 

Directly the rains set in the opportunity of capturing the 
Mullah was lost ; but, though he personally was not captured, 
the effectual blow dealt him at Jidbali, the capture of the greater 

I ])art of bis stock, the wholesale desertions of his adherents, the 

destruction of Ulig, and the relentless manner in which he was 

' followed up so long as ho remained in the British Protectorate, 

reduced his power for a long time to come. Whether it was 
broken finally and for all time depended on the future pohcy 
of the Protectorate Administration. To actually capture 
a man whose range of movements extends from Cape Gardafui 
to the Equator and from the sea to the Abyssinian border, 
waa almost a bopeleaa task, and could only be attained by an 
extraordinary piece of good fortune ; but the Haroun, which 
was his emblem of power and seat of government, offered 
a fairly large though movable objective. Though the Mullah 
himself might escape, the capture of the Haroun meant the 
destruction of his prestige, and, in all probability, his own 
final surrender. It was this objective which was so narrowly 
missed owing to the want of the Mijjarten " stop " at the end 
of March. 

As a matter of history, it is evident that the Mijjarten 
Sultan not only did nothing to oppose the Mollah, but, on 
the contrary, aided him in effecting his escape. How far the 
attitude assumed by the Sultan was influenced by local political 
considerations, it is difficult to say, but, from information 
gathered at the time, it appears that the Mullah only decided 
upon entering the Mijjarten country after being assured that 
he would not be molested. 


About the month of August, 1903, the Mullah had seized 
Illig, then a small fishing village situated at the mouth of the 
Nogal River, and, aa reported by an ItaUan warship, had 
commenced to construct a formidable fortified camp there, 
only partially visible from the sea, the main defence being 
directed inland. 

It was known that when the Mullah advanced into the Nogal 
he had left a considerable garrison in lUig and there could be 
Httle doubt that should he succeed in getting away to the south 
from General Fasken's force, Ilhg would be his first objective. 
It was, therefore, deemed necessary to destroy it. 

Had further operations against the Mullah been under- 
taken and IlUg left undestroyed, it might have played an 
important part, aSording the Mullah a sea base by which be 
could import arms and ammunition, for the supply of which 
he had hitherto been dependent on Osman Mahmud. 


During the past twelve or fifteen years a very large illicit 
importation of fire-anna took place into almost every part of 
Somaliland, the absence of administrative control over the 
interior of their protectorates by the Powers concerned 
rendering it practically impossible to enforce the Arms Regu- 
lations. The arms imported were principally rifles of the 
Gras, Lebel and Martini-Henry patterns, and all tribes possessed 
rifles in greater or less numbers, and made use of them in 
inter-tribal warfare where formerly they only employed native 

The native weapons are three ; the sword (bilawa), the 
shield (gashan) and spears (waran). 

The sword has a double-edged pointed blade of soft iron, 
2 feet long and 2 inches in maximum breadth, made for hacking, 
with a small horn hilt ornamented with zinc or pewter and a 
_white leather scabbard attached to the waist by a long white 



The shield — of rhinoceroa, bullock or preferably oryx hide 
cut from the skin over the antelope's withers — la a round 
disc, 15 to 16 inches in diameter, with a boss in the centre and 
handle at back. It Is proof against spears and arrows only. 

The spears are of a dozen different shapes, of which, how- 
ever, two are most commonly used. 

One is a small spear, plain, or barbed like ft fish-hook, and 
used for throwing at a distance of 25 to 30 yards on foot, and 
at a dozen more on horseback. 

The other, a ponderous, laurel-leaf shaped spear is used 
for close quarters, especially against horses. The Ishak 
tribes, who are mounted, generally carry one of each of these 
two kinds of spears ; but the Isa, who fight only on foot, 
use the long stabbing spear alone. The Mljjarten also use 
a club (weger), 18 inches long. 

The Midgans carry, instead of shield and spears, a bow 
and a quiver of wood bound with geranook hide ; a knife 
in sheath, a stone for sharpening arrow barbs, and a pointed 
tool for mending sandals are attached to the quiver, which 
contains poisoned arrows, iron shod or hardened at the point. 
The poison, resembling pitch or black glue, is extracted from 
the roote of the wnba. Sometimes, eg., in the Mijjarten country, 
the Midgans also carry shngs. 

Light skirmishing raids and surprises are the charac- Somali 
teristics of Somah tribal warfare. The Isa, who have no horses "^ "'*' 
and fight on foot, are distinguished from the other tribes by 
their fondness for night attacks and ambuscades, and by the 
determination which they show in pushing their attacks. 

Baids are generally effected at dawn or in the afternoon, 
when the adult males of the raided tribe are themselves away 
raiding or are asleep and have thus left the care of the herds 
to boys and women. Some days before the raid, scouts are 
sent forward to watch for a favourable opportunity, and when 
that presents itself, the raiders move in bodies of 20 to IWO men, 
often by night, and over distances of 70 miles or more to the 
grazing ground. Nothing is carried by the riders on tlicir 

(8927) X 

ponies, whicli are invariably uaed on raids, beyond a small 
water bottle and some sun-dried meat. The return march 
is made in scattered parties as rapidly as the raided camels, 
sheep, kc, can travel, and is protected by a strong rear 

When a collision does take place the order of battle is 
generally as follows : — The spearmen form the first line in 
single rank at one pace interval ; on the flanks are the horse- 
men who are, as a rule, tribal elders, and the slingera and 
riflemen, if any ; in the second line follow the Midgan archers 
or additional spearmen. Aa the hostile forces approach one 
another, the horsemen, slingers and riflemen first come into 
action ; then the smaD spears are thrown backwards and 
forwards until the combatants are within a few yards, when 
a rush is made, and the long spear, and then the sword (and 
club) are used. In attacking a zaribaed convoy an effort is 
frequently made to stampede the animals or to utihse them as 
cover for pressing the attack home, more particularly at night. 

But, as has already been noted, night attacks are not 
favoured by the Ishak and Darud SomaUs, except in small 
raiding parties, mutual distrust probably preventing sub- 
tribes combining for night attacks on a large scale, 

Against our troops the chief characteristics of Somali 
fighting were usually light skirmishing, wide fronts and a 
dissolution into small bodies when pursued ; but the actions 
of Samala, Erigo, Gumburu, Daratoleh and Jidbah afiord 
instances of determined charges in the face of rifle fire at close 
and medium ranges. 

The Somah has many quaUties which fit him to be a soldier. 
He possesses considerable personal bravery and dash. As a 
scout he is full of resource and unsurpassed in his own country ; 
his marching powers are above the ordinary. He is able to 
subsist for comparatively long periods on short rations of food 
and water, cheerfulness under such privations on active 
service being one of his best characteristics. He is a fair 
horseman, and soon makes a good shot ; he is quick to leam 


and rapidly picks up elementary drill. He has few vices, 
and serious crimes are rare ; he is, on the whole, easy to 
manage, though, as is the case with all natives, much depends 
on personal inHuence and handling. Though naturally im- 
patieut of restraint, he can leam to recognise the necessity of 
military discipline and to appreciate its value. 

On the other hand, he has several serious defects. He 
is vain and sensitive and does not willingly adopt methods 
which are foreign to him. He is by nature lazy, is unaccus- 
tomed to prolonged hard work, and finds difficulty in making 
a sustained effort. He suffers froui a highly nervous tem- 
perament, which resultfl, at times, in such excitement as to 
make the control of considerable bodies almost impossible. 

During the operations against the Mullah, a succession of 
levies and irregular corps were raised from time to time and 
disbanded again after comparatively short periods of service, 
mi»t of which was spent in the field. Their training was of 
the moat rudimentary description, and the conditions under 
which they were enlisted did not admit of their being subjected 
to any but the loosest description of military discipline. 

Nevertheless, at the actions of Erigo, Daratoleh and Jidbali 
they behaved with credit, though at the first and last-named 
actions their fault of excitability was also conspicuous. If 
they have failed on occasions to display steadiness and 
staunchness in the face of the enemy, it is rather because they 
failed to grasp the idea of co-ordinate and combined action 
than from any lack of personal courage. 

It must be remembered that Somalis amongst themselves 
have practically no organization or inter-dependence. Com- 
bined action is unknown and every man acts independently 
as he thinks fit. It is for this reason that when combined — 
to them artificially — into units, imder British or native officers, 
they find a difficulty in learning that confidence in their 
leader or in co-ordinate action, which is essential to success 
in the field, 

During the period which has elapsed since the close of the 
(8927^ X 2 

r laEornii 

and flghliiig 


operations against the Mullah, an efiort has been made to 
train and discipline a Somali Battalion on regular lines ; and 
the degree of success which lias been attained afiords good 
hope tliat under strict discipline, applied gradually and with 
tact, and with progressive and systematic military training, 
the Somali may become as reliable a soldier as any other 
African native. 

British Tactics. 

Spies and scouts were easily found, for the Somali is 
■ avaricious and enterprising. The native system of spies 
and scouts was admirable. 

Camps were always surrounded by zaribas, especially 
when there was a quantity of transport animals, the capture 
of which was made the main object of a night attack. Ab a 
rule, material for zaribaa was plentiful, cither mimosa or 
other bush, or, in the open country, stones. Zaribas were 
generally surrounded by barbed wire, and were built about 
4 feet high and as wide as possible. Even in the dense bush a 
clear field of fire of at least 200 yards could generally be 
obtained in the open belts and patches which occur at intervals. 

For security at night, sentries were usually posted about 
ten or fifteen yards outside a zariba, and not along its peri- 
meter where, owing to the noise in camp, they were unable 
to hear distinctly. When Illalos were available, they were 
employed as advanced or outlying sentries, being posted 
some distance from a zariba with instructions to give early 
warning of any hostile advance. 

The usual march and fighting formations were that of an 
elastic square with the transport in the centre ; the mounted 
troops, preceded by spies and scouts, being pushed ahead, as 
much as half a day's march and more, and kept well out to 
the flanks and rear. The transport men being usually armed 
with spears, afforded a certain amount o£ protection to the 
transport animals, but, when action was imminent, the bulk 
of the transport was usually zaribaed and left in rear under 


a small guard, the fighting column moving forward accom- 
panied on]y by such animals as were necessary to carry reserve 
ammuniti(> 1, maxim gims and other essential loads. 

Br'g.-General Manning gives the following information 
regarding the formations usually adopted in the third 
expedition : — 

In marching through thick bii.»h, where attack was probable or even 
when there was no immediate probability of attack, the formation was as 
follows : — The infantry formed a front and rear face of a square, the mounted 
troops forming the defence of the flanks. The companies of the front 
face of the squrje moved off in lines of sections, or half companies or com- 
panies in file. 

Eight to ten Somalis mounted on riding camels were aligned in the bush 
to mark the front face of the square, each Somali carrying a flag fixed 
to a pole, which could be seen from time to time above the bush. I rode 
immediately behind the centre Somali, who carried my flag ; this Somali 
rode on the path whence the dressing of the Somalis on each side of the 
centre Somali was constantly corrected. By watching these flags, which 
the men from time to time could see, the front face of the square managed 
to keep a very fair line, even in the densest bush. The maxims accompanied 
their units. 

The direction of the advance was thus kept, although the men were making 
their wiy through pathless bush. The moimted Somali camel men learnt 
after a lime to keep their intervals very fairly, and to align themselves on 
the centre Somali, who was travelling on the one bush path. 

The rear face of the square moved off in the same formation, but without 
any flagmen, as the advance guard (front face) had marked the road in 
passing along. It is to be noted that the troops thus employed were African 
troops who were at home in the bush. 

The camels of the transport moved in as many lines as possible in rear 
of, and covered by, the front face, water tins being m front. No attempt 
was made to use infantry on the flanks of the square while marching, the 
flanks being covered by mounted troops well out on each flank. 

In case of alarm the square closed up, and infantry, previously detailed 
from the front and rear faces, formed a portion of the side faces of the 
square together with the moimted troops. 

Crossing the very dense bush of the Haud in this formation as much as 
25 miles per diem was accomplished, and it was often the case that until 
the midday or evening halt the troops forming the front face were hardly 
ever visible to me except those marching behind the centre flagman. 

Before the infantry loft the zariba in the morning the Somali mounted 
infantry, who formed the advance scout?, moved out from the rear face 
of the square and proceeded first well to the rear ; then, after dividing into 
two bodies, they returned round both flanks and rejoined in front of the 

squrtre aud saouted out some miles ahead. Tho Burroitndmg biul) wa? 
thua CBrotully recornioitied, and when reportfld oleac the Bquare advanced. 

Native spiPB or aconts were pushed out daily 20 lo 30 miles aheid of the 
force, and to the same distance from a threatened Bank. 

The Hqimre formation was, of course, very loose, hut since ample nolife 
of any hostile force could be given the square could close np before an attack 
could be delivered. 

At night each face made ita own anriba and was tcsponsible for the 
defejico of its own face. A start wm never made hetCFre daylight, and the 
square was aluaya halted a full hour before dark. 

The fiame system was carried out by me when marching in open country, 
na the length and Tulncr-ability of the tranHport column waa thereby mnch 
reduced, Mid troopa and transport drivers got to know their places whether 
in bui>h or in open country. 

The subjoined notes and sketches furnished by an officer 
who commanded a column illustrate further some of the 
formations adopted. 

The ground was dend flat but covered with thorn bush some 15 to SO feet 
high, with high grnss (about 3( feet high) between the thorn trees. 


Thick'^ Bush 

As in most fights of this kind, our troopa suffered most from the enemy's 
fire going over the bends of one face of the square and hitting the men of 
the opposite face in the back, so mnch so that ooniplainta were received 
" that out own people were shooting from the centre of the squuie,"' which 
as, naturoily, apt lo npaet the al«adinesa of the men. 

The order of march and the manner in which we formod Miaaro w 


Ordtr of March. 

a of the 

a to the 

A rfpttsrnbFkmKi&Rtdiaff Camels 
Xnee'hi^llcrad inside Square 

In the event of it being necewary to form square — 

Tht Bikanirs were to halt and close up their camels, the n 

Bikanirs forming up at right angles to the path. 
The 2nd K.A.B. (Yaoa) were to form the left face. 
The Somali Camd Corps were to oloae up their animalB tight o 

Bikanir camela and the men to form the right face. 
The 12 Sikhi were to fcUo close up and to form a reserve. 
The Somali MoaiUfd Inlantry were to form the rear face, the advanced 
guard makiiig their own way round to the rear, as soon as the 
Bikanira bad formed the front face. The object of doing thia was to 
ensure that there was no unnecessary confusion in the front face, 
which was almost certain to be attacked first. 
If I had to command a column of thia kind again and had mounted 
troopa, I would always make the original advanced guard form the rear face 
in case of attack. 

The advanced guard clearing the front as they fall back the enemy would, 
in nine cases out of ten, I think, receive an unpleesiint surprise when they 
ran their noses on to the proper front face, which should he by that time 
quite ready to receive them. 

If one had only infantry, then the above would not probably apply, as 
the advanced guard would not be able to clear away quick enough. 

When moving with a column of, say, 600 infantry (five companies) 
100 aoimted troops and 500 baggage camels, onr ordinary order of march 
would be as follows : — 

The transiiort bIiouIiI move od as broad q front as tin? nilure of the 
ooiintry will admit of; the mounted advanced gimrd being well to the front, 
probably 3 to 8 milee according to the country and the information. The 
aide faoes, in a case of this kind, would oitend alongaide the transport, but 
sections always koEping intact. 

The great difficulty in Somalilnnd was tbo want of water and the long 
distances between wella, in m^iny caaea at least 50 miles and sometimeii 
100 miles without water. This meant that a, column muHt coTer at least 
16 to 20 miles a day, otherwise you could not csiry sufficient water for the 
trip. Now to march SO miles a day one cannct afford to be always halting 
and closing up, for if you did this then you move so slowly that your march 
would probably bts only S miles instead of 20. Consequently, a oolunm as 
above would probably stretch 2 to 3 miles in bush country. The only way, 
in my opiuian, to obviate the danger of such a straggling maas of transport, 
is to scout boldly at hast 3 to 4 miles ahead. 

A column actually attacked while on the march would have s, very poor 
chance, as the transport camels would almost certainly stampede and your 
water tins would bo carried off in all direclioas. The oidy thing to do would 
be to fight it out and let your transport go, trusting to coUectiog it again 
after you had defeated the attack ; but the rifk of such a fight would be 

Assuming, however, that your scouts are well out and you hnve ample 
warning, then you can keep the enemy book with your mounted troops and 
allow time for your transport to close up. 

As a matter of fact the Somalis invariably fought close to water, so that 
if you knew the wells were held by the enemy, then yon could safely depend 
on their waiting until you got within 1 to 3 miles of the wells before they 
attacked you. 

This peculiarity of the Somalis was probably caused by f3ieir anxiety 
to be able to get bock to water themselves, and also by a desire on their 
port to make us Eght ivitb a long waterless stretch of country behind us. 

My own Intention, if 1 had ever been put in such a situation, was to 
advanm with the baggage animals to within, say, 10 to 12 miles of the 


w^IIk, zaribi) up the transport strongly and IwtTe il guard ovor Iho coavoy 
and with tho remainder of tho force, consisting only of fighting men, reBerve 
nmmunition and hospital, to go out and capture the wati^r. After the fight 
to return with some of the troops and bring the baggage into the wells. 

There isone other point about lighting in bushoountry against a^iwemy 
BUch as the Somalia, who are armed with modem rifles and, at the same 
time, are formidable spearmen. 

There ore always clearings in a busb aountry. In Somoliland one oft«n 
oame across clearings varying from 90 yards across to l.OiX) yards in diameter. 
It is, I think, a very dangerous thing to fnrm tip one's forre in the middle of 
sach a olearing. and there is no doubt that many of us were inclined to do so. 
Say the olearing was 1,000 yards across, it lookiid big aud one felt safe (rom 
a rush when aae was in the GeQtri> ; but tho danger of such action was really 
very great. For. if one formed up in the middle, the troops presented an 
excellent mark for the pneiny who would all be out of sight in the edge of 
the bush, concentrating their fire on us in the open. Our fire, on tho other 
hand, would be diverging, and the probability is that we would inflict very 
trifling loss ou the enemy. In a case of this kind, it would be better to 
taki up the following position, in which at any rate one fai-e would be 
safe, while with tho other three you would be as Well off as the enemy: — 

a. «*•..,(» 








As considerable use was made of troops mounted on camels, Cumclrj, 
the following observations of Brig.-General Manning on the 
employment of camelry in Somaliland are instructive : — 

After conaidorablc eipericnce of the valuo of camelry, I am of th? opinion 
that except such a corps is accompanied by a proportion of mounted 
infantry it cannot take cote of itself, and. therefore, thongh the theory is 
advanced that a camel corps is a force which should be able to move in- 
dependently and to defend itself, the practice is to use moonted infantry as 
iconts with a camel corps in order to prevent a few determined horsemoa from 
harassingafotcemauntedoncameU, and then tiding off when they please. 


The gencrnl idea is that the man on the camel dismounts before firing, 
and in order lo dismouDt the camel mnHt Urst bs made to knecL Thia 
takes some lime, especially ae camela are likely to become restive with the 
noiao of liriug nod are apt to get up. When the man wishes to mount 
again he umtntlj hni to get the camel to kneel again. Thia also takes time. 
(Though it ia uaunl to tic the camalfl down by the knee, it is not very efflca- 
cioua), Mon can, be trained, howerer, to dismount and mount with tlie 
uamel standing, but the process of mounting in difficult. 

Tho valiio of camelry ia considerable in that they are ablo to move 
long diatanpus carrying their own food tor several diys, their camel's food, 
their reeorve ammunition and also a ooiisiderablo supply of water tor the 

Camplry can be utilised as a support to mounted troops to cany reserve 
ammunition aod grain rations for horses, but when mounted troopa aro 
used a.1 a reconnoitring party camelry would hamper their action in cise of 
rapid retirement. It ia only, therefore, in euch cases a^ a pursuit, or for the 
rapid occupation of a particular position to be held for a few days, that 
camelry can be said to be a HHeEul acce9.sory to mount^id troopa in n 
country iiuch aa Som.ililand, where the enemj-'s horaemen were un occasion 
very daring. 

The following Operation Standing Orders issued by Sit 
Charles Egerton governed the general tactical and adminis- 
trative arrangements of the field troops during the fourth 
expedition : — 


1. In the vioinity of the enemy, al! ranks will stand to arms half an hour 
before dawn, and special defensive precautions will be taken during the 
occupation and evacuation of a campmg ground. 

2. During an action, or when an action is known to be imminent, all 
non-combatants and baggage will be packed, camels made to kneel and be 
knee -haltered. 

3. Single orderlies are not to be sent on messages beyond the vicinity of 
camps [or posts on the lines of communication). 


4. Arms will never be piled ; at nigbt men will sleep with their arms 
and in the immediate vicinity of the enemy maga^inea will tie charged, 
cut-offa closed aod no round in the barrel. 

B. The bayonet only may bo used agaonst an enemy who raay.haTe 
penetrated a camp lit night. 



How carried. 

Infantry and 







Rifle. Pistol. 



Rifle. • Pistol 


Tn regimental charge — 
On the soldier 

On mules . . 

On Somali camels — 
In Ordnance or poet 
charge . . 

120 24 

80 — 
200 26 

200 ' 60 






60 24 

160 26 

180 60 

L Moot 



600 ! 100 


600 , 100 





' In belts. 

t In boxei 



7. All encampments will be zaribaed, alarm posts told off, and officers, 
soldiers and followers made acquainted with their duties in case of attack 
by day or night. 

8. Officers commanding units are responsible for the defence of the 
perimeter of their unit, for local camp reserves, and also for connecting 
defence arrangements of their camjis with neighbouring imits on both flanks. 

9. Night latrines will be arranged for, and no one (Somalis included) 
permitted to leave camp for purposes of nature before broad daylight. 

10. When a force is halted or encamped, the ground to the front or rear 
is not to bo used for latrine purposes. 


11. The water supply at an encampment will be guarded by the officer 
commanding the advanced guard, until relieved under the orders of the officer 
commanding the camp. No animals will bo watered until all troops and 

ollowers have been provided for. 

12. Water storage. — ^A Royal Engineer officer, or, in his absence, the post 
or camp commandant, will be in charge of the main water storage tanks, 
pumps, hose and syphoning arrangements. He will regulate the supply of 
water to the expense tanks according to the quantity available. The 
Provost Establishment will furnish the officer in charge with a statement 
giving the water rations required to be delivered into the expense tanks 
and will be responsible for discipline at the watering places, and for the issue 
of water from the expense tanks and from water tins on the line of march. 

13. Strict discipline will be maintained at all water supplies, and special 
precautions will be taken to guard against any form of pollution. 


14. Officers in obarge of water iBBaes will supply themBelves with boot 
blackmg (obtainable fiom the Ordnance Departmont} and will mark with it 
all tins wbiob oa\j contain wat«r Gt for Somalia and animals. 

15. A speoial transport officer will be detailed by the officer commandbg 
a. oolomQ for charge of water transport. He will be responsible for the 
quantity of watec issued and remaining in each tin. 

On the march a, bugle will be sounded for the daily issue of water at the 
mid-day halt. 

IB. To facilitate the duties of the suporrising staff, empty tins on the 
ground will be stood upright and not on their sidea. 

17. In order to avoid the loss of water tin hds, those concerned will be 
held responsible that the lid is properly screwed on again after a tin is 

IS. Reservoirs oonBtructed with sail cloths will he lined with brushwood 
to protect the cloth from stones. 

19. Officers commanding units will obtain from the Ordnance Depart- 
ment water tin keys in the proportion of two large and one small per 100 men 
and they will see that improper means are not used for opening tins. 

20. Foul air may be exhausted from a well by raising and lowering aevera 
timea a bush weighted with stones, which acts as a piston. 

M arches . 

21. The normal order of march on a plam will be : — 
Non-comhatantB and animals on as brood a front as possible, covered 

in front, rear and on the flanks by combatants. 

22. On the line of march, followers of each unit will be assigned their 
places with the first or second line of transport, and will not be allowed to 
leave them. 

21). The hours of marching will, as far as military necessities permit, 
he regulated by the requiremenlfl of camel transport. 

34. Some water tins and carriage for sick must always accompany real 


£,'>. At all posts and with all forcou and detachnients where there is no 
regular intelligence officer, the officer in immediate command will appoint 
an officer for intelligence duties, in addition to hie own, and report bis 
name to the Assistant Quartermaater-General (nr Intelligence. 

2(j. When a force traverses a route the Intelligence officer will iavariabiy 
either execute a route report and sketch or check exiatlng rontc reporW. 
The offioer in immediate command will forward the work to the Assistant- 
Quartermaster- Genera I for Intelligence as soon as completed, reporting 
important details by telegraph if necessary. 

27. For meat ratl(>ns m^O animals will be allotted to Indian troops a 


28. All troops and followers will carry on the person* besides filled water 
botUe, one day's ration for themselves. Animals will carry one day's 
grain. In addition, camels will carry four and Army Transport mules 
two days' grain. All issues to be made the day previous to marching. 

29. Transport of Fighting Units, 

1. Machine guns ., 

2. „ ammuni- 

3. Small arms am- 


4. Pioneer equip- 


5. Signalling equip- 


6. Medical equip- 


7. Water 

8. Entrenching tools 

9. Great coats 

10. Cooking pots 

11. Rations . . 

12. Baggage . . 

First line Transport, i Second line Transport. 

On mules or Arab camels 
10,400 rounds per gun 

on mules or Arab 

80 rounds per rifle on 

On mules 

On mules. 

Panniers, 1 mule ; water 
for surgical purposes, 
1 mule 

For consumption on the 
march on camels 

2,200 rounds per gun 
on camels. 

200 rounds per rifle on 

On camels. 

On camels. 





30. Unless special orders are issued by the officer commanding a column, 
the second line transport will be marshalled by units, in the order of march 
of the column, headed by staff baggage and followed by the supply column. 
1'he whole in charge of the senior transport officer present. 

31., Not more than three camels or mules may be on one string, except 
for special reasons approved by the officer in charge. 

32. Spare transport animals are not to be used for any other purpose 
than to relieve distressed or broken down animals. 







'' -'"'■ 





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